Yeats, Bloom and the dialectics of theory, criticism and poetry by Skelley, Steven J.
Skelley, Steven J. (1992) Yeats, Bloom and the 
dialectics of theory, criticism and poetry. PhD thesis, 
University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/13628/1/315119.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
Yeats, Bloom, and the Dialectics of
Theory, Criticism, and Poetry
by Steven J. Skelley, MA
~:~.:.; ..
"<f./ -,
'\
.>
t.(r{"ri'"'1 I ... <.. II-
-. '
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, October 1992
Acknowledgments
To my supervisors, Dr. Bernard McGuirk (Hispanic Studies and
Critical Theory) and Dr. David Murray (American Studies and Head
of Postgraduate School of Critical Theory), lowe a great debt
of gratitude for their enthusiasm for this proj ect. Their
intellectual and practical support was priceless, and their
cooperation with each other and with me never failed as a model
of supervisorial expertise. All PhD candidates ought to be
blessed with such supervision.
I also wish to thank Dr. Douglas Tallack (American Studies
and former Head of the School of Cri tical Theory) for his
encouragement both intellectual and administrative towards the
successful completion of this project.
To the PhD students and to the supervisorial staff who
attended work-in-progress seminars in the School of Critical
Theory, and who offered so many helpful comments, suggestions,
and opinions, I also give thanks.
The staff of the Hallward Library must not go unmentioned,
for their fine and courteous assistance throughout these four
years.
Dedication
This dissertation is dedicated to my epipsyche and muse,
Hala Darwish, whose inspirational presence in my heart was, it
may be said, the magic within these evasions, these wanderings .
. . . Until one day I met a star that burned
Bright in the heart of my heavenly breast,
And then I knew why I was who I was,
And why my soul would be forever lost
In the folds of her voice raging in my veins
SJS, August 1992
ABSTRACT
This thesis begins by showing how a strong and subtle
challenge to poetry and theories of poetry has been recently
argued by writers like Paul de Man and J. Hillis Miller--critics
whose ironic linguistic "disfigurations" of lyrical voice have
thrown poem and poet into an anti-mimetic free fall, an abyss of
bewilderment or undecidability. To its credit, de Manian
deconstruction strongly misreads various mimetic approaches to
William Butler Yeats, as its corrosive irony empties out theories
of imitation. Chapter two explains how New Criticism, biograph-
ical, psychoanalytic, and philosophical criticism, all treat
Yeats's poetry as a reflection or imitation of some prior being,
text, or doctrine; and chapter three how, most recently and
energetically, various new historicisms treat his poems as
ideological artifacts determined by the world or history, but as
artifacts that must seek to change the world in order to have
value.
Harold Bloom's theory meets such challenges. It enacts
deconstruction's misreading of poem and poet without reducing
them to a linguistic abyss; and it re-envisions mimetic
approaches by reading poems in terms of genealogical influence,
without moralizing. Chapter four investigates Bloom's vision of
strong poetry as a "supermimesis" or in terms of gnostic figures
of "negative transcendence." Bloom's work, however, also needs
Yeatsian creative correction. As the fifth and sixth chapters
show, it needs, like Yeats's poetry, to hold itself more open to
the chaos of history. Invoking instruction from the very poetry
that has so influenced Bloom's theory of influence, yet from
which Bloom has turned away, this thesis re-interprets Yeats's
poems and Yeats criticism generally. Using Yeats's openness to
history to revise Bloom and his pragmatic theory of misreading
to re-interpret Yeats, the thesis attempts to advance dialec-
tically both Yeats criticism and Bloomian theory.
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My father's spirit! In arms! All is not well.
I doubt some foul play. Would the night were come!
Hamlet
Sing out the song; sing to the end, and sing
The strange reward of all that discipline.
Yeats, "The Phases of the Moon"
o what am I that I should not seem
For the song's sake a fool?
Yeats, "A Prayer for Old age"
Introduction
There is a crisis in literary studies affecting the
criticism of poetry. The classical certainties of the age of New
Criticism have been under increasing pressure for decades now.
From one side, the edifice of "disinterested" literary activity,
autonomous literary work, and authorial integrity--derived
originally from Kant and Coleridge through Matthew Arnold to
"Modernist" critics like T. S. Eliot, Cleanth Brooks, Northrop
Frye, and M. H. Abrams--has been declared an illusion, an effect
of language, of the figures of speech that constitute the play
of signs within the prison-house of language which is our mental
abode. From another side, the edifice has been declared not an
illusion but an ivory tower, an ethos that must be destroyed in
the name of social progress. So powerful is the pressure
nowadays either to empty poetry and criticism of subjectivity
through textual irony, or to assault them on "political" grounds,
i
that to seek another vision which will revise and transfigure the
classical certainties while also resisting the pressure to
conform to the current trends may be a lonely, impossible quest.
Yet it is the burden of this thesis--with specific reference to
the poetry of William Butler Yeats and its criticism--to
articulate and practice a theory and a criticism which may
envision a new and antithetical dialectic among theory, poems,
and criticism.
Among contemporary cri tics and theorists there are few
allies to be discovered in such a contest, but most crucially I
ally myself--given specific reservations which I argue in chapter
five--with Harold Bloom, whose work on imaginative writing from
Genesis to Kafka, Beckett and Wallace Stevens dares to transform
the critical-theoretical ethos of our age. Since his first book
on Shelley in 1959, and especially after his book on Yeats in
1970, Bloom has sought with increasing energy to perform a
critical theory that engages with poetry in its deepest
ambivalence. While this much may be admitted even by Bloom's
enemies, who are many, my own insight is that Yeats is the
crucial precursor of Bloom's own theory and practice, for it is
Yeats who instructs Bloom most profoundly in the revisionary
Bloomian principle that later poets malform or distort their own
poetic fathers.
This thesis, therefore, is a story of fathers and sons. As
such it takes and rejects, or absorbs and resists, much of the
work of Bloom's critical-theoretical forerunners, contemporaries
and adversaries. Bloom competes with writers like Frye and
Abrams, for example, by turning their classical sureties into
ii
Romantic volatilities. Though their careers are based on their
writings about Blake and other Romantic poets, they project an
air of objectivity and balanced impersonal judgment that would
be anathema to the Romantics and that Bloom undermines
vigorously. He takes Frye's formalistic "anatomy of criticism"
and Abrams' insights on the temporal structure of "the greater
Romantic lyric I" and he turns them anew. 1 The result is that
Frye's anatomy and Abrams' lyric become a visionary, highly
subjective theory of poetry, less objective about poetry than
dialectically engaged with poetry. From the perspective of
traditional objectivists, Bloom's theory and practice appear to
be self-inflated bombast.
But no more enamored of Bloom are many of those who would
read poetry as the ironic disfiguration of lyrical voice. As my
first chapter shows in detail, deconstructive readings of poetry
achieve their insights at a fatal cost, the dissolution of
lyrical voice in favor of absolute linguistic difference or
undecidability. Bloom nevertheless shares with Paul de Man, for
example, the sense that poetry is an error and a misreading, but
the lie that is poetry is not epistemological or cognitive (as
it is for de Man) I though it may certainly be gnostic; and its
misreading of its precursors is not merely linguistic. Rather
it is the expression of a "poetic will," a pneumatic drive for
the illusion of immortality. Bloom thus restores lyrical voice
not as a presence, but as a lie that is necessary to his under-
I refer to Abrams' essay, "Structure and Style in the
Greater Romantic Lyric," which shows that poems like Wordsworth's
"Tintern Abbey" have a structural rhythm that moves outside-
inside-outside.
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standing of poetry, just as poetry itself is a "lie-against-
time."
Latest arrivals at the scene of literary dialectics are the
"new historicists," cultural determinists who have swerved or
deviated from the earlier deconstructors by turning the lessons
of linguistic difference into demands for political difference.
In this context poems become either mere symptoms of the pre-
vailing social ideology or symbols of resistance to it. With the
fervor of the fundamentalist, historicizers seek to re-make the
world, marshalling poetry and criticism as their weapons. Bloom
shares with these agonists their sense of poetry and criticism
as a form of struggle, just as he shares their devotion to
history. But for Bloom, struggle and history have less to do
with external, worldly affairs than with the internalized
dynamics of creativity and the endless breaking and re-making of
poetic history. Borrowing one of Bloom's tropes then, we might
say that his work "transumes" the work of traditionalists,
deconstructors, and historicizers alike. Bloom breathes, as the
J writer said of Yahweh and the red clay that became Adam, the
breath of life into literary tradition and into history by turn-
ing "voice" into the deep lie that poets speak each time they
rediscover their origins, that is to say, each time they write
a poern i '
Yeats is the greatest "Modern" poet to explore the profound
ambivalence of poetic creativity. So energetic and so sustained
was his exploration that his career can be read as one dis-
2 "Yahweh shaped an earthling from clay of this earth, blew
into its nostrils the wind of life. Now look: man becomes a
creature of flesh." Bloom, The Book of J, p. 55.
iv
continuous poem on the theme of his own creativity. Yet this
giant imagination has not been matched by his interpreters. A
bevy of traditionalists has depicted his verse as "a verbal icon"
(Wimsatt) or as a "well wrought urn" (Brooks). They have mined
his poetry for its apparent formalism, its structural and
semantic ambiguities, its paradoxes and tensions. They have
exhibited its "objective" content and tamed its elusive nature.
Allied traditionalists have turned the poems into allegories of
the life of the poet and his times. Others have read them as
symptoms of his psychological make-up, or of one or another
philosophical doctrine, Platonic, Kantian, occult, and so on.
More devastatingly subtle than all of these has been the
response of deconstructors to the poems. De Man and J. Hillis
Miller, for example, have read them as signs of an undecidable
impasse--as the death of which Yeats writes so well and so often.
On the other hand, Yeats's poems have inspired something like
moral disgust in those who would turn poetry to the interests of
some political agenda. Gayatri Spivak, for instance, when she
comes to consider the visionary work of Yeats and Dante, sees
only what she wants to see, a couple of dead white misogynists.3
It is the argument of this dissertation that the importance
of Yeats's poems runs much deeper than biographical psychology,
poetic ambiguity, philosophical doctrine, deconstructive death,
or any cultural political agenda. For the critical theory of
Harold Bloom has opened the possibility of reading Yeats's poems
as acts of revision by an agonistic imagination moving towards
3 I refer to Spivak's essay, "Finding Feminist Readings:
Dante--Yeats," published in her book, In Other Worlds: Essays in
Cultural Politics (1987).
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gnosis or gnostic transcendence. It is an intriguing irony that
this theory of poetic influence draws so much upon Bloom's deep
reading of Yeats, yet after 1970 Yeats plays only a very minor
role in Bloom's writing. It therefore falls to me, in this
dissertation, to delve into the agonics of the relationship
between Bloom and Yeats, which, in its fuller Romantic outlines
includes Shelley and Blake and even the voice of Hamlet.
Extravagance in such a quest is not only inevitable but
necessary, as each station in that wandering will be seen to have
its purpose in the goal.
vi
Plato thought nature but a spume that plays
Upon a ghostly paradigm of things.
"Among School Children" 1
Chapter One
Yeats, Deconstruction, Lyrical Voice
Since Plato's contest with Homer and with his other poetic
precursors such as Pythagoras and Heraclitus, the rift dividing
philosophy from poetry, with few notable exceptions, has seemed
unbridgeable, much like the division between the spume and the
ghostly paradigm suggested in Yeats's poem. The problem that
this thesis aspires to solve is the proper bridging of that
rift--"Load every rift with ore" was Keats's motto.2
But my Keatsian metaphor may seem inadequate, too weak in
its dualism, for it implies that poetry is made of the same earth
as philosophy (or literary criticism or critical theory), all
being "language," the same cosmic clay, even if some upheaval,
some catastrophe caused the rift. We would then want to speak
not of the rift, but of the cosmic distances dividing earthly
criticism from poetry which is more like a star. So much
All quotations of the poems, unless otherwise noted, will be taken
from Yeats's Poems, edited by A. Norman Jeffares.
His advice to Shelley, in a letter, August 1820.
2criticism and theory seem so woefully inadequate to their poetic
object, so weak, mundane, and merely rational, talking about and
around (the) poetry. On the other hand, poetry seems vital,
vigorous, pulsating, and self-begotten. "The metaphysica, the
plastic parts of poems / Crash in the mind," as Wallace Stevens
puts it.3 The tradition of poetry that stretches from Homer and
the Bible to Yeats and beyond is both a visible and a knowable
continuum, even as it is always a self-breaking tradition; while
criticism and theory dimly and ponderously look on, amazed at the
sublime, oracular power they observe in poetry.
That I exaggerate for effect need not be stressed, for some
criticism has seemed eminently suited to its object--even
criticism not always done by poets themselves. walter Pater,
though not a "poet" as such, has produced, in The Renaissance
(1871) ,4 a kind of criticism that is stronger in its apprecia-
tion of metaphor than the criticism written by Matthew Arnold who
mistrusted his own and others' poetic powers. Not only did
Arnold repudiate his lyric drama, Empedocles Upon Etna, because
he had come to deny "the notion that the proper goal of poetry
is to project an allegory of the poet's mental state";S but he
also was decidedly ambivalent about Shelley's extravagant
indulgence in metaphor--"in poetry, no less than in life, he is
"The Glass of water," The Collected Poems of Wallace stevens, p. 197.
All quotations of stevens's poems, unless otherwise noted, are taken from this
edition. All italics or emphases within quotations are those of the quoted
author, unless otherwise indicated.
The date in parentheses that follows the title of a work represents
its first publication (in English). But in the case of poems by Yeats, and
unless otherwise noted, it represents the date of composition in Richard
Ellmann's The Identity of Yeats, pp. 287-294.
J. Hillis Miller, The Linguistic Moment, p. 28.
3'a beautiful and ineffectual angel, beating in the void his
luminous wings in vain.' ,,6 A criticism or theory of poetry
faithful to (the) poetry would not need to be written by a poet
at all, but it would need to love and struggle with metaphor,
neither trying to purge itself of metaphor, nor subordinating
metaphor to other ends, such as reason or ideology, politics or
morals. Those are fine things, cultural artifacts, materials of
life; but they are not the breath of poetry.
So what would a contemporary criticism or theory, fearless
of its debt and link to poetry, look like? In the last twenty
years or so, a generation of critics in America and Britain have
written voluminously under the influence of a philosophical
cri tical theory associated with the term deconstruction, and with
such names as Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, and J. Hillis Miller.
The problem for poetry posed by the work of these critics and
those under their influence is that while they appreciate the
value and the purpose of metaphor in their own writing and in
poetry, they also strenuously ironize and demystify the
subjective categories traditionally used to understand poems and
poets. If the subject, the individual, the author, poet, or
reader are so severely disfigured and emptied that they appear
to be merely effects of discourse and ideology, a nostalgic dream
from an age not ours, then will lyric poetry be any less a
fragmented and centerless series of traces than its poet or
critic? Repeatedly staging the limits of intelligibility,
Taken from George Bornstein, Yeats and Shelley, p. 40. Bornstein
quotes from Matthew Arnold's "Shelley" (originally published in 1888) which
was a review of Edward Dowden's two volume biography of Shelley. The final
clause is Arnold quoting Dowden.
4deconstructive criticism enjoys its own textual play and irony.
And such textual pleasure is surely a mark of the poetic. But
at what cost? In this first chapter I want to appraise that
cost. With specific reference, where possible, to the lyric
poetry of William Butler Yeats, I will measure the strengths of
deconstructive criticism.
1.1 Hillis Miller's "Yeats" as "Nothing"
A sudden blast of dusty wind and after
Thunder of feet, tumult of images,
Their purpose in the labyrinth of the wind.
"Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen"
It is well-known that the kind of textual criticism that,
with some irony now, we call "New Criticism" relies on relatively
stable categories when it uses terms such as text or poem, and
author or poet. Though I reserve for my second chapter a
detailed discussion of New Critical formalism (among other kinds
of criticism that I find wanting), suffice it here to say that
deconstructive criticism, which in America and Britain has been
staged as a criticism or a revision of New Criticism, does not
take such categories as stable. On the contrary, they are
assumed and shown to be volatile. Although the eminent Yeats
critic, Richard Ellmann, has written The Identity of Yeats
(1954), implying by his title that a unified sense of a certain
man is derived from a proper reading of the whole of that man's
poems which themselves form a unified whole, a deconstructive
critic like Hillis Miller on the other hand practices a kind of
Yeats criticism that in effect dismisses such fiction of unity
and wholeness concerning poem(s) and poet. And to sharpen the
blade of his cutter, in his chapter called "Yeats" in The
5Linguistic Moment (1985), Miller even quotes Yeats to the purpose
of demystifying poetic voice:
"I commi t my emot ion to shepherds, herdsmen, camel-
drivers, learned men, Milton's or Shelley's
'Platonist,' that tower Palmer drew. Talk to me of
originality, and I will turn on you with rage. I am
a crowd, I am a lonely man, I am nothing." [324;
taken from "A General Introduction for my Work,"
Essays and Introductions 522]
With a deft brilliance that I greatly admire, Miller shows Yeats
to be a deconstructive poet who "speaks as no one, from nowhere,
at no time, to no identifiable listeners" [320]. The voice of
the poem is not the poet's voice, but is "another voice,
universal, anonymous, depersonalizing, a voice speaking through
the poet" [324, my emphasis]. Poetic voice is demystified as an
illusion, "the voice ultimately of 'nothing'" [324]. Although
Miller is addressing himself specifically to one Yeats poem,
"Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen" (1919-1922), his claims extend
much further--"one poem standing by synecdoche for them all"
[320], and all lacking "organic unity" [320]. Instead of the
usual New Cri tical organic form, the balance-in-tension of
paradoxical and ironic structure, Miller argues that Yeats's
poems mobilize images that are best seen as "heterogeneous
materials yoked together by violence" [321]. Miller's strategy
therefore empties this poem and all of the poems of any
conceivable center. Poet, voice, and textual form are all
dismissed, all substituted by the figure of "the labyrinth of the
wind"--a center which of course is no center at all:
[T]here is no identifiable central, literal
thing of which all else is figure. The poem, in
short, is a "labyrinth of the wind." ... The absence
of an identifiable center disqualifies all the con-
ceptual oppositions that the critic needs to interpret
6the poem but at the same time give the poem its enig-
matic power. [320]
Miller/s deconstructive reading of the Yeatsian poem and
voice links his work to the work of de Man in literary critical
theory, and to that of Derrida in philosophy. If we follow this
traj ectory, our concerns will become not only less strictly
poetic but also less Anglo-American and more Continental. For
de Man and Derrida have influenced theories of British and
American poetry more by way of French and German criticism and
philosophy (say Kant, Mallarme, and Nietzsche) than by Shelley
and Emerson for example. Not that Kant, Mallarme, and Nietzsche
are irrelevant to British and American poetry. On the contrary,
great poets from Coleridge to Yeats have felt the dark gift of
their influence, and have relied on that influence for a strong
sense of the poetic imagination, even if, paradoxically, that
strong imagination in its turn relies upon an ever more
strenuously emptied or negated sense of the self, which, in
Mallarme for instance, threatens to become a blank poem made up
of wayward traces.
1.2 Derrida's Fictive Philosophy
He/d crack his wits
Day after day, yet never find the meaning.
"The Phases of the Moon"
The de Manian and Derridean interventions in cri tical theory
and philosophy intensify this trajectory of the self-emptying
self, but the act of self-emptying is also severely ironized so
that it is made to appear as an inevitable consequence of the
catastrophic condition of language, not as the result of an
acting subject. De Man's "aporia," his radical "de-facement" of
7autobiography, his deconstruction of the epistemology of
metaphor, and Derrida's "differance," his reading of metaphor as
an infinite biodegradable series of heliotropic traces, his
7
argument that "the center is not the center," all plunge the
self into the textual abyss, a labyrinth of the wind, a
tropological space where all language is potentially figure and
figure of figure, an immanence wi thou t origin or end where
"mirror on mirror mirrored is all the show," in Yeats's ruthless
trope ["The Statues" 461J. But it may be that a free fall into
the abyss of language, the epistemology of metaphor, is not
adequate to poetry. As Wallace Stevens reminds us,
. there is still
The impossible possible philosophers' man,
The man who has had the time to think enough,
The central man, the human globe, responsive
As a mirror with a voice, the man of glass,
Who in a million diamonds sums us up.
["Asides on the Oboe" 250]
Regarding d i.f f erancc , or mirrors without voices, it may be
superfluous to trace the twists and turns of this sign "which is
neither a word nor a concept," as Derrida puts it.s Suffice it
to say that differance allows Derrida strategically to dismantle
all closure from inside and from outside, as brilliantly per-
formed in his recent "Biodegradables" (1989) and elsewhere.
In his essay "The Epistemology of Metaphor" (1978) de Man
concludes that the literary and the philosophical are mutually
permeable and contaminate each other. As a result they can never
be distinctly known: "All philosophy is condemned, to the extent
"structure, Sign, and Play," Writing and Difference, p. 279.
"Differance," Margins of Philosophy, p. 7. The term has largely been
taken directly into English critical theory at least since Frank Lentricchia's
historical reconsideration, After the New Criticism (1980). I therefore
follow that practice.
8that it is dependent upon figuration, to be literary and, as the
depository of this very problem, all literature is to some extent
philosophical" [28]. In "White Mythology" (1974), by showing
that the trope of "the sun" is the central metaphor of philo-
sophy, a metaphor intrinsically divided from itself, Derrida has
demonstrated with his own solar energy that the philosophical
text, though it seeks to dominate metaphor, to alienate metaphor
from itself, is suffused with metaphor: "Classical rhetoric,
then, cannot dominate, being enmeshed within it, the mass out of
which the philosophical text takes shape. Metaphor is less in
the philosophical text than the philosophical text is
within metaphor" [Margins of Philosophy 258]. Both writers put
forward what must be regarded as a strongly poetic sense of
metaphor as the impulse of all language, in accord with Shelley's
famous declaration that the poets are the unacknowledged
legislators of the world. Yet though de Man, Hillis Miller, and
other deconstructors have done much to revive the cri tical
fortunes of Romantics such as Shelley and Wordsworth (after the
severe demotion of Romanticism by cri tics under T.S. Eliot' s
influence), and though their work shows important affinities to
Romantic criticism due to their appreciation of metaphor, the
rift between them and their Romantic precursors still remains
unbridged.
When interviewed Derrida once said, "I've always been
interested in literature--my deepest desire being to write
literature, to write fictions--I've the feeling that philosophy
has been a detour for me to come back to literature. ,,9 But
Salusinszky, Criticism in Society, p. 22.
9given Derrida's grammatological theory of differance, he could
never have been on such a detour--his philosophical writing
always having been a form of literary fiction--and he will
forever remain on that detour, since all writing inevitably
stages the failure of its desire to enact an essence, a genre,
an appropriation of identity or origin.
"Freud and the Scene of Writing" (1972)
As Derrida says in
[TJhere is no life present at first which would
then come to protect, postpone, or reserve itself in
di f f erance . The latter constitutes the essence of
life. Or rather, as differance is not an essence, as
it is not anything, it is not life, if Being is
determined as ousia, presence, existence/essence,
substance or subject. Life must be thought of as a
trace before Being can be determined as presence .
. To say that differance is originary is simul-
taneously to erase the myth of a present origin.
Which is why "originary" must be understood as having
been crossed out, without which differance would be
derived from an originary plenitude. It is a non-
origin which is originary.
[Writing and Difference 203J
In such a context metaphor becomes crucial, but not metaphor in
any nostalgic sense such as fusion or identity or unity, but
metaphor as transfer, translation, doubling, repetition within
difference, the play of absence and presence, metaphor decentered
and in love with death. Commenting on a poem by Edmond Jabes in
"Ellipsis" (1978), Derrida writes:
The strange serenity of such a return. Rendered hope-
less by repetition, and yet joyous for having affirmed
the abyss, for having inhabited the labyrinth as a
poet, for having written the hole, "the chance for a
book" into which one can only plunge, and that one
must maintain while destroying it. The dwelling is
inhospitable because it seduces us, as does the book,
into a labyrinth. The labyrinth, here it is an abyss;
we plunge into the horizontality of a pure surface,
which itself represents itself from detour to
detour. [Writing and Difference 298J
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1.3 Paul de Man's Ironic Abyss
The holy centaurs of the hills are vanished;
I have nothing but the embittered sun.
"Lines Written in Dejection"
Ever open to the value of gnostic metaphors, Salman Rushdie
has said that he writes fiction to try to fill a god-shaped hole
inside of him.lO A key question in my research has been to
comprehend "the abyss" that so clearly fascinates Derrida in
"Ellipsis." Paul de Man has dwelt in a similarly inhospitable
trope which he calls "aporia" or the undecidable. In a trope,
a turn, or detour which famously overturned the orthodox received
wisdom of Yeats criticism, in "Semiology and Rhetoric" (1973) de
Man interpreted the question mark at the end of Yeats's "Among
School Children" (1926) in a way in which no one before had ever
read that punctuation mark.1'
o chestnut tree, great rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom, or the bole?
o body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance? [325]
With drastic simplicity he suggested that the question mark not
be dissolved away. "How can we know the dancer from the dance?"
was not simply a statement implying the transcendence of
identity, but also a plea for knowledge. De Man does not deny
the validity of the orthodox figurative reading; rather he simply
insists that the literal reading of the question mark be allowed
10 Rushdie has used this trope at least twice, in vigorous defense of
his Satanic Verses (1988): in "The Book Burning" (1989) and more recently in
his Herbert Read Memorial Lecture, "IS Nothing Sacred?" (1990).
11 In fact de Man first broached a similar reading of the Yeats poem in
his 1960 PhD dissertation on Mallarme and Yeats. But the relevant section of
the thesis was only published after de Man's December 1983 death in The
Rhetoric of Romanticism (1984) as "Image and Emblem in Yeats," which I will
discuss in the second chapter.
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into the interpretation of the poem, allowing for "greater
complication of theme and statement":
... since the dancer and the dance are not the same,
it might be useful, perhaps even desperately
necessary--for the question can be given a ring of
urgency, "Please tell me, how can I know the dancer
from the dance"--to tell them apart. ["Semiology,"
Allegories 11-12J
I reserve for the next chapter a discussion of "Among School
Children" and its place as a canonical poem in the Yeats cri tical
institution. For the moment I want to emphasize how the poem's
final line serves de Man with a surpassingly brilliant example
of his abyssal sense of aporia. For he situates himself and his
reader between two interpretations which are both necessary yet
contradictory and impossible. Undecidability or aporia is the
scene of reading for de Man. It is the black hole at the center
of a poem, the labyrinth of the wind said Hillis Miller quoting
Yeats. The structure of metaphor is divided against itself,
inside/outside, literal/figural, and a reader can never be sure,
and yet must choose, which face to read. Like "the fiery blossom
and the earthly leaf [whichJ are held together, as well as apart,
by the crucified and castrated God Attis" [12J in Yeats's poem
"Vacilla tion," the de Manian reader of metaphor vacillates
between mutually necessary yet incompatible choices.
To this point we have seen how Hillis Miller enacts the
deconstruction of Yeats's "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen," and
how Derrida and de Man deconstruct metaphor--Derrida philosophy's
metaphor and de Man criticism's and lyric poetry's metaphor. But
it is important now to see exactly how Hillis Miller and de Man
deal specifically with the traditional notion of lyrical voice.
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1.4 De Man and the Negation of Voice
There cannot be, confusion of our sound forgot,
A single soul that lacks a sweet crystalline cry.
"Paudeen"
The long and short of it is that voice too is taken to be
a metaphor, with its own aporia. Miller hinted as much in his
discussion of Yeats. He sees the poem's center as no center at
all, as a labyrinth of the wind, but with urgency asks himself
"What is that wind?" [328J His answer is compelling for the way
in which it plunges into the abyss only to re-invoke, through
negation, the very binary oppositions he wishes to deconstruct.
"Black hole" [329, 332], "dark sun," "endless tunnel" [337J,
"labyrinth" and so on become metaphors for the "unnamable center"
[336J, the "it" of the poem:
This it is at a center that is no center but is
missing there, and at the horizon but missing there,
too. It is dispersed everywhere, not just outside,
beyond the last wall, nor inside, at some inner core .
. . . Nor is this it in a transcendent realm .... It
is neither word, nor force, nor thing, nor subjective
energy, nor spiritual entity, but all those "things"
at once in a confusion that confounds the clear
distinctions and binary oppositions between subj ect
and object, between word and thing, between literal
and figurative language, between this world and the
supernal one, which are necessary to clear thought,
whether in poetry, in philosophy, or in literary
criticism. [338J
The Yeats poem dissolves in a stream that is not "any sort of
transcendentalism, Platonic or otherwise," nor an "immanence of
Being." All tradition having been negated, something yet
remains, the poem as an encounter, an experience, an event, a
voice yet remains:
If the it is neither thought, nor thing, nor spirit,
nor wor~ it is not nothing either. In the encounter
with this it, the validity of the notion of the
linguistic moment reaches its limit and dissolves
before something that is not language. [338]
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Thus, a powerful series of negations leads Miller to the
conclusion that there is something that is not language. This
crucial insight, this briefly flickering spark, is the one moment
in Miller's Yeats essay that is not relentlessly deconstructive,
the breath of a suggestion that all is not necessarily aporia,
differance, the tracing of a trace. At the linguistic moment
Miller seems to allow that there is an outside to language,
something outside the text, even though it "can only be
approached through that language" [339].12
Paul de Man, on the other hand, is relentless, never letting
down his guard, and producing a thoroughly rigorous critical
" f ' ,,13theory that to my mind epitomizes the irony 0 lrony. While
Derrida's differance opens out, unfolding, as trace leads to
trace without origin or end, de Man's aporia opens in, imploding
or "infolding," as ironic distances are ironized, inwardly
widening and deepening the chasm of metaphor like a bottomless
well. For example, in his essay "The Rhetoric of Temporality"
(1969) (reportedly dubbed the most photocopied critical essay in
American postgraduate study) ,14 de Man meditates on the nature
of irony, a trope whose structure originates the structure of
literary consciousness itself, doubled, inauthentic, and
approaching the abyss of madness, as seen in this cento:
12 That there is nothing outside the text (or there is no outside {to}
text ["Ii n r y a pas de hors-texte"] is an oft-cited trope taken from Derrida's
Of Grammatology, p. 158, and discussed with reference to "differance" in
Lentricchia's After the New Criticism, p. 170.
i3 Harold Bloom uses this phrase in The Breaking of the Vessels (1982),
p. 17.
14 Wlad Godzich quoting Jonathan Culler in "Caution! Reader at Work! II
Godzich's introduction to the revised edition of Blindness and Insight, p.
xvi.
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In speaking of irony we are dealing not with the
history of an error but with a problem that exists
wi thin the self , self-duplication or self-
multiplication .... The dedoublement thus designates
the activity of a consciousness by which a man
differentiates himself from the non-human world,
. by means of language as a privileged category .
. . . Language thus conceived divides the subject into
an empirical self, immersed in the world, and a self
that becomes like a sign in its attempt at differen-
tiation and self-definition .... The ironic language
splits the subject into an empirical self that exists
in a state of inauthenticity, and a self that exists
only in the form of a language that asserts the
knowledge of this inauthenticity, ... [yet] to know
inauthenticity is not the same as to be authentic .
. Irony is unrelieved vertige, dizziness to the
point of madness [and] absolute irony is a
consciousness of madness, itself the end of all con-
sciousness, a reflection on madness from the inside of
madness itself. [211-216, Blindness and Insight]
Irony thus appears to de Man as a master trope that structures
the self into an inevitable inward doubling, but ironically it
cannot be an origin because irony itself is the effect of
differance which, as we have seen above, leads back only to
traces without origin.
Similarly, when applied to a discussion of lyric poetry, de
Man's severely ironic stance opens up a bottomless aporia within
voice itself, denying lyric a founding inaugural moment. In his
essay "Lyrical Voice in contemporary Theory" (1985) de Man wishes
to dismantle the nostalgic essentializing notion that voice
begets poem, even though he puts at risk any understanding of the
poem:
The principle of intelligibility, in lyric poetry,
depends on the phenomenalization of the poetic voice.
Our claim to understand a lyric text coincides with
the actualization of a speaking voice, be it (mono-
logically) that of the poet or (dialogically) that of
the exchange that takes place between author and
reader in the process of comprehension. [55]
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There may well be a third choice, not entertained by de Man, a
way that is neither the voice of a poet's monologue nor the voice
constructed from a dialogue between poet and critic; for the time
being, however, I must delay developing this third choice. But
as de Man describes it here, nostalgia for the speaking voice--a
nostalgia which is mystifying and duplici tous because not ironic,
as argued in "The Rhetoric of Temporality"--desires that "the
status of the voice not be reduced to being a mere figure of
speech or play of the letter, for this would deprive it of the
attribute of aesthetic presence that determines the hermeneutics
of the lyric" [55, my emphasis]. De Man himself sees voice
precisely as a figure of speech which attempts to capture and
"phenomenalize" the inherently nomadic quality of poetry, to
localize and literalize it within the name and metaphor of voice.
He takes it as his job, therefore, not only to show how certain
critics nostalgically essentialize the figure of lyrical voice,
but also how Romantic poets such as Wordsworth and especially
Shelley already anticipated this critical error by writing poems
that de-faced or disfigured the poetic voice that their poems are
presumed to speak with. Like Hamlet, de Man would remind us that
"A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a king, and eat
of the fish that hath fed of that worm," meaning only to show us
"how a king may go a progress through the guts of a beggar. ,,15
In his essay "Autobiography As De-Facement" (1979) de Man
pursues with intense irony another version of his central theme
that the self-presence of voice is a metaphor imploded by aporia.
1 S IV, iii, 26-30; p. 158. All quotations from Hamlet are cited act,
line, and page from Spencer's 1980 Penguin edition.scene,
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Here his discussion of Wordsworth's Essays on Epitaphs dwells on
the figure of prosopopeia which, like irony in "The Rhetoric of
Temporality," empties out the figure of voice. Prosopopeia is
seen by de Man as "the fiction of an apostrophe to an absent,
deceased, or voiceless entity, which posits the possibility of
develops, its insistently compelling
the power of speech"
as de Man's argument
quality is not his
the latter's reply and confers upon it
[Rhetoric of Romanticism 75-76J. But
observation that Wordsworth's prosopopeia makes the dumb speak,
epitaph giving voice to a senseless stone [77J. Again focusing
on the structure of metaphor, de Man argues that the giving of
voice to stone "acquires a sinister connotation" [78], an
antithetical symmetry whereby voice is silenced in the living:
by making "death speak, the symmetrical structure of the trope
implies, by the same token, that the living are struck dumb,
frozen in their own death" [78]. Prosopopeia, the figure of "the
fiction of the voice-from-beyond-the-grave" [77], has a
"chiasmic" structure. That which gives voice to the dead must
cross over and give up its own voice. Here de Man's aporia
becomes the point of crossing where the dead stone gains a voice
and where the giver of voice becomes mute, voiceless, a figure
of death.
But more than all this, the chasm of aporia begins to open
up and swallow poet, writing, and critic when we read de Man
arguing that Wordsworth is prosecuting a polemic against the very
figure that he invokes to give voice to his writing. On the
level of content and style Wordsworth is said to "speak out
forcefully against [Alexander pope's] language of satire and
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invective and plead eloquently for a lucid language of repose,
tranquillity, and serenity" [78-79]. This puts Wordsworth as
much in the camp that he is attacking as on the side of poetic
"repose." On the level of figurative structure, "The language
so violently denounced [by Wordsworth] is in fact the language
of metaphor, of prosopopeia and of tropes" [80], that is to say,
his own language. Wordsworth is rightly taken by de Man as a
great poet of autobiography, and autobiography for de Man is "the
prosopopeia of the voice and the name" [81]. De Man concludes
his essay with the sentence, "Autobiography veils a de-facement
of the mind of which it is itself the cause" [81], succinctly and
intensely summarizing the deconstructive abyss that he finds
essential and inevitable for dealing with the voice of great
Romantic poets like Wordsworth.
In an early essay, "Symbolic Landscape in Wordsworth and
Yeats" (1962) de Man distinguishes Yeats from Wordsworth, arguing
that
whereas Wordsworth's imagination [in his sonnet
"Composed by the Side of Grasmere Lake"] remains
patterned throughout on the physical process of sight,
Yeats's frame of reference [in "Coole Park and
Ballylee, 1931"], by the very nature of his statement,
originates from experiences without earthly equi-
valent. [Rhetoric of Romanticism 143]
Despite this distinction, it would be possible to apply to Yeats,
who also wrote an autobiography and gave the gift of life and
voice to several stones in his poems, the same chiasmic moment
of aporia that de Man, in "Autobiography As De-Facement," reads
into Wordsworth. Examples are legion, notably Yeats's epitaph
carved in a stone at his grave in Drumcliff, Ireland, and his
poem carved in a stone at his home, Thoor Ballylee. In fact,
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carved stone is a Yeatsian obsession. Also several elegies and
many other Yeats poems too numerous to mention call the dead to
life. But this is to belabor what should be obvious, tradition
being, for a poet at least, inescapable, and tradition being
nothing if not the voice of the dead living amongst us. De Man
is hyper-aware of this, thus his emphasis on disfiguration,
discontinuity, death as the center of metaphor. In fact, even
in de Man's previously unpublished 1960 PhD dissertation,
"Mallarme, Yeats, and the Post-Romantic Predicament," from which
"Image and Emblem in Yeats" (1984) was excerpted for The Rhetoric
of Romanticism, early traces of what will later become the aporia
of metaphor are clearly evident in his argument:
[T]he logical discontinuity that disrupts the natural
image [is] often concealed within the image
itself [and] becomes explicit on the thematic level .
. The treatment of nature remains contradictory,
... it is indispensable, but as the entity which, by
its mere presence, voids the poet's hope to find per-
manence in words, it is his worst enemy. It throws
him back upon himself, in sterile self-contemplation,
"Raging at his own image in the enamelled sea."
[158-160; "The Indian to His Love" 49]
Yeats's imagery is thus internally divided, and a chasm or a void
begins to open up between meaning and intent, between word and
world.
Nevertheless, the de Manian essay most appropriate for Yeats
cri ticism would in my view be his essay on Shelley who is
arguably the most crucial figure among Yeats's precursors. In
"Shelley Disfigured" (1979) de Man gives his reading of Shelley's
poem "The Triumph of Life," a difficult poem written in Dante's
terza rima and left incomplete at the time of Shelley's death by
drowning. True to the temporal and internally distanced form of
his thought as the irony of irony, de Man takes Shelley's poem
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to be a figure of its own disfiguration. "The repeti tive
erasures by which language performs the erasure of its own
positions can be called disfiguration" [Rhetoric of Romanticism
119], and the poem of course displays and performs these erasures
of its own figurality. As de Man reads it, the poem is a free
fall, a contraction or limitation of the self. The poet, who to
himself is but a figure of himself, gives us the figure of a
speaker who in turn has a vision of a disfigured "Rousseau" who
also in his turn relates his vision,
a vision of continued delusion that includes
him. He undergoes a metamorphosis in which his brain,
the center of his consciousness, is transformed. The
transformation is also said to be the erasure of an
imprinted track, a passive, mechanical operation.
The erasure or effacement is indeed the loss of
a face, in French figure. Rousseau is dis-
figured, defigure, de-faced .... The trajectory from
erased self-knowledge to disfiguration is the tra-
jectory of The Triumph of Life. [99-100]
It is also the trajectory of de Man's criticism, a free fall of
self-contraction, the irony of irony. The poem is and puts
forward figures but it does not mean its figures, for being and
meaning in a poem cannot coincide:
language posits and language means (since it
articulates) but language cannot posit meaning; it can
only reiterate (or reflect) it in its reconfirmed
falsehood. Nor does the knowledge of this impossi-
bili ty make it less impossible. This impossible
position is precisely the figure, the trope, the
metaphor as a violent--and not as a dark--light, a
deadly Apollo. [117-118]
This may look like "the impossible possible philosophers' man"
of Wallace Stevens that I mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter, but I don't believe it is. As I intend to show later,
the Yeatsian and Stevensian man, "the central, the human globe"
is certainly a figure, like a mirror, but more Shakespearean, "a
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mirror with a voice," On the other hand, the de Manian
impossible man, although he too is but a figure, a trope, merely
reiterates or reflects, and confirms his falsehood again and
again. In this self-disfiguring abyss, Shelley's poem displays
"the madness of words" [122J:
The Triumph of Life warns us that nothing, whether
deed, word, thought, or text, ever happens in
relation, positive or negative, to anything that
precedes, follows, or exists elsewhere, but only as a
random event whose power, like the power of death, is
due to the randomness of its occurrence. [122J
Taking the measure of de Man against Shakespeare's Hamlet
would be a useful critical exercise, bearing in mind Horatio's
desparate warning to the tragic hero concerning his father's
figure-from-beyond-the-grave:
What if it tempt you toward the flood, my lord,
Or to the dreadful summit of the cliff
That beetles o'er his base into the sea,
And there assume some other, horrible form,
Which might deprive your sovereignty of reason
And draw you into madness?
[I, iv, 68-74; p. 88]
I am not aware of a more strenuous, self-emptying, deconstruction
of lyrical voice than de Man's essay on Shelley. Hillis Miller
too has an essay on "The Triumph of Life. ,,16 His deconstruction
of Shelley's poem, like his deconstruction of Yeats's "Nineteen
Hundred and Nineteen," is persuasive and eloquent in its transfer
to the poem of Derridean "non-concepts" like differance, as he
reads the poem as an allegory of his poetics.
Miller's style of thought is energetically "direct" whereas de
Yet because
Man's is pitilessly ironic, I feel that de Man's work is even
more tightly contracted or "infolded" than Miller's. To redeem
16 His chapter called "Shelley" (1985) in The Linguistic Moment.
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de Manian critical theory from the paralysis of aporia, to save
it for a criticism intimate with the impulses of poetry, would
require a transformation of de Man that he has vigorously hedged
his work against. Wallace Martin has noted de Man's long
opposition to any form of "'redemptive poetics. ,,,17 Such a
redemption or transformation would amount to what de Man
castigates as "a monumentalization of sorts" [123].
1.Sa The Revenge of Historicism: Edward Said
What if the Church and the State
Are the mob that howls at the door!
"Church and State"
Reacting against what they see as the impoverishments of de
Man and of Hillis Miller, some critics and theorists have
attempted to restitute lyric poetry by the re-insertion of
history, politics, and social morality into post-deconstructive
critical and literary theory. Herbert Tucker, for example, has
decried the "abysmal disfigurements" of the deconstructive
approach to lyric poetry, and has called for a dialectical
approach that sees poetry as "a ratio of history and desire. ,,18
With writers such as Edward Said and Frank Lentricchia, and more
recently Jonathan Arac and his associates, in the forefront,
critical theorists have labored to get beyond the labyrinth of
differance that apparently tropes and traps all criticism into
what Said and Lentricchia have called "wall-to-wall discourse"
[After the New Criticism 313, 317] and others have called the
17
"Introduction," The Yale Critics, p. xxvii.
18 "Dramatic Monologue and the Overhearing of Lyric," in Lyric Poetry,
pp. 243 and 231.
22
prison-house of language. With these writers develops a con-
sidered and forthright critique of deconstructive critical
theory, but at the cost of widening the rift between poetry and
criticism. And interestingly enough, Lentricchia and Said have
each taken a distinctive tack in sailing through "the labyrinth
of the [deconstructiveJ wind." For while Said has largely
ignored de Man while focusing his fire on Derrida, Lentricchia
has in fact tried to trope Derrida to appear as an ally in
Lentricchia's battle with de Man. But what links the two, along
with other historicizing critical sailors, is their common
mooring in a Foucauldian harbor.
Throughout Said's book The World, the Text, and the Critic
(1983) and especially in the chapter "Criticism Between Culture
and System," the author carefully follows the arguments that
Derrida raises in his all-pervasive critique of Western logo-
centrism as the fallacy of the metaphysics of presence. When
Said looks at Derrida he likes important aspects of what he sees.
But the things that he likes he also sees in Foucault who, to
Said's mind, has other distinct advantages over Derrida. In both
of them Said praises what he reads as essentially a democratizing
or even revolutionary impulse that "challenges the culture and
its apparently sovereign powers of intellectual activity" [184-
185] (but what I would simply read as a poetic aspect of their
writing) :
For both writers, their work is meant to replace the
tyranny and the fiction of direct reference--to what
Derrida calls presence, or the transcendental
signified--with the rigor and practice of textuality
mastered on its own highly eccentric ground and, in
Foucault's case, in its highly protracted persistence.
[185]
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But the tag that Said throws onto his description of Foucault's
sense of textuali ty shows that he considers Foucault to be
somehow more "worldly" (Said's term), more rooted in and focused
on history, whereas Derrida is seen, despite his revolutionary
textuality, as ultimately a new breed and breeder of textual
formalism or idealism. Said believes Derrida to be producing
just another dualism of world and text, and he wants to overcome
that dualism, grounding textuali ty in worldliness. He sees
Derrida's "ambition" [212] as
. . . to reveal one or another undecidable elements in
a text in lieu of some simple reductive message the
text is supposed to contain , to reveal the
entame--tear, incision [de Man's aporia]-- . an
entame already inscribed in written language itself by
its persistent desire to point outside itself, to
declare itself incomplete and unfit without presence
and voice. [212, 207]
Although differance initially presents itself to Said as a
liberating impulse, it ends up being a new limitation, contracted
to the form of mere textual repetition of the trace.
Of course Derrideans would protest that it is Said's reading
of Derrida which produces this contracted "Derrida," since there
is nothing beyond the text or alternatively there is only the
beyond-text, both equally Derridean positions that are one
position, and since Derrida's writings are not at all limited to
the notion of textuality that Said ascribes to him. It is
certainly true that a series of texts by Derrida published since
the early 1980s have engaged, not merely with "textual" matters
such as readings of Hegel or of Plato, but with more "worldly"
matters. I have in mind five essays by Derrida, one on
Apartheid, "Racism's Last Word," a second in response to a
cri tique of it, a third essay on nuclear disarmament, "No
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Apocalypse, Not Now," and his two vigorous essays concerning
accusations of Nazism against Paul de Man, "Paul de Man's War"
and the previously mentioned "Biodegradables. ,,19 Even so, it is
Foucault not Derrida who is seen by Said as the champion of a
more worldly textuality where the trope of "actuality" wins a new
priority:
For if the text is important to Derrida because its
real situation is literally a textual element with no
ground in actuality, . then for Foucault the text
is important because it inhabits an element of power
with a decisive claim on actuality, even though that
power is invisible or implied. Derrida's criticism
moves us into the text, Foucault's in and out. [183]
Said finds decidedly uncomfortable "the ecriture en abime" [183]
and "the mise en abime" [204], metaphors of the abyss that
deconstructors use virtually as textual strategies. He protests
that these metaphorical strategies "reduce everything that we
think of as having some extratextual leverage in the text to a
textual function" [204]. But Said's attack on Derrida begins to
look more and more like a latter day Arnoldian anxiety over
metaphor, its freedom and its power. He quite rightly says that
"Dissemination does not mean. . Dissemination maintains the
perpetual disruption of writing, maintains the fundamental
undecidability of texts" [204], but he feels that this is a sorry
state for critical theory for "it entails a certain figurative
So far as I know, Said has not pronounced himself on the furor
surrounding Paul de Man's articles published in 1941 and 1942 for a newspaper
under Nazi control in occupied-Belgium, although I personally wrote to Said
in 1988 asking that he either contribute to the debate or share his ideas with
me privately. He did not respond to my letter, nor am I aware that he has
published on this issue. (Several months after writing this chapter, I was
able to obtain Said's new book, Musical Elaborations (1991). He spends five
pages (36-41) generalizing on the subtle moral dilemmas of the de Man issue,
yet he takes no personal position except rightly to emphasize what all other
commentators to my knowledge have ignored--the most infamous anti-Semitic
article by de Man has a sentence that implicitly endorses a strategic alliance
between Nazis and Zionists to move Jews out of Europe to Palestine.
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castration." Deconstructive play with the undecidable power of
metaphor--which I read as the most severe ironization of poetry
and theory in English since the "impersonality" poetics of T. S.
Eliot (another Arnold, fearful of his own poetic powers)--is read
by Said as figurative castration. Presumably, therefore,
Foucault returns the phallus to the writer, erecting a new tower,
materialist, historical, social, political:
Foucault's interest in textuality is to present the
text stripped of its esoteric and hermetic elements
[Said's tropes for deconstructive play, but also
aspects of Yeatsian poetics], and to do this by making
the text assume its affiliations with institutions,
offices, agencies, classes, academies, corporations,
groups, guilds, ideologically defined parties and
professionals. [212]
But what appears to Said as Foucault's redemption of decon-
struction for social work, appears to me as further retreat.
"The most heroic effort to escape from the prisonhouse of
language only builds the walls higher. ,,2<:' The subordination of
metaphor to politics is surely a trope intensely hostile to
poetry. Strip the text of esoterica and coerce it into offices
and parties, this is Said's clarion call.
1.5b The Revenge of Historicism: Frank Lentricchia
Even the wisest man grows tense
With some sort of violence .
"Under Ben Bulben"
An error very similar to Said's appears to me to be made by
Frank Lentricchia. Said paid no attention to Miller and very
little to de Man. A few pages in The World, the Text, and the
Critic suffice Said to deal with the "extraordinary talents" of
20 Miller, "The Critic as Host," p. 230.
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de Man and his critical doctrine which, in Said's view, is
that literature is the "endless naming and renaming of the void
.: when critics or poets believe themselves to be stating
something, they are really revealing--critics unwittingly, poets
wittingly--the impossible premises of saying anything at all"
[162, 163]. On the other hand, Lentricchia (more in After the
New Criticism [1980], less in Criticism and Social Change [1983])
attempts to dissociate de Man from Derrida and thereby to save
Derrida from the paralysis that he feels pervades de Man's
discourse of the aporia. In the earlier of the two books,
Lentricchia gives a much more sympathetic reading of Derrida's
general critique of logocentrism than we saw Said give. He finds
Derrida "utterly persuasive" [176J, his argument "irresistible"
[174J, though it is clear that he longs to extend Derrida' s
position beyond ontological decentering to more specifically
"historical labors":
Put as baldly as possible, Derrida' s point is that
once we have turned away from various ontological
centerings of writing, we do not turn to free-play in
the blue, as the Yale formalists [i.e., de Man and
Hillis MillerJ have done. Rather, it would appear
that our historical labors have just begun. [175]
Lentricchia argues that both Said and Yale critics have misread
Derrida's differance, taking it as an ontological rather than as
a textual strategy. He chides Said for seeing grammatology as
"disguised ontological work," as a "linguistically crafty
existentialism which poises writing, in Said's phrase, 'just a
hair beyond utter blankness.' Derrida is no ontologist of Ie
neant, because he is no ontologist" [171]. But Said is not
Lentricchia's true target. He's a Foucauldian ally. Lentricchia
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is more interested in exposing the misreading of Derrida done by
his popularizers at Yale:
Oddly, however, though Derrida warned that differance,
as the subversion of all ontological realms, could
authoritatively command nothing, the Yale critics have
taken differance as a radically subversive authority
which autocratically commands, as abyme, the whole
field of writing, and while doing so establishes
writing as a monolith itself that forever escapes
determination. [173]
In a word, de Man and Miller have idealized Derrida, in this
argument, and have made obstacles for a more historically
sensitive reading and use of Derrida's philosophy.
Lentricchia divides Derrida from "the American Derrideans"
[184], and even goes so far as to read Miller as counter-
deconstructive:
To use the aporia, particularly in the anti-Derridean
way that Miller does, in order to privilege literary
discourse for its supposedly self-deconstructive power
[but de Man also uses this approach], is to reinstate
the speaking subject as a free and unblinded author-
ity. [184]
Lentricchia here turns Miller (and de Man) against themselves,
making these "boa-deconstructors," as Hartman has called them,
appear as anti-deconstructors. "What do you read, my lord?" asks
Polonius. "Words, words, words," Hamlet replies in the
Fishmonger 2'Scene .. Lentricchia's goal is to save Derrida' s
textual practices for social and historical critique, a path that
has been taken by others as well, such as Michael Ryan who is the
most radical of the socializers or politicizers of "Derrida."
Ryan's book, Marxism and Deconstruction (1982), turns differance
21 My use of names such as the Fishmonger Scene or the Council Scene is
borrowed from Harry Levin's book, The Question of Hamlet (1959).
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into a political strategy of absolute, levelling "democracy. ,,22
But Lentricchia clearly feels much more comfortable, in both
books, when lambasting Paul de Man, not from a Derridean but from
a Foucauldian stance.
In his chapter on de Man in After the New Criticism,
Lentricchia, like Said, emphasizes the mimetic trope of "the
actual," as he cites with approval "Foucault's positive
genealogical view of discourse [which] encourages us to focus on
actual historical formations," whereas de Man's writings are said
to "reveal a critical intention to place literary discourse in
a realm where it can have no responsibility to historical life":
The issue here, as Foucault has argued, is not one of
allowing history, as something "outside" discourse,
"inside. " The issue is one of allowing the myriad
discourses that are history to have some power. The
difficulty is that de Man ... unnecessarily grant[s]
power only to the self-deconstructing move of the li-
terary, a move which succeeds in emptying literary
discourse of everything but the aporia, the undecid-
able. This is the error. . of isolationism, which
has repeatedly emasculated formalist thought.
[310-311 ]
Emasculation again, another figurative castration (Said). But
in Criticism and Social Change Lentricchia's denunciation of de
Man, reinforced by a series of accusatory pathological metaphors,
is even more nakedly stated. De Man is said to write "easily
within the claustrophobic space of the literary man" [49]
(psycho-pathology) . His critical practice "falls prey to [an]
illness of the spirit" (moral pathology) that is equivalent to
"paralysis of action" [43] (physical pathology). And his poli-
tics are "that passive kind of conservatism called quietism" [50]
22 Ryan writes, "I would argue that deconstruction is a philosophical
pretext for a socialism that would be radically democratic and egalitarian in
nature" [41-42].
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(religious pathology). These accusations look amazingly like an
unconscious allusion to Hamlet's self-diagnosis:
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all;
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pith and moment,
With this regard their currents turn awry,
And lose the name of action. [III, i, 83-88; p. 125]
But are they not voiced against de Man (Hamlet) from the point
of view of an impetuous Laertes who, in order to revenge the
murder of his father, Polonius-as-history, and the madness of his
sister, Ophelia-as-aporia, would "cut his throat i'th'church"?
[IV, vii, 126; P . 176] :
There is nothing outside the text, said Derrida; de
Man revises to say there is nothing outside the
literary text .... Deconstruction is conservatism by
default--in Paul de Man it teaches the many ways to
say that there is nothing to be done. [50, 51]
1.6 Miller's Ethics of Linguistic Negation
The struggle of the fly in marmalade . .
"Ego Dominus Tuus"
Voiced in the supposed interests of social critique, an
assault such as Lentricchia's only more urgently begs the
question of the relevance of social critique to poetry. Is the
poetry of Yeats or Wordsworth or Shakespeare really to be
understood best by stripping it of esoterica, and making it
assume links with classes and corporations? Enter Hillis
Miller's essay on de Man in The Ethics of Reading (1987). Stung
by hard-hitting, even moralizing attacks against deconstruction
(the ferocity of which would only increase within a year with the
publication of de Man's collaborationist wartime journalism),
Miller has tried to answer that de Man does insist on an ethics:
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The category of ethicity is one version of [de Man/s]
insistence on a necessary referential, pragmatic
function of language which distinguishes de Man/s work
from certain forms of structuralism or semiotics. It
gives the lie to those who claim "deconstruction"
asserts the "free play" of language in the void,
abstracted from all practical, social, or political
effect. [44]
But despite this caveat to his anti-mimeticism, Miller is not
finally a historicist, and although it allows for the obvious--
the "situatedness" of deconstruction in the world and history--
his essay on de Man attempts to (but does not) advance what I
take to be the central question that dogs mimetic and historicist
theories of poetry: whether, and if so, how do history
(Lentr i.cch.i.av s trope of "the actual" which is somehow beyond
"text") and/or historicity (Sai dv s tropes of "actuality," "world-
liness," classes, institutions, discourses, etc.) have any
bearing at all on a poet in the act of self-transformation that
we call writing a poem?
Despite Miller/s attempt to save "ethicity" for decon-
structive poetics, it remains true that he and de Man empty lyric
poetry of voice, while Said and Lentricchia restitute that
emptiness by loading it with "history." I would argue that both
approaches remain beyond poetry, are inadequate to poetry. The
social approach loads the rift alright, but loads it not with the
golden ore of poetic voice but with the untransformed detritus
of history. Though more responsive to the power of metaphor, the
first approach either falls into a severely ironic asceticism (de
Man), or divides itself between either indulging in an admirably
joyful free play that substitutes itself for the poem (Miller),
or repeating a series of deconstructive slogans that are simply
imposed on the poem, as we shall see. While the third chapter
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will go into detail concerning my critique of the Foulcauldian
distortion of poetics, the rest of this chapter will explore my
sense of the rift between deconstruction and poetry.
1.7 The Blissful Abyss
. turn away
And like a laughing string
Whereon mad fingers play
Amid a place of stone,
Be secret and exult .
"To a Friend whose Work has come to Nothing"
There can be no doubt that Derrida and de Man have inspired
some dazzling readings or interpretations of lyric poetry. In
this context, I have already discussed Miller's reading of
Yeats's "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen," but an essay by Richard
Rand must not go unmentioned. Member of a highly select group
of individuals by virtue of being one of Derrida's
translators,23 his "Ozone: An Essay on Keats" (1987) epitomizes
a critical style provocatively given over to metaphor, light,
free play. The essay does not so much argue a point as perform
it. Keats's poetry is not so much interpreted to us as its
genius is enacted. Rand's essay can hardly be called an
analysis, rather it reads Keats by becoming itself an allegory
for what it takes to be the spirit of the letter and word in
Keats--erotic and infinite substitution, transfer, metaphor:
[During] a stage which I am tempted to call the
"ozone" of his career . . . Keats invested a truly
remarkable degree of energy in "0" as a grapheme, in
"0" as a phoneme, and in the virtual zone between and
around the two terms. "0," in an infinity of
manifestations, became the chief focus of his concern.
I submit this point in the full knowledge that Keats
himself would have questioned it; in the matter of
23 Rand's translation of Signeponge!Signsponge was published in 1984.
32
vowels he claimed to play the field. . Endymion,
we recall, falls in love, and does so in a dream; the
object of his passion is an "0," sporting the alias of
an "Oe" diphthong in the name of "Phoebe"
"And la! from opening clouds, I saw emerge
The loveliest moon, that ever silver'd o'er
A shell for Neptune's goblet: she did soar
So passionately bright, my dazzled soul
Commingling with her argent spheres did roll
Through clear and cloudy.
To corrununewith those orbs, once more I rais' d
My sight.
o ye deities!
Who from Olympus watch our destinies!
Whence that completed form of all completeness?
Whence came that high perfection of all sweetness?"
It is a moon, then, a full moon that dazzles
Endymion's soul, causing it to commingle with its
"argent spheres"--eyes, to be sure, but also spheres:
for there is more than one sphere in the word "moon,"
more than one "0," more than one "orb" in the orb
known as the "moon." [297-298, my ellipses]
From start to finish, Rand rolls on, playfully and lovingly
yet also "critically" performing a text of his own that is also
a parallel anachronism of Keats. When Paul de Man meditates on
a metaphor, he finds that it opens up like a chasm beneath his
feet, throwing him into an anti-mimetic void wherein he must
oscillate between the dancer and the dance in an undecidable
vacillation. But Richard Rand's meditation loads the aporia with
ore stolen from the Keatsian ozone. And in so doing he creates
"his own" poem, creates a rival poem. It is in this tropological
space or linguistic moment--the topos of Rand finding his own
voice wi thin the voice of Keats by disfiguring Keats--that
deconstructive interpretations of poetry are at their strongest
and most useful as critical acts.
The Wordsworthian critic, Geoffrey Hartman, has also been
associated with what Lentricchia dismissed as "free-play in the
blue" deconstructi ve criticism. Differance energizes Hartman
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whose profound knowledge and love of Western European literatures
is carried through a style that is playful, elliptical, quick and
light, seemingly bred on a fusion of Wordsworthian imagination
and Derridean differance. As a lover of poetry however, Hartman
has chosen to evade the implications of a purely linguistic
theory of poetry, to step back from the linguistic abyss at the
vital moment. In his essay on Wordsworth in Deconstruction and
Criticism (1979), Hartman entertains the thought that "[p]erhaps
the term 'lyrical ballad' indicates [an] excess of voice-feeling
over the articulate word, raj severe music of the signifier
or of an inward echoing that is both intensely human and ghostly"
[190 J • And in Saving the Text (1981) Hartman argues for "a
counterstatement to Derrida [that] is not a refutation but rather
a different turn in how to state the matter" [121J. Using an
approach that one critic a little derisively has called "aes-
thetic cri ticism,,24 (though I would consider Walter Pater's
legacy to have a fine literary pedigree), Hartman says he is
concerned "in literature, [with] the reality of words that con-
duct vOice-feeling" [121]. For Hartman, poetry fulfills because
it is endlessly figurative and heard in some inner ear [157J.
1.8 Thanatos, or the Cost of Being in Love with Death
I wander by the edge
Of this desolate lake
Where wind cries in the sedge
"He hears the Cry of the Sedge"
The pity however is that most deconstruct ions of lyric
poetry fail to tempt the abyss with the courage of Rand or
24 This phrase is the title of Michael Sprinker's essay on Hartman in
The Yale Critics.
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Miller, Hartman or de Man. Mechanical rather than vital, they
fail to perform an action, because to propagate slogans, to
imitate jargon, is not to act. As Miller himself warns us, "the
interpretation of tropes can freeze into a quasi-scientific
discipline promising exhaustive rational certainty in the
identification of meaning in a text and in . . the way that
, , d d ,,25mean1ng 1S pro uce . Mary Jacobus displays this tendency.
Her essay on Wordsworthian prosopopeia, "Apostrophe and Lyric
Voice in The Prelude" (1985), appeals repetitiously to the de
Manian figure of the hollowing-out of poetic voice: "Instead of
the voice of the poet, we have the voice of poetry--that is,
Nature. In order to achieve this status for his poetry,
Wordsworth has to eschew the very fiction of the individual voice
which is central to Romantic conceptions of the poet" [176].
Similarly, Tilottama Rajan's essay on Shelley's Prometheus
Unbound, "Romanticism and the Death of Lyric Consciousness"
(1985), appeals repetitiously to the Derridean figure of
"revealing the traces of another voice within the seemingly
autonomous lyric voice" [195]. On the same round, Joel Fineman's
essay, "Shakespeare's Sonnets' Perjured Eye" (1985), seemingly
with his own eye more on deconstructive critical theory than on
Shakespeare's poems, argues about the "double doubling" and the
"difference sounded in sameness" of the sonnets:
It is language, therefore, the "languageness" of
language, now conceived and conceited as something
linguistic, as both like and unlike the vision to
which it is opposed and on which it is superimposed,
that in the dark lady sonnets entails as well as
25
"The Critic as Host," Deconstruction and Criticism, p. 249.
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describes the redoubling of unity that leads to
division, the mimic likeness of a likeness that leads
to difference, the representation of presentation that
spells the end of presence. [128]
The trend prevalent among critics influenced by decon-
struction is the tendency to get bogged down under the burden of
the critical theory that they feel compelled to read onto their
poets. De Man and Hillis Miller have injected a new strength
into poetics with their intensification of irony as the
decentered propagation of metaphor and voice, and as Daniel
O'Hara in "Yeats in Theory" (1987) has argued, this new strength
is largely the result of Yeats's influence on contemporary
theory:
For, in attempting to comprehend and use Yeats, his
American theoretical heirs conceive designs which
paralyze their imaginative developments, even as they
disseminate and so perpetuate the error of proposing
such undertakings as exemplary. Rather than authoring
"Yeats," then, their chosen poet has authored and--
paradoxically if not perversely--authorized them.
[349-350]
But in the followers of de Man and Miller a sterility has set in.
The lesson of de Man and Miller, Hartman and Rand must surely be
similar to that of the poets they write about (Wordsworth,
Shelley, Keats, Yeats), that poems are the breaking and making
of metaphors. But how Jacobus or Rajan or Fineman, or the many
others like them, can be seen to be saying anything inventive,
original, and crucial in and about lyric poetry must be seriously
26in doubt.
26 Cynthia Chase's essay on Keats's "Nightingale" cannot break out of
its dependence on de Man's vision of prosopopeia; while T. S. Eliot possibly
gets the dionysiac dismemberment he deserves in Maud Ellmann's book which uses
poststructuralist jargon to disfigure any form that Eliot might inadvertently
have left alive: " ... to figure death is to disfigure the self, and to
abolish discourse in hallucination" [127], or so runs the refrain.
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1.9 Voicings, Images of Voice
I hear lake water lapping with low sounds
by the shore;
I hear it in the deep heart's core.
"The Lake Isle of Innisfree"
Real Presences (1989) by George Steiner, a resonant medi-
tation on the human origins of poetry, music, and painting, is
also a forthright critique of deconstructive literary theory.
The abyss of "the madness of words" was de Man's temptation,
while Miller's was what his "Yeats" called "the labyrinth of the
wind." Steiner too is willing to tempt an abyss, but his is not
a deconstructive abyss of language. Relying on his conviction
of the primacy of art, its inwardness, and its agonistic nature,
Steiner risks the more antithetical abyss of transcendence. He
reverses Derrida's critique of logocentrism and its radical
contextualizing of any transcendental signifier, arguing that
mere immanence, the languageness of language (Fineman), is not
the risk taken by artists, nor does it help us to comprehend the
meaning of meaning, or our own poor humanity.
In the deep heart's core, Steiner hears the music of "felt
meaning," or what Hartman called "voice-feeling":
The private reader or listener can become an executant
of felt meaning when he learns the poem or the musical
passage by heart. To learn by heart is to afford the
text or music an indwelling clarity and life-force.
. . No exegesis or criticism from without can so
directly incorporate within us the formal means, the
principles of executive organization of a semantic
fact, be it verbal or musical. Accurate recollection
and resort in remembrance generate a shaping
reciprocity between ourselves and that which the heart
knows. [9]
Few critics of literary Romanticism write this way these days,
choosing instead to propound the death of lyric consciousness
(Rajan) . Yet it seems to me that Wordsworth and Yeats, twin
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pillars of Romantic lyricism, meet in Steiner's trope of the
knowing that is the heart's knowing. Wordsworth virtually begins
Romanticism with his Great Ode, its blessings, its "song of
thanks and praise; I [its] obstinate questionings I Of
sense and outward things I FaIlings from us, vanishings"; and its
"thanks to the human heart by which we live. ,,27 Which in Yeats
becomes the music of the deep heart's core at Innisfree. Nor is
Steiner willing to allow the heart's knowing to be dismissed as
mere idealizing, or that bugbear trope, "essentializing":
The issues here are political and social in the
strongest sense. A cultivation of trained, shared
remembrance sets a society in natural touch with its
own past. What matters even more, it safeguards the
core of individuality. [10, my emphasis]
The Steiner ian wager on transcendence as the origin of art
(recall Stevens' "impossible possible philosophers' man," his
"mirror with a voice") throws him into conflict with decon-
structors and historicizers alike. While the former would like
to trap him in the textual labyrinth of aporia, the latter (Said
and Lentricchia for example) would similarly like to trap him in
the labyrinth of history and worldliness, literary texts being
linked primarily or exclusively to social power relations.
Steiner protests that
no epistemology, no philosophy of art can lay claim to
inclusiveness if it has nothing to teach us about the
nature and meanings of music. Claude Levi-Strauss's
affirmation [derived, I must add, from his precursor
Rousseau] that "the invention of melody is the supreme
mystery of man" seems to me of sober evidence. zs [19]
27
"Ode: Intimations of Immortality," Poetical Works, p. 461, 462.
28 In his Grammatology (pp. 195-200) Oerrida deconstructs Rousseau's
mediatations on music, song, and voice.
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He resists the effrontery of both deconstructive and historicist
critical theory to claim sovereignty over the provinces of the
creative. And he quarrels, in part, with a diminished,
politicized form of deconstruction practiced today in American
universities, the mechanical rather than vital legacy of Derrida
and de Man that propagates the "dominion of secondary and
parasi tic discourse over immediacy, of the cri tical over the
creative" [38, my emphasis]. (Apposite here is Hillis Miller's
famous account of parasitic discourse in "The Critic as Host"
[1977J in which the "original" host [the poemJ becomes the
parasite or guest of the commentary. Miller's work enacts this
reversal of primary and secondary texts, but with such verve and
vitality that a new and generative balance is struck between
canonical poem and commentary. Miller's mere imitators are the
suitable target of Steiner's critique.)
becomes at best mystification and at
reactionary.
All is death, discontinuity, and mere discourse.
Literary hierarchy
worst politically
As a
result, Yeats's "Leda and the Swan" (1923) can and even ought to
be read as if it were a political pamphlet. In William Johnsen's
article on Yeats's poem, Leda is reduced to woman and the Swan-
god Zeus is augmented-reduced to man, so that Johnsen can turn
the poem into a revolutionary call for the sexual refusal of men
by women. This would, he suggests, lead to "the positive
equalizing of the sexes in a non-violent society" [88J. I will
not pause to consider what "society" would exist or how it would
last if its sexes did not have sex. But how a bird-god becomes
a man, and why Leda should not represent all humanity when struck
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by a transcendent power and knowledge, is left unexplained in
favor of a political allegory that reads the poem as "a sonnet
depicting a rape as a welcome sign of a better future" [80].
Such readings ignore a poem in order to put forward other claims,
and in such a context Steiner's phrase, the "dominion of the
secondary," is an apt phrase. His critique is acerbic, deeply
felt, and seems to me right on the mark:
No textuality, no art form, no mayfly of literary,
musical or material contrivance is, a priori, ruled
out of court. The bell wether of American univer-
sities assigns to its "core curriculum," that is to
say, to its minimal requirements for literacy, a
course on black women novelists of the early 1980s.
Poets [and] novelists . . . of the most derivative or
passing interest, are made the object of seminars and
dissertations, of undergraduate lectures and post-
doctoral research. The axioms of the transcendent
. are invested in the overnight. [33]
Not only is the canon being flouted but so is basic literacy, as
Shakespeare, Mil ton, Wordsworth, and Yeats are sacrificed or
converted so that criticism and teaching can become modes of
social engineering.
But Steiner's main quarrel is not so much with imitative and
politicized forms of deconstruction; it is much more with the
primary, the original article. He defers to the "witty and
challenging . . . acrobatics of deconstruction, . [especially
when] aware of [its] own essential reductiveness" [85]; he values
the new beginning of modernism invented through the negative
risks of Rimbaud and Mallarme, precursors of deconstruction:
[With] Mallarme and modernism, language comes home to
its numinous freedom, to its disinvestment from the
inchoate, derelict fabric of the world.
Such total disinvestment can restore to words their
magical energies, can wake within them the lost
potential for benediction or anathema, for incantation
and discovery. [98]
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And the ascetic negations of Kafka are appreciated as "an Adamic
transparency achieved by no other writer." His prose has "the
immediacy of light" [113]. Yet Rimbaud's and Mallarme's and
Kafka's practices cannot be taken, Steiner insists, as sanction
for deconstruction's powerful negations. The transcendental
wagers that they made are precisely what Steiner sees as the
object of deconstructive irony and deflation. And though he
doesn't say so, he seems to have specifically in mind de Man's
disfiguration of "the principle of intelligibility" in the essay
on "Lyrical Voice" (quoted above), as well as Derrida's ongoing
critique of onto-theology or the metaphysics of transcendental
presence, when he comes to the center of his argument.
What I want to do is to clarify . . . the theological
and metaphysical repudiations which lie at the heart
of the entire deconstructive enterprise. It is in
regard to the poststructuralist, deconstructive sense
of the illegitimacy of the intelligible, as it was
grounded in a transcendent dimension or category, that
I want to consider this mutiny of theory . . . against
the authority of the poetic. [116J
Theory's mutiny against the authority of the poetic--this phrase
suggests the violent, agonistic nature of the opponents on either
side of the rift dividing poetry and commentary, the rift that
I observed at the start. Load every rift with ore, said Keats.
But what kind of ore is irony? The greatest irony here--and
Steiner is painfully aware of it--is that it is the poetic figure
of irony that de Man, for example, uses to empty out, to
destitute, and to usurp a poetic object. Figure becomes
disfiguration. Voice becomes death. Metaphor becomes the abyss.
"There is no purity in poiesis," Steiner observes. "Meta-
physical, political, social interests and concealments are at
work throughout. Deconstruction will show that theory, visible
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or spectral, dynamic or vestigial, haunts the would-be innocence
of immediacy" [117] . Once poetic form can be shown to be
polluted by impurities, the rift of aporia can be opened up and
all language, poetry included, especially poetry in de Man's and
Miller's case, can be shown to lack transcendental foundation,
to wander aimlessly through immanence without origin or end, and
ultimately to fall from "the principle of intelligibility" into
"the madness of words."
Derrida's formulation is beautifully incisive: "the
intelligible face of the sign remains turned to the
word and the face of God." A semantics, a poetics of
correspondence, of decipherability and truth-values
arrived at across time and consensus, are strictly
inseparable from the postulate of theological-meta-
physical transcendence. Thus the origin of the
axiom of meaning and of the God-concept is a shared
one. [19]
In "Ego Dominus Tuus" (1915), a doctrinal poem concerning
his antithetical poetics, Yeats wrote:
The rhetorician would deceive his neighbours,
The sentimentalist himself; while art
Is but a vision of reality. [265]
Yeats spent twenty years writing and rewriting A Vision (1925,
1937), and a lifetime trying to perfect his own vision of
reality. At times he was a rhetorician, at times a senti-
mentalist; but was his "vision" beyond impurities? The strong
ironies of deconstruction teach us that to believe as much would
involve, says Steiner, "a declared or undeclared delusion, an
innocence or political-aesthetic cunning" [119]. And yet Steiner
would have us make a wager on a sublime beyond our ken, a wager
on the internalization of "the other." In a mood that is
unmistakably Yeatsian, Steiner affirms his own wager on the
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transcendent, where "the claims of the other's presence reach so
deeply into the final precincts of aloneness" [137].
We are, at key instants, strangers to ourselves,
errant at the gates of our own psyche. We knock
blindly at the doors of turbulence, of creativity, of
inhibition within the terra incognita of ourselves.
Without the arts, form would remain unmet and
strangeness without speech in the silence of the
stone. The encounter with the aesthetic is
. that of an Annunciation, of a "terrible beauty"
or gravity breaking into the small house of our cau-
tionary being. If we have heard rightly the wing-beat
and provocation of that visit, the house is no longer
inhabitable in quite the same way as it was before.
A mastering intrusion has shifted the light.
[139, 140, 143]
What is especially remarkable about this passage is not its
conscious allusions to Yeats, the immediately recognizable
"terrible beauty" from "Easter, 1916" (1916), and even the
slightly less overt allusion to "the great wings beating still"
from "Leda and the Swan." More remarkable are the covert, bet ter
yet, the unconscious alLusi onsi" to "The Magi" (1913)--"Being by
Calvary's turbulence unsatisfied, / The uncontrollable mystery
on the bestial floor"--and the even more enigmatic allusion to
"A Dialogue of Self and Soul" (1927)--"A living man is blind and
drinks his drop. / What matter if the ditches are impure?" And
"But when I think of that my tongue's a stone." In fact, the
dialectics of this great canonical poem--which I will discuss in
detail in the fourth chapter--its quest for a blessing by the
internalization of the Other, virtually guide and dominate the
entire quoted passage from Steiner's prose, suggesting the power
of Yeats, as Daniel O'Hara has argued, to influence (the theory
of) literary criticism. "A mastering intrusion has shifted the
29 Harold Bloom will speak of "patterns of forgetting in a poem" [Agon
336] .
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light," indeed. And a voice has shifted, from Yeats to Steiner,
from heart to heart.
But it is not that "A Dialogue of Self and Soul," as a
discrete poem, is so crucial to Steiner's work, nor even that
Yeats's body-of-work as such is so crucial. It is rather the
exemplary, relatively contemporary and emblematical way in which
Yeats's great poems warp the great tradition that precedes and
follows him that is so utterly crucial--a place of crossing, if
you will. Only one critic I know of can in any way satisfy the
urge to know this "uncontrollable mystery" of breaking and re-
making that is Yeats's tradition; only Harold Bloom has shown
this sort of strength.
1.10 Bloom, the Voices of the Dead
In tombs of gold and lapis lazuli
Bodies of holy men and women exude
Miraculous oil, odour of violet.
But under heavy loads of trampled clay
Lie bodies of the vampires full of blood;
Their shrouds are bloody and their lips are wet.
"Oil and Blood"
The genius of irony is a phrase that is used by O'Hara as
the title of his beautifully provocative piece published in two
versions, "The Genius of Irony: Nietzsche in Bloom." But to me
the phrase is spoiled by reference to either writer, for
Nietzsche was far too powerful a literalist of the imagination,
to borrow Yeats's description of Blake, while Bloom entirely
transcends irony, as I intend to show. The master, the genius
of irony is Paul de Man, who once made the quite canny observa-
tion that there is no diacritical mark to indicate irony to a
reader--but even if there were such a sign, it would be unread-
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able, duplicitous, possibly not itself. Irony must be read into
a text by a reader, at the risk of making what may have been
intended as a literal statement into an ironic figure; alter-
natively, the reader might not read irony into a text, thus
taking as literal what may have been intended as a figure. This
epistemology of irony leads, as we have seen, to undecidable
oscillation, the irony of irony. Gerard Manley Hopkins, strong
poet in the same Romantic tradition that later engulfs the
younger Yeats, wrote what are called "the terrible sonnets,"
among them being "Carrion Comfort":
Not, I'll not, carrion comfort, Despair, not feast on thee;
Not untwist--slack they may be--these last strands of man
In me or, most weary, cry I can no more. I can;
Can something, hope, wish day came, not choose not to be.3D
The de Manian reader of the Hopkins prosopopeia to the deathly
figure of Despair would oscillate, bewildered, in the aporia
between the speaker not feasting on the carrion of despair and
the speaker ironically feasting on it by saying that he will not
feast on it--how can we know the dancer from the dance? De Man
greatly (but in Steiner's view, recklessly) empowers the reader
to empty out poems with the trope of irony.
But is there not more to see and to know? Another way of
looking at this issue is to realize that, inevitably, younger
writers empty out their predecessors, believing themselves to be
either more realistic and hard-headed or more progressively
idealistic than previous generations of writers. Just as Plato
ironized his predecessors, especially Homer, so Aristotle
30 Hopkins, p. 99.
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ironized plato. 31 Sometimes it seems that we have all been
ironizing Plato ever since. But in poetry and its rival,
criticism, is there only this endless round of emptying? The
criticism of Harold Bloom is the only criticism I know of that
has attempted a response--and what a vigorous response it has
been--to the ironic negations of deconstruction, and this without
falling back into the pieties of conventional formalism or into
the moralizing mode of the post-deconstructive historicizers.
We saw above that when Lentricchia looks at de Man and his
aporia, he sees "the claustrophobic space of the literary man,"
claustrophobic because literature is too confining for
Lentricchia, always closing in on him, whereas in the space of
"history" he can breathe without fear. But what to him looks
like claustrophobia, to me looks more like agoraphobia, the pure
space of a free fall, without knowing if you have packed your
parachute. "Exhilarating" is hardly word enough, for this dance-
with-death.
The Satanic Verses (l988) begins precisely with just such
a free fall, as
Just before dawn one winter's morning, New Year's Day
or thereabouts, two real, full-grown, living men fell
from a great height, twenty-nine thousand and two
feet, towards the English Channel, without benefit of
parachutes or wings, out of a clear sky. [3]
The two falling figures reveal Rushdie's Manichaean Gnostic
intuitions. One of them believes himself to be the Archangel
Gabriel, and acts the role madly throughout, while the other
31 James Olney's book, The Rhizome and the Flower (1980), situates Yeats
and Jung within the context of Plato, his precursors, and much of the Platonic
tradition; but it does not gauge the angle at which the revisions from writer
to writer have taken place. I will discuss Olney in chapter four in assessing
Yeats's agon with Platonism.
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figure is temporarily transformed, a bit like Gregor Samsa in
Kafka's The Metamorphosis, into a goat-Devil. At the novel's
conclusion the main character enacts a dramatic reconciliation
with the voice of his dying father just before the death. "To
fall in love with one's father after the long angry decades was
a serene and beautiful feeling; a renewing, life-giving thing"
[523]. For Harold Bloom, as apparently for Salman Rushdie,
poetry is not a free fall, or rather, not only a free fall. It
only begins with irony, the inevitable first movement away from
total immersion in a prior voice, but it moves on through other
angles of relationship to that voice, angles which fill or
restitute as well as empty. De Man would say that the only thing
we can know is that we do not know, yet desperately desire to
know, the dancer from the dance; but Bloom's rejoinder would be
that poetry is not at all concerned with knowledge as such,
unless it be the knowledge of "gnosis." The only thing that
matters to a poet-as-poet is power over the self, rivals, and
precursors, a power that can only be seen by reading the strength
with which a trope breaks and re-makes a previous trope, or on
the other hand, the weakness with which it merely repeats it.
This is not to suggest that the question of knowledge can be
simply dismissed or evaded. On the contrary; Yeats concludes his
"Leda and the Swan" with the enigmatic question, "Did she put on
his knowledge with his power / Before the indifferent beak could
let her drop?" [322], which only confirms the human obsession
with knowledge. And as I shall argue along with Bloom, knowledge
of the highest sort, a personal yet transcendental act of gnosis,
is the quest of all strong poems. Nevertheless, knowledge that
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is about something, knowledge of any episteme, the knowledge
apposite to any epistemology is not the knowledge of poetry.
"Man can embody truth," wrote Yeats a few days before he died,
"but he cannot know it. ,,32 Embodying truth I take to be the
gnosis of poetry, but knowing truth I take to be mere
epistemology. For poetry to be poetry it cannot be confined to
any logos, although it finds its freedom in the logos. Poetic
freedom is the antithetical action, done in words, of crossing
from a place to a stance. Bloom's criticism teaches us how, from
the Bible to Beckett, poets have obsessively sought to empower
themselves by enacting that crossing. Al though the crossing
inevitably entails a falling back again into a place of
confinement or emptiness, it is the moments of restitution, of
imagined fullness, of crossing from place to power or from ethos
to pathos that most interest Bloom. For this is truly when the
poem, the poet, and the tradition he writes in are not only
broken but re-formed. This is the gnosis that knows the dancer
from the dance. Just as "reality is an activity of the most
august imagination" (Wallace Stevens), so Bloom imagines the
dialectical patterning of the poetic act as a "catastrophe
creation," a ruining of sacred truths, a gnostic breaking and re-
making of the vessel that is tradition.
Bloom's relation to deconstruction has for a number of years
been quite complicated.
de Man, Hillis Miller,
Based at Yale University together with
and Hartman in the 1970s and early
32 Ellmann, The Man and the Masks, p. 289.
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1980s,33 Bloom was seen by many conservative literary scholars
as just another rampaging deconstructor who saw poems as an
excuse for tactlessly flaunting the cri tic's Nietzschean will-to-
power over the text. And inasmuch as Bloom contributed an essay
to Deconstruction and Criticism along side essays by Derrida, de
Man, Miller, and Hartman, he also contributed to the popular
misunderstanding of his criticism as deconstruction. But as he
once said in an interview, the book's title was his "personal
joke," one of his many jokes, but nobody got it--"that those four
were deconstruction, and [heJ was criticism. ,,34
It does not take an over-subtle reading of Bloom to realize
that since at least 1975, when in A Map of Misreading he
critiqued Derrida's totalizing "scene of writing" with his own
"scene of instruction," he has been overtly waging bat t Le against
deconstruction as he sees it. But it is not Derrida's philosophy
or even Miller's criticism that most concerns Bloom. "The
critical theorist who (after Nietzsche) troubles and wounds me
most," says Bloom, "[isJ Paul de Man" [Agon 29J. For it is de
Man's deconstruction of the Romantic tradition in Britain from
Wordsworth to Yeats (and implicitly in America from Whitman to
Stevens) that eerily resembles and so profoundly threatens
Bloom's critical vision of Romanticism.
As we have seen, deconstructors like de Man, Miller, and
their acolytes have viewed the Romanticism of Wordsworth,
Shelley, and Yeats as a highly conscious, that is to say, ironic
33 De Man died in 1983, and Miller recently moved on to the University
of California at Irvine, while Hartman and Bloom remain at Yale.
34 Salusinszky, p. 68.
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manipulation of the languageness of language, a self-decon-
structing play within the immanence of language as death and
discontinuity. This is the conscious embrace of language as the
abyss. But it may also be, as Nietzsche teaches, a perspective
on the abyss, a perspectivizing of the abyss, that is to say, a
will-to-power over the abyss. Such a will-to-power will not
suffice for Bloom, who in his ongoing critique of deconstruction
has also revised his way of seeing his precursor, Nietzsche. In
Kabbalah and Criticism (1975), Bloom asks:
What is the difference between two closely related
interpretive stances, one that asks, with Nietzsche:
Who is the Interpreter, and what kind of power does he
seek to gain over the text? And the other says, with
Emerson, that only the truth as old as oneself reaches
one, that lilt is God within you that responds to God
without. "? How, for interpreters, do the Will
to Power and Self-Reliance differ? [118]
Bloom's critique of Nietzschean will-to-power and his embrace of
Emersonian self-reliance continues to unfold as an important
element of his critique of deconstruction. Later in Agon (1982)
Bloom writes: "Reading seems to me now not so much Nietzsche's
Will to Power over texts, as Schopenhauer's power to will texts,
or rather texts of the Sublime, which is to say, of the Abyss,
. the Abyss in its Gnostic sense" [17]. For de Man, the
abyss is language, and he exercises his power over it by
embracing it in a perspective, the perspective of aporia--the
interminable deadly oscillation of undecidability. But for
Bloom, the Abyss is not language and aporia is not the figuration
of interminable doubt. If they were, the abyss, language, and
aporia would be death; but a poem and its imagination are nothing
if not a struggle to defeat death, to unite with the Abyss, to
make divine the merely cosmic self.
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When Hamlet writes to Ophelia,
Doubt thou the stars are fire.
Doubt that the sun doth move.
Doubt truth to be a liar.
But never doubt I love. [II, ii, 115-118; p. 106]
--the "truth," the power of the poetry cannot be located in
whether or not the stars are fire, or the sun moves, or truth is
a liar, or even whether or not Hamlet loves Ophelia. For as
Steiner has said, "Anything can be said and, in consequence,
written about anything" [53], and Hamlet's words and lines can
be willed "to mean" virtually anything. But the truth, the power
of the poetry is our persuasion, along with Hamlet's and
Ophelia's, that his freedom, his power to make words mean is
stronger than the power of words and circumstance to make Hamlet
their slave--even though this persuasion be a lie. For Hamlet
may indeed be a slave ("0, what a rogue and peasant slave am
I!"). But as Bloom puts it,
Language does not become poetry for us until we know
language is telling us lies, because the truth is
ambivalence and so also already death. Poetry
has to be loved before we can know it as poetry, and
must inspire ambivalence in us at the center of that
love. Language [however] does not require love
from us. . .. [Agon 30]
Like Steiner then, Bloom too makes his stance a wager on the
transcendent, for to do otherwise would be to wager only on
death, not on rebirth. To yield oneself up to the labyrinth of
aporia is not to love the Abyss, the gigantic Other within and
without. It is to make of language a new Demiurge--a fallen god,
that, like Blake's Urizen, has usurped the Abyss and turned face
and voice away from the Abyss. I realize that this prose may
seem suddenly odd, even willfully perverse. But this is because
we have moved, with Bloom, from the ironic language of logical
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negation to the sublime language of gnostic myth, which is a
language of nega tive dialectics, nega tive theology, nega tive
transcendence, and according to Bloom, the only language
appropriate to poetry. For in Bloom's eyes, contemporary decon-
structions and historicisms as well as older scholarly formalisms
(like New Criticism) are equally inadequate to poetry.
With their passion for the trope of "the actual" and their
resistance to the anti-referentiality of the deconstructors, Said
and Lentricchia propagate a new mimesis. While in making no link
at origin or end between language and world, the deconstructors
voice an anti-mimesis. But Bloom distinguishes his poetics from
both of the above by articulating what he calls a "supermimesis"
[e.g., 70, 177J that is more adequate to poetry:
Nowadays, the theorists of negation have replaced the
Demiurge by "language," but that is only to transform
"language" into the Demiurge. From a Gnostic perspec-
tive, anti-mimetic and mimetic theories of creation
merely repeat the ancient difference between stoic and
Platonic accounts, a difference that pragmatically
makes little difference, as both. . yield them-
selves up to the tyranny of time, to one or another
rhetoric of temporality. [They are just J two
kinds of ironists, neither of whom is willing to press
his dualism beyond the final bounds of demiurgic
reason. [89]
Along with the Romantic poets he studies, Bloom is willing to
press his gnostic dualism of cosmic mind and body versus acosmic
pneuma or spirit beyond the bounds of mere ironic figuration.
As Yeats's heroic precursor Blake said, "Less than all cannot
satisfy man." If de Man is right to contend that all language
is error or lies (and he is right), then why would any Romantic
poet rest content with the lies of others as the condition of
that poet's imagination? "Language is not the Demiurge, breaking
the vessels to a fresh creation of catastrophe. Catastrophe is
52
indeed already the condition of language, the condition of the
ruins of time, and of the defense against time, the deep lie at
every reimagined origin" [30]. A poem, therefore, does not
submit. Instead it defends itself against all anteriority, that
is to say, against itself, against other poems, and ultimately
, tt' 35agalns lme. It seeks persuasion, not cognition or knowledge
in any fallen sense.
In Wallace stevens: The Poems of Our Climate (1977) Bloom
confronts de Manian deconstruction and urges upon us a criticism
that will transcend the limits of aporia, the "figuration of
doubt" that for de Man dominates how tropes can know:
For the deconstructive critic, a trope is a figure of
knowing and not of willing, and so such a critic seeks
to achieve, in relation to any poem--or to find in
that poem--a cognitive moment [Hillis Miller's
"linguistic moment"], a moment in which the Negative
is realized. . But what can a cognitive or epi-
stemological moment in a poem be? Where the will
predominates, even in its own despite, how much is
there left to know? . . . A deconstructive reading of
a poem must treat the poem's urging of us, to what-
ever, as the poem's own questioning of the language of
urging. The issue of the limits of deconstruction
will be resolved only if we attain a vision of rhe-
toric more comprehensive than the deconstructors
allow, that is if we can learn to see rhetoric as
transcending the epistemology of tropes and as
reentering the space of the will-to-persuasion.
[387-388]
This space is what Bloom calls the poem as a lie-against-time.
And in this space there may be a knowledge or a knowing, but not
that of any epistemologist. Bloom's formula, it seems to me, is
that a strong lie can be a gnosis--a knowing in which the knower
becomes the known [Agon 170, 226]. But for the poem-as-lie to
be strong it must enact a drastic and antithetical or evasive
35 This is Bloom's theme of revlslonism, addressed throughout his work,
but stated succinctly in his Wallace stevens, p. 386-387.
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freedom. It is a lie because, despite the condition of
catastrophe, it must recreate self, world, and language through
a "dialectic of negation, evasion, and extravagance":
What a Gnostic or a strong poet knows is what only a
strong reading of a belated poem or lie-against-time
teaches: a freedom compounded of three elements, and
these are: negation, evasion, and extravagance. [59]
Hans Jonas, in his classic study of historical Gnosticism,
defined aporia as "bewilderment, ,,36 a useful description of that
figuration of doubt, of being lost in a wilderness or a maze.
But what for de Man is the aporia of bewilderment, the madness
of words, and death, is for Steiner and Bloom a new freedom.
Instead of the cut within metaphor which divides it from itself,
Steiner sees an arc of metaphor spanning a chasm, the Keatsian
rift:
Where it is most expressive, language, art, music
makes sensible to us a root of secrecy within itself.
The arc of metaphor, without which there can be
neither shaped thought nor performative intelli-
gibility, spans an undeclared foundation. [176]
Keats loads with ore what Steiner spans with an arc. And Bloom's
sense of "poetic
. ,,37
crosslng, apropos of Keats and Steiner,
radically re-sees the arc of metaphor and its root of secrecy.
Like Yeats's lifelong effort to embody the truth, Bloom's
revision of the arc that spans the rift reveals aporia, with
joyous extravagance, to be the site of an evasive freedom. Far
from being merely a topos of interminable error-ridden sub-
stitution of trope for trope, aporia is for Bloom the moment of
freedom wherein a place becomes a stance:
36 The Gnostic Religion, p. 188.
37 "Poetic Crossing" is the title of Bloom's theoretical "Coda" to his
Wallace stevens, wherein he offers a critique of de Man's aporia.
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A topos is truly not so much a commonplace or a memory
place as more nearly the place of a voice, the place
from which the voice of the dead breaks through.
Hence, a topos is an image of voice or of speech, or
the place where such an image is stored. The movement
from topos to topos, the crossing, is always a crisis
because it is a kind of judgment or criticism between
images of voice and between the different kinds of
figurative thinking that opposed topics [i.e., topoiJ
generate. [Wallace Stevens 399J
The Bloomian concept of evasion is crucial to this agonic sense
of conflict between images of voice, this crossing from voice to
voice. For it is in evasion and its freedom that poets live the
illusion of voicing their own voice, an illusion that moves
through six ratios or stances of dialectical identity with, and
difference from, the voice of the precursor.
Before his Wallace Stevens and Agon, Bloom's poetic theory
had offered a critique of de Manian aporia by way of his
revisionary ratios and dialectics of misreading, wi thin poems and
between poems. Whereas de Manian misreading allows only the
grand anti-mimetic trope of ironic emptying, Bloom's dialectics
of misreading sees "patterns of forgetting in a poem" [Agon 336J ;
he sees poems as misreading precursor poems in six stances which
alternately destitute, then restitute the voice of the precursor
and the new poem, as I shall demonstrate in my final chapter.
Thus Bloom's theory overcomes the ahistorical, ironic randomness
of de Man's deconstruction. Similarly, Bloom's theory of stances
allows for the emergence of a dialectic that is internal to a
poem--a great post-Miltonic crisis lyric moving between three
stances that limit and three stances that restore. Again this
overcomes de Man's extreme asceticism wherein a great poem can
only exhibit the stance of ironic self-emptying. Rather than
seeing poems as troped and trapped into aporia, "that impossible-
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to-solve mental dilemma" [Agon 274J, Bloom envisions poems as
acts of gnostic evasion or negative transcendence in which the
poet seeks self-divination in a writing that is also a voicing
of the poem. Such a writing is an agon with a composite
internalized Other, including history, other poems, and the
fallen self. Such an agon attempts to create from catastrophe
and must lead to what Bloom calls a "Great Defeat." And yet it
is the attempt which is ennobling, the stance which insists on
transforming ethos to pathos. Bloom refuses, with a noble lie,
to see poems as figures of death, as mere signs on a page:
A poetic "text," as I interpret it, is not a gathering
of signs on a page, but is a psychic battlefield upon
which authentic forces struggle for the only victory
werth winning, the divinating triumph over oblivion.
[Puetry and Repression 2J
That divinating triumph over oblivion is only won at the cost of
a confrontation with death in its myriad and protean variety of
forms. But more than a death, writing for Bloom must be a re-
birth that happens "where the voice of the dead father breaks
through" [Agon 245J. Clearly alluding to deconstructors like de
Man and Miller, Bloom notes that "The marking, the will-to-
inscribe, is the ethos of writing that our most advanced philo-
sophers of rhetoric trace" [245J. But he is interested in a
wager that crosses beyond ethos to "the knowing [thatJ is itself
a voicing, a pathos, and [thatJ leads us back to the theme of
presence that, in a strong poem, persuades us ever afresh, even
as the illusions of a tired metaphysics cannot" [245J.
Bloom's critique of deconstruction shows the way forward for
criticism, just as did Yeats's 1928 letter to Sean O'Casey which
sets out the primal and final responsibility of the artist:
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Do you suppose for one moment that Shakespeare edu-
cated Hamlet and King Lear by telling them what he
thought and believed? As I see it, Hamlet and Lear
educated Shakespeare, and I have no doubt that in the
process of the education he found out that he was an
altogether different man to what he thought himself,
and had altogether different beliefs.33
It ought to be clear that in repudiating all moralizing imposi-
tion on art and poetry, Yeats envisions the making of art, music,
poetry as an act that transforms and renews the artist. Vision,
voice, and gnosis are inevitable, inalienable metaphors for this
negative and evasive process of self-transformation. A poem can
be nothing but "a dumb struggling thought seeking a mouth to
utter it, ,,39 said Yeats. His antipathy for the mimesis of a
moralizing literature was no less vigorous than his rejection of
any anti-mimesis that would glorify the random, dwell in the
asceticism of pure irony, or undermine all genealogy. In the
same essay that Miller uses ironically to quote the poet against
himself, Yeats in a Bloomian spirit said of art that "all that
is personal soon rots; it must be packed in ice or salt.
Ancient salt is best packing. [I]magination must dance,
must be carried beyond feeling into the aboriginal ice. ,,40 Like
his precursor Yeats, and unlike his deconstructing colleagues,
Bloom does not see language as the abyss, the void of arbitrary
meaning, the madness of words, and death. In such a void there
can be no value to a kiss. But like Dante and Shelley before
him, and Bloom after him, Yeats knows that the kiss and the dance
38 Quoted by Whitaker, p. 98.
39 Essays and Introductions, p. 317.
"A General Introduction for my Work," Essays and Introductions, p.
522, 523.
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are possible, even if achieved only at the great cost of a great
defeat--"We free ourselves from obsession that wemaybe nothing.
The last kiss is given to the void. ,,41
41 Quoted by whitaker, p. 113.
One had a lovely face
And two or three had charm
But charm and face were in vain
Because the mountain grass
Cannot but keep the form
Where the mountain hare has lain.
"Memory"
Chapter Two
Mask, Dancer, Plato, Muse:
Yeats and the Tropes of Influence
Having considered in the first chapter the severely ironic
critical theory of deconstruction as well as the costs to be paid
for invoking it to interpret Yeats, Romantic poetry, and lyrical
voice, I now turn to the issue of Yeats criticism as a collective
body or institution that has produced the composite figure we
commonly refer to as "Yeats." I will review and revise bio-
graphical, New Cri tical, psychoanalytical, and philosophical
accounts of "Yeats," deferring historical-political accounts to
the third chapter. My aim will be to critique the weaknesses of
these accounts and the weaknesses of the composite figure that
emerges from them, all the while suggesting what I take to be the
best critical theoretical approach to "Yeats" and to the poems.
Broadly speaking, my trajectory will be similar to that of Daniel
O'Hara in "Yeats in Theory" (1987)--an article strongly
influenced by the critical theory of Harold Bloom. But where
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O'Hara emphasized the great influence of Yeats generally over
American critics and theorists (R. P. Blackmur, Northrop Frye,
Harold Bloom, and Paul de Man), I will concentrate specifically
on the influence of A Vision and especially "Among School
Children" over various critics such as Richard Ellmann, T. R.
Henn, Joseph Adams, Cleanth Brooks, Frank Kermode, the early Paul
de Man, David Lynch, and Robert Snukal.
For the most part, we now go back to a consideration of
criticism that is antediluvian in being pre-deconstructive, even
though some of the texts to be considered were written and
published after that cataclysmic moment of the late 1960s and
early 1970s when deconstruction shocked English literature
programs in North America. Biographical and psychoanalytical
readings of Yeats have in common a tendency to use the poems as
a means of shedding light on aspects of the life of the man--his
private affairs, his public engagements, his spiritualist
obsessions, his psychological anxieties, and so on. Critics
interested more in the poetry than in the life often either focus
too narrowly on each poem as a discrete text thereby neglecting
its relations to a larger poetic matrix, or they consider Yeats's
work merely as a reflection of myths, symbols, and a presumed
doctrine. Philosophy-oriented critics see the poems as examples
of various philosophical arguments and positions, rather than
more properly as poetic acts breaking and remaking Yeats's poetic
tradition.
All these approaches have their strengths, their
temptations, and their pleasures, because all in some degree are
the result of what Yeats called "sedentary toil":
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Why should you leave the lamp
Burning alone beside an open book,
And trace these characters upon the sands?
A style is found by sedentary toil
And by the imitation of great masters.
["Ego Dominus Tuus" 266]
Yeats's critics, enchanted by him as a great master, seek to
imitate him. They sit and they toil, and in so doing, they
create achievements that earn our respect. But were they truly
to imitate their master, they would not merely bend his poetic
energies into limited figurations of his life or his psyche or
his philosophy. They would do as he did to his masters, Shelley
and Blake.
2.1 Ellmann and the Influence of the Mask
Those men that in their writings are most wise
Own nothing but their blind, stupefied hearts.
"Ego Dominus Tuus"
In Yeats criticism, Richard Ellmann is the name that
dominates the field of literary biography. Published in 1948,
nine years after the poet's death, Yeats: The Man and the Masks
was his first book on the poet. A few other books preceded his,
one by Louis MacNeice in 1941 and one by Joseph Hone in 1942, but
MacNeice's book was a highly idiosyncratic expression of worry
over the gap between Yeatsian poetic freedom and socialist
responsibili ty, while Hone's book was virtually a straight
forward biography. It was Ellmann' s book that so greatly
influenced the literary biographies to follow his. By usurping
Yeats's trope of "the mask" as a grand trope in an attempt to
integrate an interpretation of Yeats's life with his work,
Ellmann inaugurated a form of Yeats criticism that would find
imitators for decades.
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But Ellmann used the poet's trope of the mask in a way that
was entirely different from Yeats's own use of it. For Ellmann
the mask was a mimetic and a psychological concept that never
changed, but simply allowed him to describe the man, not the
poet, in terms of a split within the biographical self which
motivated Yeats's well-known poetic desire for "Unity of Being."
Ellmann summarizes the stories of doubling and splitting in the
lives of Yeats's friends and acquaintances, George Russell/A.E.,
Oscar Wilde, and William Sharp/Fiona Macleod, and then writes:
Yeats came to maturity in this atmosphere of doubling
and splitting of the self, but his mental growth was
parallel to that of other writers and did not derive
from them. Yeats noted everywhere about him
confirmation of his sense of internal division. But
as we have seen, that division had its origin in
childhood with a revolt. . against his father and
his father's world. He sought in vain the unself-
conscious life which he associated with his mother's
family. Thus many personal factors and many
examples, and beyond these the spirit of the times,
made him see his life as a quarrel between two parts
of his being. [77J
The passage above is, in my view, the crucial passage in The Man
and the Masks. Its importance can be recognized when we see that
psychological biography is the origin and end of Ellmann's
narrative. A man's life is to be understood in terms of his
mind, and literary works come from the particular psychology of
that mind:
What [GeorgeJ Moore did not realize was that Yeats,
during the 'nineties, had not one style but two, that
he used the one to undercut the other, and that as a
result he was less committed to anyone way of writing
than he appeared. The same uncertainty which made him
set up a tension in his life between opposing con-
ceptions of his personality, and a further tension
between the principles of opposition and fusion,
affected all his thought and kept him for a long time
from deciding unequivocally upon a manner of ex-
pression. [138J
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The Man and the Masks is Ellmann's best contribution to the
field of Yeats studies because it used the concept of "tension
between the principles of opposition and fusion" to drive his
narrative description of Yeats-the-man. Less concerned with the
life and times of the poet than with his poems, The Identity of
Yeats (1954) is a fine example of practical literary criticism;
while Eminent Domain: Yeats among Wilde, Joyce, Pound, Eliot, and
Auden (1967) is interesting for the biographical matrix of
literary men that it depicts. Yet neither can measure up to
Ellmann's first book which so influenced later studies because
of its domestication of the trope that Yeats called "the mask."
The trope that for Yeats was an image of voice in the poetic act
of self-transformation decays for Ellmann into the more access-
ible, biographical notion of a psychological self splitting and
striving for unity. Ellmann's sense of "the mask" is relatively
stable because it is the motor prinCiple of the psyche in all its
guises, poses, permutations, leading to a composite figure called
"Yeats." But Yeats's own sense of the mask is highly volatile
because it is beyond the psyche and its guises. More radical in
his dualism, Yeats made his mask the voice of the antithetical
self which, when under severe pressure, becomes the gnostic spark
which is alien to any mere psychological mask. For Yeats, the
concept of the mask was much closer to Derrida's non-concept of
differance than to Ellmann' s sense of it. It was a gnostic,
self-revisionary, poetic trope--a trope antithetical to itself
as in the formula that one equals one plus or minus (1 1+/-),
a formula that I will have more to say about later on. Despite
Ellmann's swerve from his master, The Man and the Masks was the
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first book to purloin a major Yeatsian trope and use it to trope
Yeats into a figure.
Yeats's trope of the mask (mainly elaborated in A Vision
[1925, 1937]) and his related tropes of the antithetical self
and the "Daimon" (mainly elaborated in the earlier Per Arnica
Silentia Lunae [1918]) have their ancestry in Dante's "Virgil,"
in Milton's "Satan," in the "Rousseau" of Shelley's The Truimph
of Life, and surprisingly enough, in Yeats's ambivalent internal-
ization of Wordsworth's trope of "nature" as a primordial,
achieved anti-self. I will have more to say about Yeats and his
precursors, especially Shelley, as this dissertation develops,
but discussion of this ancestry is not my main aim here. More
to my point are the many instances of critical studies derived
from Yeats's tropes, but also legitimated by Ellmann's use of
"the mask."
In 1950, two years after Ellmann's book, T. R. Renn pub-
lished The Lonely Tower. The central trope of the book he takes
from several canonical poems such as "The Phases of the Moon"
(1918), "A Dialogue of Self and Soul" (1927), and "Blood and the
Moon" (1927), as well as from the book of poems Yeats titled The
Tower (1928). But Herin also takes the trope from the same
passage of "A General Introduction for my Work" (1937) that, as
we saw in the first chapter, J. Rillis Miller used--but only
after cleaning the passage of its salt, its references to
traditionality--to turn or trope Yeats into a deconstructor avant
la lettre:
Unless othe rwi.es: noted, all references to A Vision are to the 1937
edition (corrected in 1962).
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I must choose a traditional stanza, even what I alter
must seem traditional. I commit my emotions to
shepherds, herdsmen, camel-drivers, learned men,
Milton's or Shelley's Platonist, that tower Palmer
drew. Talk to me of originality and I will turn on
you with rage. I am a crowd, I am a lonely man, I am
nothing. Ancient salt is best packing. [522J
Clearly, the tower is a compelling trope in Yeats's work,
a trope which, if we take up the implication of Henn's epigraph,
Yeats derived from Shelley's Prince Athanase.2 More importantly
for me here, Henn uses "the tower" in much the same way that
Ellmann used "the mask"--as a trope taken from the poet's armory
of tropes but used reductively by the critic to suggest the
central dimensions of the poet's mind as it sees and as it sees
itself. But Henn diverges from Ellmann in the way he sees the
poet's mind:
man ascends to the topmost room, to find
spiritual peace. In Ideas of Good and Evil [1903J
Yeats describes the tower as the symbol of the mind
looking outward upon men and things, as well as the
symbol of the mind turned inward upon itself. At
night bats fly round it, butterflies beat their wings
against it. Both are traditionally souls or
disembodied spirits. They seek to gain entry, to
communicate the wisdom of the dead, but are too
fragile to do so. [14]
Throughout the book, and in passing, Henn observes the various
bats and butterflies--"the towering dead / With their nightin-
gales and psalms," as Dylan Thomas turns his Keatsian-Yeatsian
composite precursor--beating their wings against Yeats's tower,
his mind. But for Henn, the poet's mind must not be seen as a
place of "tension between the principles of opposition and
fusion," as in the more subtle and ironic Ellmann. For Henn, the
2 These lines from Prince Athanase form the central epigraph of the book
and are quoted again by Henn in a footnote on p. 14:
His soul had wedded Wisdom, and her dower
Is love and justice, clothed in which he sate
Apart from men, as in a lonely tower.
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mind is the lonely tower and the tower is loosely equivalent to
its output, the poet's body-of-work, not to its conflicts with
itself or with "the towering dead," the butterflies and bats who
are the poet's precursors. Henn is more concerned to describe
the structure of the tower as body-of-work, its stone and mortar,
its interior spaces and its winding stairs, than to see the tower
as mind-in-tension, or like Bloom, to reveal the tower's losing
battle to defend itself from the wings of the dead. Ellmann must
frequently meditate on the usefulness of his central trope, the
mask, because he is using it as a heuristic device to elaborate
a certain poetic psychology; Henn, on the other hand, does not
brood over "the tower." He is more interested to describe the
general poetic pattern that he sees, the myths, the symbols, and
especially the Yeatsian doctrine he perceives. Nevertheless,
like Ellmann before him he must steal a burning branch from
Yeats's fire in order to light up his own story of Yeats's
poetry, to create his own "Yeats."
The crucial observation to be made concerning my argument
about Yeats, Ellmann, and the influence of the mask is that, to
a larger extent than criticism has so far realized, Yeats
virtually invented the institution of Yeats criticism.
Similarly, with his 1893 study of his precursor William Blake,
co-written with Edwin Ellis, Yeats can truly be said to have
invented Blake criticism. Even Northrop Frye's Fearful Symmetry
(1947) cannot manage to see Blake except through the strong
inaugural vision of Yeats.3 The phenomenon that I have
In Blake and Yeats: The Contrary Vision (1955), Hazard Adams, who is
an excellent scholar but certainly no scholar of "influence" in Bloom's sense,
traces out the history of critical approaches to Blake [44-55]. Yet he
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described of Yeats's trope of the mask decaying into Ellmann's
mask, and that of his tower becoming Henn's tower, mediated and
legitimated through Ellmann's use of the mask--this phenomenon
remains today the identifying mark of Yeats criticism. Another
way of putting this is to say that no critic has yet transumed
Yeats, although Paul de Man and, as we shall see, Harold Bloom
come closest to this transumption of their precursor. In the
4first chapter (1.9), I demonstrated how even a critic as strong
as George Steiner relied upon the Yeatsian vision of the negative
dialectics of self and soul. After Ellmann and Henn there are
many examples of critics who, like Steiner, are inspired by a
Yeatsian aesthetic to produce their criticism, most of them
unhappily falling short of Steiner's sublime provocative
strength.
In Romantic Image (1957) Frank Kermode made his early mark
on criticism and theory. Intending to vent his misgivings about
the prevailing Eliotic aesthetic of the dissociation of
sensibility, Kermode invoked the counter-dissociative Yeatsian
tropes of "the tree" and more persuasively "the dancer," tropes
which culminate in "Among School Children," in order to develop
his conception of the modernity of Romantic imagism:
[The poet's] aristocratic ideal, which links Yeats's
theory of history with the Romantic theory of imagery,
applies equally to the beauty of woman and to the
beauty of the work of art. Proportion, movement,
describes the Yeats-Ellis edition as "an ambitious undertaking, the first
attempt by anyone to interpret Blake's system in detail" [44-45], as "often
brilliant and provocative" [47], and speaks of Yeats as "Blake's first real
interpreter" [54], despite general disagreement over Yeats's use of the term
"mysticism" to describe Blake's poetry and thought.
References to previous points of discussion will be made by chapter
and section in parantheses.
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meaning, are not intellectual properties, but belong
to that reality of the imagination which is a symbolic
reality. The beauty of a woman, and particularly of
a woman in movement, is the emblem of the work of art
or Image. [57]
Like "the mask" and "the tower" before it, "the dancer" here
becomes another grand trope for an understanding of "Yeats." But
in Kermode the claims transcend a discussion of his "Yeats."
"The dancer" becomes the figure for a more general cri tical
aesthetic. The effect of such a trope is startling for what it
teaches about the power of Yeats to influence critical thought.
What must be said about Frye should also be said about Kermode.
Like "the great wheel" used in Frye's Anatomy of eritici sm, which
was published in 1957, the same year as Kermode's book, and which
anatomized literary form much as Yeats had anatomized literary
history on great cosmic wheels in A Vision, "the dancer" used in
Kermode's Romantic Image contributed to the "Yeatsianizing" of
criticism and theory--a vile but an accurate phrase suggesting
the effective and growing ascendency of Yeatsian over Eliotic
critical tropes.
2.2 The Anti-Ellmann Anti-Mask
The signs and shapes;
All those abstractions that you fancied were
From the great Treatise of Parmenides;
All, all those gyres and cubes and midnight things
Are but a new expression of her body
Drunk with the bitter sweetness of her youth.
"The Gift of Harun Al-Rashid"
In our own day of "poststructuralmania," another vile
phrase, the fortunes of "the mask" have taken a new turn. In
Yeats and the Masks of Syntax (1984), Joseph Adams turns "the
mask" with a sharply ironic twist. Rather than the gnostic
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supermimesis of Yeats's "mask," rather than the psychological
mimesis of Ellmann's "mask," Adams' "mask" is an anti-mimetic
trope--he prefers the term "antiplatonic"--which submerges all
consciousness, even poetic consciousness, under a tide of
differential linguistics. "Syntactic masks," according to Adams,
are "anomalous structures" that exemplify
a shift in the relation of subjectivity to language,
with the subj ect seen as a textual product or con-
struct rather than a full centre of consciousness
expressing itself through language. Syntactic masks
also exemplify the role of "difference" in language .
. . . Both these aspects link the masks with a larger
cul tural and philosophical shift in modern
language, literature and thought, [formingJ part
of an emerging antiplatonism. [lJ
Adams makes his argument without once referring to Ellmann,
without even including The Man and the Masks in his "selected
bibliography." This anti-mimetic Yeatsian linguist, it seems,
would not want to appear to be descended from, or even associated
with, a mimetic Yeatsian. Instead, Adams prefers to find the
fathering force of his "syntactic masks" in A Vision, but his
Yeatsian credentials are not persuasive since he devotes only one
paragraph (p. 11) to discuss "the Mask" and A Vision. On the
other hand, he clearly wishes to appear as a follower of Gilles
Deleuze by citing him repeatedly as his authority. Yet Adams'
prose often seems more influenced by the tropes of Paul de Man
than by those of other poststructuralists:
an oscillation is set up between alternative
possibilities. With neither syntactic form becoming
fully possible, no final meaning can be assigned.
Form and meaning become radically dislodged from one
another. [TJwo mutually exclusive syntactic
alternatives do somehow occur simultaneously in the
same words. Syntactic masks thus become radically
undecidable elements stuck into the normal flow of
discourse. [4J
69
Although he claims that "platonism [is] dominant in both
Yeats and modern culture," Adams confidently insists on "the
penetration of antiplatonism into Yeats's language," and refers
to "Yeats's syntactic masks" [1, my emphasis], though the term
is obviously his own. Drawn into the vexed question of Yeats's
relation to the Platonic tradition, a question that I will
entertain in chapter four, he asserts quite flatly that
"antiplatonism" defines the thought of A Vision by tying his
syntactic masks to A Vision and its "antiplatonic theory" of the
subject:
In Yeats's model as in Deleuze's, the subject is never
completely separate from the primordial field of ten-
sions defining it ("My instructors identify conscious-
ness with conflict," A Vision, 214.) The subject, the
individual consciousness, is finally only a result
within the system of gyres. It only comes about
through the systematic play of oppositions, reci-
procities and interdependencies among the "Four
Principles" and the "Four Faculties" (including the
Mask) . [11]
Without a theory of the genealogy of tropes, the anti-mimeticist
falls into absurdity. Tropological legitimacy is taken from the
father (syntactic masks are Yeatsian), yet mind and meaning are
secondary effects, mere illusions of the arbitrary differential
laws of language.
The reduction of A Vision to anti-Platonic anti-mimeticism
seems to me to be "gorgeous nonsense" (Bloom), yet I find it a
useful trope to highlight my own differences with mimeticists
like Ellmann and anti-mimeticists like Adams. It appears to me
that Yeats's vision shares nothing with either of them, unless
we say that his extravagant negation of both positions is a kind
of "sharing" with them. For what ought to be clear is that both
Ellmann and Adams are reductionists of "the mask" and are only
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arguing about degrees of irony. Ellmann wants to reduce "the
mask" to an imitative image which he can then use as a tool to
shape the psychology of Yeats-the-man. Adams, on the other hand
and with stronger irony, wants to reduce the mask to a non-image
which is not imitative of any psychology, and which will
substitute "the languageness of language" (Fineman, 1.8) for
psychology, consciousness, and life.
Yeats, however, is elsewhere. His "mask" (not to mention
his "tower" and his "dancer") is irreducible to either the irony
of psycho-biography or to the more severe irony of the absence
of psychology and the subject in differential linguistics.
Yeats's "mask" transcends both of these by being at once far less
and far more than the two of them. They both reify the trope of
the mask, but Yeats is a great poet because his work is an
ongoing project that evasively negates his tropes in the making
of new tropes, and "the mask" is only one of his emblems for this
antithetical activity.
No doubt, Yeats is often tempted by what could be called the
Parmenidean ideal, Parmenides having been maybe the first
historical protagonist of that anti-mimetic form of thought that
today goes by the name of poststructuralism. Nevertheless, it
comes as a surprise that in one sentence Adams reduces A Vision
to mere determinism--"The subject, the individual consciousness,
is finally only a result of the system of gyres" [11]--and in
doing so, he exposes a great ignorance. For there is little
Making a similar point about recent debates between M. H. Abrams and
J. Hillis Miller, Harold Bloom writes: "Increasingly, I suspect that Abrams
and Hillis Miller, when they debate interpretive modes, truly dispute only
degrees of irony, of the human gap between expectation and fulfillment" [Agon
31) •
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value to A Vision unless it be a quest for the tropes which will
temporarily suffice to guarantee Yeats's poetic freedom, by
transcending the unsatisfying conventions and orthodoxies of
mimetic idealism, and the overwhelmingly corrosive ironies of
historical necessity (the gyres). "I hail the superhuman," says
Yeats. Being a great poet, Yeats must impose himself on mimetic
and anti-mimetic alike, or die into the mere repetition of the
tropes of other poets, including his own past selves.
Day after day I have sat in my chair turning a
symbol over in my mind, exploring all its details,
defining and again defining its elements, testing my
convictions and those of others by its unity,
attempting to substitute particulars for an
abstraction like that of algebra. I have felt the
convictions of a lifetime melt though at an age when
the mind should be rigid, and others take their place,
and these in turn give way to others. . Then I
draw myself up into the symbol and it seems as if I
should know all if I could but banish such memories
and find everything in the symbol.
But nothing comes--though this moment was to reward
me for all my toil. Perhaps I am too old. Surely
something would have come when I meditated under the
direction of the Cabalists. What discords will drive
Europe to that artificial unity--only dry or drying
sticks can be tied into a bundle--which is the
decadence of every civilisation? Then I
understand. I have already said all that can be said.
The particulars are the work of the Thirteenth Cone or
cycle which is in every man and is called by every man
his freedom. Doubtless, for it can do all things and
knows all things, it knows what it will do with its
own freedom but it has kept the secret.
[A Vision 301-302]
2.3 schooling, and Cleanth Brooks
. the children's eyes
In momentary wonder stare upon
A sixty-year-old smiling public man.
"Among School Children"
A crucial insight of Bloomian criticism concerns the uncanny
power of some poems to influence not just later poems, but also
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criticism and theory. "Among School Children" possesses this
uncanny power and may turn out to be, like Wordsworth's Great
Ode, the most influential poem of its era. I would argue that
no other single poem, not even "The Waste Land," has influenced
the criticism and theory of poetry as the Yeats poem has. If
critics are compelled to speculate about the possibility of
poetic vision, they come to deal with "Among School Children,"
which was already there imposing itself on them. They intuited
the possibility of poetic vision because "Among School Children"
gave them that possibility with inescapable persuasiveness.
And yet they betrayed the poem, by reducing it. They took,
but did not give back in the same measure. Cleanth Brooks could
"only" return a practical theory of paradox, tension, and
reconciliation--a critical move embellished a decade later by
Frank Kermode with his attention to the trope of "the dancer."
Paul de Man could "only" return the more bitterly truthful error
or irony of interminable oscillation between mutually exclusive
imperatives--how can we know the dancer from the dance? David
Lynch brilliantly reduces the poem by turning it merely into
symptoms of a psychoanalytic condition, while Robert Snukal
typifies the compulsion to reduce the poem to a philosophical
doctrine or debate.
I
I walk through the long schoolroom questioning;
A kind old nun in a white hood replies;
The children learn to cipher and to sing,
To study reading-books and history,
To cut and sew, be neat in everything
In the best modern way--the children's eyes
In momentary wonder stare upon
A sixty-year-old smiling public man.
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II
I dream of a Ledaean body, bent
Above a sinking fire, a tale that she
Told of a harsh reproof, or trivial event
That changed some childish day to tragedy--
Told, and it seemed that our two natures blent
Into a sphere from youthful sympathy,
Or else, to alter Plato's parable,
Into the yolk and white of the one shell.
III
And thinking of that fit of grief or rage
I look upon one child or t'other there
And wonder if she stood so at that age--
For even daughters of the swan can share
Something of every paddler's heritage--
And had that colour upon cheek or hair
And thereupon my heart is driven wild:
She stands before me as a living child.
IV
Her present image floats into the mind--
Did Quattrocento finger fashion it
Hollow of cheek as though it drank the wind
And took a mess of shadows for its meat?
And I though never of Ledaean kind
Had pretty plumage once--enough of that,
Better to smile on all that smile, and show
There is a comfortable kind of old scarecrow.
V
What youthful mother, a shape upon her lap
Honey of generation had betrayed,
And that must sleep, shriek, struggle to escape
As recollection or the drug decide,
Would think her son, did she but see that shape
With sixty or more winters on its head,
A compensation for the pang of his birth,
Or the uncertainty of his setting forth?
VI
plato thought nature but a spume that plays
Upon a ghostly paradigm of things;
Solider Aristotle played the taws
Upon the bottom of a king of kings;
World-famous golden-thighed Pythagoras
Fingered upon a fiddle-stick or strings
What a star sang and careless Muses heard:
Old clothes upon old sticks to scare a bird.
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VII
Both nuns and mothers worship images,
But those the candles light are not as those
That animate a mother's reveries,
But keep a marble or a bronze repose.
And yet they too break hearts--O Presences
That passion, piety or affection knows,
And that all heavenly glory symbolise--
a self-born mockers of man's enterprise;
VIII
Labour is blossoming or dancing where
The body is not bruised to pleasure soul,
Nor beauty born out of its own despair,
Nor blear-eyed wisdom out of midnight oil.
o chestnut tree, great rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
o body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?
Cleanth Brooks is one of a few major names associated with
the formalist movement called New Criticism. The Well Wrought
Urn (1947) contributed fundamentally, as a practical application
of the principles of New Criticism, to the jobs of teaching
poetry and writing about poetry. Following chapters on
Wordsworth's Great Ode and Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn" among
others, we find a chapter on "Among School Children." Brooks
plainly intends to use it along with the other poems to exemplify
his main thesis about the complex structure of lyric poetry, its
paradoxical tensions and its "achieved harmony" [159], which
looks suspiciously like Yeats's "Unity of Being." Brooks intends
to use the poem, but more tellingly, the poem uses him, acting
as the horizon within which he sees, or better yet, as the light
by which he sees.6 His reading of the poem is logically argued
but sadly incomplete because it cannot get beyond being merely
a dull reflection of the structure of the poem's "super-
In Destructive Poetics Paul Bove makes a similar point, suggesting
that A Vision functions as "the 'center' of [Brooks'] Modern Poetry and the
Tradition" (1939) [107].
75
structural" brilliance. In fact, if the poem were as dull as
Brooks' reading makes it seem, few would bother to read it.
To be fair, Brooks does note an important point that has
escaped the view of all other commentators on the poem, so far
as I am aware, and that is the relationship between it and
Wordsworth's Great Ode. Yeats cri tics have been blind to
Wordsworth's influence over him·7, he is usually described as
having no link or only an antipathetic relationship to
Wordsworth. But having mooted a golden insight, Brooks does
little with it except to observe that both poems deal with the
child, the man, and "the process of growing up," and that both
reflect lithe Platonic doctrine of prenatal recollection" [145].
Like many other critics, Brooks then proceeds to explicate that
Platonic doctrine and Yeats's reflection of it for the imagistic
structure of the poem, along the way noting the poem's allusion
to plato's Symposium. But a critic with an eye for more than the
mimetic reflection of images and doctrines, a critic with an eye
for the revisionary acts that break and remake poetic careers and
literary traditions would be keen to speculate on the origins of
"Among School Children, II its haunting by the "Intimations" Ode
and by Plato, and its compulsion to free its own voice of the
shadowy dead, to exorcise the voices of "the towering dead with
their nightingales and psalms. II
Instead, Brooks stumbles, especially over the challenge of
the poem's last stanza; its subtle revisionism is beyond him.
Patrick J. Keane's book, Yeats's Interactions with Tradition (1987),
is the only work I am aware of that deals with Wordsworth's influence on
Yeats. But Keane concentrates almost exclusively on passages about the French
Revolution in The Prelude said to echo in "The Second Coming." Keane's sense
of "interaction with tradition" falls far short of the Bloomian revisionary
sense of influence that I operate in this thesis.
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In life the second chance may be possible, but in poetry the
second chance is an illusion. The art of poetry is to embrace
the illusion and make it feel like the first and only chance.8
Yeats wagers his poetic career in "Among School Children" to try
to get it right, once and for all. Until this moment he has
written poem after poem, obsessed by questions and questioning,
especially about the possibility of knowing, and here he begins
in "the long schoolroom questioning." Until this moment he has
been a tower under siege by internalized "bats and butterflies,"
or if you will, with bees and starlings: "My wall is loosening;
honeybees, / Come build in the empty house of the stare" [312J.
The poetic self has come to see itself as nothing but a trope,
to be destroyed and remade again and again in the act of writing
poems. In "Among School Children," the first half of the fourth
stanza, the entire fifth stanza and the latter half of the eighth
stanza are questions, each demanding an answer concerning the
various idealisms that have been, until now, a bulwark against
death, a lie against time and suffering. But will they hold
again? Will one more lie hold against the ravages of time? and
be for the poet "A compensation for the pang of his birth, / Or
the uncertainty of his setting forth?" Will cheeks of perfect
beauty drink the wind?
Brooks seems to think that Yeats faces a question of
choosing between idealism and materialism, and he answers that
"Yeats chooses both and neither."
Alluding to a passage in Nietzsche, Bloom writes: "A trope is thus
a way of carrying a perpetual imperfection across the river of Becoming, while
thinking we carry a goddess" [Agon 32).
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One cannot know the world of being save through the
world of becoming [nor the dance save through the
dancer, we seem to overhear] (though one must remember
that the world of becoming is a meaningless flux apart
from the world of being which it implies). [152]
Brooks concludes that "The last stanza does not refute Plato--is
not intended to refute Plato" [153], but he is dancing with
shadows. Materialism was never a temptation for Yeats as a poet.
Yeats's career-long contempt for materialism of any sort was the
sine qua non of his poetry writing, his first basic negation.
The battle in the poems and in "Among School Children" is not
between materialism and Plato, but between gnosticism and the
various permutations of Platonism that have seduced Yeats
throughout his career, including his occult spiritualism, his
Cabbalism, his Neoplatonism, and so on. These are all forms of
thought that idealize spirit either as beyond human life or else
as trapped into a cycle of death-in-life and life-in-death.9
Antithetical to everything, even to itself, Yeats's gnosticism
is a more severe dualism that puts in question all these ideal-
isms by re-seeing all systematic and mystically solidifying
thought. Yeats's gnosticism vaults the poet toward a counter-lie
that gains pathos and persuasiveness only through its refusal to
be fixed into any trope, its power to negate and evade all
reification, as in the formula 1 = 1+/-.
But the cost of such a gnostic quest is high. In "Among
School Children" Yeats writes possibly his most noble defeat.
9 In the poem "Byzantium" Yeats uses these as tropes for the gnostic
V1Slon: "I hail the superhuman; I I call it death-in-life and life-in-death"
[363]. But here I use them as tropes of Platonic idealism. My meditation on
the relation between Platonism and gnostic vision will come in chapter four.
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The poem's success comes in its sublime re-voicing of
Wordsworthian serenity:
What though the radiance which was once so bright
Be now forever taken from my sight,
Though nothing can bring back the hour
Of splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower;
We will grieve not, rather find
Strength in what remains behind;
In the primal sympathy
Which having been must ever be;
In the soothing thoughts that spring
Out of human suffering;
In the faith that looks through death,
In the years that bring the philosophic mind.10
But the poem's defeat comes in its ambivalent rejection and
acceptance of the various Platonisms it questioned. "Among
School Children" succeeds in negating the seductive power of
religious asceticism (the body "bruised to pleasure soul"),
aesthetic idealism ("beauty born out of its own despair") and
philosophic mysticism ("wisdom [born] out of midnight oil")--
which were all tropes of serious temptation for the poet and
which argue just how close Yeats was to his Wordsworthian
precursor. But these successes are ambivalently thrown back into
question when the final four lines re-affirm the idealism of form
through the glorification of the chestnut tree, and yet force a
doubting of that form by questioning the knowing of the dancer
from the dance. Unlike that knowing visionary moment in the
third stanza when the speaker's "heart is driven wild: / She
stands before me as a living child"; unlike that amazingly
deflated sublime moment in the fourth stanza when Aristotle and
his golden precursors, Plato and Pythagoras, become, like the
speaker, mere "Old clothes upon old sticks to scare a bird"; and
10
"Ode: Intimations of Immortality," from canto x.
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surprisingly enough, unlike that bitterly dialectical moment of
the fifth stanza when mother and son engage in the knowledge of
each other's past and future suffering--unlike these, the moment
of the final stanza comes to rest in the formal beauty of dance
and tree, and the questioning of that form. In other words, the
gnostic visionary fails, in this poem, to achieve thematically
a negative transcendence of his various idealisms. But what is
so striking about this poem, and what frees it to enforce a
strong influence over later poems, criticism, and theory, is that
"Among School Children" impresses upon the reader the feeling of
being in the "presence" (Steiner) of a superhuman strength. And
this feeling is the result of two things: the poem's huge self-
revision, that is its negation, evasion and crossing beyond its
own tropes and Yeats's tropes in earlier poems, and its radical
re-voicing of the Wordsworthian Sublime. In Yeats, the wound of
defeat can be a blessing. In contemporary criticism and theory,
that blessing obliges us to see with his eyes and to speak with
his voice, unless and until we too can re-envision his
enterprise.
2.4 Dancing School, and Frank Kermode
Let the new faces play what tricks they will
In the old rooms; night can outbalance day,
Our shadows rove the garden gravel still,
The living seem more shadowy than they.
"The New Faces"
Earlier I mentioned that Frank Kermode's use of the trope
of "the dancer" in Romantic Image bears analysis for its debt to
Richard Ellmann' s use of "the mask." Of equal importance,
however, is the complex relation that links the argument of
80
Romantic Image to "Among School Children" through Cleanth Brooks
and New Criticism. Published ten years after The Well Wrought
Urn, Romantic Image takes a more intensely Yeatsian stance as a
solution to the problem of creating and practicing New Criticism
as a theory. The Urn culminates its argument for structural
tension, balance, and harmony in the lyric with reference to the
awesome tropes of "Among School Children," even as it tries to
disperse our sense of its debt to Yeats by using several other
poems and poets to exemplify the argument. Ten years on,
however, and Kermode virtually centers his whole New Critical
aesthetic on the trope of "the dancer"--a startling correction
and revision of Brooks's stance toward the precursor, and an
insightful anticipation of de Man's deconstruction of the image,
his splitting of the dancer from the dance.
Romantic Image is an aptly titled work. Not only does it
move beyond the narrow New Critical concern with the paradoxical
harmonious structure of discrete autonomous poems, but it also
returns the poetry studied to its visionary Romantic home.
I
Brooks was loath to discuss the importance of social relations
to poems. These were extrinsic matters, irrelevant to the
structure of well-wrought urns. But Kermode's work begins with
the social isolation of the artist, picking up on what Yeats
considers an aspect of the antithetical quality of poetry. Yeats
and English Romantic poets bear comparison to Baudelaire and
other French Symbolists:
An awareness of the Image involves, for English poets
also, a sense of powerful forces extruding them from
the life of their society, a sense of irreconcilable
difference and precarious communication. . To be
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cut off from life and action, in one way or another,
is necessary as a preparation for the "vision." .
[The artistJ must be lonely, haunted, victimised,
devoted to suffering rather than action
--in order to feel "the power of joy" in "the act of the
imagination" [6J. Already we see the anti-naturalism, misread
by Joseph Adams as linguistic "antiplatonism," of Yeats's
romantic image. Poetry does not reflect or imitate life, nature,
the psyche of the poet, or even language, for the poets in this
tradition see "the Romantic theory of the Image as anti-
discursive" [72J; poetry powerfully negates them through
imaginative action.
The Image has nothing to do with organic life [in
which I include the psycheJ, though it may appear to
have; its purity of outline is possible only in a
sphere far removed from that in which humanity
constantly obtrudes its preoccupations. [64J
Thus linking Yeats to precursors such as Blake, Coleridge, Pater,
and Wilde (without attempting to measure among them their
comparative revisionary strengths), Kermode identifies as
Romantic the aesthetic ideology that they share.
It is from this context that Kermode launches into the most
detailed analysis of the trope of "the dancer" that we have. He
follows through the appearance and the importance of "the dancer"
in the works of some of the most celebrated artists and poets of
the day, especially Pater, Wilde, and Mallarme, and then proceeds
to trace what is for him "the Image of the Dancer" as it appears
throughout Yeats's plays as well as his poems. And in "Among
School Children" Yeats's trope of "the dancer" achieves its
ultimate perfection.
[TJhe dancer, inseparable from her dance, devoid of
expression--that human activity which interferes with
the Image--turning, with a movement beyond that of
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life, in her narrow luminous circle and costing [the
artist] everything; the bronze and marble that does
not provide the satisfactions of the living beauty but
represent [sicJ a higher order of truth, of being as
against becoming, which is dead only in that it cannot
change: these are the images of the Image that ...
culminate, in Yeats, in the Dancer-image of "Among
Schoolchildren. ,,11 [91J
Whereas Brooks tentatively and defensively thought that the
poem's "last stanza does not refute Plato--is not intended to
refute Plato" [153], Kermode would seem to believe that the
victory is entirely Plato's, that the poem fulfills the Platonic
ideal.
[T]here is nothing but the dance, and she [the dancer]
and the dance are inconceivable apart, indivisible as
body and soul, meaning and form, ought to be. The
Dancer can exist only in the pre-destined
dancing-place, where, free from Adam's curse [Kermode
here alludes to one of the Yeats poems that is a
precursor-poem revised by "Among School Children"],
beauty is born of itself, without the labour of
childbirth or the labour of art; where art means
wholly what it is. [85J
Kermode's transcendentalizing vision of the poem through the
perception of the absolute unity of dancer and dance has been,
until the appearance of Paul de Man, the most influential view
of the poem. For instance, Denis Donoghue, in his own Yeats
(1970), writes of the "great stanza" and its "aura of beatitude":
Life assumes the freedom of art, art the fullness of
life. Fact, time, place, and person converge upon
tree and dancer; when we say that tree and dancer are
symbols [Kermode uses "Image" J, we mean that mere
things are touched with supernatural radiance. Their
unity is indissoluble. [89]
With this sort of idealization of Yeats having become a critical
commonplace--drawn, as I see it, from the utter strength with
11 According to the Variorium (p. 443), this was the spelling of the
title only in the two earliest publications of the poem, in The Dial and The
London Mercury, both August 1927.
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which Yeats contests the tradition of poetic idealism in
Wordsworth and plato--it is little wonder that a movement of
ironic emptying would arrive to turn or trope this idealizing
view inside out.
2.5 Kermodean Schooling, and Paul de Man
Birth-hour and death-hour meet,
Or, as great sages say,
Men dance on deathless feet.
"Mohini Chatterjee"
Daniel O'Hara's article "Yeats in Theory" rightly points out
the debt of Paul de Man's critical speculations to the Yeatsian
Sublime. O'Hara does not mention Kermode's Romantic Image
possibly because of lack of space or because he is telling a
story of Yeats's influence over "critical theory in America"
[366], not in Britain. Kermode may be an Englishman, but the
role of his book in the unfolding of de Man's critical theory
cannot be dismissed, nor can the specific importance of "Among
School Children," which O'Hara only alludes to in passing.
I will come to de Man's use of the trope of "the dancer"
presently, but it is a fitting irony, I believe, that Kermode
anticipated de Man in more than just the centralizing of the
trope of "the dancer." Even prosopopeia, which I discussed in
the first chapter as a crucial trope among de Man's arsenal of
tropes for the deconstruction of lyrical voice, even prosopopeia
de Man may owe to Kermode. For in his commentary upon "the
dancer," Kermode relies heavily on what he calls a Paterian-
Yeatsian "paradox of making a dead face stand for all that is
most 'vital' in art" [65J. This phrasing would seem to suggest
an allusion to "the mask," yet Kermode neither mentions Ellmann
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at all, nor does he discuss A Vision or any other Yeats work in
terms of "the mask" as a trope for the voice or the face of the
dead. Nevertheless, his discussion emphasizes the importance of
"[t]he dead face which has another kind of life, distinct from
that human life associated with intellectual [I would add psycho-
logical and 'psychic'] activity" [91, my emphasis]. Kermode's
trope of "the dancer," therefore, is certainly stronger in its
appreciation of Yeatsian anti-naturalism than Ellmann's mimetic
trope of "the mask," yet it is later quite overtaken by the
negative power in de Man's "disfiguration" of lyrical voice, his
wielding of the trope of prosopopeia as "the vOice-from-beyond-
the-grave. ,,1? The crowning irony in this story of the swerving
of tropes from "mask" through "dancer" to prosopopeia is that,
in light of the recent uncovering of de Man's collaborationist
wartime journalism, the interpretation of his mature well-known
work in relation to the earlier buried work may require the
usurpation of Yeats's antithetical trope of "the mask.,,13
In the first chapter (1.3), I discussed the exquisite fit
that de Man noticed between his sense of aporia and the last line
of "Among School Children." But I also mentioned in a footnote
that de Man's use of the trope of "the dancer" in "Semiology and
Rhetoric" (1973), a standard work of deconstructive poetics, was
prepared by his use of it thirteen years earlier in his PhD
thesis on Mallarme and Yeats. The appearance of "the dancer" in
12 Rhetoric of Romanticism, p. 77.
13 In discussing the severe contrast between the de Man that she and
others knew and the de Man of the long-hidden wartime journalism, Barbara
Johnson has said that "the cri tic to whom de Man now appears to have been most
polemically and mercilessly opposed was his own former self. But who was that
masked de Man?" [14] --
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the later essay, because of its drastic simplicity, has a
casualness about it that is deceptive, for in the earlier
dissertation there was clearly a more labored analysis of the
rhetorical relation between "dancer" and "dance"--all coming in
the context of de Man's reaction to Kermode's use of "the dancer"
in Romantic Image which was published just three years before the
date of the dissertation.
There are several references to Romantic Image in "Image and
Emblem in Yeats," the part of the dissertation recently published
posthumously in de Man's Rhetoric of Romanticism (1984). It
seems as though Kermode' s sense of "the Image" presented a
certain challenge to de Man. Whereas Kermode had troped Yeats
back into a transcendental Romanticism, de Man was interested to
see Yeats's romanticism, now perceived with a lower case "r,"
"de-transcendentalized" and split within itself. Whereas Kermode
sees the Romantic Image as the embodiment of Yeatsian Unity of
Being, and "the Dancer" as the culmination of the Image, de Man
sees image and emblem in Yeats, with neither being truly
transcendental and each the negation of the other. Yet for both
Kermode and de Man, the secret knowledge of the workings of the
Romantic Image or of image and emblem is hidden within the tropes
of "Among School Children."
For de Man, the "image" is more properly the "natural
image." It is a metaphor, being "able to cross the gap between
subject and [naturalJ object without apparent effort, and to
unite them within [aJ single unity" [153J. In other words, the
image is a mimetic use of language to represent natural objects.
This definition would not seem so startling, were it not for the
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fact that even here, in 1960, de Man emphasizes the priority of
the split within the metaphor, "the logical discontinuity that
disrupts the natural image" [158]. Though this gap will later
come to represent the discontinuous structure of the sign
according to deconstruction, this is not the gap which de Man is
particularly concerned about in his PhD thesis. Rather it is the
rift between image and emblem which intrigues him here. For the
emblem in de Man does not follow the image in uniting subject and
object in a sign. The emblem is anti-mimetic. Comparing two
early examples in Yeats, de Man says:
In "Ephemera," [the words "star" and "meteor"J are
mimetic nouns referring to natural objects which the
poet claims to present to us as perceived by him. In
"The white Birds," the same nouns have no mimetic
referent whatever; in no way can it be said that the
poem is "about" actual stars or actual meteors; the
images have given up all pretense at being natural
objects and have become something else. [164-165]
Claiming to be following Yeats, de Man calls these anti-mimetic
objects "emblems," and speaks of Yeats's style as "evolv[ing]
from image to emblem," and of "Yeats's strategic attempt to
disentangle himself from the predicament reflected in his
earliest style. Hence the effort, in the later work," de Man
goes on, "to bridge or, rather, to conceal the gap that separates
the emblem from the natural image" [170J. This argument amounts
to a radical revolt against mimeticism, and it is precisely here
that "Among School Children" becomes so important for de Man, for
it becomes his ultimate instance of "emblems masquerading as
images" [194].
Kermode's interpretation of the poem becomes de Man's main
target for failing to distinguish between image and emblem. De
Man rightly describes Kermode's reading of the poem as
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heralding the triumph of the reconciliatory image.
It might seem far-fetched or even perverse to
find here [in the poem's final four lines] anything
but a splendid statement glorifying organic, natural
form, its sensuous experience and fundamental unity
[197 ]
--but de Man "perversely" intends to do just that:
One naturally assumes that the question, "Are you the
leaf, the blossom or the bole?" and "How can we know
the dancer from the dance?" are to be read as
rhetorical questions that express unity and state the
impossibili ty of distinguishing the part from the
whole, the action from the actor, or the form from its
creator. Assuming however that a difference exists
between what is represented by the dancer and what is
represented by the dance, by the leaf, and by the
blossom, the question could just as well express the
bewilderment [recall from chapter one that Hans Jonas
notes "bewilderment" as the meaning of aporia] of
someone who, faced with two different possibilities,
does not know what choice to make. In that case, the
question would not be rhetorical at all, but urgently
addressed to the "presences" in hope of receiving an
answer. [200]
From here de Man goes on to identify the "tree," the "dancer,"
and the "dance" as emblems, rather than as images, by associating
them with the "anti-natural," the "unearthly," the "divine," and
"the symbol of the 'body'" [201, 202].
These passages are important for the sense in which they
clearly inaugurate what will later become tropes of de Manian
deconstruction. But Kermode's role in the genealogy of tropes
should not be lost, nor of course should Yeats's. In his zeal
to identify Kermode's "Romantic Image" with the "natural image"
that he wants to undermine, de Man seems to have forgotten that
Kermode was a strong enough dualist or ironist to alienate the
"Romantic Image" from nature. As I noted above, Kermode says
that
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The Image has nothing to do with organic life, though
it may appear to have; its purity of outline is
possible only in a sphere far removed from that in
which humanity constantly obtrudes its preoccupations.
[64]
This passage and others like it show that, contrary to de Man's
apparent wish to dissociate his theory of poetry from Kermode's,
the two of them have in common a perception of Yeatsian anti-
naturalism. De Man's swerve outside and beyond his precursor,
Kermode, comes in the intensification of his ironic stance, so
that instead of the trope of "the dancer" subsuming the trope of
"the dance" in an idealized reconciliation, we have a new trope
that insists on "dancer" and "dance" negating each other.
The ways of the image and of the emblem are distinct
and opposed; the final line [of "Among School
Children" J is not a rhetorical statement of
reconciliation by an anguished question; it is our
perilous fate not to know if the glimpses of unity
which we perceive at times can be made more permanent
by natural ways or by the ascesis of renunciation, by
images or by emblems. [202]
We can speculate on the measure of de Man's influence over
Yeats criticism through his PhD thesis and its focus on "Among
School Children" by simply observing its effect on an article
published twenty years later. J. Hillis Miller, who in my view
is one of the most inventive and independent of contemporary
Li,terary cri tical theorists, published an article titled "The
Rewording Shell: Natural Image and Symbolic Emblem in Yeats's
Early poetry" (1980). Not only is his title drawn directly from
the early de Man; not only does he recognize, like O'Hara, that
"The poetry of W. B. Yeats has played a special role in
twentieth-century English and American literary criticism" [75J ;
not only does he cite Cleanth Brooks and Frank Kermode' s Romantic
Image as special examples of that role; not only does the trope
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of prosopopeia play a crucial part in his interpretation--but
Miller also generates his whole argument for the deconstruction
of New Criticism from the final four lines of "Among School
Children."
The "rhetorical" questions at the end of "Among School
Children" are, however, far from merely rhetorical.
A full reading of the poem would show them to be
unresolved oppositions which cannot by any means be
synthesized. They leave the poem open, anything but
organically unified or unifiable. Far from confirming
New Critical theory, Yeats's poetry from the beginning
puts in question this or any other unified theory of
poetry. [76]
What I find most marvellous of all, however, is Yeats's role
concerning these ironies. Based upon "Among School Children" and
its paradoxical intrinsic structure, Cleanth Brooks develops a
theory of poetry that emphasizes balance and harmony in discrete
poetic units. Based upon "Among School Children," Kermode pushes
Cleanth Brooks's theory beyond attention to discrete poems with
paradox and harmony by invoking the trope of "the dancer" and
calling it "the central icon of Yeats and of the whole tradition"
[89]. And based upon "Among School Children," de Man (and Hillis
Miller) severely ironize(s) Kermode's idealization of "the
dancer" by rigorously reading it as emblematical or anti -natural,
and as a discontinuous negation of "the dance" rather than as
identical to "the dance." But Yeats stands beyond these degrees
of irony. As I have been arguing, "Among School Children"
transcends its various critical and theoretical reductions. Not
only does it father them all, but its vision can rest neither in
mimetic idealisms nor in counter-mimetic negations. Despite the
powerfully seductive charm of the Miller-de Man approach, I must
distinguish my own reading for the poem from theirs.
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The voice of the poem is too strong, too antithetical to
itself, for such reductions. Even though, as I argued above
(2.3), the poem's defeat is its thematic failure to achieve a
negative transcendence of idealism, its victory is its
achievement of a style, a re-voicing of the Wordsworthian Sublime
through a relentless interrogation of the tropes of Yeatsian
Platonism. The poem may not be adequately described as an
"organic" balance of being and becoming (Brooks), nor as an
achievement of ideal form (Kermode), but the deconstructive
alternative does not suffice. The mutual negation of "dancer"
and "dance," the undecidable oscillation between natural image
arfsymbolic emblem, cannot account for the poem's preternatural
"
strength in confronting the Wordsworthian-Platonic precursor, or
in begetting a series of critical readings and theories. The
poem's strength can only receive a sufficient critical
description from an approach that appreciates the making of a
poem as an act attempting a gnosis, achieved (or not achieved,
as the case may be) by the breaking and remaking of prior voices.
As Yeats says in another famous poem, in lines that re-see and
re-trope the dancing images of "Among School Children"--"Marbles
of the dancing floor / Break bitter furies of complexity, / Those
images that yet / Fresh images beget, / That dolphin-torn, that
gong-tormented sea" [364].
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2.6 psychoanalysis, the Master, and the Muse
Those masterful images because complete
Grew in pure mind but out of what began?
"The Circus Animals' Desertion"
To this point we have focused on Ellmann's trope of "the
mask" as a psychological biographical reduction of Yeats. We
have considered tropes such as "the dancer," "the tower," and
"the mask" for their roles in spawning a series of textual
approaches to Yeats. And we have examined in detail the
relations of influence among the tropes that link and revise
these various reductions of Yeats. Whether mimetic or anti-
mimetic, the tropes that emerge from A Vision and "Among School
Children" to construct "Yeats," practical cri ticism, and cri tical
theory, are tropes that Yeats usurped from his tradition, and
that impose themselves on his critics who seek a way into his
life, his work, and his critical-theoretical legacy. What still
remains to be considered in this chapter are the psychoanalytic
and philosophical reductions of Yeats epitomized in work by David
Lynch and Robert Snukal, both of whom rely heavily though not
exclusively on "Among School Children," that daemonically
influential poem.
The similarities and the differences between Ellmann's The
Man and the Masks and Lynch's Yeats: The Poetics of the Self
(1979) deserve to be clearly drawn out. The two books share a
concern to depict the life of Yeats, and this life they see and
describe through psychological categories and arguments. To this
end, quotations from the works of the poet are used to shed
further light on the arguments and conclusions made about the
life of the poet-as-man. And here the similarities largely end.
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If Lynch uses a trope from Yeats as a master-trope around which
he can bend and twist his image of "Yeats," it is certainly not
"the mask." In fact, Lynch uses The Man and the Masks to suggest
the type of psychological biography that his own work pits itself
against, the type that is based "more or less explicitly [on]
oedipal hypotheses" [194]. Furthermore, he makes the point--very
useful in the context of my thesis that Yeats invented Yeats
criticism--that the many works utilizing the drama of father and
son to portray Yeats all derive from the poet's own self-
portrait.
On the whole neither Yeats's biographers (critical and
otherwise) nor the few students of his poetry inclined
to approach it from a psychological point of view have
had much to add to his own interpretation of his story
in Reveries over Childhood and Youth. [194]
Lynch intends his book as a new departure then, a new break from
the standardized Yeatsian trope of "a timid and sensitive son
(whose 'wandering mind' already shows signs of poetical
temperament) tyrannized over by his admirable and aggressive
father" [195].
But what Lynch substitutes for this "oedipal" trope is no
less derived from Yeats's prior figurations. This is the trope
of "the muse" in her many and ambivalent forms, sometimes called
"the mother," but most often called "the woman lost" by Lynch,
who takes the phrase from "The Tower" (1925):
Does imagination dwell the most
upon a woman won or woman lost?
If on the lost, admit you turned aside
From a great labyrinth out of pride,
Cowardice, some silly over-subtle thought
Or anything called conscience once;
And if memory recur, the sun's
Under eclipse and the day blotted out. [305]
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By concentrating on "the woman lost," Lynch can tell a story not
told in quite the same way before or since by any cri tic of
Yeats. Though the story of Maud Gonne and Yeats has been widely
circulated, here the story of Maud Gonne is integrated with the
story of other important women in the life of the man, especially
his mother Susan Yeats, but also his wife George, his friend and
literary collaborator Augusta Lady Gregory, and his mistress and
friend Olivia Shakespear ("Diana Vernon" in his diaries). On one
level, the straight biographical level, the role of Susan Yeats
is given a new prominence, but more importantly the status of
"the muse" is studied as never before in Yeats criticism, as
Lynch unfolds the psychoanalytical significances of "the muse"
for a poet obsessed with tropes concerning "the woman lost."
What is most important to me, however, is that the figure of "the
muse" receives perhaps its deepest and most enigmatically sublime
troping in the fifth stanza of "Among School Children," which is
precisely where Lynch's speculations become most insightful. For
it is here that issues such as the relations among muse, lover,
mother, generation, memory, and creativity are laid out by Yeats
in such provocative and memorable form.
What youthful mother, a shape upon her lap
Honey of generation had betrayed,
And that must sleep, shriek, struggle to escape
As recollection or the drug decide,
Would think her son, did she but see that shape
With sixty or more winters on its head,
A compensation for the pang of his birth,
Or the uncertainty of his setting forth?
This stanza becomes, to use a figure, the still center
around which the whole of Lynch's meticulously drawn out argument
rotates. Lynch sees Yeats's poetic obsession with "the woman
lost" as a reflection of his frustrated love of Maud Gonne. The
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obsession takes the form of a fascination for lithepower of the
'woman lost' to excite fantasies in which things seem to fall
apart" [24]. ~4 But the obsession with the Muse as "the woman
lost" Lynch reads as a displacement of a more primal loss, the
loss of primary narcissism which is the story that matters, the
pre-oedipal story of sons and mothers. This story is so
powerful, according to Lynch, that it explains Yeats's poems and
his creativity.
Lynch takes the subject of "Among School Children" to be
"the feeling of depression and decrepitude [that] Yeats
associated with the 'rage ... against old age, II while he reads
the poem's conclusion as "an expression of the beatitude of the
remade self" [43]. The problem that Lynch hereby sets himself
is to explain how the self-emptying irony and asceticism of rage
against old age can become beatitude. Oedipal rivalry for Lynch,
even a triumph of the son over the father for the affections of
the mother, is not primal enough. Only the attempt to heal the
narcissistic scar can explain the poem and the poems, and the
fifth stanza embodies this movement back to the origins of
individual consciousness. The author paraphrases this movement
in which memory is crucial:
When 1 try to express how 1 feel when 1 feel old, he
says, 1 think of how a mother feels about her son. 1
feel the way the son would feel if he knew he had
become something she did not love; the limits of my
affection for myself are the limits of her affection
for him. [1 know this because of] a memory: 1
know how she would feel about me because 1 knew how
she felt about me then. . [The son rages because
14 By this phrasing, Lynch alludes to "The Second Coming," wherein
"Things fall apart, the center cannot hold." He thus links Yeatsian poetic
apocalypse to "the excitement over which the Muse presides" [25].
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his] first lesson in life was that he could never
fulfill his mother's hope ..
The story of the son who became a poet, then, is
the story of the phase of psychological development
that determines [the quality] . of maternal
affection.. It is in this "pre-oedipal" phase
that the "spiritual" or what psychoanalysis would call
the "narcissistic" issues of personality are defined,
as the poet suggests, by the image of the self
reflected in the mirror of a mother's love. What is
at stake is precisely the sense of wholeness that
Yeats found "no natural thing." [47, 50]
The strength of Lynch/s analysis is that is seems to explain the
poet's rage against decrepitude by way of his desire to return
to the origins of a primal narcissism that was for Yeats
painfully lacking in wholeness; it also seems to explain the
poet's "rhetorical intimation of an idealized and ecstatic
reunion of self and other" in the sublime final stanza, by way
of his desire to escape "the shameful burden of self-conscious-
ness imposed by the maternal/image /" [52]. I say "seems to
explain" because, in effect, Lynch is playing with mirrors, in
a new mimesis.
His biographical passages about mothers and mistresses break
new ground, especially because of the way that they support his
psychoanalytical passages. And these passages, which turn
mothers and mistresses (whether won or lost) into muses, also
break new ground in Yeats studies by explaining, in very close
argument and in great detail, the poems and especially the
cuchulain cycle of plays in terms of narcissism, hypochondria,
hysteria, oral deprivation, neurosis, psychosis, and so on. But
the flaw in this strategy is that it takes psychoanalysis as an
allegory of poetry, and poems or passages in poems as symptoms
of psychoanalytic conditions. It seems to me that the author of
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The Poetics of the Self has not finally overcome the influence
of the author of The Man and the Masks if he merely gives a new
twist to Ellmann's mimetic strategy of drawing a portrait of the
life of the poet-as-man through the use of psychological
categories to explain various poems and plays. Admittedly, Lynch
gets away from Ellmann's emphasis on an "oedipal" model,
especially by his provocative substitution of "muse" for "mask"
as the trope which will tell the story of the poet's psychology.
But it does not seem at all appropriate to the poems to reduce
them to a psychoanalytical diagnosis of the poet-as-man. I do
not doubt the diagnosis. I am not qualified to doubt it, and it
may indeed be quite accurate. But the life of a poem is not
reducible to its maker's psyche or illnesses.
A poem like "Among School Children" may invite a diagnosis,
but its trajectory suggests a gnosis. The psyche or the mind is,
like the body that it operates, a fallen thing, an element of the
detri tus of the cosmos, and is exactly what needs transfiguration
through the fiery process of the making of the poem. In
"Byzantium," that eminently gnostic poem, the poet writes:
"Before me floats an image, man or shade, / Shade more than man,
more image than a shade"; and "Miracle, bird or golden handiwork,
I More miracle than bird or handiwork" [363]. In these four
lines Yeats quests after tropes that will negate body and mind
to envision a gnosis--"more image" and "more miracle" than psyche
or body. In "Among School Children" the final stanza also
strives for such a gnosis, but falls just short of that special
knowing in which the knower becomes the known--How can we know
the dancer from the dance?
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2.7 Philosophy, Poetry, Plato's Revenge
o mind your feet, 0 mind your feet,
Keep dancing like a wave,
And under every dancer
A dead man in his grave.
"A Drunken Man's Praise of Sobriety"
High Talk: The Philosophical Poetry of W. B. Yeats (1973)
by Robert Snukal is a mixed blessing for Yeatsians. Its heavily
Kantian reading of Yeats does more to coerce the poems into a
reflection of Kantian philosophy than to read the poems as poems.
In the case of "Among School Children," Alfred North Whitehead
presides over the tropes of the poem. And its bizarre soup of
inept misreadings and fascinating insights can leave a reader
nonplussed. Commenting on "A Dialogue of Self and Soul" (1927),
like "Among School Children" one of the more brilliant and
influential poems of this century, Snukal misses its most
remarkable feature, its gnostic dialectics: "Yeats's cosmology
disdains the opportunity of release .... [He] insists that if
you simply forget about heaven you are able to achieve a secular
blessedness" [30, 32]. Comments like these are far wide of the
mark, yet Snukal is right on the mark when it comes to Yeats's
position on the essential freedom of the will and his hostility
to social determinism:
To pity a man is to reduce him to the status of
victim; Yeats's point [in general] is that the only
moral attitude, the only attitude that recognizes
humanity, is to acknowledge each individual's struggle
against the accidents of life. The argument depends
on a recognition that life can only be viewed
qualitatively, and this recognition is possible only
when we hold firmly to the knowledge that death is
inevitable. [157]
We can see just how these two statements, the first so weak and
the second so persuasive, can coexist in the same book when we
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realize that Snukal, like Joseph Adams in The Masks of Syntax,
is devoted to a thesis in which Yeats must be seen as anti-
Platonic. It may therefore be a measure of just how wrong both
Adams and Snukal are about Yeats that, while subordinating their
discussions to the trope of Yeats as anti-Platonist, Adams sees
Yeats as a pure determinist who embraces the gyres and refuses
the freedom of the will as a delusion, yet Snukal sees Yeats as
a champion of free will over determinism. It seems to me that
neither Adams nor Snukal has well-understood Yeats's problematic
endorsement and revision of the Platonic tradition.
My discussion of this problematic will come in my fourth
chapter, but it will not run amiss here to prefigure that
discussion by contrasting Snukal with Lynch and with Brooks,
since the three of them deal with Yeats through the emphatic
centralizing of "Among School Children" in their work. Whereas
Lynch's commentary on the poem virtually equals his book in
miniature, Brooks and Snukal allow their books to culminate
inexorably in their final chapters' devotion to the poem. Lynch
takes no stand on Yeats's Platonism. He just notes that the
poem's "deliberate alteration of plato's parable in the second
stanza" [45] is an allusion to the myth of the creation of the
sexes in the Symposium, and he offers some detail on Yeats's use
of porphyry's doctrine of "pre-natal freedom" in the fifth
stanza.15 By not taking a position on the propriety of Yeats's
15 Among its three appendices, Snukal's book includes in full "Thomas
Taylor's edition of Porphyry's essay, 'On the Cave of the Nymphs, in the
thirteenth book of the Odyssey, ,,, to which Yeats directs his readers in a note
on "Among School Children." [Yeats's Poems 759)
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platonism in the poem, Lynch implies that Yeats may be taken to
be a faithful Platonist in some general sense.
Brooks insists for his part that the poem's emphasis on the
sensual body "does not refute Plato" [153J, nor does it embrace
Plato, for he sees the poem as a balanced non-choice between
idealism and materialism [152J, the exact inverse of de Man's
compulsory yet impossible choice. In Brooks's argument, we must
not "read into the vision of the chestnut-tree an affirmation of
the beautiful, careless play of nature, and thus a rebuke of
Plato's holding nature a mere play 'of spume' upon a 'ghostly
paradigm of things'" [153J. Apparently Brooks feels that reading
the poem as a rebuke to Plato is a danger he must warn against.
Yet this is precisely Snukal's reading of the poem, which he sees
as a refutation of Plato because of the balance it strikes
between Heraclitean flux and Pythagorean pattern: "I
shall contend," writes Snukal, "that 'Among School Children'
should be read . [asJ profoundly anti-Platonic" [193]:
And the conclusion that [Yeats] reaches is that if we
take the "eternal ideas, " the presences, that
symbolise all heavenly glory, to be anything other
than abstractions, if we hold, with Plato, that we
have found reality instead of an image, then we can
only serve to break hearts. For we live in a complex
world of process . . . [thatJ can only seem senseless
and hostile unless we see the connexity or prehensive
unity, which holds both event and eternal idea in a
continuing relationship with what has gone before and
after. [196-197]
Snukal approves of what we might call "the blossoming Yeats," for
he sees the poet as much like the "great-rooted blossomer" of the
poem, which "produces not something eternal, but something
fragile and transient. But in doing so it is 'rooted' in what
has passed and it gives promise for the future; it is an example
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of fruitfulness in time" [215]. And quoting the first four lines
of the last stanza, Snukal continues what he imagines to be his
faithfully Yeatsian protest against Platonic dualism: "And in
the final stanza we are given, not an abstraction, not a pattern
imitated, but the joyous participation in life of the whole man"
[215]. Snukal draws out the portrait of "the blossoming Yeats,"
concluding that "it is in the conjoining of flux and pattern that
we discover reality. . The [brightening] glance discovers
that we cannot discover [or know] the dancer without the enduring
pattern [the dance] of real events" [217]. Thus, the question,
How can we know the dancer from the dance? becomes the statement,
we cannot discover the dancer without the pattern of the dance.
Flux and pattern are conjoined, unified. Yet, as Snukal would
have it, this conjoining happens as part of a counter-Platonism.
I would argue, however, that it is more likely that such a
conjoining is a Platonism. "Should Jupiter and Saturn meet / 0
what a crop of mummy wheat!" [406, A Vision 302] writes Yeats in
a little poem called "Conjunctions." Surely the conjoining of
flux and pattern that Snukal makes happen in the poem can only
come about as an apperception or intuition of an ideal. His
Whiteheadean notions of "connexity" and "prehensive unity" are
derived from and firmly rooted in the Neoplatonic tradition,
attempting to resolve the problem of the dualism of being and
becoming by troping both into one ideal monism--"Unity of Being"
as yeats puts it in his more Paterian and Platonizing moments.
And as James Olney has demonstrated, but on a very different
level of argument, one of the distinguishing features of Plato's
idealism is his conjoining of his precursors, Heraclitus and
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Pythagoras whom we might call the philosophers of flux and of
pattern, into one single system of thought. I would argue that
neither Brooks nor Snukal is right about the poem, that it is
neither anti-Platonic (Snukal) nor simply a refusal to choose
(Brooks). And it is certainly not an embracing of Platonism as
must be implied in the view that the poem gives us a "blossoming
Yeats" where 1 = 1, where the One embraces and subsumes all flux
and pattern. But the poem may certainly give us an antithetical,
a "Blooming Yeats" wherein 1 = 1+/-, where dancer and dance evade
becoming One.
What portion in the world can the artist have
Who has awakened from the common dream
But dissipation and despair?
"Ego Dominus TUus"
Chapter Three
The Negative Dialectics of Yeatsian History
In the first chapter of this dissertation (1.6) I asserted
that the crucial question shadowing historicist theories of
poetry concerns whether, and if so, how history affects poetry.
This shadow persists because it is not at all clear that
historicism ever gets beyond treating poetry as no more than a
reflection of historical processes and events. The over-powering
determinism of what Yeats calls "the gyres" enforces a
mimeticism--all the rage these days in various forms of "New
Historicism." It therefore becomes imperative to respond to this
mimetic approach to poetry not by throwing out the relevance of
history to poetry, but by re-seeing the dialectics of poetry and
history.
In this chapter I intend to layout my perspective on this
dialectics. To do so I will invoke what I call "Yeatsian
history," which is a gnostic sense of the antithetical relation
of poem to history, and will (for the most part) contrast it to
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the sense of history that the institutions of Yeats studies and
theory have tried to impose upon our poet. "Caught in that
sensual music all neglect / Monuments of unaging intellect"
[301], writes Yeats whose poetic career is nothing if not a
subtle and sublime monument of resistance to being chained down
by "worldliness" (Said), or as it were, the dragging of road
metal.
The fascination of what's difficult
Has dried the sap out of my veins, and rent
Spontaneous joy and natural content
Out of my heart. There's something ails our colt
That must, as if it had not holy blood
Nor on Olympus leaped from cloud to cloud
Shiver under the lash, strain, sweat and jolt
As though it dragged road metal. My curse on plays
That have to be set up in fifty ways,
On the day's war with every knave and dolt,
Theatre business, management of men.
I swear before the dawn comes round again
I'll find the stable and pullout the bolt.
["The Fascination of What's Difficult" 188]
On another occasion, Yeats may become "Indignant at the fumbling
wits, the obscure spite" of an old shopkeeper, but he crosses out
of this ethos into a place "on the lonely height where all are
in God's eye," a place of self-power which transforms the human
condition, the sweat and strain of dragging road metal, into the
vision that "There cannot be, confusion of our sound forgot, /
A single soul that lacks a sweet crystalline cry" ["Paudeen"
211].
"The Fascination of What's Difficult" (1909-1910) and
"Paudeen" (1913) both show implicitly that the dialectics of
poetry and history is no easy matter of the poet simply claiming
independence. In "The Lake Isle of Innisfree" (1890), the poet
claims that he "will arise and go now, and go" to a place where
"peace comes dropping slow" [ 74] • That is a desire
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unfulfilled in natural fact is less important than the
possibility that it is fulfilled in the making of the poetic
vision. Throughout his career, however, Yeats never ceases to
revise his sense of his relation to history. Fierce independence
is only one of his stances toward history, for he can also
fiercely assert his part in the real and its horrors.
Come, fix upon me that accusing eye.
I thirst for accusation. All that was sung,
All that was said in Ireland is a lie
Bred out of the contagion of the throng,
Saving the rhyme rats hear before they die.
["Parnell's Funeral" 395-396]
The point is that the dialectics of poetry and history is too
complicated to be reduced to the mimetic image of history
breeding its reflection as poetry--though Yeats strongly ironizes
his own past poetry ("All that was sung") by declaring that his
poems were among the lies "Bred out of the contagion of the
throng." Mimesis is but a partial explanation at best. In "The
Decay of Lying," Oscar Wilde, Irish master-wit and Yeatsian
precursor, would turn Aristotelian mimesis inside out, and
proclaim that it is life that imitates art.
Art never expresses anything but itself. It has an
independent life, just as Thought has, and develops
purely on its own lines. It is not necessarily
realistic in an age of realism, nor spiritual in an
age of faith. So far from being the creation of its
time, it is usually in direct opposition to it, and
the only history that it preserves for us is the
history of it~own progress. . All bad art comes
from returning to Life and Nature, and elevating them
into ideals .... Life imitates Art far more than Art
imi tates Life, [and] Lying, the telling of
beautiful untrue things, is the proper aim of Art.
[319-320]
Wilde's formula solves the problem of the poet being a slave to
nature, but also increases the artist's responsibility. For if
poetry were just a reflection of history, then history, not the
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artist, would take the blame. But given Wilde's formula, Yeats
was haunted not just by his Romantic precursors, but also by the
remorseful thought, as here in "Man and the Echo" (1938), that
his work had so powerfully intervened in the stream of historical
event that misery and death had resulted.
Man
In a cleft that's christened Alt
Under broken stone I halt
At the bottom of a pit
That broad noon has never lit,
And shout a secret to the stone.
All that I have said and done,
Now that I am old and ill,
Turns into a question till
I lie awake night after night
And never get the answers right.
Did that play of mine send out
Certain men the English shot?
Did words of mine put too great strain
On that woman's reeling brain?
Could my spoken words have checked
That whereby a house lay wrecked?
And all seems evil until I
Sleepless would lie down and die.
Echo
Lie down and die .... [469 ]
In this chapter, therefore, I will argue that the relation
of Yeats's poetry to history may be re-thought, that the poems'
most characteristic feature is their special mode of negation or
resistance of "the actual" (Lentricchia). But the linguistic
mode of negation proposed by de Man and his followers will not
suffice, for this mode produces an anti-naturalism whose only
poetic stance is irony. Though all poems begin in irony in order
to begin, though irony is since Nietzsche the characteristic
stance of contemporary criticism and theory towards its objects
and its precursors, it would be a mistake for criticism to
transfer that stance to poetry, especially poetry of this range
and caliber. Reading poetry as an allegory of criticism is not
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impossible to do. In fact, it is the strength of contemporary
criticism as well as its error. De Man's Allegories of Reading
(1979) and other writings such as his "Shelley Disfigured" (1979)
perform this sort of criticism, troping great artists of
literature from Rousseau's day to our own into his (de Man's)
ironic theory. But I propose that our choices are not limited
to the mimetic mode of historicists who would give us the world
and not the poetry, nor to the anti-mimetic mode of the
deconstructors who would give us the poetry as always an ironic
emptying-out of the world or of the self. I propose a critical
literary theory that, in doing both, does neither of these yet
transcends them.
The world and the self are undoubtedly the stuff of poetry,
and yet the poetic negation of the world and the self does not
reduce poetry always and only to an ironic perspective on world
and self. Poetic activity of the sort that Yeats and his
authentic precursors and epheboi perform transfigures or
transforms both world and self in the making of the vision. That
achieved moment of transfiguration may come in great poetry, and
if it does, it comes as in the tropes of "The Phases of the Moon"
(1918) :
All thought becomes an image and the soul
Becomes a body: that body and that soul
Too perfect at the full to lie in a cradle,
Too lonely for the traffic of the world:
Body and soul cast out and cast away
Beyond the visible world. [296]
In the negative dialectics of poetic vision the existence of
natural forms is not imitated, nor merely linguistically negated;
absorbing nature and its negation in order to re-figure, to cast
out new life, the negative dialectics of poetic vision passes
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through a kind of death: " . Things unborn, things that are
gone / From needle's eye still goad it on" [406].
3.1 Partisan Poetics: Harrison and the Violence of Tropes
o what if levelled lawns and gravelled ways
Where slippered Contemplation finds his ease
And Childhood a delight for every sense,
But take our greatness with our violence?
"Ancestral Houses"
The failures of the historicizing type of criticism when
applied to Yeats can be seen in their crudest form in John R.
Harrison's The Reactionaries (1966). In his chapter on Yeats,
Harrison's purpose seems to be not only to criticize opinions and
values expressed at times by Yeats, but also to prosecute and
convict the man of the crime of being a "reactionary," an
"authoritarian." To this end, poems, letters, other quoted
writings, and opinions and memories of acquaintances are narrated
to make Yeats's particular sort of conservatism appear as
fascism. Lost in the hubbub, the poetry is distorted into an
echo of all that Harrison despises. Centering his discussion on
Yeats-the-man, Harrison proceeds as if the man were identical to
the poet by simply transferring to the poet the attitudes that
he finds in the man. He then is able to read the poems as though
they exemplify the attitudes that he finds so execrable in the
man. Louis MacNeice fifteen years before, though of a similar
political persuasion, was at least deeply ambivalent about the
power of the Yeatsian Sublime to court visions of horror. But
Harrison shows no compunction about the integrity of the poetry
while criticizing the poet-as-man.
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Commenting on Yeats's early attraction to the socialism of
William Morris, Harrison writes:
[Yeats] never seemed particularly concerned with the
well-being of the masses, and he certainly had no
sympathy with ordinary humanity that one would expect
a socialist to have. There are numerous references by
people who knew him to his lack of human sympathy, his
coldness and aloofness. He was probably
attracted [to Morris's writings] more by the idea of
helping to cause some momentous change than by
sympathy for the poor .... Many sensitive people are
attracted by socialistic ideas and ideals in youth; of
these, few go as far in the other directions as Yeats
did in later life. [41-42]
In this argument-by-innuendo, Yeats is decried for not expressing
the social ideals that the author presumably has and thinks that
everyone, including poets, should express. But Yeats's rejection
of socialism and its myth of ultimate progress toward world
social equality ("He had no faith in the idea of progress, the
belief that society is developing towards perfection" [61]) ought
to be no more important or revealing than his rejection of
orthodox Christianity and its myth of the ultimate defeat of
evil, an issue that Harrison ignores presumably because he is not
defensive about Christian ideology. He seems to hold that social
optimism, the ethics of socialist ideology, is the ultimate
measure of a man; if he is right, then Yeats stands duly
condemned--unlike "[t]he communist poets of the 1930s [who]
welcomed the declining influence of noble families and
traditional values [and who] sought the destruction of
wealth, privilege and hierarchy" [51].
An irony embedded in his position is that the violence
required to destroy wealth, privilege, and hierarchy Harrison
does not scrutinize or criticize, yet the violence required to
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preserve wealth, privilege, and hierarchy Harrison virtually
equates with fascism:
George Orwell said that Yeats's "tendency" was
fascist, that throughout his life his outlook was that
of those who reach fascism by the aristocratic route.
We have seen that he believed in a rigid hierarchy,
concentration of power in a few hands, and unquestion-
ing obedience to a leader by virtue of his personal
supremacy. This is very close to the fascist ideal.
[50]
Following this logic, only the violence of a social pessimist
with a nostalgic longing for aristocracy ought to be criticized,
while the levelling violence that would destroy aristocracy is
not recognized as violence and as problematic for social ethics.
Furthermore, the easy association of nostalgia for aristocracy
with fascism is a peculiarly muddy kind of thinking which is
often used to attempt to justify the class violence of the anti-
democratic left. Likewise, the assertion that Yeats "believed
in a rigid hierarchy, concentration of power in a few hands, and
unquestioning obedience to a leader" beggars belief. Belief in
the value of hierarchy for human society is surely no great sin,
nor is it equivalent to belief in a rigid hierarchy, whatever
that means. In fact, hierarchy in some form would appear to be
culturally inalienable to the species. Moreover, the charges of
belief in the concentration of power and in unquestioning
obedience are sweeping abstractions that falsify the subtlety of
Yeats's writings.
What are these charges based on? What evidence does
Harrison bring to bear witness? Nothing but a few stray lines
of poetry, bitterly ironic ballads written when Yeats in the
early 1930s was testing the limits of his pessimism by casting
it into nostalgia for a lost social order:
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The soldier takes pride in saluting his captain,
The devotee proffers a knee to his lord,
Some back a mare thrown from a thoroughbred,
Troy backed its Helen; Troy died and adored.
And
When nations are empty up there at the top,
When order has weakened or faction is strong,
Time for us all to pick out a good tune,
Take to the roads and go marching along.
And
Where are the captains that govern mankind?
What happens to a tree that has nothing within it?
[50-51]
Taken from "Three Songs to the Same Tune" (1933, 1934), which is
a poem that anti-Yeatsians conventionally fall back on to support
their accusations of fascism against him, these lines hardly
amount to anything like persuasive evidence of a belief in the
concentration of power or in unquestioning obedience to a leader-
-especially in light of the thrice-repeated refrain which
Harrison studiously elides in his quoted evidence:
"Who'd care to dig 'em," said the old, old man,
"Those six feet marked in chalk?
Much I talk, more I walk;
Time I were buried," said the old, old man. [398]
The refrain targets its bitterly intense irony on the poetic
self, troped as "the old, old man." Surely, the old man's death-
wish undermines the lines that Harrison quotes with their
swaggering nostalgia for pride in social decorum. And in any
case, surely a poet cannot be rightly blamed for observing social
decadence or chaos, and for bringing a warning of it in verse to
the public, unless the bearer of bad news is to be condemned for
bringing the news.
Not at all do I intend to imply by this discussion that
poems like "Three Songs to the Same Tune" and others that might
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be grouped with it, such as "Three Marching Songs" (1938, which
repeats some lines from the earlier "Three Songs to the Same
Tune") are significant poems in the Yeatsian canon. Although
Yeats did make significant changes to these poems, changes of
tone as Lucy McDiarmid in Saving Civilization (1984) has shown,
these poems in fact do nothing to advance the profound gnostic
sense of self-revision that is the distinctive mark of Yeats's
poetic career. That is to say, these poems do not confront and
consume his past poems; they do not burn with revisionary fire.
I see their relevance to the canon as more topical than poetical.
McDiarmid explains that
elaborate retractions were made by Yeats, in a whole
series of changes in his marching songs. He fiddled
with them virtually every time they were reprinted,
trying--so the changes would lead one to believe--to
get rid of the tone of harangue. [77-78]
She goes into great detail showing how he hedged and surrounded
these marching songs with a long introduction and an even longer
commentary after the poem [Variorum 543, 835], and points out
that in one case Yeats cancelled a line of carping "antidemo-
cratic disgust" in favor of a more salutary "praise of
aristocracy" [78], and, I would add, of tragic heroism: "'What's
equality?--Muck in the yard' becomes 'Troy looked on Helen; it
died and adored'" [78], and, I note, finally becomes "Troy backed
its Helen, Troy died and adored" [398, Variorum 547]. We shall
presently see how Seamus Deane politically ironizes the Yeatsian
myth of "tragic heroism." However, as a measure of the
irresponsibili ty of placing the criticism of poetry in the
service of a political agenda, consider that, despite Yeats's
retraction, the deleted line about "equality [being] muck in the
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yard" is the single example chosen by Richard Kearney in "Myth
and Motherland" (1985) to illustrate his claim of a link between
"Yeats's literary cult of mythic heroes" and his "fascist
rhetoric" [78].
A poet's canon is made of the poems that strongly revise his
prior strong poems, as I shall explain in later chapters.
Yeats's late and bitter ballads play an insignificant role in the
making of his canon, but superior and more properly canonical
poems such as "The statues" (1938) which I will discuss later in
this chapter, "The Gyres" (1936?), and "A Bronze Head" (1937 or
1938) present a more serious challenge.1 "The Gyres" is easy
prey to anti-Yeatsians, for it seems to lend itself to the weak
reading that the poet is glorying in tragic suffering.
Irrational streams of blood are staining earth;
Empedocles has thrown all things about;
Hector is dead and there's a light in Troy;
We that look on but laugh in tragic joy.
What matter though numb nightmare ride on top,
And blood and mire the sensitive body stain?
What matter? . . .
What matter? Out of cavern comes a voice,
And all it knows is that one word "Rejoice!" [411]
All hangs on how one reads the tone of "laugh in tragic joy" and
"Rejoice!" for utter human depravity and cruelty can certainly
not be blamed on the poet. Is Yeats truly saying "I love
violence" or "Violence is good"? Again, in "A Bronze Head" Yeats
seems to invite the charge that he sees blood-letting as a good
thing. In the final stanza he speaks with contempt of "this foul
In The Identity of Yeats, which as I noted in chapter one is my usual
source for dates of poems, Ellmann gives no dates for "The Gyres" and "A
Bronze Head." A. Norman Jeffares supplies these dates as probable in Yeats's
Poems, p. 621 and p. 638.
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world in its decline and fall," and of the reversal of fortunes
that has brought "gangling stocks" to power while "great stocks
run dry, / Ancestral pearls all pitched into a sty, / Heroic
reverie mocked by clown and knave," all prompting the speaker to
wonder "what was left for massacre to save" [464].
Harrison is almost right to note that "the word 'save'
implies that the massacre will be beneficial to some people at
least" [66 my emphasis]. But I say "almost right" because the
poem is clearly a meditation on an event (his visit to a museum)
in the past, and a meditation on "what was left:" "I thought her
t 1" h 't " Add d h t 1 ft fsuperna ura, e wrl es, ... n won ere w a was e or
massacre to save." Far from being "inclined to welcome the
corningcatastrophe which will save whatever is left to save" [66]
as Harrison would have it, the poem exhorts us to come to a
visionary sense of tragedy in which our contemplation of the
terrors of the past will help us somehow to transcend the
inevi table horrors to come. As he writes in "Lapis Lazuli"
(1936), another poem on this anguishing theme of human cruelty
and self-destruction, "All things fall and are built again, / And
those that build them again are gay" [41 3] . Similarly, "The
Gyres" speaks of "numb nightmare" and "irrational streams of
blood." But would it not be irrational to speak of "The Gyres"
(Harrison curiously does not mention the poem) as though Yeats
were actually baying for blood and nightmare? "Now could I drink
hot blood, / And do such bitter business as the day / Would quake
to look on," reveals Shakespeare's Hamlet in a brief soliloquy
[III, 2, 397-399; p. 142]; but would it not be foolish to
understand Hamlet as a vampire, or Shakespeare, because he wrote
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tragedies, as an advocate of murder and revenge? Yet Harrison
paints Yeats as a kind of war-monger who was "looking forward to
more violence with apparent relish" [67J. It seems that Harrison
would prefer that poets only explicitly protest violence and pity
its victims, rather than push beyond these limits to the
dialectical possibility and the darker truth that we transcend
violence only by going through it.
Admittedly, "A Bronze Head" and "The Gyres" seem to invite
misinterpretation, but a sensitive knowledge of Yeats's poetic
career should forestall such weak readings. His whole career
sought release from, not imprisonment in, the gyres of repetitive
historical depravity. Being an incorrigible self-revisionist,
Yeats pushes his assumptions and desires to the extreme, and
therefore sometimes submits his vision to crushing defeat, as
famously in "The Second Coming" (1919) where there is no
transcendence of the ethos of fated repetition, and "Mere anarchy
is loosed upon the world, / The blood-dimmed timed is loosed, and
everywhere / The ceremony of innocence is drowned" [294]. Yet
even here it should be clear that the poet's human sympathies lie
with "the ceremony of innocence," and emphatically not with "the
blood-dimmed tide." And the later "Lapis Lazuli" surpasses "The
Gyres" and !lA Bronze Head" in that its tone is more precisely
controlled while expressing a similar idea. utter tragic defeat
is accepted not because Yeats loved blood and gore, but because
once faced with tragedy, we have truly no other choice but to
survive it, to transfigure it--"Gaiety transfiguring all that
dread." And it is art and the artist which can show the way, if
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way there be. With a voice of utter serenity in the face of
defeat, Yeats writes:
On their own feet they came, or on shipboard,
Camel-back, horse-back, ass-back, mule-back,
Old civilisations put to the sword.
Then they and their wisdom went to rack:
No handiwork of Callimachus,
Who handled marble as if it were bronze,
Made draperies that seemed to rise
When sea-wind swept the corner, stands;
His long lamp-chimney shaped like the stem
Of a slender palm, stood but a day;
All things fall and are built again,
And those that build them again are gay. [412-413]
Given this context in which Yeats sees poetry as a mode of
transgression that seeks to mutate historical pessimism (as
f' d' th t f "the gyres")~gure ~n e rope 0 not by simply wishing it
into optimism but more rigorously by opening himself to its
wounding power, it is all the more disappointing to see how
Harrison abuses the poems in order to support his attack on the
man. The following passage is typical of the way he treats the
poems.
[Yeats] did not want original minds stifled by formal
education. But the alternatives are poet or
ignoramus. Yeats is prepared to let the maj ori ty
remain illiterate as long as a few good poets are
produced. The passionate, intuitive life which he
said he wanted is apparently impossible if this kind
of thing is allowed to happen:
"The children learn to cipher and to sing,
To study reading-books and histories,2
To cut and sew, be neat in everything
In the best modern way." [60-61]
Harrison's using of these lines from the first stanza of "Among
School Children" as evidence for the argument that Yeats was
prepared to let the majority remain illiterate betrays again his
According to the Variorium, "... and histories," is the version of
the line published in Collected Poems, while " . . . and history," is the
version given in Yeats's Poems and all other editions.
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partisan agenda, reveals his deafness to the poetry, and runs
counter to other evidence. Certainly, the poem's "walk through
the long schoolroom" provides the poet with an occasion and an
ethos to recollect and re-envision the beauties and the traumas
of a lifetime. As such, the poem is not a meditation on the
purpose and value of literacy and numeracy in Irish general
education, although Harrison seems to wish it were. But the fact
that it is not such a meditation should hardly lead us to
conclude that "Yeats [was] prepared to let the majority remain
illiterate as long as a few good poets [were] produced. "
Undoubtedly, his speculations on formal education could be
eccentric or quirky ("Teach nothing but Greek, Gaelic,
mathematics, and perhaps one modern language," he prescribes in
On the Boiler [1938]); yet his speeches as a member of the Senate
(1922-1928) of the Irish Free State contribute to the body of his
speculations, and seek to persuade through conviction rather than
through shock and irony, as in On the Boiler.
Yeats's contribution to the Senate debate of March 1926
(following his official visit to St. otteran's School, Waterford,
in February, the setting of "Among School Children,,)3 flatly
contradicts Harrison's portrait, and reveals a figure "shocked
by what [he] saw," protesting the condition of Irish schools,
and urging fundamental improvements for them.
I saw schools where the children were learning their
lessons by artificial light at noon-day, because the
windows were too small. I saw schools where two
classes were being held side by side, because there
was not room to give a separate class to each. That
means wear and tear to the nerves of the children and
to the temper of the teachers.
3 Jeffares, w. B. Yeats: A New Biography (1988), p. 228.
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... Many of the schools are filthy. A minority
of the children who come to them, I should say a
substantial minority, are filthy. There are no
adequate basins, sometimes no basins at all, in which
the children could wash themselves. But you
cannot have [improvements] done unless the country is
prepared to spend the money.
It should be a matter of honour to the state no
matter how poor it may be, to spend the money ....
If you do not do that you will not have a centre of
civilization in the schools .... 4
Yeats concludes his speech, saying that it was delivered with
two clear principles in mind. One is that we ought to
be able to give the child of the poor as good an
education as we give to the child of the rich.
(And the other is] that the child itself must be the
end in education.
His first principle needs no comment, but his second one does.
Not "various religious systems," not "patriotism," not "the idea
of the nation," but the child is to be of paramount importance.
"I suggest," he concludes, "that whether we teach either Irish
history, Anglo-Irish literature or Gaelic, we should always see
that the child is the object and not any of our special
"purposes. The Senate Speeches of W. B. Yeats were first
published in 1960, six years before The Reactionaries, yet a
yawning gulf opens up between the Harrison "Yeats" of two
alternatives, either "poet or ignoramus," and the Yeats of the
Senate who would put the interests of the school child above the
special interests of church, state, or party. One begins to
suspect that the Harrison "Yeats" is a distortion serving little
else but partisan interests.
4 This and the following quotations come from The Senate Speeches, pp.
108-109 and 111-112. The editor, Pearce, has mixed British spelling (centre)
with American spelling (civilization) although Yeats to my knowledge always
used British.
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3.2 O'Brien and the Poetics of the Rock
There midnight's all a glimmer, and noon a purple glow,
And evening full of the linnet's wings.
"The Lake Isle of Innisfree"
I have brooded at some length upon The Reactionaries not
because it is an influential contribution to Yeats studies. This
it is not. But highlighting Harrison's crucial error exposes an
issue that dogs later historicizing critics--the error of
treating a poem as though it were a political pamphlet. Before
going on to consider other permutations of this error and their
consequences for Yeats studies and critical theory, it would be
well to examine the single most devastating criticism that
Yeats's politics has received, an article that has influenced
historical approaches to Yeats ever since.
Conor Cruise O'Brien's lengthy essay, "Passion and Cunning:
An Essay on the Politics of W. B. Yeats" (1965), has so
compellingly argued its case that it has become the unavoidable
standard work on the subject. Casually, Edward Said terms it the
"famous account of Yeats's politics," and it has provoked such
anxiety in another writer, Elizabeth [Butler-] Cullingford, that
she has devoted an entire book, Yeats, Ireland and Fascism
(1981), to its refutation. In his Field Day Theatre Company
pamphlet, "Yeats and Decolonization" (1988) I Said goes on the
describe himself as "someone who . . . had once been influenced
by Conor Cruise O'Brien's famous account," which he then rightly
observes is "an essay whose claims are hopelessly
inadequate when contrasted with the information and analysis put
forward by Elizabeth Cullingford" [19]. Even Harrison's book,
which came out just two years after "Passion and Cunning,"
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alludes to it, though only in passing. And as late as 1988 in
his book, Yeats and Politics in the 1930s Paul Scott Stanfield
would write that even "twenty years after its writing [O'Brien's
essay] remains the best single effort on Yeats's politics" [67J.
It~ argument is so persuasive that, until Cullingford, the trope
"Yeats-the-fascist" could be taken as an indisputable fact of
nature, equivalent to "Yeats-the-Senator" or "Yeats-the-director-
of-the-Abbey Theatre" in Dublin. Even after Cullingford,
Stanfield is loyal to the O'Brien camp, for when he says that he
finds O'Brien's essay "perceptive and informed" [67], what he
means, as his book shows, is that he accepts O'Brien's
perspective and is himself informed by it. "Passion and Cunning"
has been useful to its readers not because it states "the truth"
finally about Yeats's politics, but because it stands as one
extreme in the perspectivizing of those politics. Coming to the
crux of the matter with more delicacy and aplomb than I could
ever muster, cullingford points out that
The word "fascism, " however, is commonly used
[nowadays] as a synonym for "Nazism," and carries
implications of brutal totalitarianism, genocidal
racism, and desire for world conquest, which it never
possessed during the early twenties. Paradoxically
the word has also been weakened into a term of
indiscriminate abuse, usually aimed at anyone even
marginally right of centre. This linguistic
imprecision [1 would call it the will-to-power through
tropes] has been fatal to Yeats's reputation. [145]
Whether seen as linguistic imprecision or tropological will-to-
power I it may be that those who would paint Yeats the color
"fascist" are less concerned to read the poet and his works than
5 Harrison, pp. 52, 59, 69.
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to grind an axe, assuage their own bad consciences, and curry
favor with the pious.6
Since Cullingford has so masterfully elaborated the counter-
arguments, it will not be my purpose here to retrace the
counterpoint of her dance with O'Brien. For in a sense, neither
O'Brien nor Stanfield nor Cullingford is concerned to argue, as
Harrison did, on the basis of the poems that Yeats was or was not
a fascist. All three are caught up much more in the politics of
the man, in which case the poet and his poems are largely
irrelevant, except of course as they may seem to add lustre to
an argument. O'Brien is not too bashful to admit that he is not
much concerned with the poems as such, whereas I am concerned
with little else. After a long and detailed analysis of Yeats's
conservative politics, "the forms of his actual involvement, at
certain critical times, in the political life of his own day"
[210], an analysis supported by quotations from poems, essays,
but especially letters, O'Brien finally comes to consider the
importance of the politics for the poems-as-poems. In doing so,
he inclines toward an admission that there is a chasm dividing
poetry from political discourse and practice. Nevertheless, he
muddles this admission by trying to posit a "force" that is
I hasten to add that the recent furious debate over Paul de Man's
posthumously uncovered wartime journalism bears analo,gies. to the issues
concerned with Yeats and the questlon of fasclsm. Sufflce lt here to point
out that Derrida's two articles on de Man's hidden journalism, "Paul de Man's
War" and "Biodegradables" which I mentioned in chapter one, argue not that de
Man was "innocent" but that his accusers, in their fervor to condemn him and
deconstruction, display a conspicuous failure to read what he wrote. Two of
the latest twists to this debate should be noted. In her recent introduction
to de Man's Critical Writings, 1953-1978 (1989), Lindsay Waters condemns the
Nazi propaganda that de Man published during the war, yet affirms the value
of his deconstructive work. On the other hand, in Sign of the Times (1991)
David Lehman deplores deconstruction as virtually co-extensive with the young
de Man's fascism.
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"anterior" and "fundamental" to both poetry and politics.
Stumbling, he fumbles his intuition of this "force."
How can those of us who loathe such politics [the
politics of fascismJ continue not merely to admire but
to love the poetry, and perhaps most of all the poems
with a political bearing?
. Very little seems to be known--and perhaps
little can be known--of how this process of
transformation works. How can that patter of
Mussolini prose "produce" such a poem? [He alludes to
"Leda and the Swan" and to Yeats's comment on its
origins, found in The Variorum Edition of the Poems,
p. 828. J How can that political ugly ducking be
turned into this glorious Swan? . 1
Is the connection then between the politics and the
poetry only trivial and superficial? There is, I
think, a deeper connection: if the political prose and
the poetry are thought of, not as "substance" and
"metaphor," "content" and "style," but as cognate
expressions of a fundamental force, anterior to both
politics and poetry.
That force was, I suggest, Yeats's profound and
tragic intuitive--and intelligent--awareness, in his
maturity and old age, of what the First World War had
set loose, of what was already moving towards Hitler
and the Second World War. [273-275J
At this stage in his essay, O'Brien finally and haltingly begins
to ask the sort of questions that animate my own research.
"Transformation," "substance," "metaphor," "force"--O'Brien may
be disgusted by what he insists is Yeats's fascism, indeed his
essay fulminates at the figure of Yeats that he draws,
aristocratic, authoritarian, anti-Catholic, fanatical, fascist,
but he is honest enough to recognize at the end of his essay that
what happens in a poem is some kind of "transmutation" about
which "perhaps little can be known" [274].
Salman Rushdie, that impish genius of transmutation,
playfully hints that the imaginative event which so mystifies
O'Brien is a "P2C2E," "a process too complicated to explain."
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In Rushdie' s Haroun and the Sea of Stories (1990) "P2C2E"
functions as a comic refrain in a novel whose passion is to
secure the impulse of story-telling by an achieved-knowing, a
gnosis of the absolute freedom of its origins. What I am trying
to suggest is that O'Brien has the stick by the wrong end. He
is right to see that something like a "transmutation" happens
when, in a poem, "A terrible beauty is born" [274, quoting from
the famous "Easter, 1916"] , when a "political ugly duckling [can]
be turned into [a] glorious Swan. ,,7 But his undeveloped
intuition--an insight that allows him throughout the essay to
denigrate the man by reference to the poems--that there is "a
fundamental force, anterior to both politics and poetry" is
entirely mistaken. Is there anything transformative about
politics? Change, evolution, revolution, and conflict are not
transformative. To re-arrange the elements of the Heraclitean
flux is not transformative. Yeats knew this when he drew the
figure of "Parnell" (1937),
Parnell came down the road, he said to a cheering man:
"Ireland shall get her freedom and you still break stone."
[430]
--and when he wrote "The Great Day" (1937),
Hurrah for revolution and more cannon-shot!
A beggar on horseback lashes a beggar on foot.
Hurrah for revolution and cannon come again!
The beggars have changed places, but the lash goes on.
[430]
Alas, for politics is the art of telling the public another lie
while trying to persuade them that they should not believe that
In the first chapter we saw that William Johnsen turned "Leda" into
"woman" and "swan" into "man," in order to make "an ideological analysis of
[the poem] based on feminism [and] Marxism" [10], says the editor, Leonard
Orr. Here O'Brien turns the whole poem into "Swan."
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you told them a different lie yesterday. Poetry is certainly a
lie, but its lie is of a distinctly different order. Its lie is
aimed at itself, or another poem, or at time, not at the
pub l i.c ," Not simple re-arrangement of elements, but
transformation is of the essence in poetry that aspires to the
Sublime. The "force" that O'Brien finally seeks as the link
between poetry and politics and that he finds so mysterious--
even as he has proceeded throughout the essay to ironize its
mystery by reading poems as mere illustrations of political
discourses and practices--the "force" links poetry to the world
and to history in an entirely different way than O'Brien
imagines. For O'Brien ignores or forgets or remains dimly
unaware of the poetic function of what Yeats called the
"antithetical," the crucial element of what I call "Yeatsian
history."
Yeats's antithetical poetiCS is a dialectical poetics in
which the power of world history to wound is welcomed by the
imagination. Ultimately that power is the power of death. Death
and the imagination engage, and in the struggle, if a poem
results, that poem transfigures not the world but itself and
other poems and, if strong enough, time. But to expect poems to
achieve some kind of ameliorative social work, to stop war, to
halt injustice, to build a new society, is an enticing but
misplaced expectation. The redemptive power of poetry does not
redeem the world by turning it into a heaven. Nor does music,
painting, or any other art. Yeats's precursor Shelley may have
In Wallace stevens, Harold Bloom summarizes his view of the poetic
lie: "Poems lie primarily against three adversaries: 1) themselves 2) other
poems 3) time" [386-387).
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seemed to believe that poetry could redeem the world. Is this
not the theme of Prometheus Unbound which Yeats thought a great
9holy book? But more profoundly, Shelley's poem transforms the
world not a wit, but transforms itself and the tradition of
visionary poems immensely while somehow answering the poet' s
desire to satisfy his desire for divination in the act of
writing. Even Shelley's heroic cry at the conclusion to "A
Defence of Poetry" that poets are the unacknowledged legislators
of the world, should not be read as testimony to social optimism.
Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended
inspiration; the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which
futuri ty casts upon the present; the words which
express what they understand noti the trumpets which
sing to battle, and feel not what they inspire; the
influence which is moved not, but moves. Poets are
the unacknowledged legislators of the world. [159]
Far from suggesting that poets actually re-create and redeem the
world in their poems, Shelley suggests that through the power of
their tropes poets enforce a new vision or way of seeing the
world, which means especially the way that other poems have seen
the world. But the world, a fallen heap of bodies and minds,
remains stony, intractable, and untouched, beyond our power to
turn or trope it into a real heaven. "Reality is an Activity of
the Most August Imagination" runs the title of a poem by Wallace
Stevens, as Shelleyan a poet as Yeats was; but in the final
analysis the redemption and transformation of the "reality"
remain but a noble lie. Or as Harold Bloom has put it, regarding
Wordsworth's sublime struggle with death, in Ruin the Sacred
Truths (1989), "Any sublime that founds itself upon the power of
In his essay, "The }hilosophy of Shelley's Poetry" (1900), Yeats
speaks of the "certain place of Prometheus Unbound "among the sacred books
of the world" [Essays and Introductions 65].
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the mind over a universe of death must smash itself to fragments
on that rock of otherness constituted at last by death our death"
[133, sic].
yet any criticism that seeks to chain poetry upon the rock
of the world and its politics will find that the spirit of
poetry, like Prometheus, will refuse to submit, for submission
means, in poetic terms, the death of the imagination. In his
turning of the Wordsworthian sublime in "The Lake Isle of
Innisfree" (1890) Yeats writes: "I will arise and go now, for
always night and day / I hear lake water lapping with low sounds
by the shore" [74]. When a poet sets to arise and go, the world
of "the roadway" and "the pavements grey" is left behind. And
when a poet hears "lake water lapping ... in the deep heart's
core," the presence of the world of roadway and pavements grey
has been not only negated but also transfigured--a "P2C2E," no
doubt; and a lie of that music in the deep heart's core that the
poet feels as a compulsion to re-create, in the world's despite.
3.3 Nietzschean Perspectives: The Tyranny of Critique
We fed the heart on fantasies,
The heart's grown brutal from the fare;
More substance in our enmities
Than in our love.
"The Stare's Nest by My Window"
In more recent years, the figure of "Yeats" in relation to
history and politics has been turned with greater subtlety than
the "Yeats" of either Harrison or O'Brien, but that turning may
be no less misleading for criticism and theory. Since the advent
of structuralism and poststructuralism to literary studies,
critics and theorists have been more wary of Yeats, treading with
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greater circumspection on his turf and over his tropes, aware
somehow of his uncanny strength-to-influence, and his cunning
passion for politics wedded to an acutely ironic sense of history
and human destiny--dangerous ground for any critic to tread.
They find that they must deal with a visionary poet, playwright,
essayist, occultist, theatre director, Senator, and Nobel-
laureate of incalculable self-irony and comic extravagance. They
fail to deal adequately with his genius when they flatten out his
comic irony into literal statement. For what can these examples
be but of comic genius?
. when, during the [Irish] Civil War [June 1922 to
May 1923], he was asked by an English statesman
whether he supported [President] Cosgrave
[Yeats] answered, "Oh, I support the gunmen--on
both sidesh• ; and when he startled an interviewer
by picking up Sato's sword, swinging it over his head,
and crying, "Conflict! More conflict!"
[Stanfield 68] 10
Wary though they be of Yeats's strength, today's critics and
theorists also bring to their occupations a new ruthlessness no
doubt modelled on Yeats himself, but also derived from other
sources.
Here the name of Nietzsche, whom Yeats is known to have read
with devilish delight especially in 1902, must not go unnamed.11
10 The dates of the civil war I have taken from Ellmann's Man and the
Masks, p. 244. stanfield's first example comes from Grattan Freyer's
political biography, W. B. Yeats and the Anti-Democratic Tradition (1981), p.
78' his second example, whose punctuation he has altered, comes from Joseph
Ho~e's biography W. B. Yeats 1865-1939 (1942). In Hone's version of the 1937
interview, the comic quality is allowed to appear. "'[Interviewer]: Can you
give me a message to India?' Ye~ts:. 'L~t 100,000 men of one side meet the
other. That is my message to Ind~a, ~nSlstence on the antinomy.' He strode
swiftly across the room, took up Sato's sword, and unsheathed it dramatically
and shouted, 'Conflict, more conflict'" [459].
11 "In September 1902 John Quinn sent Yeats his own copy of Thus Spake
Zarathustra and impersonal copies of The Case of Wagner and The Genealogy of
Morals. For months thereafter Yeats seems to have read virtually nothing but
Nietzsche" [Donoghue, ~ 54].
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In The Identity of Yeats Ellmann compares Yeats's ideas to
Nietzsche's [91-98]. Seemingly influenced by Ellmann, Denis
Donoghue in Yeats (1971) makes the astonishing claim that
Nietzsche, more than any other poet or writer, is "the crucial
figure in Yeats's poetic life" [48]. In Yeats and Nietzsche
(1982) otto Bohlmann, like Ellmann, extensively compares the two.
Most persuasive of the works dealing with Yeats and Nietzsche,
Patrick Keane's story of Yeats's Interactions with Tradition
(1987) places Nietzsche as the central influence on Yeats's
thought. But without a theory of influence, of how tropes usurp
and defend against prior tropes, such comparisons are of little
value to a poetics that is in search of a negative dialectics.
As Harold Bloom has pointed out, contemporary theory re-enacts
Nietzsche's concern with the critic's stance, the critic's
perspective. We share "Nietzsche's suspiciousness: who is the
interpreter anyway, and precisely what power does he seek to gain
over the text."'? Nietzsche's influence over Anglo-American
criticism and theory, which cannot be underestimated, comes
refracted not only through Yeats, but through the more indirect
route of contemporary French critical thought, including
Foucault. I have explored the radical Nietzschean poetics of
Paul de Man and J. Hillis Miller, emphasized the extent to which
Yeats authorizes their abyssal readings of his work, and
suggested how I would creatively correct their readings. But a
wary ruthlessness of a different order has entered the hallowed
halls of Yeats studies.
12 The Breaking of the vessels, p. 3.
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Those Nietzscheans who affiliate with Foucault rather than
with Derrida, who see "history" and "historicizing" as the big
tropes to dominate and undo all other tropes, have turned against
de Man and Miller as though their tropes of undecidability and
aporia were in bad faith in being oblivious to the inescapable
demands of historicism. These new historicizers must be wary,
because they are keenly conscious of their own belatedness in
confronting the acute irony that Yeats hedges his visions with.
Reckless name-calling in the manner of Harrison and O'Brien will
no longer suffice. Yet though wary and no longer reckless, they
remain ruthless in advancing their own historicizing irony as the
only legitimate perspective on our poet. "The postmodernizing
of Yeats," as proclaimed by one recent editor, is an ongoing
project that covers the poetry beneath a thick and sticky coat
of postmodernist theorizing. "The shift is from the object of
study [the poems] to the tools and ideas [the theories] that can
be used to approach an old subject anew," writes Leonard Orr,
editor of Yeats and Postmodernism (1991), to introduce "the idea
behind" the collection of essays and its title [6].
gingerly yet decisively the poetry is trampled.
I have already presented in the first chapter (1.8) a
Note how
summary of William Johnsen's "ideological analysis of 'Leda and
the Swan' based on feminism [and] Marxism" [10], as the editor
puts it, and have briefly explained my objections to its bizarre
utopia that Yeats was an unknowing prophet of the separation of
the sexes. But another contribution to Orr's collection would
stand quite well along side Johnsen's as co-representative of the
volume's uninspiring trajectory, and this would be Cheryl Herr's
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essay, "Yeats and Foucault." Much like another piece recently
published in Diacritics, on Hamlet and Derrida, Herr's article
puts forward the charming illusion that a great poet is an
imitator of one of our contemporary poststructuralist critical
theorists.
In his "Nuclear Piece: Memoires of Hamlet and the Time to
Come" (1990), Nicholas Royale claims "to show that [Derrida's]
Memoires provides a reading of Hamlet but also, and perhaps more
distinctively, that Hamlet provides a reading of Memoires"[41].
But Royale's performance unfortunately does not carry out even
this all-to-easy vacillation between Shakespeare and Derrida,
each reading and being read against the other. On the contrary,
what Royale performs is virtually limited to the reading of
Hamlet against and through Derrida.
Piece" Royale fails to offer the
Throughout his "Nuclear
reader the view that
deconstruction is a latter day distortion or derivative of
Shakespeare; while the reverse is given all his energy--that
Hamlet is best seen and interpreted as a play haunted by the
ghostly fathering tropes of Derrida's critical theory. Early on,
for example, Royale deals with Derrida' s concern with ",that
which, in writing, always includes the power of a death
machine,'" and he shows that "[i]n Hamlet, and as if as a warning
of things to come, one might think of the extent to which
characters, plot, and structure are effects of a death machine,
constituted by dispatches, missives, codes," [43] and so on.
Royale's "Piece" is a playful and dazzling tour de force,
in the high style of the best of deconstructive criticism, but
its stationing of Shakespeare as Derrida' s ephebe begs the
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question of how, except through the critic's will-to-power over
Shakespeare, a work of such massive poetic influence as Hamlet
can possibly be seen as influenced by deconstruction. Harold
Bloom's criticism is not averse to reading the voice of the
father through the voice of the son; he calls this revisionary
ratio "apophrades" or "the return of the dead," and the trope
"transumption." But it only happens, he claims, when the critic
perceives a unique and "uncanny effect," that is, when "the new
poem's achievement makes it seem to us, not as though the
precursor [Shakespeare] were writing it, but as though the later
poet [Derrida] himself had wri tten the precursor's characteristic
work. ,,13
It is doubtful that the alignment that Bloom describes
pertains to the triad of Royale, Derrida, and Shakespeare, though
I hardly wish to underplay the strength and influence of
Derrida's Nietzschean ironies. What is more likely is that
deconstruction remains fully within the tropological vision that
constitutes the originality that we inevitably call the
Shakespearean mode. As Bloom has put it in his recent book, Ruin
the Sacred Truths,
We cannot see the originality of an originality that
has become a contingency or facticity for us .... To
say that, after God, Shakespeare has invented most is
actually to note that most of what we have naturalized
as prior literary representatio~ stems first from the
J writer and his revisionists, h and from Horner, but
secondarily and yet more powerfully from Shakespeare.
[53-54]
13 The Anxiety of Influence, p. 16. I shall deal with apophrades and
transumption in my final chapter.
14 Within a year or so of Ruin, Bloom published The Book of J (1991),
devoted entirely to the Yahwist, whom he there deals with, brilliantly and
provocatively, as a woman.
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Nevertheless, Cheryl Herr's version of "Yeats and Foucault"
performs, like Royale, a reversal of the alignment of influences,
but with none of the aplomb and brilliance that is Royale's. In
the editor's terms, the Herr essay "provides a conversation or
a juxtaposition of the major concepts of Foucault's work,
especially the notion of episteme from The Order of Things, and
Yeats's Vision" [10-11]. But Orr's description weakly
underestimates the degree of distortion in Herr's re-alignment
of influences. For her article enforces the perspective that it
is Foucault's tropes, his version of history that lends strength
to Yeats's Vision. Given this absurd reversal, her depiction of
Bloom's poetics as derived from Foucault's tropes falls into
place as merely whimsical and entertaining. The perspective that
she does get right, but this is no great insight, is that
Nietzsche is behind the three of them. It is a measure of just
how irrelevant much Nietzschean cri tical theory is today to
Yeatsian and Bloomian poetics that Nietzsche can be used to
justify the troping of Yeats and Bloom into Foucault.
Beginning with some modesty, Herr claims that Foucault's
Order of Things "presents a structural model that helps us to
understand the historical significance of Yeats's work A Vision"
[146]. While this limited point may be granted, though it has
little to do with the antithetical quality of Yeatsian poetics,
her argument quickly turns into arbitrary willfulness. The
phases of the Great Wheel of A Vision are seen as a version of
Foucaul t's "episteme," and Foucaul t's description of how" [p]ower
and discipline inhere in the system as a whole" [152] is echoed
by Yeats. Even though she ambiguously uses the verb "to echo in"
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both transitively and intransitively so that it is not clear who
echoes whom, the thrust is clearly that Foucault sets the
tropological pace for Yeats to follow:
[Foucault/s] vision of an integrated disciplinary
mechanism of cu Iture echoes eerily in Yeats /s
system .... At the same time, a horoscope [the Great
Wheel], especially one as totalizing as that evolved
by Yeats and his Instructors, suggests that
history systematically disciplines individual behavior
at points that appear to be empowering, as well as at
points that locate suffering and disfranchisement.
Like Foucault, Yeats becomes aware that each
era, like each phase of the moon , imposes
limitations on thought and action. . His thought
resonates with Foucault/s discussion of the underlying
unity of classical discourse. [152, 154, 158-159]
Conveniently ignoring the fact that A Vision is not a work of
history, but rather a highly eccentric speculation on the
historical form of the work of the literary imagination,
concerned more with the possibility of transcendence than with
imprisonment in historical immanence, Herr treats Yeats as a
historian of Foucauldian persuasion, as one who feels helpless
before history. From this perspective it is no great leap to
twist Bloom into a Foucauldian. Easily done. Simply turn
Bloom's theory of the internalization of poetic influence into
an externalized historicism. Regarding Yeats's poetic misprision
of Blake, Herr says that
Bloom's passionately specific charting of [their]
difference yields the conviction that deep structural,
temporally determined ruptures separate the two poets.
And Foucault/s image of the episteme works as well as
any for representing that cultural shift. [158]
Doubtless, Nietzsche is a father-figure shared by Yeats,
Bloom, and Foucault, though not all three in equal measure or in
the same psychic direction. Only Bloom's theory of influence can
shed light on the precise forms of each writer's misprision of
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Nietzsche. I shall later discuss in some detail the Nietzsche-
Yeats dyad, while the best discussion of the Nietzsche-Bloom dyad
is the previously mentioned (1.10) article by Daniel 0' Hara
called "The Genius of Irony: Nietzsche in Bloom." But what must
not be overlooked is that Nietzsche authorizes and inspires Herr
in her bizarre misprision of Bloom and Yeats as Foucauldians.
It is decisive and amazing, therefore, that both Herr and/or her
editor Orr manage to oversee and overlook a glaring error
(Herr/Orr) in her narrative of Yeats and Foucault as siblings
moving together down the path of epistemological historicism,
under the benevolent eye of their father Nietzsche:
On the margins of history, carrying well-worn volumes
of The Will to Knowledge [sic, this is Foucault' s
title, but Herr and Orr intend The Will to Power by
Nietzsche], Yeats and Foucault walk side by side,
shouldering against oddly familiar rough beasts that
do not acknowledge them and that they cannot name.
[147]
In following sections of this chapter I will elaborate my
critique of the criticism that is today's new mimeticism and its
ideologizing will-to-power over Yeatsian poetics.
3.4 Ideology, Seamus Deane, Irish Apocalypse
. hoping to find once more,
Being by Calvary's turbulence unsatisfied,
The uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor.
"The Magi"
Wi th the publication of his essay "Heroic Styles: The
Tradition of an Idea" in the collection called Ireland's Field
Day (1985), Seamus Deane has staked out for himself the position
15
of angry young man in Irish letters today. Though his stance
15 In his "Afterword" to the collection, Denis Donoghue observes that
the "real anger [of the collection is] Seamus Deane's" [111].
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owes more to the rebelliousness of the young James Joyce toward
Yeats and the Irish Literary Revival than to Yeats himself, it
is not without its Yeatsian aspects insofar as Yeats's rebellion
against Ireland can be said to have intensified with his aging.
There must be some irony in the fact that a young cri tical
scholar who can write with such passion and conviction about
Yeats should choose Yeats as his great bogeyman--the source of
all things to be rejected and expelled from Irish culture,
according to Deane's narrative. Denis Donoghue's salutary
"Afterword" to the volume calls it "a tribute to Yeats that Deane
finds him largely responsible for our obsession with the fate of
being Irish" [118J. But the issue runs deeper than the
deconstructive irony of Deane owing a discursive debt to Yeats
because he resists and argues against what he sees as Yeats's
mystified and mystifying poli tics. More profoundly, Deane's very
arguments are anticipated and authorized by Yeats himself. This
haunting of Deane's voice by Yeats's only intensifies in his
later essay, "Yeats: The Creation of an Audience" (1989).
With a truly Nietzschean flair for the massive re-
perspectivizing of a whole tradition, "Heroic Styles" turns
Deane's reading of Yeats's relation to history on its head. The
tradi tion that begins with Yeats and includes Joyce (despite
Joyce's attempt to ironize it) in Deane's view reads Irish
history as though it were literature. Choosing neither Yeats nor
Joyce, Deane's negation is a reversal, reading literature as
history, thus demystifying the rhetoric of figuration by
returning it to history. Furthermore--and this is how Deane's
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Nietzschean approach gets a Foucauldian twist 16_-Deane sees
Yeats's writing as an ideological reading of history. He reduces
the Yeatsian sublime to the writing of a political myth, "heroic
attempts," he says, "to unite culture of intellect with the
emotion of multitude, or, in political terms, constitutional
politics with the forces of revolution" [48]. This myth is
ideological (in being tragic or heroic) because in its hidden
agenda Yeats nostalgically idealizes a process in which the
forces of cultural intellect are defeated by a revolutionary
multitude.
The triumph of the forces of revolution is glossed in
all cases as the success of a philistine modernism
over a rich and integrated organic culture. Yeats's
promiscuity in his courtship of heroic figures--
Cuchulainn [sic], John O'Leary, Parnell, the 1916
leaders, Synge, Mussolini, Kevin O'Higgins, General
O'Duffy--is an understandable form of anxiety in one
who sought to find in a single figure the capacity to
give reality to a spiritual leadership for which (as
he consistently admitted) the conditions had already
disappeared. Such figures could only operate as
symbols. Their significance lay in their disdain for
the provincial, squalid aspects of a mob culture which
is the Yeatsian version of the other face of Irish
nationalism. [48]
Though preferring "pluralism" [45] and "vitalism" [52] to Yeats's
"univocal, heroic" [52] style, James Joyce fares no better than
Yeats in Deane's masterful if obsessive portrayal of the
aesthetic ideology of Ireland's two founding literary genii. (In
, 1 ent .oned "Myth and Motherland"the prevloUS y m l by Richard
Kearney, the other maj or, i.e., most provocative, essay in
Ireland's Field Day, Yeats alone, rather than along with Joyce,
16 Donoghue makes a similar observation, "infer [ring) that Deane has
been reading Foucault, and especially his attacks on ideological systems ..
. which coerce the individual without even telling him that he is to be
constrained" [111).
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becomes the odious object of contempt. While "Yeats's
mythologising [was] sanctimonious clap-trap" [71], a "perversion"
leading to "bigotry, racism, anti -semi tism, fascism, totali-
tarianism" [79]--can the list get longer?--Joyce' s mythologizing
projected "genuine utopias with the goal of universal
liberation" [79]. If Kearney and Deane cannot agree on Joyce,
then at least they can agree on Yeats.) Literature must be
stripped and exposed for its reactionary ideology, and returned
to history from whence it came and which it has defiled; and the
ideologically alert critic is its champion. With so much at
stake, such large claims being made, it matters little if along
the way a poet's emblems are treated as having been (like de
Man's prosopopeia) dead emblems all along, since heroic figures
can "only operate as symbols"; or if by innuendo he appears as
a homosexual courting male heroes. What is urgent is to explode
the big myth, dissolve the mystique, for then we might build a
new Ireland free of Yeats's repressive elitist myth of tragic
heroism.
Near the end of "Heroic Styles" Deane makes an impassioned
plea for a radical dissolution or undoing of the Yeatsian vision
of Irishness.
The oppressiveness of the tradition we inherit has its
source in our own readiness to accept the mystique of
Irishness as an inalienable feature of our writing
and, indeed, of much else in our culture. That
mystique is itself an alienating force. To accept it
is to become involved in the spiritual heroics of a
Yeats or a Pearse, to believe in the incarnation of
the nation in the individual. To reject it is to make
a fetish of exile, alienation and dislocation in the
manner of Joyce or Beckett. Between these hot and
cold rhetorics there is little room for choice.
[57-58]
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Yeatsian vision becomes the obstacle to peace in Ireland, as
Deane concludes that the "dissolution of that mystique is an
urgent necessity if any lasting solution to the North is to be
found" [58]. He attempts here to step outside of a Yeatsian
visionary mystique and its negative or mirror image, a Joycean
counter-mystique, in order to dissolve them away, to create a new
politics by transcending the gyres of Irish cultural identity.
But if Yeats's literature can be perspectivized to reveal the
hidden political ideology that the critic wants to dissolve away,
then surely that political ideology can be perspectivized to
reveal the literary narrative it conceals. In Deane's case, the
story of the dissolution of the gyres, the moment when human
history is no longer trapped in cycles of mystification, is
surely the story of Yeats's poetic career taken as a whole--it
is the story of the quest for "the Thirteenth Cone" of A Vision,
just as it is the quest for antithetical freedom in several of
Yeats's best, most canonical poems, "A Dialogue of Self and
Soul," "Sailing to Byzantium," "Among School Children," and
"Byzantium" to name just a few. If my speculations are right,
then Deane's attempt to step outside of the Yeatsian voice and
vision is only a step back inside them, concealed beneath an
ironic Nietzschean perspectivizing and Foucauldian ideologizing
twist, but all the more Yeatsian in being a quest for apocalyptic
release from the gyres.
My conclusion amounts to what Bloom might call a re-seeing,
a re-estimating, and a re-aiming of Deane's anxious postmodern-
izing turn as in fact no more than an updated model of Yeatsian
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r oman tLc i srnv" Echoing Blake/s insight that as a poet he must
18
create his own system or be enslaved by another, and echoing
the conclusion to a letter that Yeats wrote not long before he
died, that "[t]he abstract is not life and everywhere draws out
its contradictions. You can refute Hegel but not the Saint or
the Song of Sixpence,,19--Donoghue comments that
The man to beat is Yeats. .. But while an argument
can be refuted, and a thesis undermined, a vision can
only be answered by another one. I don't think any
historian/s evidence would make a difference to
Yeats/s vision, or dislodge it from our minds. Only
another vision as complete as Yeats/s, could take its
place. [120]
Though certainly no theorist of Bloomian influence, here Donoghue
touches on Deane/s problem and everyone/s problem--belatedness.
Deane's apparent demonization of Yeats may in fact betray Yeats /s
, ' " f hi 20
"daemon1zat1on 0 1m.
But it is also important to point out that Deane's argument
goes astray long before he turns his Nietzschean reversal on
Yeats. His claim is that Yeats reads history as poetry, a
reading that he would then reverse. But the relation between
poetry and history, as Yeats knew, is far more subtle than this.
The events of Easter 1916, for example, are not simply read as
if they were poetic or heroic, or simply converted into poetry.
17 In various places in his work Bloom describes rev i si.oni sm as a
dialectical triad of re-seeing, re-esteeming or re-estimating, and re-aiming,
for example in A Map of Misreading p. 4, and Poetry and Repression, p. 253.
18 The allusion is to a passage from Blake's Jerusalem (Ch. 1, plate 10,
line 20), as noted by Fite in his book on Bloom, p. 181.
19 The Letters of W. B. Yeats, January 4, 1939, p. 922.
20 "Daemonization" is a technical term in Bloom's arsenal of tropes
concerning the angles of influence that may link precursor and ephebe. I
shall discuss "daemonization" and other Bloomian tropes in subsequent
chapters.
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At least Conor Cruise O'Brien was anxious enough to speculate
upon the mystery in the transformation of politics into poetry.
Deane's flat irony that Yeats read history as if it were poetry
betrays his own simple mimetic approach to poetry, thoroughly un-
dialectical in its impulse. He sees poetry as no more than an
imitation of history, and with Nietzschean vigor he blames Yeats
for having reversed the mirror, claiming that Yeats thought that
history imitates poetry. Sadly, Deane's argument amounts to
nothing more than a re-staging of Plato's contempt, in The
Republic, for poetry as a failed form of mimesis, in contrast to
the successful form of mimesis in logical discursive thought.
And like Plato, Deane seems to desire the banishment of poets
from the new republic that will transcend the gyres. In doing
so, he forgets that, like the poet, he too is a dreamer. He
forgets the dialectic of "The Realists" (1912): 21
Hope that you may understand!
What can books of men that wive
In a dragon-guarded land,
Paintings of the dolphin-drawn
Sea-nymphs in their pearly wagons
Do, but awake a hope to live
That had gone
With the dragons? [222]
Both romantic poet and belated, ironic, self-denying critic write
books and make love in a strife-torn, dragon-ridden Ireland,
dream of something pearly and beyond, and wish to awake from the
nightmare of reality.
21 Jeffares gives 1912 as the date of first publication, but neither
Ellmann nor Jeffares gives a date of composition.
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3.5 Deane and Figures of the Heart
And I took the blame out of all sense and reason,
Until I cried and trembled and rocked to and fro,
Riddled with light.
"The Cold Heaven"
In "The Creation of an Audience" Deane's tone and stance
appear less aggressive and angry toward Yeats, more reconciled
to the precursor. But this is not to say that he is any less
insistent on the correctness of his self-styled realism, or less
critical of "the pretence," "the rich deceit" [38], the tactics
of "the seance" [39], and "the elaborate game of deception" [45]
that he reads in(to) Yeats. Nor is he any less indignant about
Yeats's "hatred of the modern world" which Deane, like Kearney,
O'Brien, and Harrison, finds easy to associate with "Fascism"
[43] • But by making his essay an extended interpretive
paraphrase or translation of Yeats, he strikes a tone more
placid, less accusatory. In fact, at some points a reader might
be forgiven for believing that Deane has come to appreciate the
subtle power of the negative dialectics of Yeatsian history, for
he notes that the attempt to create an audience
concentrated [Yeats's] attention on the difficult
problem of the relationship between historical
actuali ty and the gesture of a poet who wished to
alter it. What reality did the gesture have? In
fact, what reality did any form of cultural activity
have when confronted by a reality of such
intransigence? It was a question Yeats was to
meditate upon for the rest of his career. The
creation of an audience led him to the question of the
function and the nature of art in history. [34]
Deane goes on to provide an account of the relationship of
Yeatsian art to history, but only from the perspective of the
supposed interests of that history. The creation of an audience
in his poetry "permits him to create dialogue where monologue had
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previously dominated" [34J, but that audience being only partly
real, becomes more and more fictional, a movement away from the
real, a poetic deception. "[YeatsJ learned to negotiate between
legendary and historical figures by assuming them both to be
ideal types of the audience for which he was writing" [37J. But
the debilitating nature of this "elaborate game of deception" is
intensified when the audience, already falsified, is further
divided along three ideological lines, "sectarian difference,
... English-Irish stress [,J and. the tension between mass
consciousness and the consciousness of the organic group" [34].
Deane's citing of this third split incites his strongest
criticisms; his reaction to Yeatsian elitism animates his prose.
The poetry becomes "a poetry of and for the select few who had
preserved the values of true culture" [36]. Its "heroes and
heroines are . . opponents of the mass mind" [37]. And the
"hatred" that motivates the poetry Deane explicitly links to
"Fascism":
It is a hunger for Unity of Being against
heterogeneity. It is the ultimate expression of the
defence of the organic against the mechanical and
abstract which Yeats, like so many others, regarded as
the dominant feature of modern civilisation. [43]
I would argue most urgently that the "hatred" Yeats speaks
of, being a gnostic "hatred," is entirely alien to fascist
hatred, though it may be convenient for ideologues like Deane to
associate them. For as I see it, it is Deane's acceptance of a
mimetic theory of poetry that leads him into his ideological
critique of Yeats; or better yet, he founds his ideologizing--his
curious special pleading for the rights of "heterogeneity" as
against "Unity of Being," for "the mechanical and abstract" as
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against "the organic"--upon a mimetic theory that literalizes the
tropes or the images of poems. He takes "The Circus Animals'
Desertion"
22(1937-1938), one of Yeats's finest achievements in
the self-revisionary defense against his prior tropes, as a
literalizing document of self-criticism.
By becoming so entranced by the mythological images of
ancient Ireland, he had failed to pursue, even reach,
his true theme--hatred of the modern world, prepara-
tion for the coming cataclysm which would see its
collapse. Had he paid more attention to modern
Ireland in itself, not merely to modern Ireland as a
contrasting ground for ancient Ireland, he might have
found his theme more fully. [43]
Leaving aside Deane's overt translation of the poetry into
ideology, this passage may paraphrase "the message" of the poem,
but it does nothing to illuminate the negative dialectics that
are the life-blood of the poem, dialectics that lie against prior
"mythological images," or what Yeats calls in the poem "Heart-
mysteries," by feigning their ironization, feigning to put them
once and for all into their proper perspective. Of the poem's
five stanzas, the final two stanzas read as follows:
And when the Fool and Blind Man stole the bread
Cuchulain fought the ungovernable sea;
Heart-mysteries there, and yet when all is said
It was the dream itself enchanted me:
Character isolated by a deed
To engross the present and dominate memory.
Players and painted stage took all my love,
And not those things that they were emblems of.
22 Date of composition given in Yeats's Poems, p. 641.
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III
Those masterful images because complete
Grew in pure mind, but out of what began?
A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street,
Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can,
Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut
Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder's gone,
I must lie down where all the ladders start,
In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart. [472]
Yeats's sense of history and of his own poetic history is
too nuanced, too antithetical to itself, to permit Deane's
literalizing view. To lie down in the shop of the heart cannot
be, as Deane would have it, to chastise the self for having
failed to pursue one's true theme. Rather it must be to welcome
upon the self the more austere and antithetical knowledge that
the heart's freedom and its tropes were always a lie. "Never
give all the heart," wrote Yeats, "for love / Will hardly seem
worth thinking of / To passionate women if it seem / Certain, and
they never dream that it fades out from kiss to kiss" [131]. The
heart that listened to the music of "the deep heart's core" at
Innisfree [74]; the heart that is told "0 heart! 0 heart! if
she'd but turn her head, / You'd know the folly of being
comforted" [130]; the hearts that "with one purpose alone /
Through summer and winter seem / Enchanted to a stone / To
trouble the living stream" [288]; the heart that would be
"Consume[d] . away; sick with desire / And fastened to a
dying animal" [301] i and the heart that spoke of being "Struck
dumb in the simplicity of fire!" [367]--each heart is given a
death by transumption so that the foul shop of the heart might
live its antithetical life, a life that is also a lie, a life
that "must lie" as well as "must lie down."
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Here, near the final midnight of his life and his career,
yet still obsessed with "Heart -mysteries" and with "Themes of the
embittered heart" [471], Yeats summons the strength to envision
once again what Harold Bloom calls by the names of "the breaking
of the vessels" and "catastrophe creation," that is to say, a
23
gnosis whose elements are negation, evasion and extravagance.
The figurative language of a poet's sublime, though in a
dialectic with the literal, must never submit to the literal.
The hearts of the past are negated--but not directly, only
evasively, lying down, as it were, instead of standing up. In
such a movement the freedom of the heart can be known once again,
even if extravagantly in the form of a voice-lie, re-born by
welcoming upon the self the implacable and the intransigent--
history and death.
3.6 Against Deane: Edward Said's Utopian Turn
What shall I do with this absurdity--
o heart, 0 troubled heart--this caricature,
Decrepit age that has been tied to me
As to a dog's tail?
"The Tower"
Given Deane's general condemnation of Yeats, restrained in
"The Creation of an Audience," but vitriolic in "Heroic Styles,"
it comes as a pleasant surprise that "Yeats and the Idea of
Revolution," though published like "Heroic Styles" in 1985, has
little of the latter's anti-Yeatsian piety. The two pieces do,
however, share the same theme and intention--to read, reduce, and
translate Yeats's poetics into politics; to understand the
convergence of Yeats's art with history in terms of the supposed
23 Agon, e.g., pp. 59, 250.
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interests of history; to substitute history for poetry by arguing
as if poems are best taken as ideas that imitate or reflect
historical processes.
"The Statues" best exemplifies [Yeats's] dilemma. In
no other poem did he more eagerly seek an
accommodation between his occultist system and his
vision of Ireland. The demands of that poem are great
and its ambition, especially for "We Irish," almost
measureless, but its rhetoric is strained, spoiled by
a kind of oratory which arises from convictions that
lie outside of the poem's range of reference. I want
to discover the sources of such strain by
tracing back his ideas of Ireland and of revolution .
. To describe Yeats's politics, and to a large
extent his achievement, as colonial is not at all to
diminish it. His career is, especially in its close,
marked by incoherence and by an almost wilful
mysticism. Yet his demand was always that Ireland
should retain its culture by keeping awake its
consciousness of metaphysical questions. By doing so
it kept its own identity and its links with ancient
European culture alive. As always with Yeats, to be
traditionalist in the modern world was to be
revolutionary. [38,49]
Here we observe Deane not only passing by an opportunity to
lambast Yeats for a reactionary metaphysics, but also granting
that metaphysics a measure of legitimacy as "revolutionary." (In
"Heroic styles" only the critic's effort to step outside of the
gyres of history can be seen as revolutionary, while Yeatsian
metaphysics is regarded as a plague upon Irish history.)
Furthermore, Deane questions whether or not Yeats's "temperament"
"can seriously and accurately be described as fascist" [47]. His
conclusion is that "[Yeats's] so-called fascism is, in fact, an
almost pure specimen of the colonialist mentality" [49]--a
surprising conclusion, given his all-too-easy identification of
Yeats with fascism in "Heroic Styles." But are "temperament,"
"wilful mysticism," "incoherence," and being a "revolutionary
traditionalist" really germane to the poems? Or is Deane just
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involved in an upbeat, allusive political biography? He says
that the poet is
in desperate straits. [Yeats] is translating into
politics the implications of his aesthetic. He
denies, for instance, [in "Easter, 1916"] the
bourgeois character of the Irish rebellion in order to
preserve it as an aristocratic emblem caught in the
tide of bourgeois life. [46]
And of the play, A Full Moon in March, Deane says that "[s]ex and
violence produce poetry. Aristocrat [the Queen] and peasant [the
Swineherd] produce, out of a violent fusion, art" [47]. But is
it not Deane who is the agent of the translating into politics
while producing his interpretation? It is not Yeats who
translates aesthetics into politics, but the critic who
translates poems into politics. Sex and violence do not produce
poetry. Sex produces pleasure and children ("honey of genera-
tion" he calls it in "Among School Children"), and violence pain,
not poems. Yeats writes poems that, in a process too complicated
to explain (P2C2E), transfigure the indescribable burden of
history, politics, violence, and sex into art. It is Yeats's
gnostic hatred, his loving opening of himself to past wounds and
potential wounds that mysteriously creates his sublime art.
"After Long Silence" (1929) attempts to carry this impossible
burden and to shed a bit of friendly light upon this dark
mystery:
Speech after long silence; it is right,
All other lovers being estranged or dead,
Unfriendly lamplight hid under its shade,
The curtains drawn upon unfriendly night,
That we descant and yet again descant
Upon the supreme theme of Art and Song:
Bodily decrepitude is wisdom; young
We loved each other and were ignorant. [380]
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Edward Said is well-pleased with Deane's performance in
"Yeats and the Idea of Revolution." In his own essay on "Yeats
and Decolonization" mentioned above (3.2), Said says that Deane's
essay "must stand as the most interesting and brilliant account
of Yeats's idea of revolution" [13]. But being a strong agonist,
Said has his article turn on his differences with Deane. Both
of them are historicizing mimeticists, arguing that Yeats's poems
are best read for the ideological content they conceal. Never-
theless, Said wishes to protest and correct what he sees as
Deane' s "nativism," his having "fall [en] into the nativist
position too willingly, as if nativism were the only alternative
for a resisting and decolonizing nationalism" [15]. Said sees
nativism as a binary discourse that "reinforces the distinction
[between ruler and ruledJ by revaluating the weaker or
subservient partner" [15J, and he would replace this nativism
with a more forward-looking liberationism which "involves, in
Fanon's words, a transformation of social consciousness beyond
national consciousness" [16]. The strength of Said's essay--
despite its mimetic longing, its perspective that poetry, having
no formal independent dynamics, merely reflects the overwhelming
discursive practices, such as imperialism and racism, that
surround it--is that it locates Yeats's best poetry between the
moment of nativism and the moment of liberationism in Irish
history. For all his evasions into orientalism, and ideological
materialist discourse, Said may yet come to be seen as a scholar
more influenced by Emerson than he would care to admit. For by
intuiting Yeats's poetic power to lie in the moment of crossing
and crisis between nativism and liberationism, he repeats and
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revises Emerson's dialectical vision, summarized by Bloom as
fate, freedom,
24
and power. Said repeats Emerson's dialectic
but also revises it by seeing Yeats as never achieving the
crossing into the power of liberationism, as always fascinated
by the freedom of violence but falling back into the fate of
nativism.
Yeats is very much the same as other poets resisting
imperialism, in his insistence on a new narrative for
his people, his anger at the schemes for partition
(and enthusiasm for its felt opposite, the requirement
of wholeness), the celebration and commemoration of
violence in bringing about a new order, and the
sinuous inter-weaving of loyalty and betrayal in the
nationalist setting .... Yeats struggles to announce
the contours of an "imagined" or ideal community,
crystallized not only by its sense of itself but also
of its enemy. [He] is a poet whose early work
sounds the nationalist note and stands finally at the
very threshold it cannot actually ever cross.
This at least gives him credit for adumbrating the
liberationist and utopian revolutionism in his poetry
that has been belied, and to some extent cancelled
out, by his late reactionary politics. His
greatest decolonizing works quite literally conceive
of the birth of violence, or the violent birth of
change, as in "Leda and the Swan," instants at which
there is a blinding flash of simultaneity presented to
his colonial eyes. . Yeats situates himself at
that juncture where the violence of change is
unarguable, but where the results of the violence
beseech necessary, if not always sufficient reason.
[17, 18, 20-21]
The historical moment when nativism becomes liberationism
is of necessity, in Said's view, a moment of violent historical
transformation, and it is the moment that Yeats's poetry is said
to reflect. But turning his attention to what he sees as Deane's
fall into nativism, Said diagnoses it as just a symptom of a
deeper error. For he suggests that we should resist the
24 Bloom's discussions of Emerson's dialectic are scattered throughout
his work, but his wallace stevens and his Agon present significant
developments of this theme.
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attractions of "Adorno's 'negative dialectic'" which he sees
operating in Deane's presentation. Deane culminates his piece
on "The Idea of Revolution" with quotations from Adorno on
negative dialectics [49-50], and this offers Said the occasion
for a general warning.
In a world from which the harsh strains of capitalism
has removed thought and reflection [sic], a poet who
can stimulate a sense of the eternal and of death into
consciousness is the true rebel, a figure whose
colonial diminishments spur him to a negative
apprehension of his society and of "civilized"
modernity.
The final Adornian formulation of Yeats's quandary
as it appears to the contemporary critic is of course
powerful and it is attractive. Yet might we not
suspect ita little of wanting to excuse Yeats's
unacceptable and indigestible reactionary politics--
his outright fascism, his fantasies of home and
families, his incoherently occult divagations--by
seeking to translate them into an instance of Adorno's
"negative dialectic," thereby rendering Yeats more
heroic than a crudely political reading would have
suggested?
From the perspective of liberation then,
Yeats's slide into incoherence and mysticism, his
rejection of politics and his arrogant but often
charming espousal of fascism (or if not fascism then
authoritarianism perhaps even of the South American
kind), appear as something not to be excused,
something that should not too quickly and alchemically
be dialecticised into the negative utopian mode.
[14, 16]
What is so utterly astonishing about Said's "small corrective to
Deane's conclusions" [14] is that it highlights the absolute
distinction between Deane's version of Adornian negative
dialectics and my own Bloomian sense of negative dialectics. Far
from taking to heart Said's warning which amounts to a
prescription that poetry and poetics be further enslaved to a
historicizing and politicizing discourse, I would encourage any
trace or grain of transcendental rhetorics that may be present
in Deane.
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Instead of taming Deane's rhetoric into worldliness
reflected in poetry, I would push his dualism further in order
that it might carry the tremendous weight of Yeats's own
dualisms. "Hatred of God may bring the soul to God" [404J,
writes Yeats in a fit of dualistic passion. Critics can reduce
such a line of poetry to politics, history, ideology or whatever
they prefer, but the line is attempting to bear the burden of a
dualism that transcends all orthodox dualisms, whether Judaic,
Platonic, Christian, Islamic, or Cartesian.
Said's weak dualisms will not suffice our poet.
Liberationism is no doubt a transcendent category, from the
perspective of nativism; but surely Said's quandary must be that
liberationism remains a worldly form of transcendence, if there
can be such an oddity. Is it not more likely that liberationism
mimics more of nativism than Said would find comfortable? His
analysis is that nativism counters colonialism by resisting it,
while remaining caught up in the material dialectics of colonial-
ism by simply revaluating the terms of the binary relationship
between colonizer and colonized.
better, or is it too caught up
Does liberationism fare any
in the materialism and the
interests that it would deny? Either it remains inalienably
enmeshed in the muck and the mire, or it becomes a pure utopia.
But if the latter, then why so much anxiety and hubbub about
Deane's utopian use of Adorno?
The answer must be that Said cannot see that his own
liberationist utopia is utopian. Marvellously, he sees it as
worldly, "worldliness" being a key concept in Said's major works.
On the other hand, Said imagines that Deane's Adornian maneuvers
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threaten to push beyond worldliness to a more ethere~l realm.
But he need have no such fear; Deane's arguments in "The Idea of
Revolution" toy with a sense of negative dialectics, but do not
deliver anything like the profoundly dualistic sense that in his
poetry Yeats brings to his engagement with history, his struggle
to transcend the ethos or the fate of worldliness. Furthermore,
Deane's arguments in "Heroic Styles" and "The Creation of an
Audience" convince that Said, not Yeats, is his master; that he
would willindJpursue mimetic lines of thought that would manacle
1\
a poem to tropes of literalism, worldliness, ideology, and
politics, rather than allow it the spiritual freedom of negative
transcendence. Even though he mystifyingly grants to his own
criticism, in "Heroic Styles," the power to transcend the gyres
and create a new politics for Ireland, this Yeatsian impulse
Deane exercises in profoundly anti-Yeatsian argument and theme.
Such critical ambivalence, such emptying out of the voice of
Yeats, should, however, come as no surprise given the anxious
dynamics of influence between the precursor and his reluctant,
recalcitrant ephebe, Seamus Deane posing as the new and final
modernist. As Bloom has observed on a similar matter, "[t]he
waves of Modernism from Eliot to the belated Modernism of Barthes
and Foucault have played at emptying out the authorial subject,
but this is an ancient play, and recurs in every Modernism from
[the gnostics of] second-century B.C.E. Alexandria down to our
moment" [Agon 48].
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3.7 Williams' Statuesque Correctness
--0 Presences
That passion, piety or affection knows,
And that all heavenly glory symbolise--
o self-born mockers of man's enterprise ...
"Among School Children"
It appears that Yeats's "political" poems utterly vex his
politically-minded critics. They cannot fathom that to write a
poem like "Easter, 1916" (1916), with its "All changed, changed
utterly: / A terrible beauty is born" [287], means far less for
Ireland than it means for poetry, the transformation of poetry,
especially Yeats's poetry. In taking on the wounding burden of
the Irish consciousness of Irish history, its violence, its
horror, its self-sacrificial heroism, the poem does not change
or even seek to change Ireland. Being an antithetical poet, and
not a logical positivist, a historian, or a politician, Yeats
opens himself to the world's horrors to re-create a purified
vision, a new poem, not a new Ireland.
The most glaring weakness that I am aware of in this area
is a recent article by Patrick Williams, "Cultural Coherence and
Contradiction in Yeats" (1989). The article accuses Yeats of
incoherence--mimicking Deane and Said, who also make this
charge?--and self-contradiction, yet ironically enough it
presents a "Yeats" who is highly coherent and not at all
contradictory in terms of imperialism, anti-Semitism, misogynism,
elitism, anything dark and ugly--all concealed but, thanks to
Williams, revealed in this article. Taking the Freudian trope
of "the return of the repressed" as a political imperative and
quite literally, Williams seeks to ferret out the naughty
ideology hidden in the poem call "The Statues" (1938), and to
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take revenge against Yeats on behalf of the repressed and huddled
masses of Asians, women, and workers, the silenced victims of
reactionary Yeatsianism.
I do not here mean to suggest that Williams carefully
deconstructs the poem in order to reveal its ideology; on the
contrary, he pays only brief attention to the poem which remains
throughout most of the essay little more than a backdrop against
which he projects theoretically and morally motivated narratives
and arguments. Williams can perform this maneuver because he
claims that contemporary theory, in this case Bakhtin's
"dialogism" and Said's critique of "orientalism," persuade that
the ideological nature of discourse cannot be evaded. Discourse
is "inescapably ideological" [25], he states. Poems thus betray
an ideology which the critic must articulate. As Williams puts
it, underplaying the degree to which he is doing coercive
violence to the poem, he proposes "to examine some of the
discourses in dialogue with Yeats's poem and with which the poem
as a whole is in turn in dialogue, including those of culture,
class, gender and race" [25].
Having asserted that poems and discourses are in dialogue
with each other, the article has already reached endgame. The
opponent (i.e., the poem) has been defeated by social theory, and
all that remains for the theorist to do is the mopping up. With
patience and acumen, Williams explains how the West has histor-
ically silenced and lorded over the East, how man has done
likewise to woman, and higher to lower classes. Said's highly
influential critique of orientalism is summarized, and Yeats's
poem implicated in the crime.
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"The Statues" is, it would appear, classically,
inescapably, Orientalist. It represents the putative
triumph of the West in terms frequently encountered
elsewhere in Orientalist and colonialist discourse:
the defeat of Asiatic formlessness by European form,
of Eastern chaos by Western order. [27]
Far more elusively, more by innuendo than by argument, Williams
proceeds to embed the poem in anti-Semitism, suggesting that
"[t]he poem also figures as an intervention in the attempt
by intellectuals to construct a purely European, autogenous
Greece, free of contaminating influence either from 'African'
Egypt or 'Semitic' Asia Minor" [29].
and Anarchy is taken to be a controlling pre-text for "The
Matthew Arnold's Culture
Statues" and is depicted as racist and anti-Semitic, although
left unexplained is how the latter point can be reconciled with
Arnold's suggestion that the Hebraic element of his contemporary
culture was a crucial source of its vitality and dynamism.25
"what matters," claims Williams, "is what the text [i.e.,
the poem] legitimates, the kinds of positions, attitudes, actions
in the real world which it authorizes" [33]. He can never, of
course, prove or even demonstrate that "The Statues" legitimates
and authorizes or even encourages the horrors that he decries,
but it is enough to overwhelm the reader with the suggestion that
the attitudes he sees in the poem are somehow reproduced by the
poem "in the real wor ld. " The counter-suggestion that "The
25 In the "Hebraism and Hellenism" chapter of the work, Arnold says that
he regards Hebraism as the, "fo~ce" or "energy driving at practice, this
paramount sense of the ob li qa t i on of duty, self-control, and work, this
earnestness in going manfully with the best light we have" [163]. He goes on
to say that "Hebraism,--and he,re is,the source of its wonderful strength,--has
always been severely preoccupled wlth the awful sense of the impossibility of
being at ease in Zion; of the difficulties which oppose themselves to man's
pursuit or attainment of that perfection of which Socrates talks so hopefully,
and ... so glibly" [168]. As Susan Handelman has noted (p. 170), Derrida
quotes Arnold on the dialectics of Hebraism and Hellenism as epigraph for his
essay on Levinas in writing and Difference.
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Statues" is best seen as a poem that tropes other poems that put
forward a vision of the negative dialectics of history,
imagination and creative form--in "Shelley Disfigured" Paul de
Man suggests that "it would be rewarding to read [Yeats's poem]
in conjunction with The Triumph of Life" [95]--this suggestion
seems not to occur to Williams. For he dismisses any criticism
that focuses on the poetry, referring to it as "the relentless
de-politicization of Yeats's work" [3l], as a "transcendental-
izing tendency" [3l], and as "dangerously perverse" [32]. His
vision of straightening out such perversity is to call a spade
a spade: "The 'silencing' of the Orient to which we have already
referred is an example of an even more deceitful and
ungrateful denial of (cultural) indebtedness, [the]
Phoenician origin of that (apparently) quintessential Greek
invention, the polis or city state" [34]. Williams has
apparently not noticed that, in a passage of prose criticism that
prefigures his visions of Greece in "The Statues" and "Lapis
" t f t G "h lf A ' t' ,,26Lazuli, Yea s re ers 0 reece as a - Sla lC. Yeats's
poem is deceitful and ungrateful due to its "construction of an
Irish identity [that is] dependent--not to say parasitic--upon
the prior existence of a stable Greek identity" [34], itself a
racist falsification legitimated and authorized by the poem.
Women are next on the list of victims to be saved from
Yeats's criminal poem.
Women, the poem would seem to suggest, are largely
irrelevant to the serious business of cultural
struggle and transmission. Although they figure in
the text as aetiolated adolescents on a par with the
males, thereafter they rate mention only as consumers
26
"Certain Noble Plays of Japan," Essays and Introductions, p. 225.
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of dreams given form by male artists. . Woman is
then the analogue of the Oriental in her total
dependence on the European male sculptors for the gift
of proper form--and this type of identification should
come as no surprise, since, as Said points out, the
Orient has been continuously represented as
"feminine"--to the detriment of both.
[Regarding Asiatic formlessness], the male
drive[s] to divide, separate, and impose order at all
costs, . far from being laudable as Yeats would
contend, are responsible for patriarchal
repressiveness, political oppression, war, and all
manner of contemporary horrors. [35-36]
As the male/father ogre melodramatically rears its ugly head,
Williams submi ts himself (and his reader) to symbolic
emasculation in atonement for the crime of being male, for
Yeats's crime of poetically propagating the horror of male
drives. Emasculation, or at least male-feminization, is the goal
in quest, for how else can penis-penalized wretches imitate the
ideologically correct Williams and identify with "the
corresponding female tendency to include, to unite, to achieve
a form of wholeness rather than a rigid ordering" [36]?
The conclusion to Williams' uncrowning of the king turns on
class relations.
The final silenced and disavowed Other whose exclusion
the poem seeks is the lower classes, presumably the
working class, since Yeats spends so much time
elsewhere praising the peasantry. The "many-headed
foam" which Europe overcame in the shape of the
menacing Asiatic hordes now returns in the guise of
the "filthy modern tide"--threatening society with
destruction from within, rather than from without.
[39]
It is quite clear that Williams abhors the attitudes that he
fancies are Yeats's attitudes, the attitudes in the poem, and the
attitudes of the "discourses" as he calls them, that pervade the
poem which he refers to as an "ideological construct" [41]. The
culpability of the Yeats poem in the narrative Williams advances
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is a foregone conclusion because, as he sees it, the poem only
exists to illustrate the larger discourse that he wants to
expose. Nietzsche's will-to-power over a text never had a better
emblem. But the hidden agenda of his will-to-power over Yeats
stands fully revealed when we compare "Cultural Coherence and
Contradiction in Yeats" with the second Williams article in the
collection. Here he writes of "Difficult Subj ects: Black Bri tish
Women's Poetry," and the treatment he gives this topic sharply
contrasts with that given Yeats. The style of strident moral
indignation is replaced by a style of fawning obeisance.
The ability to speak to and engage with the greatest
number of people, and to achieve the minimum
separation between poetry and everyday life, between
poetry and politics, is an important shared aim for
these writers [under discussion]. It is a position
which finds support among cultural theorists and
sociologists .
. . . In their affiliative choices in the sphere of
gender and politics, Black British women poets would
certainly seem to be working in the realm of the
"becoming-minor" [Deleuze and Guattari], opposed, for
good historical reasons, to dreams of dominance,
capable of leading their minor literature on its
"sober revolutionary path." [122, 126]
In collapsing distinctions "between poetry and everyday life,
between poetry and politics," it is clear that Williams is a
mimeticist with no interest in a poetry antithetical to nature
and the self, the poetry of the High Romantic Tradition.
"CuItural theorists and sociologists," like himself, though
feigning the denial of "dreams of dominance," are to become the
new priests, the new arbiters of the syllabus for all right-
thinking literate persons. Meanwhile the canon and its poets,
from the Yawhist and Homer to Dante and Milton, from Blake and
Shelley to Stevens and Yeats, will be scapegoated and sacrificed
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on the altar of class, race, and "gender," and only those who
speak the correct ideology or are of the correct skin color or
sex may become our new laureates. The business of measuring the
quality of a poetic utterance by standing it against its
tradition of utterance will become, worse than an irrelevance,
a reactionary exercise. Williams' performance begs the question-
-what is to be the purpose and function of criticism if it
reduces itself to a flaccid longing for a poetry of mimetic
literalizing that censors, excludes, and denies an antithetical
poetry engaged with what Yeats, in his sublime madness and
gnostic openness to the wounding power of history, called the
"Vision of Evil" ?27
3.8. Yeats, Stevens, and the Nobility of the Proper Dark
Then my delivered soul herself shall learn
A darker knowledge and in hatred turn
From every thought of God mankind has had.
"Ribh Considers Christian Love Insufficient"
In the process of making "The Statues" appear to be a
literal, political pamphlet, Williams (who it would seem has
never in his life written a poem) gravely mistakes the poem's
quest for its "proper dark":
We Irish, born into that ancient sect
But thrown upon this filthy modern tide
And by its formless, spawning fury wrecked,
Climb to our proper dark, that we may trace
The lineaments of a plummet-measured face. [461 ]
This "proper dark," which Yeats here turns as the historical
destiny of the Ireland of his day, I take to be a figure of the
evasive imagination troping itself in its struggle with the
27 A Vision, p. 144.
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overwhelming pressures of its facticity, and facticity for the
imagination means its engagement of all that is not itself, that
is to say, poetic anteriority or the history of poetic voice felt
by the imagination in this poem as outwardness, as heterogeneity,
ultimately as death. Thus, the daunting task of the imagination
here is to defeat death or time by turning it into the source of
the imagination's power to impose form on heterogeneous
formlessness.
In other great poems, other intensely historical poems such
as "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen" (1919-1922), the imagination
works to trope death by allowing the tide of historical violence
to sweep over, crush, drown, or dismember it in Dionysiac frenzy:
All break and vanish, and evil gathers head:
Herodias' daughters have returned and again,
A sudden blast of dusty wind and after
Thunder of feet, tumult of images,
Their purpose in the labyrinth of the wind;
And should some crazy hand dare touch a daughter
All turn with amorous cries, or angry cries,
According to the wind, for all are blind. [317]
As we saw in the first chapter (1.1), it was the utter Dionysiac
power of this poem that seduced J. Hillis Miller to the brilliant
if wayward reading that all Yeats is a centerless cry in the
labyrinth of the wind. But the negative dialectics of Yeatsian
history involves a forceful revisionism. From the perspective
of "The statues," "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen" is not life but
death, an element of the burden of anteriority--along with poems
like Blake's "Mental Traveller" (which is an important precursor
poem to A Vision as well), Shelley's "Ozymandia..s," and Yeats's
own poem "The Second Coming"--which threatens to chain the poet
down onto a rock of death, a rock of massive otherness. "The
statues" certainly does not welcome that otherness in the same
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way that "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen" did. Rather than
through a christlike dismemberment, here the imagination seeks
the vitality of transcendence through an Apollonian imposition
of order on chaos. What Williams reads as ideological
repressiveness, exclusion, tyranny, is no more than a poetic
vision of vitalism and nobility, figured through the creation of
form rather than through its dismemberment.
Though this argument will seem extravagant and inexcusable
to the likes of Williams, its centrality-in-eccentricity, its
proper dark, can be envisioned by standing it next to
speculations from The Necessary Angel (1951) of that other true
ephebe of Shelley, Wallace Stevens:
For the sensitive poet, conscious of negations,
nothing is more difficult than the affirmations of
nobility, and yet there is nothing that he requires of
himself more persistently, since in them and in their
kind, alone, are to be found those sanctions that are
the reasons for his being and for that occasional
ecstasy, or ecstatic freedom of mind, which is his
special privilege. [35]
In quest of its proper dark or its ecstatic freedom of mind, the
Yeats poem seeks a unique, a near-solipsistic nobility that is
a force beyond outwardness, history, anteriority, death. Again
in the words of Stevens,
But as a wave is a force and not the water of which it
is composed, which is never the same, so nobility is
a force and not the manifestations of which it is
composed, which are never the same. . [Nobility]
is not an artifice that the mind has added to human
nature. It is a violence from within that protects us
from a violence without. It is the imagination
pressing back against the pressure of reality. It
seems, in the last analysis, to have something to do
with our self-preservation; and that, no doubt, is why
the expression of it, the sound of its words, helps us
to live our lives. [35-36]
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If Wallace Stevens is right, and I passionately believe that he
is, if poetic voice, poetic nobility is not a function of water
but a force beyond the water pressing against the water, then the
violence of the struggle between the force and the water cannot
be measured or judged by an ethics of the water. To put it
another way, that we may "Climb to our proper dark" is not a plea
for a reactionary nationalism, orientalism, racism, or
misogynismi but it is a plea for the special kind of elitism that
vitalizes all things poetic or artistic. A poem either will not
be written, or, if written, will not be a great poem, will not
in any way influence the canon of poems and itself become
canonical, if it takes as its purpose to defend a political
doctrine or a moral orthodoxy. That way lies the death of the
imagination, death by drowning.
On the other hand, if a poem is to be written at all, even
more so if it is to have any influence upon the tradition of
poems that it lives in, a poem must seek its proper dark; as in
the formula 1 = 1+/-, it must be antithetical to itself, to its
tradition, to all orthodoxy, to "the pressure of reality" as
stevens calls it. It must either enact a negative dialectics,
or die a death that ignominiously submits to politics, nature,
and the self as if these were forces more primordial than the
noble force of the poetic genius--"a violence from within that
protects us against a violence from without."
As George steiner and Harold Bloom would argue, the element
of risk is crucial here. The poet risks all on a word, because
the prize is the pathos of divination. For the most part we all
lose, even poets lose, having failed to risk enough, to strive
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with the purity of a burning flame. But the great poems of the
tradition which claims Yeats and which Yeats claims, is composed
of poems that are part of that tradition because they refused to
cower or to submit to the burden of belatedness. Critics and
theorists like Harrison and O'Brien, Johnsen, Deane, Said, and
Williams do nothing for poetry or criticism to the extent that
they foster a perspectizing of poetry that sees it as valueless
or reactionary unless it slavishly reflects their opposition to
the proper dark, the elitism of the gnostic and agonistic
Sublime. Such writers find "the freedom of self-delight," as
Yeats once called it, an intolerable burden of social guilt.
They invariably seek to suppress such elitism, which gnaws at
them with the realization that it is the source of all great art
and poetry. In a little essay called "Poetry and Tradition"
(1907), published in The Cutting of an Agate and collected in
Essays and Introductions, Yeats writes of this "freedom of self-
delight" [254J as a "shaping joy" [255J that involves a "touch
of extravagance" [254J. Would that we could follow him truly in
his negative dialectics with history:
This joy, because it must be always making and
mastering, remains in the hands and in the tongue of
the artist, but with his eyes he enters upon a
submissive, sorrowful contemplation of the great
irremediable things, and he is known from other men by
making all he handles like himself, and yet by the
unlikeness to himself of all that comes before him in
a pure contemplation. It may be his enemy or his love
or his cause that set him dreaming, and certainly the
phoenix can but open her young wings in a flaming
nest; but all hate and hope vanishes in the dream, and
if his mistress brag of the song or his enemy fear it,
it is not that either has its praise or blame, but
that the twigs of the holy nest are not easily set
afire. [254-255]
Think of ancestral night that can,
If but imagination scorn the earth
And intellect its wandering
To this and that and t'other thing,
Deliver from the crime of death and birth.
"A Dialogue of Self and Soul"
Chapter Four
Yeats's Gnostic Agon with Platonism
I have read somewhere a comment which ironizes our modern
arrogance, suggesting that we are pygmies standing on the
shoulders of giants, that the Bible, Homer, and Plato contain us
and our thought, and all our anxious efforts to resist them.
Although there may be some hyperbole interlaced with the irony
here, the suggestion that even Dante and Shakespeare, Milton and
Wordsworth, Freud and Derrida are ineluctably caught up in the
visions of their great precursors should withstand the most
vigorous attempts of skeptics to debunk it. It may therefore be
just as important for criticism and literary theory to speculate
upon the process of the mutation of literary history as it is to
stand against that history, seeking to undo the visions of the
past, to strive and strike out for new directions. Our modern
temptation to revel in Dionysiac fragmentation--epi tomized I
would say in the Anti-Oedipus (1977) of Deleuze and Guattari,
which glorifies the social effects of schizophrenia while
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indulging a myth of pure libido--owes its possibility of
existence to the counter-impulse of the Apollonian towards the
construction of order out of chaos. Wallace stevens has
suggested something like this in the coda to his Romantic poem,
"The Idea of Order at Key West," a poem that confronts the chaos
of "the dark voice of the sea" with the counter-voice of song and
poetry,
Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon,
The maker's rage to order words of the sea,
Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred,
And of ourselves and of our origins,
In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds. [129, 130]
--and again, in the pithy and comic section I of "Connoisseur of
Chaos,"
A. A violent order is disorder; and
B. A great disorder is an order. These
Two things are one. (Pages of illustrations.) [215]
"Blessed rage for order" is surely a name or trope for the
Apollonian impulse, an impulse originating much that we can
describe in Yeats's poetry as the Yeatsian voice. "Pythagoras
planned it. Why did the people stare?" runs the first line of
"The statues" [460], a poem concerning the figurative qualities
that contributed to the building of civilizations, ancient Greek
and modern Irish. Yet embedded in the rage for order we
recognize the equally Yeatsian impulse to discontinue, to
fragment, to destroy, that is to say, to enjoy the energy of
breaking out of the bounds of an ethos. J. Hillis Miller is
quite right, as we saw in the first chapter, to read this latter
impulse as the driving force within the poem "Nineteen Hundred
and Nineteen," its embrace of "Thunder of feet, tumult of images,
/ . . in the labyrinth of the wind" [317]. But he is quite
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wrong to totalize the Dionysian aspect of Yeats, turning it "by
synecdoche," as he says [320], into the identifying feature of
Yeatsian voice--which he sees with deconstructive irony as no
voice at all, "the voice ultimately of 'nothing'" [324].
In the three preceding chapters I have emphasized the
inadequacies, as I see them, of mimetic as well as anti-mimetic
approaches to Yeats. I have suggested that his poetry would be
unduly limited if seen as an imitation of traditional forms,
historical discourses, or neurotic psychological anxieties. But
equally I have claimed that the corrosive ironies of decon-
structive negation, which reduce lyrical voice to a linguistic
aporia or wilderness, are inadequate to the (Yeatsian) poetic
impulse. The mimesis of Platonism, however, imposes special
burdens on the would-be Yeats critic.
The theory that poetry imi tates objects that are essentially
alien to the material world holds more in common with the anti-
naturalism of deconstruction (despite deconstruction's anti-
mimeticism) than with materialist mimetic approaches such as the
historicizing, psychoanalytic, and New Critical approaches dealt
with and set aside in chapters two and three. Yeats's anti-
naturalistic Platonism may seem to court the anti-naturalism that
informs de Man's and Hillis Miller's criticism, but as I have
argued in chapter one, deconstruction's linguistic abyss is not
the Void that Yeats would kiss. 1 Yeats is drawn to another
Void. The anti-naturalism of the Platonic tradition, which
deconstruction inherits and against which it rebels through
I here allude to my comments and quotation of Yeats in the last
paragraph of the first chapter.
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linguistic undecidability, is Yeats's greatest temptation. It
may be, therefore, that only a poetic theory and critical
practice attuned to the power of the errors of all these
approaches--deconstructive anti-mimeticism, materialist
mimeticism, and the great origin of them all, Platonic anti-
naturalist mimeticism--can productively engage with the Yeatsian
Sublime. Such a theory and practice would be a "supermimesis,"
as Harold Bloom calls
.t 2l , willing to risk a negatively
dialectical approach to the transcendental.
In this chapter my thesis is that the lyrical voice that
criticism has learned to call Yeatsian comes about through the
poet's agon with his native and acquired tendency toward
Platonism in its many forms. As I see it, the best available
analogue of the Yeatsian poetic stance is the heretical stance
of historical Gnosticism against the received orthodoxy of
Platonism and Christianity. In its impulse, which may be but the
"throb of an artery," Yeatsian gnosis seeks to de-idealize
various Platonic doctrines and to transform religious faith in
an external God into poetic knowledge of a God within. To write
a poem is (for Yeats) to attempt divination.
4.1 The Gnosis of "Self and Soul"
You think it horrible that lust and rage
Should dance attention upon myoId age;
They were not such a plague when I was young;
What else have I to spur me into song?
"The Spur"
Yeatsian gnosis, Yeatsian poetic divination, typically
refuses Platonic ideals, other worldly Edens. If possible at
E.g., Agon pp. 70, 177.
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all, it must come through a movement antithetical to itself, not
just to its opposite. It must negate Platonic transcendence as
well as time and this world. Its movement is downward and
inward, rather than upward and outward. In "The Choice" (1931)3
the voice of the poet who would perfect the work rather than the
life "must refuse / A heavenly mansion, raging in the dark"
[362] . This sketch of Yeatsian gnosis is fully drawn in "A
Dialogue of Self and Soul" (1927), that eminently gnostic among
Yeats's visionary poems. Tropes of darkness and blindness obsess
the voices of the poem which seek to answer the question, How
must I respond to spiritual darkness if that great defeat is to
be transformed into a sublime poetic victory? "My Soul" tries
to persuade "My Self" that gnosis is achieved in "scorn [of] the
earth," in "the steep ascent" along "the winding stair," in the
ascent to heaven, to the purity of silence in "ancestral night."
But "My Self" stubbornly chooses to scorn "the tower / Emblem-
atical of the night," insisting instead upon "emblems of the
day," emblems of "love and war," emblems not of Platonic
transcendence nor of Christian self-denial, but of worldly
process, the antinomies of Empedocles, that great precursor of
Plato.
I
My Soul. I summon to the winding ancient stair;
Set all your mind upon the steep ascent,
upon the broken, crumbling battlement,
Upon the breathless starlit air,
upon the star that marks the hidden pole;
Fix every wandering thought upon
That quarter where all thought is done:
Who can distinguish darkness from the soul?
Date taken from Yeats's Poems, p. 600.
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My Self. The consecrated blade upon my knees
Is Sato's ancient blade, still as it was,
Still razor-keen, still like a looking-glass
unspotted by the centuries;
That flowering, silken, old embroidery, torn
From some court-lady's dress and round
The wooden scabbard bound and wound,
Can, tattered, still protect, faded adorn.
My Soul. Why should the imagination of a man
Long past his prime remember things that are
Emblematical of love and war?
Think of ancestral night that can,
If but imagination scorn the earth
And intellect its wandering
To this and that and t'other thing,
Deliver from the crime of death and birth.
My Self. Montashigi, third of his family, fashioned it
Five hundred years ago, about it lie
Flowers from I know not what embroidery--
Heart's purple--and all these I set
For emblems of the day against the tower
Emblematical of the night,
And claim as by a soldier's right
A charter to commit the crime once more.
My Soul. Such fullness in that quarter overflows
And falls into the basin of the mind
That man is stricken deaf and dumb and blind,
For intellect no longer knows
Is from the Ought, or Knower from the Known--
That is to say, ascends to Heaven;
Only the dead can be forgiven;
But when I think of that my tongue's a stone.
II
My Self. A living man is blind and drinks his drop.
What matter if the ditches are impure?
what matter if I live it all once more?
Endure that toil of growing up;
The ignominy of boyhood; the distress
Of boyhood changing into man;
The unfinished man and his pain
Brought face to face with his own clumsiness;
The finished man among his enemies?--
How in the name of Heaven can he escape
That defiling and disfigured shape
The mirror of malicious eyes
Casts upon his eyes until at last
He thinks that shape must be his shape?
And what's the good of an escape
If honour find him in the wintry blast?
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I am content to live it all again
And yet again, if it be life to pitch
Into the frog-spawn of a blind man's ditch,
A blind man battering blind meni
Or into that most fecund ditch of all,
The folly that man does
Or must suffer, if he woos
A proud woman not kindred of his soul.
I am content to follow to its source
Every event in action or in thoughti
Measure the loti forgive myself the lot!
When such as I cast out remorse
So great a sweetness flows into the breast
We must laugh and we must sing,
We are blest by everything,
Everything we look upon is blest. [348-351)
The final declaration of "My Soul" speaks with the voice of
Yeatsian "esoteric Platonism," as I shall call it. The response
that "My Self" gives to the blandishments of "My Soul" is to
refuse the movement of ascending to heaven in favor of descending
through "life" in all its blind suffering and humiliation. "My
Self" embraces what "My Soul" had rightly called "the crime of
death and birth." In rejecting the ascent to heaven, "My Self"
yet seeks its own path to gnosis or the knowing wherein the
knower becomes the known. "My Soul" attempts to usurp this trope
of gnosis for the purpose of seducing or cajoling "My Self" to
seek ascent to heaven through Platonic meditation: "For
intellect no longer knows I Is from the Ought, or Knower from the
Known." But the gnosis and the heroic vitalism of "My Self"
comes in choosing to descend "again I And yet again," if
necessary, into the crime of death and birth, there to achieve,
if at all, the knowing that is a self-blessing. In descending
through "life" rather than ascending up and out of life, "My
Self" negates not only Platonic transcendence but also the
antinomies of Empedocles, love and strife. Yeatsian gnosis is
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antithetical to itself, as in the formula 1 = 1 +/-, because it
is achieved in dialectical negation not only of what Yeats in A
Vision calls the "primary" but also of the antithetical itself.
Both ancestral night and the emblems of the day are negatively
transcended in the gnosis of self-blessing. The death of night
and the endless strife of day are overwhelmed by self-blessing,
a catastrophe creation as Harold Bloom would call it.
In "A Dialogue of Self and Soul" it is as though Yeats were
once again re-writing Dante's Divine Comedy. In his youth he had
been obsessed with the Celestial Rose of Paradiso, writing a
whole series of works re-envisioning the Rose, troping the
transcendental. In "The Secret Rose"
4(1896) for example, he
had written a plea for apocalypse:
When shall the stars be blown about the sky,
Like the sparks blown out of a smithy, and die?
Surely thine hour has come, thy great wind blows,
Far off, most secret, and inviolate Rose? [105]
He now revises his great Italian precursor by accepting the
descent into Hell, then refusing the ascent along the mountain
of purgatory to the Edenic summit, and the leap from Eden to the
Rose of the Empyrean. He revises Dante by contracting and
concentrating the whole of Purgatorio and Paradiso into a brief
lyric moment, as though the beatific vision were to occur as
Dante and his precursor Virgil climb down and out of Hell by way
of Satan's leg.
We might yet go further, saying that the poet transforms
Platonic ascent into a Blakean-Yeatsian vortex. Blake would urge
the visionary,
Date of first publication, Yeats' Poems, p. 518; date of composition
is unknown.
171
To see the World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.5
Still unsurpassed for insight and detail on the figure of the
vortex in Blake and its influence on Yeats is Hazard Adams' book,
Blake and Yeats: The Contrary Vision (1955). For Adams, the
vortex suggests not a whirlpool or gyre--an emblem of the day--
but an imaginative moment of inward expansiveness, such that "all
images are really infinite perceptions, unified extensions of
mind" [106]. Vortices of vision similar to the Blakean quatrain
appear throughout Yeats's poetry, poems such as "A Meditation in
Time of War" (1914), "Gratitude to the Unknown Instructors" (date
unknown), and "A Needle's Eye" 6(date unknown) :
For one throb of the artery,
While on that old grey stone I sat
Under the old wind-broken tree,
I knew that One is animate,
Mankind inanimate phantasy. [297]
What they undertook to do
They brought to pass;
All things hang like a drop of dew
upon a blade of grass. [369]
All the stream that's roaring by
Came out of a needle's eye;
Things unborn, things that are gone,
From needle's eye still goad it on. [406]
While the allusion to Plotinus, or more severely to the pre-
Platonic Parmenides--"I knew that One is animate, / Mankind
inanimate phantasy"--reflects Yeats's Platonic leanings, the
throb of the artery (which is a Blakean trope), the drop of dew,
5 The introductory quatrain of "Auguries of Innocence," p. 132; Yeats
slightly misquotes the first two lines in A Vision, p. 91.
6 Neither Ellmann (The Identity of Yeats) nor Jeffares (Yeats's Poems)
can give a date of composition for the latter two poems.
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and the needle's eye suggest a visionary moment of gnosis. Like
Blake's visionary urging, the speech of "My Self" seeks a vortex
which will transform the crime of death and birth into a blessing
in the act of self-forgiveness and the casting out of remorse.
In the first chapter (1.9) I suggested that "A Dialogue of
Self and Soul" haunts a key passage of George Steiner's Real
Presences, guiding and dominating it by a persuasive dialectics,
a quest for a blessing through the internalization of the Other.
"Among School Children," as I argued in the second chapter, has
had a strong influence on modern criticism and theory. The same
must be argued for "Self and Soul." Just as in his discussion
of the dancer and the dance in Allegories of Reading (1979), Paul
de Man confirmed and enacted this influence when, in "Lyric and
Moderni ty" in Blindness and Insight (1971), he set the traj ectory
of modern poetics in relation to our critical dialogues of self
and soul. He writes that
truly modern poetry is a poetry that has become aware
of the incessant conflict that opposes a self, still
engaged in the daylight world of reality, of repre-
sentation, and of life, to what Yeats calls the soul.
. . . Modern poetry is described by Yeats as the
conscious expression of a conflict within the function
of language as representation and within the con-
ception of language as the act of an autonomous self.
[171]
De Man's strong misreading of Yeats, a reading that inaugurates
the institutional richness of the ascetic deconstructive mis-
understanding of lyric poetry, errs only in its deification of
language, turning language into a new Demiurge, making gnosis an
impossibility and aporia an inevitability. For de Man, language
is the abyss; it is perplexity and poverty. For Bloom, however,
language can be negated in a "catastrophe creation" that
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transcends the perplexity and poverty of aporia, deifying
ourselves rather than language, and thereby uniting us to the
Abyss beyond any cosmic Demi urge. The Yeats poem does not
represent, it enacts this deification in the most extravagant of
dualisms--psyche against pneuma, "cosmic soul against acosmic
self. In a poem like Yeats's A Dialogue of Self and Soul,"
writes Bloom, "this dualism attains a modern apotheosis" [Agon
7]. It is my claim that the gnostic quality of Yeatsian
apotheosis deserves more sympathetic study.
4.2 Yeats studies and the Play of Gnosis
. and yet again descant
upon the supreme theme of Art and Song:
Bodily decrepitude is wisdom; young
We loved each other and were ignorant.
"After Long Silence"
Although Yeats's Platonism could be assimilated safely to
their work, critics of Yeats have variously missed, avoided, or
dismissed the crucial importance of gnosis for the poet. As
early as 1955 Hazard Adams suggested a link between gnosis and
Yeats's poetics when he wrote, "Like Blake, [Yeats] attacked
abstraction and defended the form of experience which dictates
nondiscursively its own higher morality and comprehension, its
gnosi s" [151]. Adams also seemed to compare Yeats to an
alchemist or a magus when he wrote, "The Yeats of the lonely
tower, who struggles with learning like the fly in the vase, [is]
the searcher for elusive gnostic power, . for the solution
to antinomies beyond human understanding" [185]. Even though he
invites some confusion between esoteric Platonism and gnosis in
his comparison between alchemy and poetry, and even though his
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allusion to "The struggle of the fly in marmalade," from the poem
"Ego Dominus Tuus" (1915), weakens the antithetical force of the
line by substituting marmalade with vase, the Adams inference
about a gnostic agon in Yeats is accurate. Yet for the most part
critical ignorance prevails.
There has been no shortage of studies of Yeats and Platonism
in various guises. These usually deal with three areas: his
reading of and allusions to Neoplatonists such as Plotinus and
Porphyry (through the work of their modern translators, Thomas
Taylor and Stephen MacKenna); his links to modern Platonism from
the Italian Renaissance through Shelley to Walter Pater, William
Morris and other contemporaries; and most prevalently perhaps,
his esoteric Platonism--his occult or spiritualist readings and
practices, such as his affiliations with theosophy (from 1888 to
1890 he was a member of Madame Blavatsky's Theosophical Society
in Dublin), with popularized Kabbalah, Hermeticism, and Rosi-
crucianism (from 1890 until about 1922, he was an active member
of the Isis Urania Temple of the Hermetic Order of the Golden
Dawn, which was led for years by the magus MacGregor Mathers,
taking as his identifying motto "Demon Est Deus Inversus"), and
with seances, magic, Tarot, alchemy, automatic writing--in a
word, the
7
arcane. Yeats's prose works, especially his
Autobiographies, A Vision, and Essays and Introductions, are
spiced with references to such names, traditions, and practices.
What has not been done, however, despite the labors of Thomas
Whitaker and Harold Bloom (and more recently Patrick Keane and
7 Particular points of information here are taken from Jeffares' new
biography, w. B. Yeats (1988) and from Harper's Yeats's Golden Dawn (1974).
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Jahan Ramazani), is an appreciation of how Yeats struggles to
overcome his Platonic tendency, seeking to transform its
orthodoxies, by means of poetic revisionism, into the blessing
referred to at the culmination of "A Dialogue of Self and Soul."
The first to take up the issue of Yeatsian gnosis as an
explicit theme was the author of Swan and Shadow: Yeats's
Dialogue with History (1964). Whitaker so influenced Harold
Bloom that Bloom would describe him, with ambivalence, in 1970
as "Yeats's most learned and devoted apologist. ,,8 Without
seeing the problem that I see of a critical tension between
Platonism and gnosis, Whitaker at least takes seriously the
gnostic impulse in Yeats's writings, the premise of his book
being that the poet must somehow negate all materiality in order
to redeem himself.
Man, who is made in God's image, is also a source of
light; and in moments of creative intensity he must
see all else as but an image in a looking glass .
. . . [H]istory is his dark reflection, his adversary.
. . . Yet in a world fallen into division, that
adversary, Dragon, Serpent, or shadow can itself be a
gnostic means of redemption. Man darkly discerns all
that is "evil," all that is "other," his antithetical
daimon, a hidden manifestation of God or of his deeper
self. If he makes the heroic effort to open himself
to the fullness of experience, he may be led by that
anti-self toward an understanding of both microcosm
and macrocosm. [6-7]
Although I find the trope of understanding "both microcosm and
macrocosm" a little wayward, hardly apposite to the acosmic and
fiery moment of poetic gnosis, I find Whitaker's thesis
compelling in general, and I will return to his idea of the
Yeats, p , 377--"learned" because he surpassed even Ellmann in
revealing the subtlety and intensity of Yeats's career project; and "devoted"
because, unlike the Bloom of 1970, he saw no necessity to score the politics
of the man or the poems.
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poet's "heroic effort to open himself to the fullness of
experience" in the fifth chapter when I again take up my topic
of chapter three, revising the negative dialectics of Yeatsian
history.
Following Whi taker, Harold Bloom published his tome enti tled
Yeats in 1970. At this time, Bloom was deeply ambivalent about
gnosticism and poetry, even though his work since then was to
become the most insistently and persuasively gnostic work in
contemporary cri tical and literary theory. In 1979 he would even
publish his own gnostic novel, The Flight to Lucifer. But in the
late 1960s Bloom had yet to work through and fully commit himself
to his theory of poetic influence, with all its gnostic implica-
tions. Instead, he remained defensively committed to such views
as he had published earlier in the decade, on Blake and Shelley
as optimists and humanists. As a result, he saw Yeats as deviant
from his perception of Romantic orthodoxy, and attacked Yeats's
gnostic impulse.
But Yeats, even before he read arcane literature and
became a Rosicrucian adept, was a natural Gnostic. He
shared always the Gnostic sense of longing acutely for
the soul's fortunate destiny after the body's death,
a longing that is the negation of Blake's apocalyptic
desires. And he shared also the Gnostics' obsession
to learn the names of the demons [the Archons]9
through whose realms the soul must ascend. From the
Gnostics ultimately, Yeats took his deep belief that
evil ruled in his own epoch, but that something more
congenial would come in the next. For Yeats, like the
Gnostics, is profoundly pessimistic, even as Blake,
despite all horrors, is humanly hopeful, as Shelley is
until his last phase. [74]
9 writing of the Gnostic myth in general in the Gnostic Religion (1958),
Hans Jonas says, "The universe, the domain of the Archons, is like a vast
prison whose innermost dungeon is the earth, ... [and] each Archon bars the
passage to the souls that seek to ascend after death, in order to prevent
their escape from the world and their return to God" [43].
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Though there is much to disagree with in this passage, such as
its overstated attempt to divide Yeats from his precursors on the
basis of their humanistic optimism as against his Gnostic
pessimism, the passage illustrates my point that criticism has
failed to distinguish Yeats's movement beyond Platonism into
gnostic vision. In other words, the esoterica that I would
consider as modern permutations of Platonism, Bloom here
considers as "Gnostic." Bloom's Yeats, therefore, develops
Whitaker's earlier insight, opening Yeats's work to the analogue
of gnosis, even as it confuses his gnosticism with the arcane and
1(1
denounces it.
By the time he published Poetry and Repression: Revisionism
from Blake to stevens in 1976, with its chapter called "Yeats,
Gnosticism, and the Sacred Void," Bloom had subjected his views
on gnosticism to a severe revision. This chapter indeed
functions as a palinode for much that Bloom had said "light
years" earlier in Yeats, for it recants much in the earlier work
about Yeats's Gnosticism, even as it still expresses "reserva-
tions" about Yeats's political tendencies. Now in 1976 Bloom
sees Gnosticism not as a deviation from Romantic orthodoxy, but
quite the opposite. "Indeed, it could be argued," he writes,
"that a form of Gnosticism is endemic in Romantic tradition
10 The reader will note that I appear to be inconsistent about applying
lower case or upper case to "gnosticism." Whereas Bloom almost always uses
upper case, I wish to discriminate between historical Gnosticism, which was
a religious movement that competed Wl th Judaism and Christianity in the
Eastern Mediterranean in the first two centuries of the Common Era, and the
intuitive gnosticism of poets and artists seeking their own personal visions.
Nevertheless, I must use upper case when alluding to Bloom's use, even when
this coincides with the latter sense of the term. Like Bloom, I follow the
descriptions of historical Gnosticism put forward by Jonas in The Gnostic
Religion; mor~ov~r, I fo~l?w the analogy between h~storical Gnosticism and
intuitive artlstlC gnostlclsm put forward by Bloom In Agon and The Breaking
of the Vessels.
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without, however, dominating that tradition, or even that
Gnosticism is the implicit, inevitable religion that frequently
informs aspects of post-Enlightenment poetry" [212]. Yeats
remains "a Gnostic adept," and "his Gnosticism seems to [Bloom]
his natural religion: sincere, consistent, thoroughgoing, and
finally a considerable aid to his poetry." This severe revision
in Bloom's theory comes not so much from his realization that
Blake, Shelley and Romanticism are linked closer to Gnosticism
than to "humanism," but rather more from his intuition that
creativity of any sort, perhaps especially his own creativity,
is a sublimely individual activity--verging on solipsism--for
which the best available model or image is the revisionist stance
of ancient Gnosticism towards Platonic or religious orthodoxy,
and in which an act of gnosis attempts to achieve divination.
The curious point about this narrative of Bloom's quest for
his own gnostic criticism is the role that Yeats plays in it.
For it is my view, and I shall have more to say about this later,
that Bloom does not give Yeats the credit that his Irish
precursor deserves. In 1970 Yeats is attacked and gnosticism
eschewed as a deviation from the Romanticism of Blake and
Shelley. In 1973 Bloom's most famous book, The Anxiety of
Influence, is published, shocking his critical readership by its
visionary quali ty-- its endorsement of gnostic metaphors, but also
its assertively gnostic posture. Since then, in book after book
Bloom has continued with great energy to press his personal
gnosticism into his criticism. I believe that Yeats was the key
figure in Bloom's self-transformation, yet Yeats has remained
virtually absent from his writings. Except for the chapter in
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Poetry and Repression, and a very few comments scattered in other
works, since 1970 Yeats has remained alien to Bloom's brilliant
work. Though absent from it, the figure of Yeats haunts Bloom's
work, and this claim I will explore in greater detail as this
dissertation unfolds, performing on Bloom's theory, by way of
Yeats's poetry, the very misreading that his theory, his gift to
the world, describes. As the Valentinian author of the Gnostic
Gospel of Truth writes--in a gnomic remark taken by Bloom as his
epigraph of the Prologue to Anxiety of Influence--"It was a great
marvel that they were in the Father without knowing Him" [3, 13;
Jonas 181].
4.3 Keane, Ramazani, and the Light of Gnosis
Whether we have chosen chisel, pen or brush,
We are but critics, or but half create,
Timid, entangled, empty and abashed,
Lacking the countenance of our friends.
"Ego Dominus Tuus"
Patrick Keane and Jahan Ramazani have recently published
works that tempt us toward a vision of Yeats's gnosis, but that
finally evade the necessary extravagance of such a criticism.
In his closely argued account called Yeats's Interactions with
Tradition (1987), Keane articulately brings forward an array of
literary, philosophical, and occult citations, echoes, and
allusions that he finds in Yeats's poetry in draft and final
copy. If nothing else, Keane's work demonstrates the breadth and
depth of Yeats's readings and the labyrinthine nature of the
poet's unveiling of his readings in poems.
Without any doubt, the crucial text in Keane's account is
the text of Nietzsche, as Keane ferrets out every possible
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allusion in the poems to the writings of the German. In taking
the approach of literary echo, Keane sets himself apart from
11
Bloom whose work he clearly respects. Bloom considers the
tracing out of literary echoes an academic parlour game--in
Anxiety Bloom speaks of "the wearisome industry of source-
hunting, of allusion-counting, an industry that will soon touch
apocalypse anyway when it passes from scholars to computers"
[31]--in contrast to his own effort to interpret tradition as an
"unconscious" warping of anteriority, tradition breaking and re-
making itself. Keane on the other hand hunts for the way in
which Yeats's readings reappear in his poems. This contrast can
be clearly seen in how Bloom and Keane deal differently with the
link between Nietzsche and Yeats. Nietzsche never fails to play
an important, if ambivalent, role in Bloom's own theory and
practice, and in Poetry and Repression Bloom clarifies his view
of the influence of Nietzsche on Yeats.
From 1902 on, Yeats was a steady reader of Nietzsche.
I suggest that the crucial influences upon a poet must
come early in his development, even as Shelley, Blake,
and Pater affected Yeats early on. That Nietzsche,
whom he read after he turned thirty-seven, influenced
Yeats so strongly is due to Nietzsche's reinforcement
of the earlier influences. [206]
In contrast, Keane's narrative of interactions, which overwhelms
his reader with references to the German, suggests very strongly
that Nietzsche is the central figure of concern in Yeats's
perspective on tradition.
11 Keane is fond of quoting, f?r example, the shibboleth that peppers
Bloom's books, the so-called Emerson~an law of compensation--"Nothing is got
for nothing." And despite my comments critical of Keane, he does display at
times a Bloomian influence on his work, an intuition of poetic revisionism at
a deeper-than-conscious level.
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While I cannot "prove" that Bloom rather than Keane is right
on this issue, I can nevertheless argue that Bloom's sense of
"revisionism," with its dynamic vision of the breaking and re-
making of the canon, is a more appropriate allegory of inter-
pretation of poetry than is Keane's sense of "interactions." The
reason for this judgment must surely be that Bloom's "revision-
ism" enacts the stance of the gnostic towards tradition, and this
stance more than any other represents the stance of the strong
poet, like Yeats, towards tradition; whereas Keane's textual
"interaction," with its sense of conscious borrowing, fails as
a metaphor to suggest adequately the gnostic agon that generates
a great poem.
Even so, my quarrel with Keane would take on less importance
if his own representation of the Nietzsche-Yeats relation were
in tune with the implications of his own suggestions. "A Dia-
logue of Self and Soul," and especially Nietzsche's "influence"
on it, form the main emphasis of Keane's argument. Yet oddly
enough, even as his argument would seem to lead him inexorably
to a recognition of Yeats's Nietzschean gnosis in the poem, Keane
dismisses its possibility. After citing the Nietzsche from phase
twelve of A Vision as Yeats's model for the hero, the man able
to overcome himself, "thus attaining the antithetical 'perfection
that is from a man's combat with himself'" [146], Keane continues
to the precipice, then averts his gaze:
Self's victory, ... is over the severe moralism, the
"bad conscience," that would reduce the body to an
object of defilement and degradation ["That defiling
and disfigured shape ... "]. In Yeats's case it
seems, above all, a triumph over his own Neo-
platonism, even Gnosticism. This is creative self-
overcoming. . .. [146]
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Well, triumph over his Platonism it certainly is, but only by way
of gnostic self-blessing. Is it too much to expect in 1987 that
a writer as sharp as Keane, one clearly familiar with Bloom's
gnostic criticism, should recognize a gnostic impulse when he
virtually describes it himself?--as here, in his depiction of the
poem's heretical redemption:
The Yeatsian infusion of sweetness into a self-
forgiving breast is thus both redemptive and
heretical: a confirmation of man's claimed autonomy,
a prideful non-serviam, and a stubborn clinging to
sensuous beauty, however painful. [149]
As with the Bloom of 1970 who was deeply uneasy about his own
nascent gnosticism, Keane confuses Yeatsian gnosis with
Platonism:
As already noted in the discussion of "A Dialogue of
Self and Soul," Nietzsche provided an impressive
anti thetical counterweight to the primary world of
Plato, Plotinus, Macrobius, Gnosticism, and the" life-
denying" aspects of Christianity. [157]
In his confusion, his critical "ignosis," Keane blunts the edge
of his argument; he tames the potential extravagance of his own
criticism and denies himself and his readers the light of the
antithetical power of poetic gnosis.
Jahan Ramazani' s book on Yeats and the Poetry of Death
(1990), like Keane's before it, offers much that is useful
argument and insightful criticism. How could it be otherwise,
when his topos is the voice of the Yeatsian elegiac Sublime, and
when his argument is informed, subtly not ostentatiously, by our
most controversial and brilliant critics and theorists from
Nietzsche and Freud to Paul de Man. He bears out this observa-
tion in his comments on the final five lines of "A Dialogue of
Self and Soul" and its amor fati:
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[T]he poet frees himself from self-pity by affirming
his fate.. . The replacement of the self-mourning
"I" by the laughing "We" represents the unbinding of
object-directed pathos and its sudden transformation
into Dionysian catharsis--an unfocused libido that
drowns the dikes in a moment of blessedness. [102]
Such comments, it seems to me, imply the sense of visionary
gnosis that I have been suggesting is crucial to Yeats and ought
to be crucial to Yeats studies. Even so, there is a dismissive
slant to Ramazani's thesis by which he denigrates the very voice
that enchants him, a slant which ultimately links him to the
temporal irony, the linguistic abyss, of Paul de Man rather than
to the Abyss in its Gnostic sense, "the Sacred Void" of Yeats's
gnosticism.
In Bloom's hands, the Nietzschean trope of art as a "lie
against time" is seen as a source of the glory of strong poetry.
But in Ramazani's hands, the trope induces an ironic deflation
of the very poetry that he otherwise suggests is "sublime."
Again with reference to the latter section of "A Dialogue of Self
and Soul" and its Nietzschean origins, he writes:
The poet wills his endless return to the blindness of
inorganic matter. But this affirmation of the
eternal, autochthonous return is also compensatory.
The kinship between eternal recurrence and the sublime
should help us see that even though Yeats and
Nietzsche think that their belief in recurrence
indicates their release from the spirit of revenge, or
ill will toward time, it is in fact an illusion that
allows them to think they have transcended time, that
they can live an infinite number of lives, and that
they have therefore escaped the threatening scythe of
the father beyond all fathers. [117-118]
Taking an ironic stance toward the poem's quest for a negative
transcendence, Ramazani reminds us, as if we need reminding, that
Yeats was "in fact" not an immortal god. In this perspective the
poem's vision is "an illusion" allowing the poet "to think" he
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has transcended time. "Yeats triumphs," he says, "by making us
believe [now it is the reader who is deluded, rather than the
poet] that in choosing to live again, he has accepted death; and
that in choosing the Self over the Soul, he has embraced his
finitude" [180]. Or again, "the poet succeeds in making us
believe that he has courageously resigned himself to death, when
he has instead erased the whole question of death" [187].
Ramazani thus takes an ironic stance toward the troping of
death in this poem, indeed throughout the Yeatsian canon. In
doing so, he re-focuses attention on death in all its literality,
but he also exposes his own weakness, for even the irony of irony
can be ironized, and it may be that his ironic perspectivizing
originates in his own anxious will-to-power over Yeats's tropes,
in his own desire to live through the turning or troping of
Yeats's lively gnosis, making it appear as "an illusion." He
would thus live off of another's death, a figurative death which
he must call literal in order to gain power over it. I find
Bloom's comments in The Breaking of the Vessels (1982) to be
helpful.
To read all poetry as the irony of irony indeed nobly
refuses self-deception, but the irony of irony has
both its immediate strength and its ultimate weakness
when we realize that its only quest is for the text of
death, or the reading of all strong text as the study
of death, rather than of birth or rebirth. [17]
The challenge to Yeats studies was laid down more than
twenty years ago by Bloom in his Yeats: "The Higher Criticism
of Yeats, when it is more fully developed, will have to engage
the radical issue of his subjectivity, particularly as it is
expressed in his myth of the antithetical man" [372]. Both Keane
and Ramazani approach this myth, the light of Yeatsian gnosis,
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each with his own hopes and trepidations. Whereas Keane was able
to see the light but unable to know the light, Ramazani was able
only to turn his gaze away from the light. Maybe he fears that
it would blind him, making him "A blind man battering blind men,"
as Yeats puts it. To defend against blindness is no shame, but
Yeats criticism and the sons of Yeats must run the risk of
exposure to blindness if they are to be adequate to the strength
of their gnostic father. As Bloom has said, concerning "A
Dialogue of Self and Soul" in his Yeats I "Yeats is never stronger
than when he is totally exposed" [373]. I would argue that this
mythical moment of total exposure to the light arrives, if at
all, when 1 = 1+ / - , when the knower becomes the known in a
triumph that must pass down through an inferno of defeat, when
"the antithetical man" can remain antithetical even to "Self,"
not just to the self-denying visions of "Soul."
4.4 Anti-Platonism and Critical Confusion
Though leaves are many, the root is one;
Through all the lying days of my youth
I swayed my leaves and flowers in the sun;
Now I may wither into the truth.
"The Coming of Wisdom with Time"
In A Vision (1937) Yeats describes the fervor with which he
read Plotinus and other Platonists in his effort to deduce a
source of "inspiration" for the "geometrical symbolism" that his
"Instructors" gave him through the mediumship of his wife's
automatic writing: "I read all MacKenna's incomparable
translation of Plotinus, some of it several times, and went from
Plotinus to his predecessors and successors . " [20] • We
truly enter the labyrinth of his word and thought when we quest
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after a knowledge of Yeats's Platonism. So much ink has been
spilt over it, blotting it out, so much confusion and contra-
diction blocking the way. "Those who say that Yeats was a
Platonist are right," states Denis Donoghue in his own Yeats
(1971), "subject to the qualification that he was the opposite,
empiricist or realist, even on the same occasions" [16] .12
Already lost in the maze, Donoghue, to his credit, at least keeps
searching for the true path, but to little avail. Yeats was a
Platonist and an empiricist, he says, but his crucial "kinship
[was] with Nietzsche: it seems to me a more telling relation-
ship," he remarks, "than between Yeats and Plato, Plotinus, or
Blake" [19] . He now gives us Yeats as a Nietzschean empirical
Platonist, with Blake awkwardly linked to Platonism, the same
Blake who denounced Swedenborg in "A Marriage of Heaven and Hell"
as well as the distinction between Body and Soul. Again turning
to Yeats, Donoghue says,
What he received as neo-Platonism is a loose anthology
of occult images and figures available to a poet who
is avid for symbols. More accurately, his anthology
is largely Hermetic and Gnostic, it has more to do
wi th alchemical lore than with Plato and
Plotinus. [48]
As a description of a poet who strove long and hard for "Unity
of Being"--can there be a more tellingly Platonic concept?--
Donoghue's remarks must appear suspect. "Occul t images and
figures" are rightly associated with Neoplatonism, yet
Hermeticism, here falsely linked to Gnosticism, is also falsely
dissociated from Plato and Plotinus. And all this from a critic
12 Donoghue's Yeats was published in America as William Butler Yeats
(1971). The British version differs from the American version only in the
style of typesetting and pagination of its text, and in a slightly different
wording of the pre-text called "Chronology" and the post-text called
"Bibliographical Notes."
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who, a decade later in Ferocious Alphabets (1981) will claim that
Bloom's Yeats is wrongly focused "mainly because its emphasis on
Gnosticism is marginal to Yeats" [132]. Decidedly, clarification
is needed; but where can we turn?
If we turn to High Talk: The Philosophical Poetry of W. B.
Yeats (1973) by Robert Snukal (discussed in relation to "Among
School Children" in chapter two), we will find a more internally
coherent view than Donoghue's, but not a view I believe we can
accept. For Snukal' s programmatic neo-Kantian posture, his anti-
Platonic rhetoric, his insistence on immanence, and his use of
Yeatsian sensuality as an antidote to the contagion of Platonic
and Christian orthodoxy, all combine to blind him to the gnosis
of negative transcendence. He claims that "the ideas which were
current among philosophers of the nineteenth century" were more
important for Yeats than was "his dabbling in spiritualism" [13].
In so many words, he minimizes the importance for Yeats of the
doctrine of "the antithetical self," the years of "automatic
writing" that eventuated in two editions of A Vision (1925,
1937), and the Kabbalah--even in its decadent Golden Dawn form,
not to mention its more authentic form as Renaissance speculative
philosophy and theology--in favor of Kantian thought. Can such
devotion be persuasively set aside as "dabbling in spiritualism"?
Commenting on the final four poems of Words for Music
Perhaps (1932) ("Tom the Lunatic," "Tom at Cruachan," "Old Tom
Again," and "The Delphic Oracle upon Plotinus"), Snukal argues
that
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This group of poems reflects the anti-Platonic
direction of Yeats's poetry; that is, they reflect
Yeats's dislike for popular Platonism and Christian
spiri tuali ty and other-worldliness. Although these
poems utilise ideas and images from Plato, the neo-
Platonists, Berkeley and Henry More, the poems which
resul t are primarily concerned with the vigour and
energy of the phenomenal world. [27]
The problem with such a view is that it is only half right about
each half of its equation. Yes, Yeats opposed other-worldliness,
and yes, he was vigorous and energetic about this world; but his
opposition to spirituality derives from his revision of his
profound attraction to it, an attraction that never dies.
Inversely, the embrace of worldly vigor that he strove for was
certainly not for the sake of that world--"That is no country for
old men, the young / In one another's arms, birds in the trees
/ --Those dying generations . II he writes in "Sailing to
Byzantium" [301]--but for the sake of the possibility of the
poetic knowledge, the gnosis, that may come through the vigorous
negation of that world in poetic tropes: "Consume my heart away;
sicK with desire / And fastened to a dying animal/It knows not
what it is. " "Poetic knowledge," as Bloom says, "may be
an oxymoron" [Agon 56], but for the poet of gnosis it may also
be an tautology, poetry of the Sublime being necessarily the
deepest form of knowing, and knowledge in its highest form being
poetic. Snukal misses the subtlety of these negative dialectics.
According to both Plato and Plotinus, one could escape
from the wheel, could achieve a unity with the one,
and thus lose personality and escape re-birth. In
Yeats's cosmology, however, there is nothing beyond
the human mind. The supra-sensual world is simply
mind, and this cannot be confused with another greater
being. [29]
This reading of Yeats balks at grappling with his insistently
dualistic sense of things, and turns him instead into a monist.
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But Yeats's protest against Platonism, like the protest of the
Gnostics of Alexandria in the second century, was a protest
against the weakness of Plato's dualism, not against the dualism.
Yeats and the Gnostics would push that dualism further, to the
point where the divine ember within will re-kindle and re-join
us to the Abyss, in its Gnostic sense of course, not its
linguistic deconstructive sense of aporia. In introducing his
comments on "A Dialogue of Self and Soul," Snukal observes that
"Yeats's cosmology disdains the opportunity of release.
Yeats insists that if you simply forget about heaven you are able
to achieve a secular blessedness" [30, 32]. Well, no Romantic
poet, certainly not Yeats, can "simply forget about heaven," and
"secular blessedness," a trope that seeks to turn away from the
religious, is embarrassingly weak in the context of the Sublime,
where poetic divination is equally both secular and religious,
and neither secular nor religious. Being "beyond good and evil, "
gnosis transcends the politics of secular versus religious. Some
would no doubt protest that my "gnosis" cannot escape reinscrib-
ing the poetic within a new binarism of gnosis against politics,
privileging the former; to which I would reply that what is at
stake here cannot be comprehended within a rhetoric of linguistic
immanence or cognitive epistemology, but only within a rhetoric
of desire, power, and transcendence despite "the linguistic
facts," whatever they may logically seem to be.
Snukal would have us dismiss Yeats's Platonism, but it is
not so blithely dismissed. He himself includes as appendices
"Thomas Taylor's edition of Porphyry's essay 'On the Cave of the
Nymphs, in the thirteenth book of the Odyssey'" [240-262] and
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Henry More's Platonic poem, "The Oracle" [263-265] because they
are germane to his discussions of "Among School Children," "The
Delphic Oracle Upon Plotinus," and "News for the Delphic Oracle."
Even in these three poems, there is a desperate struggle with and
against Platonism, a struggle lost and won and lost again
throughout the poet's career. At times, Yeats will express
clearly his inclination toward Platonism, as in "Book II: The
Completed Symbol" of A Vision, where he writes that "all the
symbolism of this book applies to begetting and birth, for all
things are a single form which has divided and multiplied in time
and space" [212]. But such Platonic faith is plainly overturned,
still in A Vision, when he gives voice to the antithetical
gnosis, not faith, that 1 = 1+/-:
Exhausted by the cry that it can never end, my love
ends; without that cry it were not love but desire,
desire does not end. The anguish of birth and that of
death cry out in the same instant. Life is no series
of emanations from divine reason such as the Cabalists
imagine, but an irrational bitterness, no orderly
descent from level to level, no waterfall but a
whirlpool, a gyre. [40]
Certainly much of the early poetry is virtually in thrall to the
Platonic tradition as Allen Grossman's work demonstrates (see
below), but even in the late poetry the agon continues, as Yeats
battles then not only with the spectre of Platonism but also with
the ghost of his own past achievements. 13 The central poetic
figure in this agon is, inevitably, Shelley, for whom Yeats's
youthful passion is well known, just as Shelley's passion for
13 Here and throughout this chapter I seek to undermine the Modernist
commonplace, deriving from MacNeice, Ellmann, and the New Critics, that only
Yeats's early poetry is Platonic, that (his) Modernism is born with the
hardening of his verse in Responsibilities (1914). "From now on," writes
MacNeice in 1941, "Yeats began to qi.ve the reins to his intellect, was no
longer content to write in a half-sleep where distinctions are lost in a
perpetual chiaroscuro" [99].
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Platonism is well known. Among the works that deal with Yeats's
Platonism, and in some measure through Shelley, are F. A. C.
Wilson's W. B. Yeats and Tradition (1958), Allen Grossman's
Poetic Knowledge in the Early Yeats: A Study of The Wind among
the Reeds (1969), James Olney's The Rhizome and the Flower: The
Perennial Philosophy--Yeats and Jung (1980), and George
Bornstein's Yeats and Shelley (1970).
4.5 The Image of Yeats as Platonist
There all the barrel-hoops are knit,
There all the serpent-tails are bit,
There all the gyres converge in one,
There all the planets drop in the Sun.
"There"
When Donoghue complained (just as Snukal might well have
done) that "the influence of the entire neo-Platonic tradition
upon Yeats, if we are thinking of genuine kinship, has been
exaggerated" [Yeats 47], he may have had Wilson's study in mind.
For Wilson's book is devoted to placing Yeats clearly and
emphatically within that tradition. Wilson's quarrel being with
New Criticism and its narrow focus on discrete poems to the
exclusion of literary historical contexts, he sought and
achieved a scholarly description of "an ulterior body of
knowledge, the tradition of 'heterodox mysticism'" [15]
from which Yeats's work is drawn and to which it refers.
Donoghue's "genuine kinship" is of course only a trope; as such,
it might refer to all or to none of the writers that Yeats
studied, and by itself can neither include Nietzsche, as Donoghue
would have it, nor exclude him as others might, unless, like
Bloom, we trace and "measure" the revisionary distortions that
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occur genealogically from poet to poet, evoking genuine kinship.
But Wilson's interest is to assume Yeats's inclusion in a kinship
of Platonic mysticism and to draw out the implications of that
inclusion mainly for some plays but also for a few major poems.
The image of Yeats that Wilson presents, therefore--and in
this respect he is clearly the precursor of Olney's work--is of
a Platonic adept from youth to age, and of increasing sophisti-
cation. This adept I would see as the "Soul" of "A Dialogue of
Self and Soul," or the voice of "All Souls' Night" (1920),
emphatically not the antithetical self that Bloom alludes to.
Wilson describes how the youthful Yeats's interest in the occult
led "to alchemy, to Kabbalism and to ceremonial magic" [26] as
well as to Madame Blava tsky' s theosophy; how (using Thomas
Taylor's translation which is the same text that Shelley had
used) ,14 he "knew Porphyry as early as 1895" [33], Porphyry
being "a mine of information on the Platonic symbolic system"
[27]; and how in later life "he returned to Porphyry in the
'twenties . to use him copiously" [33], along with others
such as Plotinus. What is significant in Wilson's discussion,
and what he "must insist on," concerns
[t]he precise relation between Yeats's symbolism and
the Platonic, [and] the importance of the system
to his work. The Platonists were not only Yeats's
most informative source, but they informed most of the
other branches he knew of the tradition, [33-34]
that is to say, occult philosophies and practices. Despite its
shortcomings regarding Yeats's stance towards Platonic orthodoxy,
14 "Both poets were acquainted with the European tradition of
interpreting Plato according to the works of Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus.
They each found that merging of philosophical tradition in the works of Thomas
Taylor, the influential translator of the Greek philosophers into English
during the romantic period." Bornstein, Yeats and Shelley, p. 68.
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Wilson's work has at least the merit of linking Platonism to "the
other branches [that YeatsJ knew of [thatJ tradition," which he
broadly terms "heterodox mysticism" and which I call esoteric
I t ' 15P a onlsm.
As his title implies, esoteric Platonism is the focus of
concern in Grossman's Poetic Knowledge in the Early Yeats,
especially in the case of the fin de siecle book of poems, The
Wind among the Reeds (1899). As I speculated above, "poetic
knowledge" may be a tautology as well as an oxymoron. In
Grossman's case the term seems to suggest not so much the
revisionary stance of the gnostic poet towards tradition, as much
as the visionary stance of the alchemist towards the detritus of
earthly life. Analogous from some perspectives, these two
stances can seem to shade into one another, which is why Donoghue
mentions them in the same breath in describing Yeats's anthology
as linked to "alchemical lore," and as "largely Hermetic and
Gnostic" [Yeats 48J. Without mentioning Whitaker at all, in
pressing this alchemical view of poetic knowledge, Grossman
follows hard upon Whitaker who likewise associated Yeats's poems
with alchemy, even as he began to open up Yeats studies to
gnostic interpretations. Presently, I shall discuss exactly how
the artist's gnosis must be seen as antithetical to the Hermetic,
but for the moment I quote Grossman in order to note how Yeats's
antithetical aesthetics, his "anti thetics," should be seen,
broadly, as a Platonism.
15 Esoteric Platonism will become more explicitly my theme in (4.6)
below, as I discuss the Yeatsian crossing from Hermeticism to gnosis.
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Yeats's theory of symbolism ... derives from a once
almost universal sense of the world. . common to
figures as diverse as Porphyry, Aquinas, [the occult-
ist, Cornelius] Agrippa, and the authors of the
Upanishads, which regards reality merely as the
evidence of its own transcendent origins. Its roots
are deep in the religious sense of the real which
understands the process of knowing as the reversal of
the order of creation whereby man was separated from
the Divine Essence. [23-24]
While Grossman emphasizes with detail and acumen how just
one book of Yeats's poems intersects with the alchemical, the
magical, and the Kabbalistic tradition of esoteric Platonism
(much as Keane explores how the body of poems interacts mainly
with the works of Nietzsche), James Olney stands out as the
scholar devoted to explaining how Yeats's vision is embedded in
a more conventionally Platonic tradition which, in his argument,
links Yeats to Carl Jung:
There is no lateral or temporal line that connects
Yeats with Jung, but there are parallel lines which
one could demonstrate and retrace, stretching back
[to] such primal figures as Plato first, and
then, beyond Plato , [to] Empedocles,
Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Pythagoras. Seen in this
light, the works of Yeats and Jung are present moments
of a long past, a creative surfacing of a
continuous and unbroken, though sometimes chthonic and
subterranean, body of slowly developed and developing
human thought and performance. Thus a great tradition
is discoverable behind [them] the Platonic
system, shaped by Plato himself out of his four great
predecessors and issuing in that immense tradition
called Platonism. [9]
In a footnote, Olney distinguishes his effort from Wilson's as
less concerned with "Yeats's debt to Neoplatonism," and more
concerned with "Plato [and] his predecessors" [15]. Neverthe-
less, and despite his equal emphasis on Yeats and Jung, it is
clear that Olney's project fulfills the promise of Wilson's work
by transcending its limi ts--going beyond Wilson's emphasis,
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especially on porphyry, to Plato and his appropriation of pre-
Socratic philosophers.
But the limits of Olney's own critical ethos are soon
reached. Although the vast detail of his argument articulating
Yeats with Platonism utterly overwhelms those like Donoghue and
Snukal who, as we saw, would like to sever the tie between Yeats
and Platonism, Olney's sense of a "continuous and unbroken"
tradition from Pythagoras to Plato and then to Yeats does a
disservice to Yeats and to the tradition. For it seems to me
that our poet finds his most quintessentially Yeatsian lyricism
when he sings in his most dynamic, self-transformative voice--the
voices of wind and more so of fire, rather less in the voices of
earth and water. That is to say, Yeats links himself to the pre-
Socratics not to endorse, but to undo his Platonism.16 He uses
especially Heraclitus and Empedocles in his quarrel with himself,
the self that is his Platonic "Soul." For Olney to miss this is
to miss the mark of Yeatsian genius, which is also the mark of
his gnostic stance towards Platonism. There is no "continuous
and unbroken" poetic or philosophical tradition. There is only
the breaking and the re-making of tradition. And those
visionaries with genius enough to break the back of tradition
become a new backbone of that tradition, broken yet strengthened.
"Everything that can be broken should be broken"--another
Emersonian shibboleth that Bloom has quoted [Agon 161]--is a
gnomic slogan put into practice as well by Yeats as by any other
poet in his tradition. "Marbles of the dancing floor / Break
16 In chapter six I will look more closely as Yeats's use of Heraclitus
and Empedocles.
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bitter furies of complexity, / Those images that yet / Fresh
images beget " [364] writes Yeats in "Byzantium,"
suggesting the visionary violence with which the gnostic poet
breaks the image-voice of the internalized precursor, begetting
17images afresh. The pity concerning Olney's criticism, despite
his sound erudition in Platonism, is his deafness to the trope
of "breaking" as inalienable to tradition-making.
Bornstein's Yeats and Shelley I find more congenial than
Olney's, Wilson's, or even Grossman's work on Yeats's Platonism,
but he surpasses himself in his later book, Transformations of
Romanticism in Yeats, Eliot, and Stevens (1976). Whereas Olney
and Wilson situate the poet within the philosophical, symbolic
systems of Platonism and Neoplatonism, and Grossman does likewise
(but more radically) within the arcane systems of Hermetic
theurgy, Bornstein searches--more successfully in the second than
in the first book--for the poetic tropes that will persuade us
of Yeats's Shelleyan and Romantic Platonism. The condition of
both poetry and philosophy may be to wander endlessly between
truth and meaning, as Bloom has said,18 but when criticism sees
to it that poetry wanders into philosophy, indeed is reified into
merely an example of philo-theo-sophical symbolic history, then
it is criticism that wanders, erring into an unnecessary
weakness. To the degree that Bornstein evades this weakness,
17 Bloom also comments on this passage and "the powerful trope that
[Yeats] calls 'breaks'" in Agon. Interpreting "Spirit after spirit! The
smithies break the flood" and the lines that follow, Bloom says, ..... the
spiri ts who are t,hat flood are p~imar~ly th~ precursors: Blake, Shelley,
Keats, Pater and Nletzsche, the antlthe~lcal flvefold who from their ephebe's
perspective most truly represent 'bltter furies of complexity'" (46).
18 This is a crucial theme of his recent book, Ruin the Sacred Truths:
Poetry and Belief from the Bible to the Present (1989).
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sustaining his emphasis on the poetic qualities of the Platonism
that he finds in the Yeats-Shelley dyad and later (implicitly)
in Yeats's Romanticism generally, he deserves critical
appreciation.
Yeats and Shelley is never quite sure if it is a book about
philosophy or about poetry, so it ends up wavering between the
two. At tim~ the importance for Yeats of Shelley's poetry-as-
poetry receives due emphasis, as when Shelley's Alastor, his
Prometheus Unbound, and the description of Ahasuerus in his
Hellas are juxtaposed to various Yeats poems. Nevertheless,
Bornstein can also fall back into the weaker posture of emphasiz-
ing the importance of essay positions, philosophies, and ideas,
while remaining in touch with artistry and poetic technique:
Shelley's thought and symbols had extensive parallels
[as we saw above, a decade later Olney still speaks in
terms of such "parallels"] in earlier writers,
particularly in Plato and the Neoplatonists. Yeats
did not trace Shelley's thought back to his prede-
cessors so much to identify sources as to indicate
Shelley's place in the great tradition of anti-
materialist artists. Above all, Yeats sought in such
poets as Shelley confirmation of his own philosophy
and his own poetic technique. [109]
This sort of literary theory and criticism begins to fail its
poetry precisely at the point where discovering one's place in
a tradition and confirming one's ideas and technique no longer
suffice, the point where a great poem crosses out of its place.
We might say that "half" of a poem truly is its ethos, but its
other "half," its sublime half, if it is to come at all, must
come in a crossing out of ethos to the pathos or power that is
the breaking of ethos. Such a moment will transform a tradition
just as it thereby transforms also the poet in breaking his
relation to a tradition.
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The truly memorable moments of poetry arrive with such
crossings, less often in moments that are mere examples of a
prior ethos. Harold Bloom's revisionary criticism--beginning a
little tentatively and ambivalently with his Yeats, but
explosively with his Anxiety of Influence three years later--is
the only work I know of to be dedicated to the mapping of these
breaks or transformations, these "breakings of the vessels." But
the beauty of his work is that, while mapping, it also transforms
the tradition and breaks its own map in vigorous self-revision,
transforming its own ethos with a pathos or power over its own
past.
Bornstein seems to have caught an intuition of the critical
importance of such Bloomian moments of crossing, for his
Transformations of Romanticism enacts a revision of Yeats and
Shelley, especially in that it relies more on the theory of
"drive" (which in Bloom means a deeper-than-conscious,
antithetical poetic will) and less on a theory of cognition which
amounts to a naturalistic mimesis: "The point is not that
[Yeats] borrowed terms from, say, Wordsworth [here, he is
discussing the trope of "the mind's eye"], but that a drive to
render similar mental action causes related phraseology" among
lyric poets [52]. This sense of "mind" tends to fall short of
the divine spark or pneuma of the Gnostic, "mind" being roughly
equivalent to the "psyche"--which for the Gnostic is cosmic,
fallen, and irredeemable--or even to the Platonic "Soul" as
opposed to the antithetical "Self" in Yeats's poem. Neverthe-
less, Bornstein's later book moves towards a Bloomian trajectory.
He endorses [11] the Romantic theory that Bloom called
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"internalization of quest romance," and he enacts Bloom's sense
of poems as "dyads," a poem's identity or substance being found
only in the ratio of its internalization of the precursor.19
Although Yeatsian Platonism plays no explicit role in this
book, it is clear from Bornstein's nascent Bloomian stance, from
his sense of Yeats as a poet who transforms Romanticism, that he
would no longer find it satisfactory to view Yeats as a mere
example of the Platonic ethos. The agon of transformation (of
both self and tradition) is too insistent in Yeats to be ignored
or avoided. "The unpurged images of day recede; / . / Night
resonance recedes" [363] . As Yeats here in "Byzantium"
approaches a new gnosis, he finds again that both the day of the
natural Self and the night of the Platonic Soul, "All that man
is, / All mere complexities," must undergo the negative
transcendence of antithetical vision. Being anti-natural, the
Platonic Soul may be said to approach that vision in its ascent
up the winding stair to ancestral night, but at his strongest
moments Yeats seeks to cross over into renewed poetic divination
by negating even his own ethos of the Platonic Sublime.
19 "The Internalization of Quest Romance," first published in 1969, was
reprinted in Bloom's Romanticism and Consciousness (1970) and again in his
Ringers in the Tower: S~udies in ~omantic ,Traditi~n (1971). It is in The
Anxiety of Influence, wh~ch Bornste~n descr~bes as one of the major works of
critical mythography in our century" [23]. that Bloom deals with poems as
interpoems or dyads: "the meaning of a poem can only be another poem" [95].
He later revises even this radical position to include the reader, thus
turning poetry and criticism into a self-antithetical dialectic, implying in
my terms that 1 = 1+/-.
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4.6 From Ethos to Pathos, from the Hermetic to the Gnostic
When the flaming lute-thronged angelic door is wide;
When an immortal passion breathes in mortal clay;
Our hearts endure the scourge . .
"The Travail of Passion"
This thesis began with a consideration of the Keatsian
dictum, "Load every rift with ore," a rift which in de Man became
an inescapable anti-mimetic abyss. It is my argument, however,
that only in the leaping of the rift, the shooting of the gap
from a mimetic and self-contained 1 to a self-antithetical 1+/-,
can a poet move beyond an ethos, even though this new beyond then
becomes itself another ethos or limit which the revisionary poet
will seek to assail and breach. Bloom's most sustained and
detailed work on this theory of poetic crossing comes in his
Wallace stevens (1977), especially in its final chapter, "Coda:
Poetic Crossing," but in Agon he quotes Emerson in whom he says
that he found his "cri tical idea of poetic crossings, those
meaningful disjunctions that are the black holes of rhetoric:
Life only avails, not the having lived. Power ceases
in the instant of repose; it resides in the moment of
transition from a past to a new state, in the shooting
of the gulf, in the darting to an aim." [24]
For Emerson, life only avails, but this certainly must be a
uniquely strong sense of "life. " In Beyond the Pleasure
Principle Freud offers the horrifying--because circular--vision
that "the aim of all life is death," as he links his two drives
of Eros and Thanatos [Agon 107] .20 But Emerson's "life" is a
trope for the negation of what in our lazy moments we simply
accept as life; it is an Eros that evades unbreakable linkage to
20 Discussed in detail in "Freud and the Sublime: A Catastrophe Theory
of Creativity," Agon, pp. 91-118.
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any death drive. Emerson's "life" is closer to Yeats's formula
in A Vision for the obj ect of poetic will, "simplification
through intensity." Gnostics such as Valentinus, and Platonists
such as Plotinus certainly share a profound hatred of life, in
its lazy mundane sense, in that they all desire release from the
prison of the body. But Gnostics would embrace the Emersonian
trope of "life" when they also seek pneumatic release from the
prison that is the psyche or the soul, from platonic orthodoxy
itself, and also from Christian and Jewish orthodoxy.21 For the
Gnostics there is a mythological negation, a crossing-beyond-the-
limits of orthodoxy which divides them from their Platonizing
contemporaries, and which Emerson tropes as "life"--the moment
of transition out of a past state.
In this matter, the difficulty for the critics of Yeats's
poems arrives in the stereophonic voices that the poems project.
There is a dualism in his lyrical voice but it is not the dualism
usually described, of mysticism or anti-naturalism on the one
hand and hard-headed realism on the other, with a characteristic
vacillation between the two. As we saw above (4.4), Donoghue
wants us to see Yeats as a Platonist who was also an empiricist,
"even on the same occasions" [Yeats 16]. Even J. Hillis Miller
approximates Donoghue's view, though with infinitely greater
subtlety, when, as we saw in the second chapter (2.5), he absorbs
the approach and terms of Paul de Man's doctoral thesis, seeing
21 The main agon of historical Gnosticism was with Christianity, but
Judaism was also contested in the sense that the Gnostics transgressed Judaic
and Christian tropes for God by seeing these Gods as the Demiurge, himself a
mere creature of the Abyss or True Divinity. Nevertheless I am mindful, as
Susan Handelman has persuasively shown, that Judaism and Christianity differ
greatly in their stances towards textuality--Christianity seeing only
fulfillment, Incarnation, rejection of word in favor of the Word, Judaism
embracing absence, deferral, and infinite interpretation.
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Yeats as vacillating between naturalistic image and anti-natural-
istic emblem. Curiously enough, I quite agree with the
oxymoronic dualism of Yeats as an empirical Platonist or a
natural anti-naturalist, and say that the voice of Yeats's gnosis
is heard in the breaching of this weaker dualism by one that
wagers more and is therefore more severe. In other words, the
Yeats of "All those antinomies / Of day and night" [365], of male
and female, of "All-destroying sword-blade still/Carried by the
wandering fool. / Gold-sewn silk on the sword-blade, / Beauty and
fool together laid" [354]; the familiar homely dualistic Yeats
of natural self and ideal soul, of life and death, yin and yang
is profoundly and soundly transgressed by the Yeats of "the
thirteenth cone" in A Vision, the voice of the daemonic Yeats of
gnostic vision in Per Arnica Silentia Lunae (1917), the Yeats who
is willing and "content to live it all again / And yet again, if
it be life to pitch / Into the frog-spawn of a blind man's ditch"
[350], if this be the cost of the blessing which may transcend
mere life and mere death, Freud's "life" whose aim is death, the
life of the realists and the death of the Platonists.
Yeats virtually suggests as much, in his comments on the
terrestrial condition and the condition of fire in Per Arnica
Silentia Lunae:
There are two realities, the terrestrial and the
condition of fire. All power is from the terrestrial
condition, for there all opposites meet and there only
is the extreme of choice possible, full freedom. And
there the heterogeneous is, and evil, for evil is the
strain one upon another of opposites; but in the
condition of fire all is music and all rest. Between
is the condition of air where images have but a
borrowed life, that of memory or that reflected upon
them when they symbolise colours and intensities of
fire. [Mythologies 356-357, my emphasis]
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It would be merely an academic exercise to trace to Platonic
origins the use of certain symbols in this passage, but the only
remnant of those origins in the stance of the passage towards
those symbols is in his suggestion that in the condition of fire
"all [is] rest," a view that the Emersonian gnosis of "life" and
"power" would find suspect. otherwise, the passage strongly
suggests a crossing out of the stasis of the balance of cosmic
opposites, the balance of life and death. The terrestrial
condition suggests earth and water alike, earth associated with
the life that aims towards death in Freud, and water suggesting
the Platonic version of release from that round--"What's water
but the generated soul?" [359] writes Yeats in one of his poems.
But as Yeats came to know, Platonic release into "ancestral
night" only leads into a new round of life and death, the
Platonic doctrine of metempsychosis or the transmigration of
souls. This terrestrial condition, in its Freudian aspect that
dovetails Eros and Thanatos, receives beautiful expression in
"The Wheel" (1921):
Through winter-time we call on spring,
And through the spring on summer call,
And when abounding hedges ring
Declare that winter's best of all;
And after that there's nothing good
Because the spring-time has not come--
Nor know that what disturbs our blood
Is but its longing for the tomb. [318]
Similarly, "The Wild Swans at Coole" (1916) elegiacally suggests
the watery nature of the Platonic Soul and the eternal return of
the swans to the lake:
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But now they drift on the still water,
Mysterious, beautiful;
Among what rushes will they build,
By what lake's edge or pool
Delight men's eyes when I awake some day
To find they have flown away? [233]
other examples of the Yeatsian voice of the watery Soul,
such as in "The Lake Isle of Innisfree" (1890), could be put
forward, but I must press on. The voice of the condition of air,
as in "the haystack- and roof-levelling wind" [295] that howls
through "A Prayer for My Daughter" (1919), is still associated
with the terrestrial condition and its round of opposites, having
a "borrowed life" through memory of the terrestrial, while being
but a mirror upon which the images of fire may be reflected. But
in the condition of fire itself, "all is music," lyricism, the
image of voice--deepest of mysteries of the human divine. Time,
even in the form of the eternal return--ouroboros, the tail-
biting serpent of esoteric Platonism--time is defeated, and even
the soul becomes a body, transformed by the pneumatic energy of
the antithetical self into a god:
When all sequence comes to an end, time comes to an
end, and the soul puts on the rhythmic or spiritual
body or luminous body and contemplates all the events
of its memory and every possible impulse in an eternal
possession of itself in a single moment.
[Mythologies 357]
In such passages which recall the Blakean-Yeatsian vortex that,
as we saw in (4.1), so intrigued Hazard Adams, Yeats enacts the
gnostic "lie against time" that Bloom speaks of. He re-imagines
his own origins, and in driving for immortality he tropes and
transforms even his own beloved ethos of Platonism.
The utter difficulty of breaking out of the huge and
parental trope of Platonism can be imagined if we figure the
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historically problematic relation between Hermeticism and
Gnosticism. "Hermeticism" derives from the mysterious authorial
name of Hermes Trismegistus (Thrice-Greatest Hermes). In A
Vision (1937) Yeats refers to Hermes or to Hermetic Fragments on
f. . 22no fewer than lve occaSlons. As G. R. S. Mead has shown in
his source study and translation of the works attributed to this
mythical divine author, the term "Hermetic" carries a special
ambiguity. He says that he "adopted the term Trismegistic
literature in place of the usual designation Hermetic" in order
to distinguish it from, among other things, "the later Hermetic
Alchemical literature" [2]. He therefore speaks of "the so-
called Hermetic works" [3], concerned with medicine, mathematics,
astrology, and alchemy. Perhaps most famous among the Hermetic
works falsely attributed to Hermes Trismegistus is the Tabula
Smaragdina, the Emerald Tablet, a work of alchemical mysticism
published in 1541 that Yeats was familiar with.23
The problem for a Yeats critic attuned to his gnosticism is
that the "Hermetic" work that he knew was largely from this
category of "so-called Hermetic works," the Blavatsky theosophy,
the Mathers alchemy, magic, decadent Kabbalah, and so on. "For
things below are copies, the Great Smaragdine Tablet said" [403]
writes Yeats, alluding to his Hermetic reading. Yet the
Trismegistic literature itself Yeats also knew. Indeed, he
quotes from the Asclepius dialogue in A Vision [211]. Versions
of the "poimandres" (the Shepherd of Men), which is the first
22 Pp • 190, 21 1, 253, 254, 259 .
23 Wayne Shumaker, The Occult Sciences in the Renaissance (1972), p.
178; Jeffares, Commentary (1968), p. 428.
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treatise of the Corpus Hermeticum and also belongs, with the
Asclepius, to the Trismegistic literature proper, had long been
in circulation, since Marcilio Ficino in 1471 published his Latin
translation of the Greek manuscript of the Hermetica. (He would
later publish also his translations of Plato and Plotinus.)
Furthermore, according to the catalogue of the (William Wynn)
Wescott Hermetic Library, an English language edition was
available to members like Yeats of the Golden Dawn.24 Adding to
the difficulty is that the Trismegistic literature is, rightly
considered, proto-Gnostic. In his highly authoritative study,
The Gnostic Religion, Hans Jonas says of the Corpus Hermeticum,
"This literature, not as a whole but in certain portions,
reflects gnostic spirit," and of the first treatise he adds, "The
Hermetic Poimandres treatise itself, in spite of some signs of
Jewish influence, is to be regarded as a prime document of
independent pagan Gnosticism" [41].
However, despite the fact that they bear some analogies to
Gnosticism or have Gnostic tendencies, being, like Gnosticism,
heretical from the perspectives of orthodox Christianity,
Judaism, and even Platonism and Neoplatonism, the "so-called
Hermetic Works" in my view are not works of Gnosticism, but
rather of esoteric Platonism. In The Occult Sciences in the
Renaissance, Wayne Shumaker gives a similar distinction, dividing
"Hermetism [which is a] contemplative doctrine" from
"hermeticism [i.e. ,] esoteric systems generally" [206]. In
commenting on Agrippa's famous treatise De occulta philosophia
(first published in 1533 and quoted by Yeats in A Vision {1925},
24 Appendix S of Harper's Yeats's Golden Dawn, pp. 290-305.
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p. 220), Shumaker also po i nt s out that "the distinguishing of the
theological and philosophical Hermes from the alchemical,
astrological, and magical one becomes increasingly difficult"
[234]. If we ask, therefore, what it might be that distinguishes
Hermeticism from Gnosticism and qualifies it as esoteric
Platonism, the answer must be that Gnosticism will always take
an extreme stance in favor of what Yeats calls the "self-
delighting / Self-appeasing, self-affrighting" [297] divination
of the individual and the severe revision of received orthodoxy;
whereas Hermeticism will always be itself an esoteric orthodoxy,
decadent, occult, and void of the self-revisionary impulse of the
gnostic artist. In a word, the dualism of the gnostic is more
severe than the dualism of the Platonist, even of the esoteric
mystic, and it is the "more severe, more harassing" dualism that
commits the gnostic to an agon of revisionism within and against
the tradition, and within and against the self.25
4.7 The Condition of Fire
What if I bade you leave
The cavern of the mind?
There's better exercise
In the sunlight and wind.
"Those Images"
Just as Yeats moves against and out of the tradition that
he inherits and has internalized, he performs the crossing from
his Platonism to gnosis throughout his career, within individual
poems, between poems, between phases or periods, and wi thin
25 The quotation alludes to canto XXVIII of Wallace Stevens' poem, "An
Ordinary Evening in New Haven," a canto which, like Yeats, moves from the
Platonizing of "the endlessly elaborating poem" to the gnostic crisis or
crossing point of "subtler, more urgent proof ... in the intricate evasions
of as" [486].
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groups or collections of poems. I will not pause to detail the
revision that Yeats enacts poetically upon his Platonic
tradition, both Bornstein and Bloom having already done this
superbly in 1970. The second half of Bornstein's Yeats and
Shelley, which he titles "Antinomial Vision: Yeats's Alternative
to Shelley," develops the issue of Yeats's confrontation of his
Platonism through his rejection and revision of his earlier
Shelleyan vision. Bornstein patiently argues what I would word
more pragmatically and urgently--that Yeats's many poems and
stories on the theme of the Celestial Rose embody his changing
agon with Shelley's Platonic (and Dantean) trope of Intellectual
Beauty. And since Yeats's misreading of his precursor Blake was
to turn him into an esoteric Platonist like himself, Bloom's
Yeats develops the agon that Yeats internalized between himself
and a Platonized Blake. I therefore pass on first to consider
poetic crossing within individual poems.
We have already seen how this crossing happens as negative
transcendence in "A Dialogue of Self and Soul," whereas "Among
School Children" sublimely shies away from just this crossing,
preferring instead to deny "beauty born out of its own despair,
/ [And] blear-eyed widsom out of midnight oil" [325]. But in
"The Tower" (1925) there is no shying away:
And I declare my faith
I mock Plotinus' thought
And cry in Plato's teeth,
Death and life were not
Till man made up the whole,
Made lock, stock and barrel
Out of his bitter soul,
Aye, sun and moon and star, all,
And further add to that
That, being dead, we rise,
Dream and so create
Translunar Paradise. [306]
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Falling back into ethos again, Yeats's note to the poem and these
lines retracts his vigorous and vitally self-divinating negation
of their transcendence: "When I wrote the lines about Plato and
Plotinus I forgot that it is something in our own eyes that makes
us see them as all transcendence" [577]. He then quotes Plotinus
describing soul as "author of all living things," but his
retraction cannot nullify the force of his poetic crossing, "Out
of his bitter soul" and into his own "Translunar Paradise, II his
own gnostic vision. Merely to repeat the tropes of Plato and
Plotinus would be a form of poetic death. As Bloom has observed
on Eros and Thanatos, turning Freud to his own purposes, poetic
rather than psychoanalytic, "literal meaning equals anteriority
equals an earlier state of meaning equals an earlier state of
things equals death equals literal meaning. Only one escape is
possible from such a formula, and it is a simpler formula: Eros
equals figurative meaning. ,,26 In order to live poetically,
Yeats must "mock Plotinus' thought / And cry in Plato's teeth,lI
re-imagining his own origins, begetting himself.
Medieval or Renaissance alchemy may be a form of esoteric
Platonism, but Yeats demonstrates its utter suitabili ty as a
metaphor of the poetic process of self-recreation in IISailing to
Byzantium, II just as in writing "Byzan t i.um" he demonstrates the
limits of that metaphor, surely making his most famous of
crossings between poems. The voice of the earlier poem, despite
its resplendent troping of old age as a singing soul--
26 Agon, p. 107; italics removed.
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An aged man is but a paltry thing,
A tattered coat upon a stick, unless
Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder
For every tatter in its mortal dress ..
sing
[301 ]
--and despite its exquisite longing to join the holy precursors
in the daemonic fire of self-creation--
o sages standing in God's holy fire
As in the gold mosaic of a wall,
Come from the holy fire, perne in a gyre,
And be the singing-masters of my soul . . . [301 ]
--the voice of "Sailing to Byzantium" remains on this side, the
near side of a crossing yet to be made into the holy fire. But
the voice of "Byzantium" is that holy fire, as the poet in agon
with his precursors finds himself a flame among "flames begotten
of flame." He finds himself and begets himself
Where blood-begotten spirits come
And all complexities of fury leave,
Dying into a dance,
An agony of trance,
An agony of flame that cannot singe a sleeve. [364]
Where "Among School Children" had brilliantly evaded the agon/y
of "Dying into a dance," preferring instead "the blossoming or
dancing where / The body is not bruised to pleasure soul" [325];
where "Sailing to Byzantium" had offered the alchemical promise
to turn the self into a golden bird, an eternal artifice "Of
hammered gold and gold enamelling" [302]; the fiery voice of
"Byzantium" becomes the agonic dance of flame. Here, the promise
of transfiguration will not suffice, as the voice of the poem
cannot abide being mere vessel of transmutation. Yeats shatters
the alchemical trope of poem-as-crucible, in a new breaking of
the vessels, becoming instead "More miracle than bird or
handiwork." Even the pneuma of the Gnostic, often taken as
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"breath, II will not suffice and requires further purification into
the breathless:
A mouth that has no moisture and no breath
Breathless mouths may summon;
I hail the superhuman . . .. [363]
And the superhuman that Yeats summons and that summons him to the
fire, his Heraclitean-Coleridgean trope, "I call it death-in-life
and life-in-death," becomes the very image of the antithetical
that is antithetical even to itself, the "thirteenth cone" of A
Vision that transcends the antinomies of death and life by way
of the gnostic negation that is both and neither life and death.
Appallingly neither human nor anti-human, Yeats's "superhuman"
trope performs the supermimesis of Bloom's theory that evades
both the natural mimesis of the historicizers and the anti-
mimesis of the deconstructors. I hyperbolize, of course, but is
there another way for poet or critic to suggest the daemonic
Sublime?
As Emerson says, "life only avails," and Yeats begets new
life upon himself whenever he enacts lithe shooting of the gulf,
... the darting to a new aim, II the refusal to settle for merely
sailing to Byzantium when not only being in Byzantium but
becoming Byzantium is within his reach. Similarly, the maturing
Yeats could not survive poetically wi thin his youthful Platonism.
As Grossman's work suggests, The Wind among the Reeds is a book
of poems imbued entirely with the ethos of esoteric Platonism,
and in a poem such as "The Valley of the Black Pig" (1986) 27
this ethos takes the form of a desire for transcendence through
apocalypse: II . . . unknown spears / Suddenly hurtle before my
27 Date of first publication, Yeats's Poems, p. 516.
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dream-awakened eyes, / And then the clash of fallen horsemen and
the cries / Of unknown perishing armies beat about my ears"
[100]. But even this apocalypse appears "flaccid," as Whitaker
has said [42], when it is seen through the stance of Yeats's
stronger, more transgressive tropes, in a later apocalyptic poem
such as "The Cold Heaven" (1912) .28 For in "Black Pig" the
apocalypse is invited down upon a voice that, "Being weary of the
world's empires," seeks to "bow down to" the precursor-as-
Demiurge, "Master of the still stars and of the flaming door"
[100]. In "The Cold Heaven," however, the voice of apocalyptic
obeisance to the precursor is transformed by a stronger posture,
one that wagers more intensely, thereby stealing more of the
precursor's fire.
Suddenly I saw the cold and rook-delighting heaven
That seemed as though ice burned and was but the more ice,
And thereupon imagination and heart were driven
So wild that every casual thought of that and this
Vanished, and left but memories, that should be out
of season
With the hot blood of youth, of love crossed long ago;
And I took all the blame out of all sense and reason,
Until I cried and trembled and rocked to and fro,
Riddled with light. Ah! when the ghost begins to quicken,
Confusion of the death-bed over, is it sent
Out naked on the roads, as the books say, and stricken
By the inJustice of the skies for punishment? [227]
The voice of the later poem shows that the voice of the earlier
poem--waiting on the earthly side of death and heaven, bowing
down to the master, and pleading for transfiguration--will no
longer suffice. Instead, already "riddled with light" and
beginning "to quicken," the voice enacts its own catastrophe
creation. The "hot blood of youth" returns and pulses through
the poem's voice, though it "should be out of season." "Naked
28 Date of first publication, Yeats's Poems, p. 549.
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on the roads," under a cold heaven of burning ice, wager ing total
exposure--and as we saw above (4.3) in Bloom's words, "Yeats is
never stronger than when he is totally exposed"--the voice of the
poem may await being "stricken / By the injustice of the skies,"
but a reader may sense that the precursor's lightning does not
destroy the voice; rather it deifies the voice. Punishment
becomes a question rather than a certainty; lightning strikes the
poet, but having gained the poetic strength to seize it, he in
some measure transfigures himself as well as the earlier
"flaccid" poem.
4.8 Supernatural Crossings, Supermimetic Songs
... when such bodies join
There is no touching here, nor touching there
Nor straining joy, but whole is joined to whole.
"Ribh at the Tomb of Baile and Aillinn"
Concerning "the natural union of man and woman," in A Vision
Yeats says, "I see in it a symbol of that eternal instant where
the antinomy is resolved. It is not the resolution itself"
[214]. Earlier in the same work, Yeats writes, putting the words
into the mouth of one of his characters, Michael Robartes, as
reported in a letter by another character, John Duddon, "Death
cannot solve the antinomy: death and life are its expression"
[52]. And he continues:
The marriage bed is the symbol of the solved antinomy,
and were more than symbol could a man there lose and
keep his identity, but he falls asleep. That sleep is
the same as the sleep of death. [52]
Being a good Yeatsian, if an anxiety-ridden one, Bloom turns such
remarks to a different context, a discussion of Freud, Eros, and
Thanatos: "Sexual 'union' is after all nothing but figurative,
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since the joining involved is merely a yoking in act and not in
essence. The act, in what we want to call normal sexuality, is
a figuration for the unattainable essence" [Agon 139-140].
Yeats's "symbol of the solved antinomy" and Bloom's "figuration
for the unattainable essence" begin to suggest the trajectory of
the gnosis sought, and then itself transcended, in "Supernatural
Songs," a collection of just twelve poems in A Full Moon in March
(1935) .29 Eight of the twelve explicitly seek the light of the
unattainable essence, the negation of life and death, in sexual
union; and of the other four, only "The Four Ages of Man" and
"Meru" may be said to forego this symbol in their quest for the
light, while "There" and "A Needle's Eye" (both previously
quoted) implicitly seek the light of sexual union. Here I wish
to conclude this chapter by showing how "Supernatural Songs,"
first in the symbol of sexual union and then in the revision of
that symbol, re-engages Yeats with his Platonism and with his
gnostic agon to cross beyond it.
In 1955, as I noted above (4.2), Hazard Adams' work on Blake
and Yeats, The contrary Vision, began to open Yeats studies to
Gnostic concerns. Now thirty-five years on, his Book of Yeats's
Poems (1990) continues to make such suggestions, but to go no
further. Yet his comments on "Supernatural Songs" [215-220], if
less than inspirational, are useful. With reference to Ribh
(rhymes with Steve), the character who utters most if not all of
the poems in the group, Adams notes that "Ribh takes up the
Platonic notion of a hierarchy of imitations, but he rejects the
29 Except for "A Needle's Eye," all of the poems are dated by Jeffares,
Yeats's Poems, as late 1933 to early 1935.
Platonic idea and insists on the image" [216].
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Citing what he
calls Ribh's "antithetical theology" with its mix of "elderly
irascibili ty [and] ecstatic vision," Adams describes Ribh' s
heresy: "The Christian trinity is false because it is entirely
masculine; the true trinity is formed by father, mother, and
child, allowing for procreation" [216]. While properly
suggestive of the themes of these poems, such comments do little
to advance any notion of the poetic crossings or agons happening
in the poems and betraying their origins. Adams thus presents
a precisely detailed portrait of the poems, but cannot help us
at all to see how their meaning gets started, how they re-imagine
their origins by confronting orthodoxy.
The voice in the poems seems to desire a vision of gnostic
heresy (Adams' "antithetical theology"), yet falls at times into
merely Platonic thought. But it is the crossing between the two
that energizes the voice. In a general comment on these poems,
Yeats says that the "old hermit Ribh, . were it not for his
ideas about the Trinity, [would be] an orthodox man. ,,30 The
playful irony of Yeats must not be underestimated, yet it seems
to me that here he so far underplays the measure of his gnostic
deviation that he takes it for orthodoxy. Jeffares' Commentary
on the Collected Poems reports that in his preface to A Full Moon
in March Yeats says, Ribh's Christianity "come[s] perhaps from
Egypt" [425]. If Yeats is right, then this would make Ribh a
sort of Irish Valentinus.
In the first poem, "Ribh at the Tomb of Baile and Aillinn,"
we find Ribh addressing us "in the pitch-dark night" [402]. This
30 Jeffares, Commentary, p. 425.
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darkness may not quite be the same ancestral night of the
Platonic Soul with its blandishments to the Self in "A Dialogue, "
but it is just as deathly, for Ribh sits in a graveyard, reading
by the light of a miracle. The miraculous light that penetrates
the darkness of his soul is a momentary heretical light, just the
other side of orthodoxy. He speaks here of Baile and Aillinn:
The miracle that gave them such a death
Transfigured to pure substance what had once
Been bone and sinew; when such bodies join
There is no touching here, nor touching there,
Nor straining joy, but whole is joined to whole;
For the intercourse of angels is a light
Where for its moment both seem lost, consumed. [402]
Ribh's speech breaks through Christian and Platonic orthodoxy
precisely at the point where it insists on the simultaneity of
the spiritual and sensual coitus of the angel-lovers--"Those
lovers, purified by tragedy, / Hurry into each others' arms"--
thus evading and crossing beyond the disembodied spiritualism of
the orthodox.
But in the second poem, "Ribh Denounces Patrick," there is
only the appearance of heresy. For what seems to be a heresy,
the denunciation of Saint Patrick and of the masculine Christian
Trinity, turns out to be, as far as Yeats is concerned, the quite
orthodox posi tion of esoteric Platonism with its mimetic relation
between spirit and matter, god and human, soul and body. "For
things below are copies, the Great Smaragdine Tablet said," notes
Ribh, anachronistically alluding to the medieval Hermetic text.
Here, the coitus of humans (lithe conflagration of their
passion"), despite potential, fails to do any more than reproduce
multiplicity:
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The mirror-scaled serpent is multiplicity,
But all that run in couples, on earth, in flood or air,
share God that is but three,
And could beget or bear themselves could they but
love as He. [403J
The third poem, "Ribh in Ecstasy," performs a double
movement, first crossing into a self-divination, and then falling
back. What begins in a memory of gnostic vision ends in a
naturalistic allusion to Wordsworth's asexual vision in the
IIIntimations" Ode, and its brilliant canto V. In Wordsworth,
The Youth, who daily farther from the east
Must travel, still is Nature's Priest,
And by the vision splendid
Is on his way attended;
At length the Man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light of common day.
In Yeats's poem, though old and decrepit, the hermit has had a
vision splendid, an intensely sexual vision in his case, yet he
too falls and fades back into the ethos of common light:
. . . My soul had found
All happiness in its own cause or ground.
Godhead on Godhead in sexual spasm begot
Godhead. Some shadow fell. My soul forgot
Those amorous cries that out of quiet come
And must the common round of day resume. [403J
Yeats here achieves a vision which requires that we link him to
the Valentinian Speculation. The Aeons of the Pleroma beget
themselves in sexual spasm, thereby also creating a veil or a
shadow limiting the Pleroma and dividing it from "Error [which]
elaborate[sJ its own Matter in the Void" of the Archons led by
the Demi urge of the Cosmos. As The Gospel of Truth says,
"Oblivion did not come into existence close to the Father I
although it came into existence because of Him." For the soul
to forget the amorous cries of the Aeons is to repeat the fall
from what Wordsworth in the Great Ode calls "The glory and the
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freshness of a dream," the result being to "fade into the light
d ,,31of common ay.
In the fourth poem, the little quatrain called "There" which
I have set as the epigraph for (4.5), fails, it seems to me, to
do other than come to rest within the ethos of Platonism, its
vision of Solar unity being somewhere out "There" rather than
"Here." But surely the fifth poem, "Ribh Considers Christian
Love Insufficient," must become known as a masterpiece of
negative transcendence and Yeatsian gnosis.
Why should I seek for love or study it?
It is of God and passes human wit.
I study hatred with great diligence,
For that's a passion in my own control,
A sort of besom that can clear the soul
Of everything that is not mind or sense. [404]
Yeats names Christian Love in the title, but the poem's target
is in fact broader than this. Plato's Symposium and Shelley's
Epipsychidion are two major imaginative efforts "that seek for
love and study it," and that influenced, flowed into, some of
Yeats's best poems, including "Adam's Curse" (1902) and the great
later poem it begat, "Among School Children." But my word
"target" is misleading, for the poem seeks to evade the study of
love rather than confront it. The intense desire to "clear the
soul" by way of hatred rather than love results in the anxious
and pleonastic use of "not" in the final line above, for the
pneumatic purity that is the purpose of the Gnostic requires the
negation of mind and sense.
31 The valentinian Speculation is summarized by Jonas, The Gnostic
Religion, pp. 174-205. The quotation from The Gospel of Truth is from p. 182.
The full text of The Gospe~ of Truth, was discovered along with many other
Gnostic texts at Nag Hammad~, Egypt, ~n 1945-46.
219
Why do I hate man, woman or event?
That is a light my jealous soul has sent.
From terror and deception freed it can
Discover impurities, can show at last
How soul may walk when all such things are past,
How soul could walk before such things began.
Hatred becomes a purgative light from a "jealous soul," a force
of liberation "from terror and deception." Freedom for the
Gnostic arrives by way of the evasion of the terror of anterior-
ity which attempts to deceive the pneumatic soul into a vision
that is alien to the individual gnosis of that soul.32 As Bloom
says in Agon, alluding to the poem by Wallace stevens with which
I began this chapter,
How can evasion be an idea of order? Only by
identifying itself with an elitism, is probably the
only answer, whether one thinks of evasion in erotic,
religious or literary terms. Evasion is in flight
from or represses fate [or ethos], and again, whether
erotic, religious or literary, the principle of
evasion denies that existence is historical. [67]
The pneumatic soul quests after a way of walking that is beyond
time, and in so doing, it denies that its existence is
historical; it lies against time; it delivers itself from terror
and deception, into a new self-chosen (elite) freedom, and a
knowledge that is darker than the knowledge of orthodox
anteriority.
Then my delivered soul herself shall learn
A darker knowledge and in hatred turn
From every thought of God mankind has had.
Thought is a garment and the soul's a bride
That cannot in that trash and tinsel hide:
Hatred of God may bring the soul to God.
32 I follow Bloom's sense of "anteriority," meaning the burden of
tradition felt by the belated imagination. I also here follow his sense of
"evasion," not meaning (as it sometimes can) a weak turning away from the
precursor, but meaning a strong turning of poetic desire for priority despite
the inevitability of belatedness. In Bloom, evasive freedom is a fulcrum in
a dialectical triad--"negation, evasion, and extravagance" [Agon 59].
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Like the antithetical self of "A Dialogue of Self and Soul," the
Yeatsian voice of the old hermit seeks a blessing that may come
only by a movement that is downward and inward, rather than
upward and outward as in the Platonic and Christian ascents via
love. In this poem, downward and inward movement purifies the
soul of its "trash and tinsel"--a sublimely evasive negation of
"every thought of God [that] mankind has had." And the bold
extravagance of the line, "Hatred of God may bring the soul to
God," is surpassed only by the fourth stanza itself, which
portrays the coital coming of the soul as a bride to God by way
of the evasive hatred of anteriority.
At stroke of midnight soul cannot endure
A bodily or mental furniture.
What can she take until her Master give!
Where can she look until He make the show!
What can she know until He bid her know!
How can she live till in her blood He live! [404]
The coitus of the soul and God becomes the act of knowing in
which the knower becomes the known. Christian faith and love are
irrelevant, insufficient, for the soul of Ribh's voice, "at
stroke of midnight," has, in an act of solipsistic negation,
purged itself of all "bodily or mental furniture." "At stroke
of midnight," the moment of possible release from the antinomies
of death and birth, the wheel of eternal return, the pneuma of
the Gnostic poet may re-unite itself with the Abyss.
The sixth poem of the group, "He and She," seems to be the
voice of Ribh's soul singing of her being known: "'His light had
struck me blind / Dared I stop.'/ . . / All creation shivers
/ With that sweet cry" [405]. "What Magic Drum?" breaks off the
intuition that coitus may be a gnosis, as Yeats turns to feel and
221
see the perversely beautiful, darkly postnatal rhythms and images
of androgynous Godhead and its young:
He holds him from desire, all but stops his breath lest
Primordial Motherhood forsake his limbs, the child no
longer rest,
Drinking joy as it were milk upon his breast.
Through light-obliterating garden foliage what magic drum?
Down limb and breast or down that glimmering belly move his
mouth and sinewy tongue.
What from the forest came? What beast has licked its young?
[405]
The eighth poem, however, "Whence Had They Come," returns to see
again the notion that "Eternity is passion," but here the poet
turns against even this gnostic insight of his, attacking it with
a pessimistic historical bitterness that is equally gnostic.
Eternity is passion, girl or boy
Cry at the onset of their sexual joy
'For ever and for ever'; then awake
Ignorant what Dramatis Personae spake; [405]
"Ignorant" reveals the utter bitterness of the speaker--is it
still Ribh? we know not--at the fall away not only from gnostic
knowledge but from "sexual joy." Bitterly attacking his own
poetic stances, he cries, "A passion-driven exultant man sings
out / Sentences that he has never thought." Typically, Yeats
would seek the voice of exultant passionate singing as a lie of
release, but these lines are a bitter self-attack in that he
associates such "Sentences" with the self-mortifying actions of
an ascetic: "The Flagellant lashes those submissive loins /
Ignorant what that dramatist enjoins, / What master made the
lash" [405-406]. Yeats's gnosticism has at this point come to
torture him, its severe dualism that denies faith and love being
a source of acute pain, a form of self-induced terror. There is
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no release from the wheel, he seems to say, only the illusion of
it, as in the ninth poem, "The Four Ages of Man":
He with body waged a fight,
But body won; he walks upright.
Then he struggled with the heart;
Innocence and peace depart.
Then he struggled with the mind;
His proud heart he left behind.
Now his wars on God begin;
At stroke of midnight God shall win. [406 ]
The trope of the "stroke of midnight" returns, but unlike in the
poem on "Christian Love" which took the most exquisite pleasure
in transmuting negation into transcendence, here we find only
more turnings of the wheel of fate as defeat is heaped upon
defeat.
"Conjunctions" is poem ten, and like "A Needle's Eye" which
follows it, "Conj unctions" manages to rediscover a voice that
finds joy in speaking of the fusion of things contrary:
If Jupiter and Saturn meet,
What a crop of mummy wheat!
The sword's a cross; thereon He died:
On breast of Mars the goddess sighed. [406 ]
But nearly as miraculous as Ribh on "Christian Love" is the final
f th "Meru."poem 0 e group, The poem, a Shakespearean sonnet,
recapitulates Yeats's vision of the wheel of civilization and
reiterates his horror at its meaning for humankind, the utter
depravity of our race. And then he finds something glorious.
Civilisation is hooped together, brought
Under a rule, under the semblance of peace
By manifold illusion; but man's life is thought,
And he, despite his terror, cannot cease
Ravening through century after century,
Ravening, raging, and uprooting that he may come
Into the desolation of reality:
Egypt and Greece, good-bye, and good-bye, Rome!
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Hermits upon Mount Meru or Everest,
Caverned in night under the drifted snow,
Or where that snow and winter's dreadful blast
Beat down upon their naked bodies, know
That day brings round the night, that before dawn
His glory and his monuments are gone. [407]
The glory of this poem is in its crossing, its shooting of the
gap and darting to a new aim; the crossing from ignorance to
knowing, from "ignosis" to gnosis. The speaker of "Whence Had
They Come" bewailed twice the "Ignorant" state of "girl or boy,"
"exultant" poet, and ascetic "Flagellant," indeed of all
humankind. This ignorance, if anything, is only intensified in
"Meru"; "manifold illusion" dominates our sight, "terror" our
emotions, and destruction our actions, as we "cannot cease I
Ravening through century after century, I Ravening, raging, and
uprooting that we may come I Into the desolation of reality."
This desolation is a trope of the zero-point of human depravity.
And yet there is a knowing that transcends our depraved
negations. Like a gazelle leaping a ravine, the voice of the
poet leaps across the divide between ignorance and knowing, and
once again his repressed or forgotten precursor, now here
daemonically remembered, is the Wordsworth of the "Intimations"
Ode.
In wordsworth, the crossing to the voice of the Sublime
happens between cantos VIII and IX. As if speaking to the
"little Child" but more precisely to his own pneumatic soul, his
crushed, aging, and straining poetic voice, Wordsworth crosses
from a severe contraction to a glorious expansion:
Why with such earnest pains dost thou provoke
The years to bring the inevitable yoke,
Thus blindly with thy blessedness at strife?
Full soon thy Soul shall have her earthly freight,
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And custom lie upon thee with a weight,
Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life!
IX
o joy! that in our embers
Is something that doth live,
That nature yet remembers
What was so fugitive!
In Yeats, the pressure of the "inevitable yoke ... [of] earthly
freight" is re-seen as the horrifying trope, "the desolation of
reality," even as the pneumatic voice of each poem is close to
death-by-exposure to frost and snow. Yet like Wordsworth, Yeats
manages to cross over to the feeling that his ember, his divine
spark, still lives, as he introjects the gnosis of the hermits
on the mountain who see and know the meaning of desolate reality:
although "Caverned in night under the drifted snow, /. . /
[they] know / That day brings round the night, that before dawn
/ [Man's] glory and his monuments are gone." Catastrophe
creation--can there be a trope more pragmatic for this crossing
than Bloom's?
It has been my argument through this chapter not that Yeats
was not a Platonist or Neoplatonist, but rather that his sense
of belatedness in the context of his tradition and his powerful
impulse to the revision of that tradition and to self-revision
compells us to regard his native and beloved Platonism as the
very ethos which he had to transcend if he would remain a living
imagination--this stance being precisely the stance of the
ancient Gnostics towards Platonic and religious orthodoxy. In
much of The Gnostic Religion Hans Jonas clearly contrasts Gnostic
dualism to the pious Hellenic view of the cosmos that prevailed
at the beginning of the Common Era when Gnostic religions sprang
up in the Eastern Mediterranean area. He notes that
225
cosmic law, once regarded as the expression of a
reason with which man's reason can communicate in the
act of cognition and which it can make its own in the
shaping of conduct, is now seen only in its aspect of
compulsion which thwarts man's freedom. The cosmic
logos of the Stoics is replaced by heimarmene,
oppressive cosmic fate. [253]
A little further on, he continues,
The only thing the pneumatic is committed to is the
realm of the transmundane deity, a transcendence of
the most radical kind. This transcendence, unlike the
"intelligible world" of Platonism or the world-Lord of
Judaism, does not stand in any positive relation to
the sensible world. It is not the essence of that
world, but its negation and cancellation .... [T]he
acosmic Self or pneuma, otherwise hidden, reveals
itself in the negative experience of otherness, of
non-identification, and of protested indefinable
freedom. [271]
Turning Jonas's comments to his own purposes of describing poetic
tradition as an ongoing dialectic of misreading and revisionism,
Bloom says that
Every Gnostic version of the Demiurge is an instance
of what I would call "revisionary counterpoint," in
which the Hebraic Genesis, the Gospel of John, and
Plato's Timaeus are intricately "misread" so as to
produce a "corrective" new amalgam, which is always a
catastrophe. [Agon 77]
No wonder, then, that the Neoplatonists, such as Plotinus and
Porphyry, as well as the Church Fathers, such as Irenaeus and
Hippolytus, mounted such attacks on the Gnostics, attempting to
defend their weaker cosmic dualisms and positive mythologies
against the transgressive dualisms and acosmic mythologies of the
Gnostic sects. And no wonder that Yeats's poems have been so
weakly misunderstood or attacked by his critics, even by the
early Bloom. For Yeats's poetic gnosis can be a bitter vision.
His fame suffers under the weight of cri tical ideologies of
cosmic positivity, weak misreadings all, which seek to tame the
spirit of absolute self-recreative freedom that is the sign of
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the dialectics of his poetic career. The spirit that rages in
Yeats's veins is the spirit of Pico della Mirandolla, friend of
Ficino, Renaissance Hermeticist, and Christian heretic, who,
discoursing "On the Dignity of Man," said:
And if he is not contented with the lot of any
creature but takes himself up into the center of his
own unity, then, made one spirit with God and settled
in the solitary darkness of the Father, who is above
all things, he will stand ahead of all things. [5]
Nor can we deny the influence into Yeats of his divine precursor,
Hamlet:
What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason,
how inf ini te in faculties, in form and moving how
express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in
apprehension how like a god: the beauty of the world,
the paragon of animals! And yet to me what is this
quintessence of dust? [II, ii, 303-308; p. 112]
A shudder in the loins engenders there
The broken wall, the burning roof and tower
And Agamemnon dead.
"Leda and the Swan"
Chapter Five
Yeatsian History and the White Noise that Wounds
Since I have extended such praise to Harold Bloom's work in
chapter four, will the reader find it bizarre that I now go on
to argue the one area of weakness that I find in his work? No
critic and certainly no theorist but Bloom can bring me so close
to my deepest intuitions concerning poems as events and poetry
as tradition. And yet Bloom's failure--if we can name any aspect
of such a sublime vision a "failure"--may be that his theory of
poetry and his practical criticism fall short of a fully blown
negative dialectics, in that he does not emphasize the manner of
the negation of history that poetry is. To this juncture I have
been implying no more and no less than Bloom, that poetic
negation is an event of literary or tropological revisionism.
But I now wish to revise my own and Bloom's conj ectures by
expanding the pragmatics and purpose of poetic negation to
encompass what I call the "white noise" of history, the raw event
or massive deathly Other that invades and threatens to destroy
227
228
us. Could "white noise" as insidious history have been Blake's
intuition when he wrote "The Sick Rose"?
o Rose, thou art sick!
The invisible worm,
That flies in the night,
In the howling storm,
Has found out thy bed
Of crimson joy;
And his dark secret love
Does thy life destroy. [31]
The purpose of this fifth chapter therefore will be to
revise, to further negativize Bloom's theory. To fulfill this
purpose, I must return to what in the third chapter I called
"Yeatsian history," and must elaborate the sense in which
"Yeatsian history" is a creative correction of Bloom. To aid me
in this process I must have recourse not only to Yeats's poems
but also to the greatest of Yeats critics on the question of
Yeats and history, Thomas Whitaker. In chapter four I discussed
briefly his Swan and Shadow: Yeats's Dialogue with History
(1964), as the first book to begin to deal at all adequately with
Yeats's gnosticism and therefore as the crucial precursor-work
for Bloom's explosive revision of Yeats's gnosticism. In the
present chapter, therefore, I will confront the revisionary
gnostic trinity of Yeats, Whitaker, and Bloom in order to put
forward a transumption that may be criticism's best second chance
to approach knowing what happens when poetry and "white noise"
meet at the crossroads, when the crimson rose and the invisible
worm meet in the imagination of a strong poet like Yeats.
In the first chapter I laid out my appreciation of, as well
as my objections to, the anti-mimetic poetics of deconstruction,
just as in the third chapter I detailed my reservations con-
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cerning the mimetic poetics of historicism. Clearly, therefore,
I do not here intend to lapse into a new historicism. My trope
of "white noise" is intended to defend against that ever-present
possibility, and to defend against the free-fall of anti-mime-
ticism, while at the same time opening poetry to the ravaging
power of history. Just as this ravaging power was pictured by
the poet in "Meru"--
And [man], despite his terror, cannot cease
Ravening through century after century,
Ravening, raging, and uprooting that he may come
Into the desolation of reality. .. [407]
--so, the opening of poetry to that power is suggested by Bloom
in The Anxiety of Influence when he discusses the sixth of his
six revisionary ratios, "Apophrades," or "the return of the
dead":
The later poet, in his own final phase, already
burdened by an imaginative solitude that is almost a
solipsism, holds his own poem so open again to the
precursor's work that at first we might believe the
wheel has come full circle, and that we are back in
the later poet's flooded apprenticeship, before his
strength began to assert itself in the revisionary
ratios. But the poem is now held open to the
precursor, where once it was open. .. [15-16]
Bloom here describes the "uncanny effect" that seems to make
Yeats, for example, the poet of Shelley's best poems, but I wish
to steal away with his trope of the poet "holding himself open,"
in order to advance my critique of Bloom. For it is my argument
that, even in his most recent work, Bloom has not quite enough
held himself open to the Yeatsian voice, the voice of his
precursor.
The absolute genius of Bloom is to have discovered and
elaborated with unceasing ravenous energy "the shame and
splendor" of the event of writing a poem:
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For the poet is condemned to learn his profoundest
yearnings through an awareness of other selves. The
poem is within him, yet he experiences the shame and
splendor of being found by poems--great poems--outside
him. To lose freedom in this center is never to
forgive, and to learn the dread of threatened autonomy
forever. [Anxiety 26]
Here as nearly everywhere in Bloom, he verges upon the Yeatsian
insight that the white noise, the chaos of history engages with
the imagination in a negative dialectics that transforms poetry
and the poet. He verges upon it, but draws back from the horror
of that abyss. Bloom writes of "catastrophe creation," and "the
breaking of the vessels," which are tropes of a poet's agon with
a tradition that he would dialectically revise and re-create; but
this "tradition" is not quite identical to my "white noise,"
which must remain larger and more menacing than the admittedly
awesome trope of "tradition." The burden of the Yeats critic,
therefore, will be to transcend the limits of a criticism, even
one as strong as Bloom's, that would speculate on Yeats's self-
voicing through his agon with tradition. The burden must be to
enact such a criticism as Bloom's, but also to seek the self-
transformation that Yeats achieves in holding himself open to the
white noise of history.
5.1 Whitaker's Dialogue with Yeats's History
So the Platonic Year
Whirls out new right and wrong,
Whirls in the old instead;
All men are dancers and their tread
Goes to the barbarous clangour of a gong.
"Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen"
In) am not aware of any work, not even Bloom's Yeats, that':
approaches the issue of Yeats and history with the acumen and
insight of Whitaker's book. The title, Swan and Shadow: Yeats's
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Dialogue with History, alludes to two crucial figures in Yeats's
career work. The figure of the Swan appears for example in "Leda
and the Swan" (1923), in "Dove and Swan" which forms a section
of A Vision, in "The Wild Swans at Coole" (1916), and elsewhere,
but most ecstatically perhaps in "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen"
(1919-1922) where the swan becomes a figure of the poet.
Some moralist or mythological poet
Compares the solitary soul to a swan;
I am satisfied with that,
Satisfied if a troubled mirror show it,
Before that brief gleam of its life be gone,
An image of its state;
The wings half spread for flight,
The breast thrust out in pride
Whether to play, or to ride
Those winds that clamour of approaching night.
The swan has leaped into the desolate heaven:
That image can bring wildness, bring a rage
To end all things, to end
What my laborious life imagined.. [316]
In 1970, Bornstein and Bloom both claimed that this passage
derives from Asia's song at the end of Act II of Prometheus
1
Unbound: "My soul is an enchanted boat, I Which, like a
sleeping swan, doth float I Upon the silver waves of thy sweet
singing. " But the urgency of the figure of the swan in
Alastor Yeats may also have been repressively, that is to say,
daemonically, remembering:
. . . A strong impulse urged
His steps to the sea-shore. A swan was there,
Beside a sluggish stream among the reeds.
It rose as he approached, and with strong wings
Scaling the upward sky, bent its bright course
High over the immeasurable main. [lines 274-279]
Why do I say that the Yeats passage "repressively remembers" the
passage from Shelley's Alastor? Throughout his work, Bloom turns
Bornstein, Yeats and Shelley, pp. 104-105; Bloom, Yeats, pp. 359-362.
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Freud's term "repression" away from the psychoanalytic uncon-
scious into the field of imaginative activity. Repression
becomes a dialectical action, both a driving down of the tropes
of the precursor in an aggressive forgetting, and a flying up or
flight of these tropes into a new remembering which gives a new
voice to the ephebe, now "daemonized" by the voice of the
precursor. In A Map of Misreading Bloom says, that "the defense
of repression conceal[s] an unconsciously purposeful
forgetting .... The glory of repression, poetically speaking,
is that memory and desire, driven down, have no place to go in
language except up onto the heights of sublimity" [73, 100].
Later, in The Breaking of the Vessels, Bloom speaks of
"daemonization," with its "spectacular images of height and
depth," as "exaltation always ... in flight from the fathering
force of the past" [10]. Following Bloom's antithetical
dialectics, therefore, the swan of Alastor with its "strong wings
I Scaling the upward sky," daemonizes the swan of "Nineteen
Hundred and Nineteen," as Yeats struggles to repress quotation.
In flight from the voice of his precursor, Yeats finds his voice
only in a forgetting that is also a remembering of that voice.2
Whitaker takes for his title the daemonic figure of the
Swan-as-poet in flight--"breast thrust out in pride," and
"leap [ing] into the desolate heaven." But the figure of the
Shadow-as-history must be more elusive, enigmatic, mysterious,
for the Shadow in Whitaker's work will be both an internalized
unconscious figure and an externalized worldly figure.
In Poetry and Repression, pp. 66-67, Bloom cites Kilekegaardas the
source of his notion that remembering and forgetting are, in poems, one
dialectical action.
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The interrogation of [one's double or] shadow may
therefore lead the poet toward an understanding,
simultaneously, of two areas which seem dangerously
"other": one in the world beyond himself, one in his
own hidden nature. If the shadow appears in the guise
of current history, he may partly discover, in a
single act of perception, the evils of his time and
his own secret complicity. [6]
While the figure of the Swan may be linked, in "Nineteen Hundred
and Nineteen" at least, to Yeats's defensive distortion of his
self as a Shelleyan poet, the figure of the Shadow gestures
towards the spirit world, the world of the dead, that is to say
the world of white noise that wounds from beyond the body of
literary tradition.
By writing of the figures of Swan and Shadow as constituting
Yeats's dialogue or dialectic with history, Whitaker advances
Yeats studies beyond the limits imposed by the psychological
biography of Ellmann's approach, the dialogue of man and mask
discussed in chapter two. Gnostic self-transcendence cannot be
reduced to mere psychological dialogue; likewise, Whitaker's
trope of History-as-Shadow, internal and external, far outstrips
Ellmann's sense of the anti-self as psychological mask. In a
passage that effectively summarizes the fine detail of his
argument, Whitaker lays out his view of the dialectics permeating
"Yeats's panoramic vision of history":
[Its goal is] the reversal of fall and incarnation,
the transmutation of flesh and Word, the correlative
deification of the poet, who sees all history in his
reflection. However, the progress toward that goal is
complicated by the existential movement in Yeats's
dialogue with history--as the poet recognizes his
human finitude, undergoes the dramatic experience of
life in time, and provokes encounters with an anti-
self who may teach him all that he does not yet know.
In fact, that existential complication is integral to
the apocalyptic doctrine itself. For though the early
Yeats often wished to evade it and critics of
gnosticism often wish to ignore it, the practical
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consequence of that doctrine is clear. If the poet
would transcend the world by transmuting all flesh, he
must explore and realize in art the full circle of
human potentialities. Most immediately, he must
pursue that which seems his opposite, adversary, or
shadow, but is really unconscious within him.
That fuller recognition and understanding of history's
dark forces and of the correlated forces within his
own being will mean for him both self-annihilation and
growth. [36]
This passage demonstrates Whitaker's commitment to a critical
vision of "Yeatsian history" that I find, with some revision,
practical and genial to my critique of Bloom's more delimiting,
if far more enthusiastic, historical poetics. Whereas Bloom
excludes all but the literary or tropological from his work,
Whitaker excludes nothing; yet the weakness of Whitaker's trope
of "dialogue," when compared to Bloom's IIrevisionism," must be
that its powers of persuasive negation are lacking. I suggest
that Yeats creatively corrects them both--holding himself open
to the white noise of history, he negatively energizes Whitaker's
tropes of Swan and Shadow, while performing a negation of Bloom's
work that breaks through and beyond the limits of the most
sublime criticism that we have.
As implied in the quoted passage, Whitaker envisions Yeats's
sense of history as a composite of "pano ramf o vi.si.on" and
IIdramatic experience"--a god's eye view and a human's eye view,
or alternatively, a pythagorean-Parmenidean divine vision as
opposed to a Heracli tean-Empedoclean drama of human passion.
This pattern is reflected in the structure of his book, Part One
titled "History as Vision" and Part Two titled "History as
Dramatic Experience," with the latter part taking two-thirds of
the book's development. Yet this structural division only
superficially enforces a separation in Whitaker's argument, as
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he rightly describes throughout the book how the divine and the
human views of history play in continuous dialogue throughout the
poet's career. If anything, however, this balancing of the
extremes becomes the error of the "Hegelianization" of Yeats, a
misreading that evades the greatest difficulty in Yeats and the
source of his poetic strength--his performance of the
antithetical as antithetical to itself not just to the primary,
his performance of the formula 1 = 1+/-.
Whitaker shows the merit of operating comfortably among
various Yeatsian antinomies--Paterian, Nietzschean, and occult--
in his fine discussion of the early story "Rosa Alchemica"
(1896)3 and the aporia or bewilderment of the story's narrator:
Wishing to transcend the world, the narrator of "Rosa
Alchemica" moves towards Yeats's Byzantium; lacking
courage equal to desire, he clings to an effete
version of classical order.
He is torn between the historical opposites which
Pater had called "centrifugal" and "centripetal" or
"Asiatic" and "European," and which Nietzsche, as
Yeats would soon learn, had called "Dionysian" and
"Apollonian." Yeats clearly knew their occult
analogues, the "Transfiguration" and "Incarnation,"
and he would later sum up all these connotations in
his terms primary and antithetical. [42]
To the extent that the story's narrator is caught bewildered
between antinomies, he also oscillates between them in a sort of
de Manian undecidability avant la lettre, facing (figuring) now
one way, now the other. But Whitaker soon moves on to argue that
the aporia has become, in Yeats's early and middle phases, a
"synthesis of opposites":
wade gives April 1896 as date of first publication.
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Al though cycle and apocalypse [the topics of
Whitaker's second and third chapters] assumed fairly
clear form in Yeats's mind during the nineties, from
1889 to 1919 his judgments of history and his hopes
for a new era moved through three phases suggestive of
a Hegelian dialectic. That was because, as spiritual
alchemist, he knew the soul to be a mercurial
synthesis of opposites. Restlessly following the
spiral path "between two fires," Yeats first sought a
Dionysian transcendence of form, then an Apollonian
reconstitution of form, and then paradoxical syntheses
of both impulses, [all] reflected in his
shifting vision of history. [55-56]
Whitaker, it seems to me, settles for less than what ought to
suffice. In order to support his conjecture that Yeats follows
an Hegelian trajectory that begins in Dionysian transcendence
then moves through Apollonian reconstitution to paradoxical
synthesis, he must rely almost exclusively on the Dionysian
quality in such works as "The Valley of the Black Pig," and the
Apollonian revision of this quality in such poems as "The Magi."
Such poems indeed may be said to express a desire for a visionary
transcendence of history in the first case and a visionary
reconstitution of history in the second, but Whitaker must leave
aside poems of the same period that do not seem to desire either
"Dionysian transfiguration" or "Apollonian incarnation" [70].
Undermining Whitaker's thesis here are the many love poems of the
early period, "Adam's Curse" (1902) for example, poems that
desire transcendence of the inane mundane, yet poems that desire
a perfect Apollonian form.
The problems that come from applying Nietzsche's terms to
poems and placing them within an Hegelian dialectic are
compounded when we see that Whitaker identifies Yeats's term
"primary" with the Dionysian, and his "antithetical" with the
Apollonian, as when he says that "[Yeats] was demanding the
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freedom of that Apollonian principle which he would later call
the subjective or antithetical intellect" [64]. The antithetical
is certainly a principle of freedom, but is it Apollonian or
Dionysian? The implication of my argument throughout this
dissertation, especially in the previous chapter, is that it is
Yeats's poetic intuition that the binarism called
Dionysian/Apollonian is just another form of the Great Wheel, the
round of life and death; whereas the principle of freedom must
be an element antithetical to both the Dionysian and Apollonian,
to both the primary and the antithetical, if there are to be more
poems. The antithetical must also be an irreducible third term,
not just part of an endlessly oscillating binary.4
In my revision of Whitaker, therefore, I would say that
Yeats's early idealizing work is formalist and Apollonian, yet
it is Dionysian in its resistance to its own tendency to freeze
up, to reify itself and take its metaphors and voices as "true."
The later, more passionate "bodily" work intensifies the
dialectic of Apollonian and Dionysian, of Platonizing Soul and
Heretical Self, by appreciating ever more fully the power of form
(as in "Among School Children" or "The Statues" for example) and
by negating such formalism through the fire of self-revision (as
in "A Dialogue of Self and Soul" or "Byzantium" for example).
Thus, any synthesis sought or achieved, Hegelian or otherwise,
is a negative or antithetical synthesis, one that--like Blake's
crimson rose--reveals its negation to be its life. For negation
is the beginning step in the freedom of a poet to begin again.
4 The figure of Crazy Jane, who sees that "nothing can be sole or whole
/ That has not been rent," is illustrative of my view of the antithetical as
an irreducible third term, as discussed at the conclusion of (5.2) below.
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As Yeats puts it in a comment quoted by Whitaker, "'History is
necessity until it takes fire in someone's head and becomes
freedom or virtue'" [245].5 Yeats's trope of history as the
inescapable burden of necessity, which is a trope of ethos,
suddenly becoming the fire of freedom in someone's head, which
is a trope of pathos, exemplifies my thesis of history as white
noise breaking, by way of negation--the poet holding himself
open--into new poetic form.
Yet the power of history to wound, to ravage poet and poem,
appears hardly at all in Whitaker's Hegelianizing discourse.
Instead of a poet holding himself open to white noise, Whitaker
offers a quiet history, robbed of its power to ravage and enrage.
Beginning with a direct personal relation to Ireland,
moving in widening circles through the re-experienced
[i.e., textualized] drama of the past, Yeats could
reach a universal history--the Renaissance, Phidian
Athens, all the antinomies of primary and antithetical
or of blood and the moon. Fleetingly in personal
meditation, enduringly in the poems, he merged
dramatic experience and panoramic vision in a full-
bodied yet comprehensive reality. [215]6
The urgency of history as the intolerable burden of necessity,
which is certainly Yeats's vision of it in A Vision, hardly
appears in this passage of history muted and idealized. It is
as if Yeats following Hegel had reached Absolute Spirit by
merging drama and vision into "a full-bodied yet comprehensive
reality." Because history appears here as always already safely
troped, its terror is no more; its teeth and its claws have been
5 Whitaker quotes Yeats's Pages from a Diary Written in Nineteen Hundred
and Thirty (Dublin: Cuala, 1944), p. 54; reprinted in Explorations.
6 In this passage which focuses on the vision of universal history
achieved by Yeats in A Vision, especially its final chapter, "Dove or Swan,"
Whitaker alludes to the poem "Blood and the Moon" which he has just been
discussing in detail, as well as the famous first two lines of "The Second
Coming."
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extracted. But in the matter of history as white noise, it is
Blake, not Hegel, who is Yeats's precursor. Haunting A Vision
and its gyres is the terror of eternal return as seen in Blake's
poem "The Mental Traveller," a poem that, like a Mobius strip,
turns back upon itself in a vision of endless incarceration.7
Moreover, the dreadful symmetry of Blake's "The Tyger"--
And what shoulder, & what art,
Could twist the sinews of thy heart?
What the hammer? what the chain?
In what furnace was thy brain?
What the anvil? what dread grasp
Dare its deadly terrors clasp? [33J
--breathes through the voice of Crazy Jane who sings the stark
refrain that "Love is like the lion's tooth i !" and terrorizes
the voice of "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen" that sings of the
white noise in the human breast:
We who seven years ago
Talked of honour and of truth,
Shriek with pleasure if we show
The weasel's twist, the weasel's tooth. [31 6 J
Whitaker's Swan and Shadow is surely one of the glories of
Yeats studies. His attention to the poet's gnosticism precurses
Bloom's great achievement; his devotion to the issue of history
avoids the pitfalls of the positive mimeticists such as Seamus
Deane and Edward Said that I criticized in chapter three, while
opening up the critical possibility of a negative dialectics of
Yeatsian history; and his intuitions about the historical
development of poetic tropes receives its due complement in the
Bloomian theory of poetic misprision, the "repressive
In A Vision Yeats refers to "The Mental Traveller" on no fewer than
five occasions, pp. 106, 189, 212, 213, 262.
"Crazy Jane Grown Old Looks at the Dancers" (1929) [375].
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remembering" that turns a Shelleyan into a Yeatsian swan. That
is to say, Whitaker's argument regularly relies upon a sense of
how Yeats performed a self-revision in poem after poem:
"The Magi," like "The Valley of the Black Pig,"
transcends historical theorizing--but with striking
differences. The speaker himself is no longer a
weakly yearning soul; yet because he need not be
specially dream-awakened, his own fate is clearly in
question. Yeats has turned from the divine beast of
the ancestral darkness to the bestial mystery that
begins a new cycle. [66]
We can only surmise how Bloom must have felt in the late 1960s
while studying Swan and Shadow in preparation for the writing of
Yeats--the shock at re~ognizing his own vision as a distortion;
the intense ambivalence at loving his own rejected thoughts, yet
hating his gnostic belatedness. For several years later Bloom
would quote his American father Emerson on the "theme of the
reader's Sublime," saying, "< i.nevery work of genius we recognize
our own rejected thoughts; they come back to us with a certain
alienated majesty'" [Agon 103].
5.2 Bloom's Agon with Yeats
Whatever flames upon the night
Man's own resinous heart has fed.
"Two Songs from a Play"
Bloom's "alienated majesty" is a loving blow that strikes
the ephebe, somewhat like the "sudden blow" that strikes in "Leda
and the Swan."
A sudden blow: the great wings beating still
Above the staggering girl, her thighs caressed
By the dark webs, her nape caught in his bill,
He holds her helpless breast upon his breast.
It is to Whitaker's great credit that in his discussion of "Leda
and the Swan" he does not associate or identify the Swan-god Zeus
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with the Shelleyan figure of the Swan-as-poet, for that would
lead to the fashionable banality that the Swan is men and Leda
is 9women. The violent eroticism of the poem is not even
literally (much less figuratively) an eroticism between man and
woman. The erotic storm that suddenly blows through the poem,
in my view, is best seen as the ravaging-ravishing of humankind
by the white rushing noise of history, the strange yet utterly
inalienable heart of history.
How can those terrified vague fingers push
The feathered glory from her loosening thighs?
How can body, laid in that white rush,
But feel the strange heart beating where it lies?
Shattering our cosmic vessels as it shudders, history impregnates
us all, engendering in man and woman so that we each, broken and
burning, must bear the burden of tragedy within us.
A shudder in the loins engenders there
The broken wall, the burning roof and tower
And Agamemnon dead.
Like Blake's rose that sickens with the inevitable arrival of the
worm to its bed of crimson joy, the city of Troy awaits its
devastation, which is also our own.
The deepest allegory here is the allegory of imaginative
activity, which is to say the allegory of artistic knowledge or
gnosis. This is the allegory of the poetic negation of a brute
power beyond our ken. But since negation means "to absorb and
resist" simultaneously, a memorable phrase from A Map of
Misreading,lO even this gnosis is viewed with skepticism as the
9 In chapter one (1.9) I briefly discussed this view of the poem which
was put forward by William Johns;=n, who makes a fetish of "gender" and social
revolution, and turns the poem ~nto an allegory of his own moral imperative
to heap abuse upon the masculine and to separate the sexes.
, 10 Map, p. 162; but in this self-antithetical phrase Bloom describes not
the poet's agon with history, but with the precursor.
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sonnet ends by asking an unanswerable question as to the
possibility of Ledaean gnosis in the moment of brutalization by
the mastering white noise of an indifferent and alien power that
strangely lives and breeds within.
Being so caught up,
So mastered by the brute blood of the air,
Did she put on his knowledge with his power
Before the indifferent beak could let her drop? [322]
The white noise of history is to all humanity as a Swan-gad's
violation would be to Leda. Bloom's terrible genius is to place
himself as a belated Leda, attempting to negate, that is,
simultaneously to absorb and to resist his Yeatsian precursor as
Swan-god.
If Whitaker opened Yeats studies to an appreciation of
gnostic vision and the possibility of a negative dialogue with
history, then Bloom further opened Yeats studies to revisionism
or antithetical criticism. For when Bloom wrote in 1970 of the
"Higher Criticism of Yeats engag[ing] the radical issue of
his subjectivity, particularly as expressed in his myth of the
antithetical man" [372], he spoke in the first instance of
himself--he spoke with the voice of a son, dreaming of ambitions
to father something unique. Twenty-two years on, we are aware
that something unique indeed was begotten by the Yeatsian ephebe,
but the vast dimensions and consequences of that ongoing genesis
have so far only been guessed at. For Bloom's critics, with but
a few exceptions, hardly measure up to his standard of intuitive
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critical excellence, while his influence remains strong, though
subterranean, even among those who seek to dismiss him.ll
By way of parenthesis I would make the following comments
on Bloom's detractors. His most dangerous critics are those who
attack him from one of two perspectives: the supposed privileges
of "history," or the absolute textuali ty of deconstruction--
critiques which chapters three and one are intended to defend
against. Frank Lentricchia, Jonathan Arac, and Paul Bove have
taken the first perspective, while Paul de Man and Wlad Godzich
the second. In his chapter on Bloom in After the New Criticism
Lentricchia charges the Bloom of Poetry and Repression with
endorsing "interpretive anarchy: a programmatic subjectivism
that can only lead to the purest of relativisms" [339J. Noting
Bloom's response to this charge in Agon [38-43J, I would add that
his map of misreading, his dialectic of revisionism, in fact
functions as a bulwark against pure relativism which is a charge
more appropriately laid against the linguistic anti-mimeticism
of deconstruction a la de Man, than against Bloom's over-
determined Freudian (i.e., repressive) criticism and negative
dialectics. Like Lentricchia, Arac would turn poetry and the
critic of poetry into slaves to materiality:
11 I have ~eal t wi th m~ny of these themes in two published essays,
"Mapping Anglo-Irlsh Poetry: Wlth(out) Harold Bloom," reviewing Tradition and
Influence in Anglo-Irish Poetry (1989), edited by Terence Brown and Nicholas
Grene, and "Harold Bloom in/and History," reviewing Harold Bloom: Towards
Historical Rhetorics (1988) by Peter de Bolla.
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Only precise attention to the place of poetry in
society--the opportunities offered to voice, script,
and instruction, by whom, to whom and for what
purpose--will allow the nuance, detail, and
differentiation that make a history, and set proper
limi ts to a theory. 12
Clearly, Arac is annoyed with Bloom's extravagance, chafing
against the view that the glory of poetry is its power "to absorb
and resist" materiality. In Destructive Poetics Bove confusedly
advances a Heideggerian historicism that entirely misses the
mark, based as it is on the weak reading that Bloom endorses "the
idea of a continuous tradition, . assured by his theory of
imitation" [36]. As I have already shown, Bloom's tradition is
only continuous in that it is self-broken, i.e., discontinuous,
while "imitation" is entirely alien to his sense of poetry. On
the other hand, deconstructors like Paul de Man and Wlad
Godzich--who takes his cue directly from de Man--seek to save
Bloom from himself. "De Man rescues Bloom," says Godzich, "from
the naivety of psychological naturalism, and from the Hegelian
dialectics of the self implied in the problematics of stance. ,,13
Although it is most certain that the great fruitfulness of
Bloom's career derives, in part, from his agon with Paul de Man,
to whom A Map of Misreading is dedicated, I believe that this
dissertation has already demonstrated the utter poverty of the
trope of "psychological naturalism" in describing Bloom;
similarly, a dialectics of the self Bloom unashamedly operates,
but a dialectics less Hegelian than Hebraic, Gnostic, and
Freudian, a dialectic of negative transcendence as opposed to
12 "The Criticism of Harold Bloom: Judgment and History," p. 39; revised
and republished as part of chapter one of Arac's Critical Genealogies (1987).
13
"Harold Bloom as Rhetorician," p. 48.
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Hegel's Absolute Spirit. David Fite and Peter de Bolla have
produced book-length studies of Bloom that somehow approximate
his ideas, but that avoid engaging Bloom in an antithetical agone
Having completed a parenthesis on his detractors, I would
argue that, among Bloom's critics within my purview, only Susan
Handelman and Daniel O'Hara begin to practice upon Bloom himself
the very" anti thetical criticism" that his own work practices and
calls for.14 But at what cost has the Promethean ephebe stolen
the fire of the precursor? What he wrote in 1970 about the
Yeatsian misprision of Shelley and Blake may redound upon Bloom
himself:
Yeats has read Shelley with great accuracy and
insight, but will not abide in that reading, for if
Shelley's way as a poet is right, then indeed Yeats's
developing way is wrong. In compensation, Yeats has
read Blake with great inaccuracy and deliberately
befuddled insight, so as to produce an antithetical
poetic father to take Shelley's place. [59]
This passage contains in germ Bloom's theory of influence and
revisionism. It suggests something strange and insightful about
the vagaries, the wanderings, of poetic influence flowing from
the young Yeats and into him from Shelley and Blake; but it also
implies something aggressive and ambivalent about Bloom's being
influenced by all three of them. The passage shows Yeats to be
reading, loving, and rejecting Shelley in order to have his own
voice, not Shelley's, and then gravely misreading Blake while
making him falsely into the true father, the imago. But how
should we read Bloom here among his fathers?
14 In The Slayers of Moses (1982), Handelman brilliantly reviews "the
emergence of Rabbinic interpretation in modern literary theory," employing
Bloom's theory of misprision to misread Freud, Derrida, and Bloom himself back
into Rabbinic tradition. Similarly, in "Yeats and Theory" and "The Genius of
Irony: Nietzsche in Bloom," O'Hara antithetically misreads Bloom back into his
precursors, Yeats and Nietzsche.
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In order to absorb and resist the passage we must turn it
on its head, reading its predicate as its subject so to speak.
That is, we must read Bloom with the antithetical fire that he
steals from Yeats. We must recall that in Shelley's Mythmaking
(1959) and in Blake's Apocalypse (1963) Bloom had dreamt of the
form of Shelley and Blake, making them into an image of the
father several years before he wrote Yeats. In Harold Bloom: The
Rhetoric of Romantic Vision (1985), David Fite takes Blake to be
the single crucial influence on Bloom and his theory; 15 I, on
the other hand, would press the darker notion that Yeats is
Bloom's crucial influence, in that Yeats figures as Bloom's most
uncanny and most dangerous image of his gnostic, extravagant
self. The naming of the poetic father is crucial to the
imaginative life of the son who must undergo various ratios of
revision in the naming of himself in relation to the name that
he gives to the father. Yeats has interfered in the naming
process, the dialectic between Bloom and his Blakean-Shelleyan
composite precursor. In fact, the interference has been so
powerfully disruptive that Yeats threatens to usurp the place of
Blake and Shelley in Bloom's dialectic. The wonder of Bloom is
that he has the antithetical strength to imply as much himself,
as here in the final pages of Kabbalah and Criticism (1975):
A poem is either weak and forgettable, or else strong
and so memorable. Strength here means the strength of
imposition. A poet is strong because poets after him
must work to evade him. A critic is strong if his
readings similarly provoke other readings. What
allies the strong poet and the strong critic is that
15 Fite argues that to find "the source of the later Bloom/s theories
[i.e.I post-~) we need only look to Bloom himself and to his early
writings on his true precursor, Blake" [56).
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there is a necessary element in their respective
misreadings ....
Some of the consequences of what I am saying
dismay even me. Thus, it cheers ~ up to say that the
misreading of Milton's Satan by Blake and Shelley is
a lot stronger than the pitifully weak
misreading of Satan by T. S. Eliot. But I am rather
downcast when I reflect that the misreading of Blake
and Shelley by Yeats is a lot stronger than the
misreading of Blake and Shelley by Bloom. [125-126]
In this remarkable passage, Bloom verges on the shadowy insight
that his aggression towards Yeats five years earlier was a
function in the transference of authority sought by an ephebe who
swerves to evade, sometimes violently, the influence of the
precursor. The fact that Yeats was a Kabbalist--a decadent
occul t Kabbalist, but a Kabbalist nonetheless--surely poured gall
onto Bloom's wound. "In its degeneracy," he writes, "Kabbalah
has sought vainly for a magical power over nature, but in its
glory it sought, and found, a power of the mind over the universe
of death" [47]. Wishing to associate with the lat ter and
dissociate from the former, Bloom flings the charge of "occult
mummery" at
16
Yeats. It is a testimony to Bloom's poetic
courage--his "entering into the abyss of himself, ,,17 as Yeats
was to put it--that his admission to being "downcast" at the
revisionary strength of Yeats-the-Kabbalist comes in Kabbalah and
Criticism.
Discontinuously holding himself open to the wounds of his
agon with Yeats, Bloom advances along a winding path: from his
bitterly ambivalent stance in Yeats, to his more philosophically
detached stance in his chapter on Yeats in Poetry and Repression
16 ~I p. 455.
17
~I p. 462.
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six years later, to his stance of virtual silence in his
assertively gnostic work of the early 1980s, Agon and The
Breaking of the Vessels--a silence that can only persuade us now
of his ongoing wariness of the precursor. Bloom evades any
longer speaking of Yeats now that he has himself become the
gnostic visionary that he once found so distasteful in Yeats.
But "nothing is got for nothing," and in Bloom's recent book,
Ruin the Sacred Truths (1989), a sublime portrait of revisionary
literary history from the Yahwist to Kafka and Samuel Beckett has
been purchased at the price of a wound that is a double silence--
his silence on the white noise, the nightmare of history, and his
silence on the precursor that he once recognized to be
"[c]ertainly the major Gnostic poet in the language" [Agon 46].
Increasingly, Bloom has taken the Patriarch of the Yahwist
for his antithetical model, Wrestling Jacob who struggled all
night with a superhuman being, gaining the Blessing thereby, but
at the cost of a wound to his hip. 1 S Jacob's agon wi th the
angel is offered as an allegory of the process that, since A Map
of Misreading, Bloom has called "the Scene of Instruction," the
primal scene in which the ephebe loses or gains a distinctive
voice in an imaginative struggle for priority with the precursor.
It is the Scene of Instruction that makes it possible for me to
speculate on the waywardness of Bloom's agon with Yeats,
wandering from bitter ambivalence to philosophical detachment,
and finally to a wary but painful silence. Bloom's work, indeed,
may be taken to be an extended meditation, an elaboration of the
18 The story of Wrestling Jacob takes special prominence in The Breaking
of the Vessels and most recently in The Book of J (1990).
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dialectical Scene of Instruction. But there may be no better
illuminant of the bitter love that binds Bloom to Yeats, yet
frees him, than this passage from A Map of Misreading, especially
its final sentence.
The Bible and Milton are not mocked, and even more
vitally are not contained bv their revisionists.
Primal repression carried over into repetition yields
the Sublime repression of belatedness or Romanticism,
yet the fathers not only remain unaltered by the sons
(except in the sons) but do not cease from altering
their progeny. The last truth of the Primal Scene of
Instruction is that purpose or aim--that is to say,
meaning--cleaves more closely to origins the more
intensely it strives to distance itself from origins.
[62]
It is a paradox of the transference of poetic authority that
Bloom must describe Yeats's vision as "systematic inhumanity,"
"spiritual squalor," "eugenic claptrap," "occult mummery," and
"pythagorean Fascism," if he is to redeem his own gnosticism from
"the darkest bondages of the idols of determinism. ,,19 He must
declare the precursor's vision depraved and fallen if he is to
proclaim his own voice transcendent. Being much like Leda, being
"so caught up, / So mas tered by the brute blood" of the
precursor, Bloom must turn away in revulsion at the horrifying
darkness of Yeatsian gnostic catastrophe; for Bloom, as is Yeats,
is in a desperate struggle "for the only victory worth winning,
the divinating triumph over oblivion. ,,20
To the burgeoning crowd of idealizing realists, mimeticists,
historicists, and psycho-structural-linguists, such tropes appear
as self-aggrandizing melodrama, but to Bloom the strong ephebe
(whether poet or critic) confronts, when writing, what he refers
19 The quotations come from Yeats, pp. 422, 455, 444, and 436.
20 Poetry and Repression, p. 2.
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to in various passages as "the agonistic self-questioning of the
Sublime," a dialectic that matches the ephebe against anteriori ty
and forces the question--am I more than, less than, equal to the
21
precursor? This was Jacob's question as well, when in the
darkness he wrestled with the Daimon, so crucial was the Blessing
to him, so necessary the wound. In fact, the association between
the Blessing and the wound verges on an identity when we realize
that "bless" derives from the Old English bloedsian, meaning to
mark with blood, thus to consecrate, and that one of its meanings
still today is to injure or to wound, as in French, blesser, to
wound. In poetry, the achievement of the Blessing certainly
requires a self-wounding, as in "A Dialogue of Self and Soul,"
where "My Self" chooses the wound, chooses to "Endure that toil,
the distress, . pain, clumsiness, The
mirror of malicious eyes, the wintry blast"--all in order
that a great sweetness may flow into the breast, and "Everything
we look upon [be] blest" [351]. Following Ellmann, Bloom quotes
the poet embracing the poetic necessity of the wound that may be
a blessing, the wound that is the abyss of the self: "Why should
we honor those that die upon the field of battle? A man may show
as reckless a courage in entering into the abyss of himself. ,,22
In his agon with Yeats, Bloom participates in the Yeatsian wound
that is a gnostic abyss, and there he finds his own wound, lithe
deep lie at every reimagined origin":
21 For example, Agon, pp. 117, 193, 226, 238, 239.
22 The Man and the Masks, p. 6; ~, pp. 67-68, 462. Quoting the
passage twice, Bloom slightly alt,ers Ellmann' s punctuation and spelling,
changing honour to honor and a sem1-colon to a question mark.
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Language does not become poetry for us until we know
that language is telling us lies, because the truth is
ambivalence and so also already death. Poetry has to
be loved before we can know it as poetry, and must
inspire ambivalence in us at the center of that love.
[30]
Crazy Jane, that most wounded yet sublime of Yeatsian
personae, reminds us of Bloom's "Primal Lie,,23 when she
declares, against the Bishop's Platonizing Christianity, "'For
nothing can be sole or whole / That has not been rent'" [375].
The Yeatsian abyss is a gaping wound that Bloom has internalized.
His creative struggle to heal the wound has led him along a
winding path, moving from his early and violent attempt at
externalizing or projecting the wound (his vitriolic attack on
Yeats for "systematic inhumanity," etc.), to the visionary prose
he now writes that reminds us of nothing if not of the deepest
rhythms of Yeats:
We make of the quarrel with others, rhetoric, but of
the quarrel with ourselves, poetry. Unlike the
rhetoricians, who get a confident voice from
remembering the crowd they have won or may win, we
sing amid our uncertainty; and, smitten even in the
presence of the most high beauty by the knowledge of
our soli tude, our rhythm shudders. ["Per Amica
Silentia Lunae" 331]
5.3 The Clash of Strong Readers
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.
"The Second Coming"
Yet there still remains the issue of history as white noise,
its menacing presence in Yeats and its apparent absence in Bloom.
The dialectics of white noise and the poetic imagination seem to
be the theme in this passage on "nobility" by Wallace Stevens:
23 Poetry and Repression, p. 287; quoted by Fite, p. 92.
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It is a violence from within that protects us from a
violence without. It is the imagination pressing back
against the pressure of reality. It seems, in the
last analysis, to have something to do with our self-
preservation; and that, no doubt, is why the
expression of it, the sound of its words, help us to
live our lives. [36]
The Stevens metaphor of "pressing back" may appear to contradict
my metaphor of "holding oneself open," but appearances deceive.
For what are "holding open" and "pressing back" but the poles of
the Bloomian dialectic of poetic negation, "to absorb and
resist"? The particular strategies that Yeats and Bloom practice
as negative dialecticians differ slightly but significantly.
Bloom's negation absorbs and resists all tropological anteriority
while Yeats's negation holds him open to, and presses back
against, all tropological anteriority along with an unknown that
asserts itself as prior to all tropes. Such white noise invades
Yeats's poems most famously perhaps as war or political
conflicts, but personal events, though on a lesser cosmic scale,
also constitute white noise. In other words, death, in its
endlessly unforeseen forms, in its power as final threat, is the
violence that presses on the imagination. (This is why
Ramazani's research, discussed in the previous chapter, ought to
provoke interest.) By holding himself open to death, the poet
also pushes back against it, thus earning a temporary measure of
what stevens calls "self-preservation," which in poetic terms
means divination, wordsworth's intimations of immortality. "All
changed, changed utterly," writes the poet, "A terrible beauty
is born" [287].
Bloom too has his moments of openness to white noise, as in
Agon when he describes the dialectic of the kelippoth of
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Kabbalah, the "evil shells [that] are formed directly by God's
nihilizing light":
The Cossack insurrection of 1648 in Poland and Russia
produced a quasi-Holocaust of East European Jewry. In
this triumph of the evil husks of the kelippoth, the
way was prepared for the Messianic advent of Sabbatai
Zevi. . [85]
Bloom's description here allows the quasi-Holocaust he speaks of
to play its negative role both in a Messianic advent and, as the
passage goes on to show, in the Kabbalah of Nathan of Gaza,
Sabbatai Zevi's prophet. Similarly, white noise breaks into his
discussion of the formation of Emerson's Orphism:
February 8, 1831: death of his first wife, Ellen;
May 9, 1836: death of his brother, Charles;
January 27, 1842; death of his first son, Waldo.
These Orphic 10~s should have shattered the
American Orpheus, for all his life long these were the
three persons he loved best. As losses they mark the
three phases in the strengthening of his self-reliant
American religion, an Orphism that would place him
beyond further loss, at the high price of coming to
worship the goddess Ananke, dread but sublime
Necessity. [161]
Here Bloom opens his criticism to a force beyond the obsessively
internalized revision of tropes. But his usual practice, even
in his most recent work, is to focus attention on the
tropological agon of a work. The imagination participates
thereby in a dark shadow, but it is the shadow of the precursor
or poetic anteriori ty, not the darker shadow of white noise.
"That even the strongest poets are subj ect to influences not
poetical is obvious even to me," he notes with wry humor, "but
again my concern is only with the poet in a poet, or the
aboriginal poetic self" [Anxiety 11]. The history that a poem
is involved in, as Bloom sees it, is the genealogy of tropes, the
endless and discontinuous defense against prior poems.
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Yet even as I make this claim, I ask myself--do I go too
far, falsifying my own precursor? "There are no texts," he says,
"so that it makes little difference to affirm [with Derrida] that
there is nothing outside the text. ,,24 In The Breaking of the
Vessels Bloom quotes a long passage from Emerson's Self -Reliance,
the passage that contains the comment on the "alienated majesty"
of our "rejected thoughts" which I quoted above to conclude
(5.1). Bloom's own reading of this passage is what he calls an
"antithetical apothegm":
[E]ven the strongest poem, particularly the strongest
poem, costs us too much, but without that cost the
poem is only so many words, and not human action.
.. There are no texts, so that it makes little
difference to affirm that there is nothing outside the
text. Rather, there are configurations, richly
perverse interlockings of a multiplicity of strong
texts and a few scattered handfuls of strong readers.
Poetry happens within those configurations, within
those ratios of revision that adjust the balances of
psychic warfare between and within texts and readers.
[34, italics removed]
Setting aside, if we dare, the savage elegance of these lines,
they certainly focus the issue I here seek to address. Literary
history, rather than being a matter of texts, is a series of
events or happenings, i.e., "human action." It is the dead
letter that is only a text, "so many words," and is of no concern
to Bloom. Yet his description falls short, does it not, of
seeing the negative dialectics of poetry and white noise, for if
poetry happens only between and within poems and readers, then
raw event, the pure unknown, would seem to be either excluded
24 It should be obvious that Bloom is alluding not only to Derrida/s use
of the phrase, "rL n'y a pas de hors texte," but also and even more vehemently
to the lesser followers of Derrida in the American academy who may have tended
to wave the phrase as a flag. For in a subtle way, Bloom is here agreeing,
provisionally, with Derrida, while arguing that there is more to poetry than
textuality.
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from the creative process or already contained within the tropes
and the readers involved in psychic warfare. This would make my
trope of white noise either a desperate and futile evasion of
Bloom's ratios of revision or a new shattering of the vessels
that contain those tropes. In order to gain the sublimity of a
new shattering of the vessels, I risk a desperate and futile
evasion.
It may be that Bloom's greatest dialectical openness to
white noise comes not in his theory of poetry but in his theory
of teaching. Both rely of course on the primal Scene of
Instruction, but Bloom's discussion of the imperatives of
teaching literature places the professor between the student and
the literary tradition in a position of wounded openness to
historical pressure in the widest possible sense. In A Map of
Misreading Bloom meditates upon the implications of his own
"Gospel of Gloom":
The teacher of literature now in America, far more
than the teacher of history or philosophy or religion,
is condemned to teach the presentness of the past,
because history, philosophy and religion have
withdrawn as agents from the Scene of Instruction,
leaving the bewildered teacher of literature alone at
the altar, terrifiedly wondering whether he is to be
sacrifice or priest. If he evades his burden by
attempting to teach only the supposed presence of the
present, he will find himself teaching only some
simplistic, partial reduction that wholly obliterates
the present in the name of one or another histori-
cizing formula, or past injustice, or dead faith,
whether secular or not....
All literary tradition has been necessarily
elitist, in every period, if only because the Scene of
Instruction always depends upon a primal choosing and
being chosen, which is what "elite" means. Teaching,
as Plato knew, is necessarily a branch of erotics, in
the wide sense of desiring what we have not got, of
redressing our poverty, of compounding with our
fantasies. No teacher, however impartial he or she
attempts to be, can avoid choosing among students, or
being chosen by them, for this is the very nature of
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teaching. Literary teaching is precisely like
literature itself; no strong writer can choose his
precursors until first he is chosen by them, and no
strong student can fail to be chosen by his teachers.
strong students, like strong writers, will find the
sustenance they must have. And strong students, like
strong writers, will rise in the most unexpected
places and times, to wrestle with the internalized
violence pressed upon them by their teachers and
precursors. [39]
I have quoted this passage at such length in order to draw out
the contrast between Bloom's use of the Scene of Instruction and
my misreading of it in putting forward my argument about white
noise. For I have no doubt that he is right on the mark
concerning the analogy of teacher and student to precursor and
ephebe. Yet it seems to me that Bloom's argument implies more
than he would allow.
He creates the Scene of Instruction as a trope to seal off
history from the creative process. In this view, the retreat of
history, philosophy, and religion from the Scene of Instruction
is an historical "fact" that is "external" to the literary Scene
of Instruction; as I see it, however, this "fact" only more
greatly pressurizes the Scene of Instruction for the contemporary
teacher and student of literature, emphasizing and exaggerating
the burden of their belatedness as well as the extravagance of
any evasions of belatedness that they may make. Another way of
putting this is to say that the curriculum is not equivalent or
identical to the canon of literature, even though they are almost
universally spoken of nowadays as one and the same. For if, by
some bizarre yet increasingly possible evasion, the curriculum
were to become the study of second, third, and fourth-rate works
in order to assuage "one or another historicizing formula, or
past injustice, or dead faith, whether secular or not," the
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position in the canon of Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth,
Keats, and Yeats--"dead white males" all--would not have been
overturned or deleted. On the contrary, for the canon is not a
squalid political compromise decided by a committee vote. But
what Bloom misses is that the very condition of curriculum
pressure on the canon is a kind of white noise which teacher and
student absorb and resist during the negations of the Scene of
Instruction. Bloom's description of the repressive beauties of
the process of election (elitism) portrays the sublimities of
election and its inevitably "internalized violence," but the
dialectics of choosing and being chosen among poems, teachers,
and students is a process profoundly if negatively influenced
(absorbed and resisted) by an all-pervasive white noise that is
mysteriously alien yet internal to poem and players.
5.4 Facticity, Ruination, Tenebrio--Yeats in Bloom
I sing what was lost and dread what was won,
I walk in a battle fought over again,
My king a lost king, and lost soldiers my men;
Feet to the Rising and Setting may run,
They always beat on the same small stone.
"What Was Lost"
In a brief ten-line poem, "Men Made out of Words," Wallace
Stevens--wi th the deft delicacy of the Keats of "Ode to a
Nightingale"--sets out the negative dialectics of word and world,
the anguish of fate and the beauty felt in absorbing and
resisting it.
What should we be without the sexual myth,
The human revery or poem of death?
castratos of moon-mash--Life consists
Of propositions about life. The human
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Revery is a solitude in which
We compose these propositions, torn by dreams,
By the terrible incantations of defeats
And by the fear that defeats and dreams are one.
The whole race is a poet that writes down
The eccentric propositions of its fate. [355-356]
As gnostic poet and gnostic critic, Yeats and Bloom, torn by
dreams and defeats, take for their subjects the fear that defeats
and dreams are one--an awful and antithetical dualism that
shatters the heart of orthodox mimetic thought. Yet even this
shattering is contained within the largest trope that Bloom has
voiced, the trope that in Ruin the Sacred Truths he names
"facticity." The trope of facticity contains, or rather re-
contains, the shattering of the vessels because it marks the
horizon of our visions and revisions where human revery is a
solitude.
Speaking of the stories of the Yahwist, Bloom says that they
are
so original that we cannot read them [because] .
we are still part of a tradition that has never been
able to assimilate their originality, despite many
efforts to do so. I am thinking of such weird tales
as Yahweh making Adam by scooping up some wet clay and
then breathing upon it, or Yahweh sitting upon the
ground under the terebinths at Mamre, devouring roast
calf, curd, milk and bread, and then being offended by
the aged Sarah's sensible derision when he prophesies
the birth of Isaac. [6]
It is as if the Yahwist were the originator of the figurative use
of language, trapping us within our literalization of the figures
of the book of J.
J was a vastly eccentric great writer whose difficulty
and originality are still obscured for us, and by us,
because of a condition of enclosure that J's force has
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imposed upon us. When we attempt to call J's stories
of Yahweh anthropomorphic, we truly are defending
ourselves against J, by overliteralizing the figura-
tive being he called Yahweh. [7]
Interpolating Bloom here, anthropomorphism applies, I would say,
more to the pagan figures of ancient Greek divinity; it therefore
cannot answer the question, Who is Yahweh?--a question too
uncanny for our literalizing readings of J. As Bloom will argue
in The Book of J, Yahweh is a literary character of consummate
antitheticality, a figurative being entirely incommensurate with
himself, a being of pure freedom.
Bloom goes on to name Shakespeare and Freud as "[t]he two
other maj or instances of this imprisoning factici ty" [7] in
Western tradition. In trying to read Shakespeare,
we confront a poetic strength that surpasses even the
Yahwist, Homer, Dante, and Chaucer. We cannot see the
originality of an originality that has become a
contingency or a factici ty for us. [T]he
greatest of [Shakespeare's] originalities [is] the
representation of change by showing people pondering
their own speeches and being altered by that consider-
ation. We find this mode of representation common-
place and even natural, but it does not exist in Homer
or the Bible, in Euripides or in Dante. [53, 54]
Freud too has imprisoned us in his vision due to the ineffable
way that his enterprise "has usurped our diction for describing
all psychic instances, agencies, and events" [7]. But Freud's
map of the mind performs a transumption of Jewish tradition
itself. Our father Freud
transformed the initial prime obstacle to psycho-
analysis, the transference, into the pragmatic prime
instrument of analytical therapy. If there is
something ineluctably Jewish about that transforma-
tion, then perhaps we can take it as a synechdoche for
all the Jewish metamorphoses of exile into achieve-
ment. The wandering people has taught itself and
others the lesson of wandering meaning, a wandering
that has compelled a multitude of changes in the modes
of interpretation available to the West. Of these
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changes, the Freudian speculation has been perhaps the
most influential in our century, if only because we
now find it difficult to recall that psychoanalysis,
after all, is only a speculation, rather than a
science, a philosophy, or even a religion. [146-147]
Like the Yahwist and Shakespeare, Freud profoundly reshapes our
seeing and knowing, so much so that we mistake both his revision
of Judaism and the arbitrary originality, the catastrophe
creation of psychoanalysis. Moreover, Bloom's own originality
in Ruin the Sacred Truths is to re-envision Western tradition as
a dialectical genealogy of imaginative freedom engaged with the
facticity of western tropes.
Above I pointed out the sixteen years of wary silence that
Bloom has kept on Yeats since Poetry and Repression. Although
Ruin the Sacred Truths follows Bloom's usual practice of
providing no index, I can say with confidence that in its pages
Yeats is not mentioned once. Nevertheless, Yeats shades his way
into Bloom, like a tenebrio, making his ghostly presence felt in
the subtlest possible way within Bloom's discussion of
"facticity," his largest trope for history-as-trope. The
Yeatsian idiom that breaks through into Bloom's vision of the
Yahwist' s "imprisoning factici ty" is the voice of Yeatsian
history, the voice that holds itself open to white noise, here
unavoidably the voice of "Leda and the Swan":
By "facticity" I mean the state of being caught up in
a factuality or contingency which is an inescapable
context. . I am suggesting that there is a brute
contingency to all origins as such, and so the
engendering of every tradition is absolutely
arbitrary, including the Yahwistic, Shakespearean, and
Freudian traditions of seeing the nature and destiny
of human beings. [7-8, my emphases]
Here the repressed presence of the voice of Yeats performs the
"daemonization" that Bloom emphasizes in A Map of Misreading and
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Poetry and Repression as the fourth of his six ratios of
revision--the purposeful forgetting that remembers by way of
poetic negation. Like the ghostly presence of "A Dialogue of
Self and Soul" in the critical writing of George Steiner (1.9),
"Leda and the Swan" remains repressed here, driven down, but its
voice breaks into the discourse, rising with palpable energy, as
if Bloom himself were "so caught up" and "so mastered by" the
Yeatsian Sublime that he becomes Leda to Yeats's Swan-god, "the
brute blood of the air," "engender [ing] there," in the daemonic
ratio of precursor and ephebe, the breaking, burning, deathly
fiction of "factici ty." Furthermore, while the Yeats poem
exemplifies through myth what I have been calling the negative
dialectics of Yeatsian history, the Bloomian fiction of
"facticity" stubbornly--even gloriously resists holding itself
open to white noise. The brute contingency integral to all
origins, and the engendering of tradition that is absolutely
arbitrary, remain sublimely internalized and internalizing forces
that act within tropological traditions, and evade the forces of
an unknown chaos beyond their horizon.
5.5 Crossings: From Bloom to J, From Man to Woman
And thus declared that Arab lady:
"Last night, where under the wild moon
On grassy mattress I had laid me,
Within my arms great Solomon,
I suddenly cried out in a strange tongue
Not his, not mine."
"Solomon and the Witch"
One of the most salient features of Bloom's two decade
migration from Yeats to The Book of J has been its self-
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revisionary nature.25 Never resting on his laurels, the tropes
of his past works, never allowing his former figures, former
selves, to reify, to harden into idols, Bloom invariably
pressurizes not only the state of criticism and theory as he
finds it, but also his own best work. "Everything that can be
broken should be broken," he says, grandly quoting Emerson, and
his own work receives no special exemption. Mapping the
crossings and self-revisionism of Yeats's career will be the
theme of my sixth and final chapter, but I here ask if, in
shooting the gap between Ruin the Sacred Truths and The Book
of J, the self-revisionary Bloom has crossed from an internalized
and internalizing critical theory to the sort of negative
dialectics that I have been pleading for.
The crucial indication that Bloom is at the threshold of
this crossing comes in The Book of J's simplest yet most
devastating coup--his fiction of the Yahwist as a woman.
I am assuming that J lived at or nearby the court of
Solomon's son and successor, King Rehoboam of Judah,
under whom his father's kingdom fell apart soon after
the death of Solomon in 922 B. C. E. My further
assumption is that J was not a professional scribe but
rather an immensely sophisticated, highly placed
member of the Solomonic elite, enlightened and ironic.
But my primary surmise is that J was a woman, and that
she wrote for her contemporaries as a woman, in
friendly competition with her only strong rival among
those contemporaries, the male author of the court
history narrative in 2 Samuel. Since I am aware that
my vision of J will be condemned as a fancy or a
fiction, I will begin by pointing out that all our
accounts of the Bible are scholarly fictions or
religious fantasies, and generally serve rather ten-
25 David Fite' s book on Bloom patiently traces the permutations of
Bloom's work from the 1959 book, Shelley's Mythmaking, through the 1977 book
Wallace Stevens. Except for a brief discussion of Bloom's use of Freudia~
repression, Fite hardly touches the 1982 books on the gnostic and Kabbalistic
agon of poetry. But Fite ~voi?s entering into an antithetical dialectic with
Bloom, evading an authent~c f~ght.
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dentious purposes. In proposing that J was a woman,
at least I will not be furthering the interests of any
religious or ideological group. Rather, I will be
attempting to account, through my years of reading
experience, for my increasing sense of the astonishing
differences between J and every other biblical writer.
[9 ]
Touche, Bloom! One day, when we come to accept as "natural" that
the Yahwist was a woman, then Bloom will have profoundly
demonstrated his thesis noted above, that "the engendering of
every tradition is arbitrary." We will credit him (yet again,
I must say) with having enlarged upon the horizons of our
critical vision.
Among the many wonders of The Book of J is its predominant
concern with matters "historical" as opposed to poetical or
literary. As Bloom's summary above shows, The Book of J is
devoted to a range of issues that center on the dialectics of
word and wor ld. This alone signals the distance from himself
that Bloom has crossed since The Anxiety of Influence, for
example, with its sole concern being the poet-in-a-poet. Now the
court of Solomon and of his son, Rehoboam, the collapse of
Solomon's kingdom after his death, the friendly imaginative
rivalry between two elite writers, and the antithetical politics
of his speculation that J was a woman--all these points and more,
such as the consequences for the Yahwist's writings and for our
readings once we see the writer as a woman, are woven by Bloom
into a texture that is richer in historical speculation than
anything else he has written. Has Bloom hereby crossed into the
Yeatsian ethos of total exposure to white noise? Recall that
twenty years earlier he had written, apropos of "A Dialogue of
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Self and Soul," that "Yeats is never stronger than when he is
totally exposed" [Yeats 373J
There are important reasons to answer that indeed he has
made such a crossing, not least of these being the fact that in
taking J to be a woman, Bloom speculatively identifies his self,
his critical voice, with female subjectivity. This amounts to
the making of a new poetic crossing from his predominantly
patrilineal ethos (precursor-ephebe) to a new pathos of
antithetical voicing. In some ways, this crossing re-enacts the
crossing that Yeats made into the voice of Crazy Jane,26 whose
glory is born out of a great defeat, despite the orthodox pieties
of the Bishop:
"My friends are gone, but that's a truth
Nor grave nor bed denied,
Learned in bodily lowliness
And in the heart's pride." [375J
Add to this the fact that The Book of J frequently speculates on
the dialectical influence that historical events at the court of
Solomon and elsewhere may have had on J's writing, and we
seemingly must conclude that the book marks a new departure, a
new crossing for Bloom.
Yet the question remains unanswered, for Bloom's otherwise
hegemonic trajectory of tropological internalization can hardly
be said to be here abandoned. His central concern composed with
26 While I see Yeats as having crossed over from his male ethos to a new
and impossible pathos by having taken upon himself the voice of the female,
C. L. Innes sees Yeats as having given his own voice to Crazy Jane, a gift
which is then rejected for broadly political reasons. Concerning the Crazy
Jane poems and the sequence of poems called "A Woman Young and Old," Innes
writes that these poems "give women a voice, speaking from and of their bodies
and their desires .... The subversive female [however] is removed from all
social context so that her critique of male power becomes concerned with a
sterile Christian morality which Yeats contrives to divorce from political or
economic structures .... [Crazy Jane] inhabits Yeats's tongue and expresses
his desire and not her own" [59, 69]. Thus poems should be political
pamphlets instead of poems.
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great good humor throughout, is to offer a practical yet
antithetical criticism of the extant work of the Yahwist,
treating it as the original facticity or primal ground of our
self-knowing.
If the history of religion is the process of choosing
forms of worship from poetic tales,27 in the West that
history is even more extravagant; it is the worship,
in greatly modified and revised forms, of an extra-
ordinarily wayward and uncanny literary character, J's
Yahweh. Churches are founded upon metaphors, such as
rocks and crosses, but the Western worship of God is
in one sense more astonishing than the foundation of
any church. The original Yahweh of the Bible, J's, is
a very complex and troublesome extended metaphor or
figure of speech and thought. So is Hamlet. But we
do not pray to Hamlet, or invoke him when we run for
political office, or justify our opposition to
abortion by appealing to him. [12]
In treating Yahweh as a trope, albeit a trope so influential and
original that it virtually engendered three great monotheistic
religions, Bloom is hereby involved mainly with a certain side
of J--a writer who is
tricky, sublime, ironic, a visionary of incommen-
surates, and so the direct ancestor of Kafka, and of
any writer, Jewish or Gentile, condemned to work in
Kafka's mode. This other side of J will receive the
largest share of my exegesis, because it is the
antithetical element that all normative traditions--
Judaic, Christian, Islamic, secular--have been unable
to assimilate, and so have ignored, or repressed, or
evaded. [13]
Even in The Book of J, which is Bloom's subtlest and deepest
encounter with the dark forces of history, there is an evasion
of this darkness, as literary tradition remains an internalized
and internalizing force. Yeats, on the other hand, holds himself
open to the darkness, ecstatically singing, "Black out; Heaven
blazing into the head: / Tragedy wrought to its uttermost" [412].
27 Bloom here alludes to a comment in Blake's work, "The Marriage of
Heaven and Hell."
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Nonetheless, Bloom's critical evasion of this darkness remains
the strongest lie-against -time available to criticism and theory.
His "facticity" evokes a critical horizon that is more pragmatic
than that of any other critic I have encountered. Even the de
Manian abyss of aporia, which, reduces poetry to "the madness of
words, ,,28 fails as poetics because it merely seduces cri tics,
like Nicholas Royale in (3.3), to suggest what Bloom would call
the "gorgeous nonsense" that in Hamlet Derrida is Shakespeare's
precursor. Moreover, Bloom's "tradition" imposes upon those of
us who would know a poem the grandest burden possible, yet a
burden of greater promise than offered by any other criticism,
the burden of knowing ourselves by knowing the past. The only
other claim that I would add here, as if this were not already
enough, is that despite himself, Bloom draws his most persuasive
antithetical, self-revisionary strength from Yeats.
28 "Disfiguring Shelley," The Rhetoric of Romanticism, p. 122. I allude
to my argument in chapter one, especially in (1.4).
A man that had six mortal wounds, a man
Violent and famous, strode among the dead;
Eyes stared out of the branches and were gone.
"Cuchulain Comforted"
Chapter Six
Antithetical Criticism: Yeats's Career as Crisis-Lyric
"Black out; Heaven blazing into the head," writes Yeats in
"Lapis Lazuli" [421]; in so doing, he takes a revisionary stance
against what seem to be similar visionary moments in earlier
poems of his. Decades before, in "The Cold Heaven," he had
written of being "Riddled with light" [227]. Precisely why and
how the later poem's lightning should be seen as a strongly
revisionary moment of negation that absorbs and resists, that
holds itself open to and presses back against the earlier poem,
will form much of the purpose of this, my concluding chapter.
A useful way of describing Bloom's theory would be to say simply
that the meaning of a poem is always another poem, or in my own
antithetical formula, 1 = 1+/-. Building on Bloom's pragmatic
theory of poetry as a revisionary event--in chapter five I showed
how Bloom's career itself is a revisionary event--my larger
strategy will be the critical articulation of Yeatsian moments
of self-revision. That is to say, by way of my own misreading
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of Bloom's enterprise, especially his dialectics of revisionism,
I hope to turn Yeats's career into a cri tical poem of self-
revision, a poem that, due to Yeats's revisionary energy, moves
dialectically through the six phases of what Bloom calls the
post-Miltonic crisis poem. The six phases are wounds self-
inflicted by a poet in quest of divination, wounds that dare
uncanny association with the "six mortal wounds" absorbed by the
hero of "Cuchulain Comforted."l
This concern for poetry as a revisionary event, moreover,
draws me into further consideration of the canon of poetry, and
how it comes to be. In the previous chapter I claimed that the
canon is by no means equivalent or identical to the curriculum,
the reading list for a typical Bachelor's degree in literature.
Whereas the curriculum is the result of a political compromise
among university professors, I will here argue along with Bloom
that the canon is the real expression of an internalized agonic
activity that is in fact antithetical to political compromises
as well as to itself. The canon of poetry results not from
repetition, the weak reading of anterior work, but from the
sublime event in which a poem breaks-yet-remakes its tradition.
It is not constructed, but re-envisioned. Canonization,
therefore, is a dialectical rupturing and reforming, and just as
it can be described as the agon between poets--Milton's
misreading of Shakespeare, Dante, Homer, and Genesis becoming
A fuller argument than I have space to present explicitly in this
chapter would simultaneously articulate the dimensions of the dialectics of
Yeats's career with those of Bloom's career, thus performing an antithetical
reading of both at once and further .drawin~ the w~und~ and the blessings of
Bloom's agon with Yeats. I have outl~ned th~s read~ng ~n an article published
in Paragraph, reviewing Ruin the Sacred Truths, "Harold Bloom: Crisis, Gnosis,
Self-Revision."
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both Blake's and Wordsworth's misreadings of Milton, etc.--so it
can also be described as the agon within a poet, within a poetic
career.
Bloom's general practice has been either to manifest the
movement of a poem through his six ratios of revision, as in the
Wordsworth chapter in Poetry and Repression where, among other
things, he works "to uncover the pat terns of revisionism" in
"Tint ern Abbey" [65]; or to trace the defensive permutations of
a trope through the work of various poets, as in The Breaking of
the Vessels where his third and final chapter follows the
"transumptive chains" that link the tropes of the blank, of the
leaves, and of cries, from Paradise Lost through Wordsworth,
Coleridge, Shelley, Emerson, and Whitman, to Wallace Stevens.
But Bloom has also treated a poetic career as a poem subject to
dialectical mutation, as in his book on Wallace Stevens. In any
of these contexts the same revisionary principle applies--earlier
strong poems act as blocking agents that later poems must not
repeat but must usurp if there are to be new and stronger poems.
The Yeatsian and Bloomian careers, which in truth are poems,
enact this dialectic of self-revisionism, thereby canonizing
their work both within and against their tradition.
Strong poems, whether individual poems or careers, survive
only by imposing themselves upon earlier strong poems, and their
ability to survive is in-built, not the result of academic
politics. In Agon Bloom puts it this way: a strong poem, "to
have any hope of permanence, necessarily builds the canonical
ambition, process and agon directly into its own text" [284].
"Canon-formation is not, . . . for more than a generation or two,
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socially or politically determined, even by the most intense of
literary politics," writes Bloom in A Map of Misreading. And he
continues:
Poets survive because of inherent strength; this
strength is manifested through their influence upon
other strong poets, and influence that goes through
more than two generations of strong poets tends to
become part of tradition, even to become the tradition
itself. Poems stay alive when they engender live
poems, even through resistance, resentment, misinter-
pretation; and poems become immortal when their
descendants in turn engender vital poems. Out of the
strong comes forth strength, even if not sweetness,
and when strength has imposed itself long enough, then
we learn to call it tradition, whether we like it or
not. [200]
This Bloomian version of canon-formation has the unique merit
that it "de-idealizes" our sense of how traditions come to exist
and to function. The New Critical view--that if poems have any
relation to other poems, it is a benign relationship of imitating
and borrowing ideas--is no more upheld by Bloom than is the
currently fashionable, ideological view that cultural politics
entirely determines the canon. Even the most academically
canonized poet of this century, T. S. Eliot, poet of the self-
desiccated imagination, may one day seem to be a bizarre example
of academic misjudgment. In "The Scholars" (1914-1915) Yeats
wrote:
Bald heads forgetful of their sins,
Old, learned, respectable bald heads
Edit and annotate the lines
That young men, tossing on their beds,
Rhymed out in love's despair
To flatter beauty's ignorant ear.
All shuffle there; all cough in ink;
All wear the carpet with their shoes;
All think what other people think;
All know the man their neighbour knows.
Lord, what would they say
Did their Catullus walk that way? [243]
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We might ask today whether the literary academy has changed much
since "The Scholars," or does its ethos remain, so far as poetry
is concerned, that "All think what other people think"?
Bloom's thesis of canon-formation defends against more than
extremes of weakness, past and present. For even the strengths
of deconstructive criticism would send us into a free fall of
infini te linguistic substitution and relativism, although it
shares with Bloom the same canon. J. Hillis Miller and Paul de
Man, for example, choose to write about great poems, great works
which, Bloom would say, chose them, yet they can provide no
theoretical basis for this choosing or being chosen. In the
labyrinth of Miller's "linguistic moment," in the aporia of de
Man's "madness of words," there exists no defense or figure able
to link literary transformations. Discontinuity becomes the new
Demiurge, while genealogy appears as an arbitrary fiction of the
un-self-deconstructed critical theorist. Yet Miller's book, The
Linguistic Moment, repeats virtually the same canon from
Wordsworth to Wallace Stevens that is the obsession of Harold
2
Bloom, just as the more cosmopolitan Paul de Man, from his
1960 PhD dissertation until his death, chose to write about the
works of such figures as Rousseau, Wordsworth,
Nietzsche, Mallarme and Yeats.
Shelley,
While refusing the bad conscience of political historicism
as a basis of literary judgment, Bloom also refuses the free fall
of deconstructive relativism which negates linguistically any and
all grounding. Instead, Bloom insists that there must be a
Only Miller's choice to write on Gerard Manley Hopkins and William
Carlos Williams excepts him from Bloom's choice of poets.
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poetic genealogy and that its basis is found in the rather gloomy
figurative area of aggressive defense. Yet even this dark area
has its light humor, as here in Kabbalah and Criticism:
No one would survive socially if he or she went around
assuming or saying that he or she had to be misin-
terpreted, by everyone whosoever, but fortunately
poems don't have to survive either in civil society or
in a state of nature. Poems fight for survival in a
state of poems, which by definition has been, is now,
and is always going to be badly overpopulated. Any
poem's initial problem is to make room for itself--it
must force the previous poems to move over and so
clear some space for itself. A new poem is not unlike
a small child placed with a lot of other small
children in a small playroom, with a limited number of
toys, and no adult supervision whatever. [121]
Bloom's toys are the tropes he uses, just as Yeats at the
twilight of his career-poem saw his previous tropes as "circus
animals [that] were all on show" [471]. Had he not made them
turn tricks and jump through fiery hoops? But what good now were
such memories, such tropes? Jumping again through the old hoops
will not suffice. Repetition of the old tropes is always a
temptation, but will not engender a poem able to survive among
so many other poems, able "To engross the present and dominate
memory," instead of merely "enumerate old themes" [471]. "The
Circus Animals' Desertion" manifests Yeats's anxiety about his
own most characteristic stance, the stance of aggressive defense
or revision of his own anterior voices. To repeat those voices
would be a curse of death for a poet, who will evoke new life,
only, paradoxically, by enacting the deathly burial of old
voices:
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Accursed who brings to light of day
The writings I have cast away!
But blessed he that stirs them not
And lets the kind worm take the 10t.3
Here Yeats curses the curse of repetition, just as in another
quatrain he blesses the antithetical process of remaking the self
which is an act that is isomorphic with the writing of any strong
poem:
The friends that have it I do wrong
When ever I remake a song,
Should know what issue is at stake:
It is myself that I remake.
Highly conscious of his belatedness regarding a tradition so
embarrassingly rich that it seems already glutted with genius,
and also highly conscious of his belatedness regarding his own
strongly-voiced poems of the past, Yeats struggles to remake
himself, to do more than enumerate old themes, to bury the past
that, dead, it may breed new poetic life.
6.1 The Scene of Yeatsian Instruction
I, too, await
The hour of thy great wind of love and hate.
When shall the stars be blown about the sky,
Like the sparks blown out of a smithy, and die?
Surely, thine hour has come, thy great wind blows,
Far-off, most secret, and inviolate Rose?
"The Secret Rose"
I have already argued, in the fifth chapter, that Yeats
(rather than Blake, as Fite has claimed) is the crucial precursor
of Bloom's work, and the vision that I present in this chapter
should work to reinforce this argument. But in the case of
Yeats, I take the crucial precursor to be Shelley, a precursor
3 This and the next untitled quatrain are not part of Yeats's Collected
~. They are published by Finneran, p. 549 and 548, in the section of The
Poems: A New Edition (1983) that he calls "Additional Poems." -
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who later appears as a composite of Shelley and Hamlet. That is
to say, I intend to show that the crucial crossings in Yeats's
best poetry are made to happen when Yeats summons the pneumatic
strength to seek the lie of voice by confronting and defending
against the ghostly voice of the composite precursor welling up
within him. Such creative moments Yeats experiences as the agon
of a fiery darkness that he must pass through, as described in
"Sailing to Byzantium" where the precursors are addressed--
o sages standing in God's holy fire
As in the gold mosaic of a wall,
Come from the holy fire, pern in a gyre,
And be the singing-masters of my soul . [301 ]
--and as described in "Byzantium," with its "agony of flame that
cannot singe a sleeve," where
At midnight on the Emperor's pavement flit
Flames that no faggot feeds, nor steel has lit,
Nor storm disturbs, flames begotten of flame ..
[364]
Shelley's sublime skepticism and his passion for the
epipsychidion, the soul out of his soul, and later Hamlet's
tragic heroism and his passion for union with the fatherly voice
from beyond the grave, combine variously to draw Yeats again and
again into the darkness of a holy fire, a Scene of Instruction
in the presence of sages and their absent internalized voices.
But there is more. With each passage through the Scene of
Instruction, each breaking and remaking of the tropes of the
precursor, Yeats's own prior poems tend to merge with the
precursor, so that Yeats becomes his own precursor. As Bloom has
put it, in a comment on a passage from Freud,
the adult ego, at its strongest [the ephebe in his
maturity], defend[s] itself against vanished dangers
and even seek[s] substitutes for the vanished
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originals. In the agon of the strong poet, the
achieved substitutes tend to be earlier versions of
the ephebe himself, who in some sense laments a glory
he never had. [Anxiety 89]
Thus, when we reach "The Circus Animals' Desertion" (1937-
1938),4 we feel the uncanny effect of being in the presence of
a Yeatsian voice that is struggling to evade merely enumerating
old themes, and struggling once again to dominate memory dia-
lectically by releasing it from obsession. And yet we hear a
voice like that of an aged Shelleyan poet, grown skeptical even
of his love for visionary wonder--"Those masterful images [that]
/ Grew in pure mind" [472]; and we hear a voice like that of an
aged Hamlet, weary of the figurative transmutations required in
heroic duels with rapier and dagger and ready to "lie down where
all the ladders start."
Though it might be objected by New Critics, de Manians, and
cultural ideologues alike that my story of Hamlet and Shelley and
Yeats himself as the composite precursor of Yeats's poems is but
an arbitrary fiction of my own choosing and making, I would
contend that I here seek to perform upon Yeats's poems (and
Bloom's cri tical theory) the very antithetical misreading of
their work that I claim to be the source of their strength and
that Bloom claims to be the source of all that is memorable and
valuable in both poetry and criticism. Recalling that the divine
pneuma of the Gnostic is spark or the lie of voice, just as the
Hebraic davhar is "act made one with word rather than word
referring only to another word (logos)," Bloom describes the
dialectic that identifies poem, criticism, and reading: "A poem
4 Yeats's Poems, p. 641.
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is spark and act, or else we need not read it a second time.
Criticism is spark and act, or else we need not read it at all"
[Vessels 4]. The critical reader is therefore an element
inalienable to the dialectics of poetry; just as the ephebe is
to the precursor, so the critic is to the poem. The relations
of force that tie Hamlet, Shelley, Yeats, and Bloom, to myself
in a knotty matrix of misreaders can be wished away, but such a
wish would amount to a weak evasion of the challenge imposed upon
us by our cultural heritage.
6.2 Clinamen, or the Fall that Is a First Breath
What one in the rout
Of fire-born moods
Has fallen away?
"The Moods"
Wi th self -assured guile in the Council Scene, Claudius,
false father and king, declares,
And now, Laertes, what's the news with you?
You told us of some suit. What is't, Laertes?
You cannot speak of reason to the Dane,
And lose your voice. [I, ii, 42-45; p. 71]
Yet it is in the darker dread that he will never gain his voice
that, as a poet, Yeats begins--much like Hamlet, brooding and
silent in his "inky cloak" of grief for the dead father and of
protest against the false father and the weak and wayward mother;
and reduced to clever but ineffectual quips about being "too much
in the sun"; yet he will meet his fate ("My fate cries out," he
warns Horatio) in the voice and form of the ghost of the king his
father at midnight on the pLat f orrn;" When Yeats begins, he
5 The quotations are from Act I: ii, 77, p. 73; ii, 67, p. 72; and iv,
81, p , 88.
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begins by falling, falling away primarily from the voice of
Shelley. As I have shown in previous chapters, especially in
(4.5) and (5.2), Bornstein's Yeats and Shelley and Bloom's Yeats
argue--each one emphasizing certain aspects from his point of
view--that Yeats begins in Shelley. My own perspective on the
Shelley-Yeats dyad is that the youthful Yeats felt utterly
flooded by the voice of Shelley for many years. Indeed, in an
early poem, "Cuchulain's Fight with the Sea" (1892),6 Yeats has
cuchulain, his heroic anti-self, murder a youth who turns out to
be his son, and then wade into the sea to drown, doing battle,
sword in hand, "with the invulnerable tide" [70]. Beyond merely
reversing the Theban drama at the crossroads where Oedipus
murdered his father Laius, Yeats here plunges into the deep
ambivalence of his relation to Shelley. Is he the murderer or
the murdered? Is he Cuchulain, or is Shelley Cuchulain and he
the slain youth? Either way, Yeats was gasping for a breath of
his own in poem after poem. And he only gradually and
discontinuously achieved this breath, partly by invoking other
voices against that of Shelley.
Permutations of Oedipal conflict engrossed Yeats throughout
his career. Although my theme is Yeats-the-poet not Yeats-the-
playwright, I should mention that he published his own versions
of Oedipus Rex and Oedipus at Colonus; furthermore, that in his
late play, purgatory (1939), he has an old man--who as a youth
had killed his own father--murder his son "on the same
jackknife," as climax to his futile effort to liberate the ghost
of his mother from the wheel of eternal recurrence that always
6 Date of first publication, Yeats's Poems, p. 497.
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brings round the violence of his mother's wedding night, the
night that he was conceived. The drama of the rivalry of fathers
and sons, its horrors and its sublimities, is a deep and crucial
figure--a primal scene like Bloom's Scene of Instruction--of the
Yeatsian imagination.
In The Witch of Atlas Shelley presents a mythic vision of
the divine origins of love, pleasure, and desire fulfilled--the
Witch herself being an angelic prankster [line 665J who "would
write strange dreams upon the brain" [617J, and sow "sweet joy"
[651] into mortals. Hers is a world of pure creativity, of a
narcissism before any fall or catastrophe. More than an arcadian
myth, Shelley's poem writes the origins of Arcadia. But Yeats
can only begin in a fall away from such origins. His "Song of
the Happy Shepherd" (1885) is the first poem of his first book
of poems, called Crossways (1889), aptly titled if we read it as
an emblem of the crossroads where Yeats, a modern day Oedipus,
must struggle with an unknown father as an internalized voice.
The woods of Arcady are dead,
And over is their antique joy;
Of old the world on dreaming fed;
Grey Truth is now her painted toy. [41]
Unlike the voice of the tale of the Witch, the happy shepherd
sings a song of loss. In Shelley's myth, death is only an
irritant to be overcome at a whim by the Witch whose magic can
transport a dead body into a mode of being that is protected from
both life and death:
And there the body lay, age after age,
Mute, breathin~, beating, warm, and undecaying,
Like one asleep ln a green hermitage,
With gentle smiles about the eyelids playing,
And living in its dreams beyond the rage
Of death or life. [lines 609-614]
279
But unlike the happiness of Shelley's Witch, the happiness
of Yeats's shepherd is under great pressure. Like the Wi tch,
Yeats's shepherd practices a magical power to protect from life
and death, but his powers are less confident and effective, more
ambiguous and strained:
I must be gone: there is a grave
Where daffodil and lily wave,
And I would please the hapless faun,
Buried under the sleepy ground,
With mirthful songs before the dawn.
His shouting days with mirth were crowned;
And still I dream he treads the lawn,
Walking ghostly in the dew,
Pierced by my glad singing through,
My songs of old earth's dreamy youth:
But ah! she dreams not now; dream thou!
For fair are poppies on the brow:
Dream, dream, for this is also sooth. [42]
Whereas the enchantments of the divine Witch are fail-proof,
those of the earthly shepherd are not. That his glad singing may
pierce through death, to quicken the buried hapless faun, remains
but a song and a dream; yet this being all he has, he pours all
his enthusiasm into this action that is also a word (Bloom's
Hebraic davhar): "For words alone are certain good: / Sing,
then, for this is also sooth."
We see here an example of the swerve from origins that Bloom
calls "clinamen," the first of his six ratios of revision.
Feeling the absence of the father as a overwhelming presence of
voice, Yeats reacts against its presence while yet remaining
within its absence. He repeats, but with a difference, the
Shelleyan voice, gaining his first breath but at the cost of
continuing to sing the song of the father. For the happy
shepherd repeats the stance of the Witch in all but the certainty
of his magical powers. In relation to the precursor, Yeats falls
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or contracts, in order to begin. He thereby gains a first and
measured victory, the evasion of mere repetition, the evasion of
death-by-drowning in the voice of the precursor.
Some of Yeats's early work fails to gain even this first
evasion. For instance, in his Yeats and Shelley Bornstein
implies--and I here re-embed his argument in my own version of
Bloom's terms--that some of Yeats's early work merely repeats,
without a lifesaving difference, the stance and voice of
Shelley's Alastor; or the Spirit of Solitude. Concerning The
Seeker, The Island of Statues, and Mosada (poems which Yeats
rejected for inclusion in his Collected Poems), Bornstein points
out that "Yeats followed Shelley in treating love as a continuous
quest, ending in death and symbolized by star imagery, ... [a]
pattern most clearly [followed] in Alastor" [14]. Bloom also
shows the dependence of these works on Alastor especially [Yeats
52-55]; and like Bornstein, Bloom notes the dependence of The
Wanderings of Oisin upon a Shelleyan vision of the quest.
Bloom's most important comment in this context is, "In Oisin,
Yeats takes no more care to distance himself from his hero than
Shelley does in Alastor" [96].7
It is not my purpose here to trace the matrix of synapses
that link Shelley's Alastor, Yeats's rejected early poems (The
Seeker, The Island of Statues, Mosada), and his Oisin, Born-
stein's analysis of these links, and Bloom's revisionary comments
7 Bornstein identifies Oisin as much closer to Prometheus Unbound than
to Alastor or The Triumph of Life, pp. 24-25. Bloom on the other hand finds
the origins of ~ in Alastor which, more than Wordsworth's Excursion or
Keats's Endymion, is "a poem perfectly consistent with itself ... ; its
drastic solution contra naturam founded a tradition that Wordsworth and Keats
could not themselves foster" [92], the tradition of the poem of quest in which
"the Poet must die unfulfilled, his vision still evanescent" [91]. Bloom dis-
cusses Oisin among Alastor and its other precursor-poems in Yeats, pp. 83-103.
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on all of these to my own version of the Shelley-Yeats dyad,
although to do so would be an exemplary exercise in the
pragmatics of revisionary misreading. However, I do find it
crucial to draw out the importance of Bloom's observation that
"The Song of the Happy Shepherd" was "originally printed as an
Epilogue to both The Island of Statues and The Seeker" [54].
These two poems (along with Mosada) are so inundated with the
voice of Shelley that they have no breath or pneuma of their own,
which is surely why Yeats excluded them from his Collected Poems.
Yet the epilogue that he wrote for the poems does achieve the
fall or contraction from the precursor that is necessary for a
beginning breath. Thus "The Song of the Happy Shepherd" is
chosen by Yeats to begin his first book of lyric poems,
Crossways.
Before moving beyond "The Song of the Happy Shepherd" as a
crucial poem of clinamen in relation to Shelley, I should mention
that along with its companion poem, "The Sad Shepherd," it
performs a clinamen in relation to Milton when read against his
companion poems, "L'Allegroll and "II Penseroso." Both sets of
poems suggest the contrasting symmetry that links psychological
states. But the Yeats pair defends against the Milton pair by
making two significant turns. Firstly, Yeats's happy and sad
shepherds may seem to reflect Milton's mirthful one and his
contemplative, simply by virtue of symmetry, but both of Yeats's
shepherds sing within the visionary space opened by Milton's
contemplative, both rejecting the daylight naturalism of
IIL'Allegro." Instead, they both seek the darker compensations
of imaginative voice in the world of 1111 Penseroso.1I For both
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the happy and the sad shepherds would sing their stories to an
"echo-harbouring shell," thereby turning the world of experience
into its artistic negation, much like the contemplative, who
sings:
Or let my lamp at midnight hour
Be seen in some high lonely tow'r,
Where I may oft outwatch the Bear,
With thrice great Hermes, or unsphere
The spirit of plato to unfold
What worlds or what vast regions hold
The immortal mind that hath forsook
Her mansion in this fleshy nook. [85-92J
But secondly, Yeats's happy shepherd is closer to Milton's
contemplative than is his sad shepherd, since unlike the former
two, the sad shepherd finds no reward at all for his effort to
re-word his sorrow by singing into a shell:
Then he sang softly nigh the pearly rim;
But the sad dweller by the sea-ways lone
Changed all he sang to inarticulate moan
Among her wildering whirls, forgetting him. [43J
Milton's contemplative sings a high song of imaginative freedom,
a song rejecting the naturalism of the companion piece,
"L'Allegro"; and Yeats's happy shepherd, though he has broken
faith with the world and its "Grey Truth," keeps faith with the
power of the word and its dreams. But the sad shepherd has
fallen even from the power of his own voice, for when he sings
he hears only "inarticulate moan."e
8 In Yeats, pp. 8-10, Bloom discusses "L'Allegro" and "11 Penseroso,"
but in relation to a grand sweep of poetic tradition after Milton, rather than
as I have done in relation to Yeats's two early arcadian poems. As Bloom
there points out, in ,"The Phases of the Moon" Y~ats himself reminds us that
his precursors are M11ton and Shelley by aLl.udi nq , self-mockingly, to "11
Penseroso" and "Prince Athanase":
He has found, after the manner of his kind,
Mere images, chosen this place to live in
Because, it may be, of the candle-light
From the far tower where Milton's Platonist
Sat late, or Shelley's visionary prince:
The lonely tower that Samuel Palmer engraved,
An image of mysterious wisdom won by toil;
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6.3 Rose-Breath, or the Swerve from the Rose
Come near, come near, come near--Ah! leave me still
A little space for the rose-breath to fill!
"To the Rose upon the Rood of Time"
Despi te the beginning breath taken in "The Song of the Happy
Shepherd," it is only with Yeats's second and third books of
poems, The Rose (1893) and The Wind among the Reeds (1899), that
Yeats's agon with Shelley takes more emphatic form, more
aggressive turns of contraction and fall. These poems, more than
any others that Yeats was to write, constitute his own rather
occult version of Shelley's "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty":
The awful shadow of some unseen Power
Floats through unseen among us,--visiting
This various world with as inconstant wing
As summer winds that creep from flower to flower,--
Thy light alone--like mist o'er mountains driven,
Or music by the night-winds sent
Through strings of some still instrument,
Or moonlight on a midnight stream,
Gives grace and truth to life's unquiet dream.
[1-4, 32-36]
While Shelley derives his Platonic "Spirit of BEAUTY" from its
poetic source in Dante's Celestial Rose in the Paradiso, Yeats
combines Shelley's "unseen Power" with Dante's Rose, and gives
it the extra twist of his esoteric Platonism, to culminate in the
9
Rose of his own early poems.
And now he seeks in book or manuscript
What he shall never find. [268]
Mocking his own belatedness, Yeats here again anticipates Bloom. The argument
that links Mil ton and Shelley to Yea,ts and Bloom lends greater weight to my
comments on the trope of the tower ln (2.1) and to my discussion of Hermes
Trismegistus and Yeats's Platonism especially in chapter four.
As I have shown in chapter four (4.5) there is no better guide to the
occult vision, the alchemical a~d esoteric Platonism, of Yeats's early poetry
than Grossman's book on The Wlnd among the Reeds, Poetic Knowledge in the
Early Yeats (1969).
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I must distinguish my remarks in the discussion that follows
from Bornstein's discussion of "the Rose poems" and the relation
of Yeats's trope of the Rose to Shelley's Intellectual Beauty.1o
Bornstein's discussion, highly useful in its own way, balks at
engaging in a strong misreading of Yeats and Shelley. More
conventional than agonic, it is concerned with system and the
conscious manipulation of system by Yeats. He comes closest to
my theme when he writes that
Yeats shared Shelley's intent to express his vision of
Intellectual Beauty through a pattern of symbols. In
place of Shelley's star [discussed by Yeats as
Shelley's symbol of Intellectual Beauty in "The Philo-
sophy of Shelley's Poetry," Essays and Introductions,
pp. 88-89J he puts the Rose, with its Christian,
hermetic, national, and literary associations. [48J
Bornstein explains his view of these associations as conscious
borrowings, but he cannot explain the meaning of the subs titution
of Rose for Star as a purposefully evasive forgetting and
remembering, because that would take him into the darker area of
Bloomian transformations, a tapas that he still mainly avoids,
despite his increasing sympathies with Bloom, even in his later
book, Transformation of Romanticism in Yeats, Eliot, and Stevens
(1976) •
As his eyelids are splashed with the water of Paradise,
Dante says,
Splendour Divine, 0 thou through whom I saw
The lofty triumph of that Realm of truth,
Grant me the power to tell it as I saw it!
Supernal light is there, light which reveals
Creator unto all who are create,
Whose peace consists alone in seeing Him.
10 Before having read Bornstein's account, I wrote a work-in-progress
seminar paper articul,ating" my reading of t,he genealogy of the Rose and
Intellectual Beauty, t i tLed SeLf+Trans forrnatLons; Yeats's Stones and Roses."
285
It spreads into a figure circular,
So broad that its circumference would be
A girdle far too ample for the sun.
Mirrored in thousand steps and more, I saw
As many of us as have there returned
And if the lowest of the steps includes
Light so majestical, how great the breadth
Between the utmost petals of the Rose!
.
Into the yellow of th'eternal Rose,
Which wider spreads and wider in its grades
Successive, and exhales fragrance of praise
Unto that Sun which makes perpetual spring,
Beatrice drew me onward, like a man
Who, speechless, longs to speak ....
[canto XXX, lines 94-102, 110-114, 121-126]
"The courts of heaven this time assume the shape of a rose,
expanding leaf over leaf of candid lustre, spreading outwards
from the heart of gold to God who is its sun. ,,11 In Dante, the
beatific vision is an achieved eternal moment, but in the more
skeptical Shelley (as in the Wordsworth of the "Intimations" Ode)
the vision splendid is painfully fleeting, so that he must
dedicate poems like the "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty" to the
possibility of achieving such an eternal moment:
Spirit of BEAUTY, that dost consecrate
With thine own hues all thou dost shine upon
Of human thought or form,--where art thou gone?
Why dost thou pass away and leave our state,
This dim vast vale of tears, vacant and desolate?
[13-17]
But from Yeats's perspective as belated ephebe, Shelley's voice
is already the fullness of hymns and odes, Alastor, Prometheus
Unbound, Epipsychidion, and "Ode to the West Wind" being already
the "awful LOVELINESS" [line 71] that Yeats himself quests after.
That Yeats identified Dante's Celestial Rose with Shelley's
Intellectual Beauty should be clear from various perspectives,
11 symonds, An Introduction to the study of Dante, p. 193.
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despite the ambivalence of some of his comments.
short story called "Out of the Rose," he wrote:
In an early
After gazing a while towards the sun, he [an old
knight in rusted armorJ let the reins fall upon the
neck of his horse, and stretching out both arms
towards the west, he said, "0 Divine Rose of
Intellectual Flame, let the gates of thy peace be
opened to me at last!" [Mythologies 157J
Beyond this, Yeats used "Rose" in the titles of six early poems,
and in other poems he referred to "The Incorruptible Rose" [104J,
"the Immortal Rose" [107J, and so on; he published a book of
poems entitled The Rose, a book of short stories entitled The
Secret Rose (1897), and in the same year an "apocalyptic
,,12 t 't1 d "Rosa Alchenu.ca. "romance en 1 e His occult studies
included the Christian heresy of Rosicrucianism, in which the
Rose is a crucial symbol of transcendence and deification through
the mystical marriage of male and female, Cross and Rose.
Commenting on this powerful trope, Yeats had to mention Shelley,
even though his need to take possession of the trope made his
comments evasively ambivalent about the precursor:
the quality symbolised as The Rose differs from the
Intellectual Beauty of Shelley and of Spenser in that
I have imagined it as suffering with man and not as
something pursued and seen from afar ....
With a rhythm that still echoed Morris I prayed to
the Red Rose, to Intellectual Beauty.
[Yeats's Poems 495, 496J
Yeats's perception of the relation between his own esoteric trope
called "The Rose" and Shelley's more conventionally Platonic
trope called "Intellectual Beauty" tries but fails to conceal the
true nature of their relation. He says that unlike Shelley's
Intellectual Beauty, his Rose suffers with man, and he thereby
12 The phrase is Whitaker's, p. 38.
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turns what he takes to be a Platonic trope into his own heretical
Christian trope. But he forgets that Prometheus, as Shelley's
lyrical drama begins, is certainly a Christ-like Rose,
"crucified" upon a rock, yet destined for a redemptive
transcendental vision. Similarly, his Rose is not pursued from
afar, says Yeats, and he thereby turns Shelley's "Spirit of
BEAUTY" into an external experience. But Shelley's trope gains
all its power by evoking an internal experience, all the more
painful for having now fled. The Poet who is the protagonist of
Alastor is driven to his death only because he is true to a quest
that begins in a visionary dream--most inward of human
experiences:
A vision on his sleep
There came, a dream of hopes that never yet
Had flushed his cheek. He dreamed a veiled maid
Sate near him, talking in low solemn tones.
Her voice was like the voice of his own soul
Heard in the calm of thought; its music long,
Like woven sounds of streams and breezes, held
His inmost sense suspended in its web
Of many-coloured woof and shifting hues.
Knowledge and truth and virtue were her theme,
And lofty hopes of divine liberty,
Thoughts the most dear to him, and poesy,
Herself a poet. [149-161]
The true distance between Yeats's Rose and Shelley's
Intellectual Beauty--the mention of Morris is an evasion, for he
cannot match the influence that Shelley has over Yeats's voice--
is not just his contraction from the Platonic to the occult, for
both suggest powerfully internal experiences of the Divine. The
true distance is that Yeats desires yet fears the voice of the
He must be possessed by the Rose if he is to achieveRose.
divination, the voice of an eternal; yet he must not die the
death of drowning in the voice of the Rose, the death of merely
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repeating the precursor. He must struggle, at the cost of a
wound like wrestling Jacob, to achieve a blessing that is his own
pneuma, his own spark or breath. And as we shall see, the soul
out of his soul, the epipsyche, will be crucial to the quest for
the blessing, a blessing intuited from a voice that is "like the
voice of his soul/Heard in the calm of thought."
Yeats's anxiety to perform the fall from Shelley that is
also the stealing of some of the power of the voice of the
precursor is acutely felt in "To the Rose upon the Rood of Time"
(1892) ,13 a poem whose title alludes to Yeats's Rosicrucianism,
and the poem which introduces the book entitled The Rose:
Red Rose, proud Rose, sad Rose of all my days!
Corne near me, while I sing the ancient ways:
Cuchulain battling with the bitter tide;
Corne near, that no more blinded by man's fate,
I find under the boughs of love and hate,
In all poor foolish things that live a day,
Eternal beauty wandering on her way.
Corne near, come near, come near--Ah, leave me still
A little space for the rose-breath to fill!
Lest I no more hear common things that crave.
[65]
"Rose-breath" is the crucial trope here. It may seem to be an
emanation from the precursor-as-Rose, but read agonicly, it is
Yeats's desperate defensive trope against drowning in the Rose.
He still quests after an immortal, internal, and (for him)
esoteric voice--
But seek alone to hear the strange things said
By God to the bright hearts of those long dead,
And learn to chaunt a tongue men do not know . .
13 Date of first publication, in The Countess Kathleen and Various
Legends and Lyrics, Yeats's Poems, p. 496.
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--yet he prays that he may remain in touch with the cries of
mortals, with
common things that crave;
The weak worm hiding down in its small cave,
The field-mouse running by me in the grass,
And heavy mortal hopes that toil and pass ..
This poem shows Yeats to be wounded nearly to death in pleading
to be engulfed by the divine tropes of the precursor. He gains
the poetic blessing of rose-breath, but only through the process
of misreading the precursor to make him appear to be less
concerned with "common things that crave" or the "suffering of
man," and more concerned with the illusory pursuit of things
"seen from afar" instead of with the occult voice of a God who
speaks to "the bright hearts of those long dead."
The struggle for the rose-breath is emblematical of Yeats's
first swerve away from origins--a falling away that he enacts
many times in his early poetry, and that may be seen as the very
II d " (1893) :14theme of The Moo s
Time drops in decay,
Like a candle burnt out,
And the mountains and woods
Have their day, have their day;
What one in the rout
Of fire-born moods
Has fallen away? [90]
The weariness, indeed the utter exhaustion, suggested by this
poem manifests the energy required for poets to contract into a
fall that will free them, even if temporarily and marginally,
from the voice of a precursor. This exhaustion or loss of breath
may imply that the poet has reached the limit of his contraction
and may be approaching a new dialectical crossing. In Yeats's
14 Date of first publication, Yeats's Poems, p. 508.
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case the crossing out of the first contraction of clinamen, and
into what Bloom calls the new restitution of "tessera" or the
second ratio of revision, took place prior to "The Moods" on at
least one occasion. While the whole of The Wind among the Reeds
(to which "The Moods" belongs) may be an occult fall from the
voice of Shelley, Yeats had already created for himself another
voice, another way to write a poem, by writing "The Lake Isle of
Innisfree" (1890).
6.4 Tessera, or the New Fullness
And no more turn aside and brood
Upon love's bitter mystery.
"Who Goes with Fergus?"
Bornstein has insight fully observed that "The Song of
Wandering Aengus" (a poem from The Wind among the Reeds) "is an
Irish Alastor in miniature." For like the Poet-protagonist of
Alastor, Yeats's Irish Aengus "has a vision of an ideal maiden
in a forest by a stream; furthermore, as in Shelley's poem, she
'h ,,15then van~s es. By virtue of being "an Irish Alastor," the
poem performs a clinamen in relation to Alastor I with Yeats
repressing quotation while repeating Shelley's vision.
Intriguingly, the first Yeatsian crossing from clinamen to
tessera, from contraction to completion or restitution, is
achieved when Yeats uses Wordsworth against Shelley. For "The
Lake Isle of Innisfree" is as much an Irish "Tintern Abbey," a
15 Yeats and Shelley, p. 56. In "The Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry" in
Essays and Introductions, Yeats refers to Alastor as the poem's protagonist.
Bornstein uses the symbol "Alas tor" to refer to Yeats's mistaken identifi-
cation of the name in the title with "the nameless youth of Shelley's Alastor"
[29-30]. For Alastor properly refers to the spirit pursued by the Poet, the
nameless youth, rather than to the youth himself. I add that Yeats's mistake
amounts to a classic example of what Bloom calls poetic misprision.
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clinamen or swerve from "Tintern Abbey," as it is a completion
or even a fulfillment of Alastor.
In The Anxiety of Influence Bloom refers to tessera as "a
completing link," and observes that
tessera represents any later poet's attempt to
persuade himself (and us) that the precursor's Word
would be worn out if not redeemed as a newly fulfilled
and enlarged Word of the ephebe. [67]
In A Map of Misreading clinamen is paired with tessera (just as
the third ratio I "kenosis," is with the fourth, "daemonization,"
and the fifth, "askesis," with the sixth, "apophrades"). The
impression therefore received from Anxiety, that the strong poet
simply passes through the six phases, is revised and replaced
with an impression of a dialectical crossing from first to
second, from third to fourth, and from fifth to sixth, each being
a crossing from the ethos or fate of a contraction to the pathos
or power of a restitution, and with each successive pair increas-
ing the strain of the dialectical pattern. In his Wallace
stevens book, Bloom gives names to each crossing and elaborates
the purpose of each. The first is "the Crossing of Election."
Here a poet "faces the death of the creative gift and seeks an
answer to the question Am I still a poet." The second is "the
Crossing of Solipsism" (in Agon called "the Sublime Crossing") .
Here a poet "struggles with the death of love, and tries to
answer the fearful query Am I capable of loving another besides
myself." The third is "the Crossing of Identification." Here
a poet suffers a "confrontation with mortality, with total death,
and the prohibited instinct is the drive toward death" [Wallace
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Stevens 403]. In A Map of Misreading Bloom illustrates the
first crossing in these terms:
When the latecomer initially swerves (clinamen) from
his poetic father, he brings about a contraction or
withdrawal of meaning from the father. The
answering movement, antithetical to this primary, is
the link called tessera, a completion that is also an
opposi tion, or restorer of some of the degrees-of-
difference between ancestral text and the new poem.
[97]
Just as some of the key attributes of clinamen are limitation,
contraction, swerve, and fall, some of the crucial character-
istics of tessera are restoration, completion, reversal, and
fulfillment.
Yet even as early as Poetry and Repression as well as later
in Ruin the Sacred Truths and in various essays collected in
Poetics of Influence (1988), tessera as a term is dropped in
favor of "figura." This allows Bloom to attack what is surely
his least favorite ratio. For figura, as he uses it, is the
trope that lays b(v~1Z.the illusion that the New Testament is a
fulfillment of the Old Testament. In the chapter called "Shelley
and His Precursors" in Poetry and Repression--wi thout linking his
discussion to his own trope of tessera yet using the same figures
that describe tessera--Bloom describes the illusion of figura as
part of "a basic principle of poetic misprision":
No later poet can be the fulfillment of any earlier
poet. He can be the reversal of the precursor, or the
deformation of the precursor, but whatever he is, to
revise is not to fulfill. [88, italics removed]
16 The leap from a contraction to a restitution is described, in A Map
of Misreading and Poetry and Repression, as a "substitution." But by
increasingly associating this crossing or leap with the Kabbalistic "breaking
of the vessels" and later with Gnostic evasion and catastrophe creation, Bloom
revises his own dialectic which later becomes the Gnostic dialectical triad
of negation, evasion (or freedom), and extravagance that I have referred to
earlier, in (1.10), (3.5), and (4.8).
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Later, in Ruin the Sacred Truths, Bloom attacks the critical
notion that Dante's Commedia is a fulfillment of Virgil's Aeneid,
and he likewise excoriates the Christian version of figura in
which,
Instead of
we get the
Testament,
Testament.
Saint Paul
the Hebrew Bible of J, Jeremiah, and Job,
captive work, the Old or indeed senescent
considerably less vital than the New
The Hebrew Bible becomes the letter, while
and Saint John become the spirit. [42]
By re-seeing tessera as the trope of figura, Bloom exposes the
bad faith hidden in the Christian tropes of Old and New
Testaments, which he rightly renames the Original and Belated
17
Testaments. We might therefore call figura the illusion of
tessera. Bloom also uses tessera to describe derisively the link
that Lacan made in his work to Freud. Ironically, however,
Bloom's work itself might be seen, not only as the perversely
complex revision of Yeats that I have argued mainly in chapter
five, but also as a completion or fulfillment of Freud in the
.area of creativity theory.13
17 Poetics of Influence, pp. 387-403. It is precisely the view that the
spirit of the New Testament fulfills the letter of the Old that Susan
Handelman strongly criticizes in "Escape from Textuality: The Fulfiller of
Signs," a chapter from The Slayers of Moses wh~ch I referred to in (4.6) and
(5.2). In various late essays in Bloom's Poetlcs of Influence, a collection
of articles edited by John Hollander, Bloom continues his assault on figura,
especially as it relates to Christian revisionism of the Torah and the TalmUd.
In effect, tessera or figura here becomes a trope for the misreading that we
must call Pauline Christian anti-Semitism.
18 Much of the fourth chapter of Agon, "Freud and the Sublime: A
Catastrophe Theory of Creativity," is devoted to fending off Lacan as a useful
author within Bloom's field of Freudian poetics. "In tribute to Lacan," says
Bloom "Lacan in particular has uncovered Freud as the greatest theorist we
have ~f what I would call the necessity of misreading" [92]. But he goes on
to say that "any theory of artis,tic creativity that wishes to use Freud must
depart from the Freudlan letter In order to develop the Freudian spirit [this
is clearly the trope of tessera or figura], which in some sense is already the
achievement of Lacan and his school, though they have had no conspicuous
success in speculating upon art" [97-98]. I have dealt with the issue of
Bloom on Lacan at greater length in "Harold Bloom in/and History."
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6.5 Yeatsian Tessera and the Music of the Heart
[We] had been savagely undone
Were it not that Love upon the cry
Of a most ridiculous little bird
Tore from the clouds his marvelous moon.
, "A Memory of Youth"
Returning to our consideration of Yeats, "Tint ern Abbey,"
and Alastor, it is my argument that, in "The Lake Isle of
Innisfree," Yeats uses a clinamen from the Wordsworth poem to
defend against the Shelley poem. The relation to Shelley is a
tessera because "Innisfree" may be seen as a reversal that
restores the potential of Alastor. Indeed, from the point of
view of "Innisfree," Alastor is a divine failure. The nameless
youth or Poet of Alastor pursues his dream or gnostic quest--
thus driven
By the bright shadow of that lovely dream,
Beneath the cold glare of that desolate night,
Through tangled swamps and deep precipitous dells,
Startling with careless step the moonlight snake .
[lines 232-236]
--but he achieves in the end only a sublime death. While just
such a death is the occult prayer of almost every poem in The
Wind among the Reeds, the earlier poem, "Innisfree," seeks to
fulfill Shelley's Alastor by showing how a nameless youth would
achieve a dream:
I will arise and go now, and go to Innisfree,
And a small cabin build there, of clay and wattles made:
Nine bean-rows will I have there, a hive for the honey-bee,
And live alone in the bee-loud glade. [74]
At Innisfree all glorious and vain pursuit --whether that of
Yeats's recently completed and longest poem, The Wanderings of
Oisin,19 or that of the Poet-youth of Alastor--comes to rest, as
19 Begun in 1886, ~ was completed in 1887, while "Innisfree" was
composed in 1888; Yeats's Poems, pp. 483 and 499.
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Yeats achieves his first intuition of what later becomes known
as "Unity of Being."
And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes
dropping slow,
Dropping from the veils of the morning to where
the cricket sings;
There midnight's all a glimmer, and noon a purple glow,
And evening full of the linnet's wings.
The delicacy of the images disguises the utter strength of
Yeats's lying against time in these lines. For the fullness of
the perfection of nature here coincides with the peace that is
the speaker's; combine this with the formal perfection of the
verse, and we are left with the impression that time has
stopped--not in the death of a youthful hero who has failed in
his quest, but in a new life beyond death and time, a life fully
at one with self and nature.
But it is precisely at this point that Yeats combines his
tessera vis a vis Shelley with his clinamen regarding Wordsworth.
The bard of Cumbria finds his voice on the banks of the river Wye
in listening to the rolling music of its waters--
Five years have past; five summers, with the length
Of five long winters! and again I hear
These waters, rolling from their mountain-springs
With a soft inland murmur. [1-4]
--and this music of the waters becomes the occasion of the memory
of "The still, sad music of humanity," and the memory of
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things. [91, 94-102]
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The "presence" that disturbs Wordsworth possesses Yeats as an
absence, and he gains a measure of release from the power of that
absence over him by splitting his Being in order to achieve its
Unity. (Recall that much later Yeats will write the antithetical
knowledge or gnosis of Crazy Jane, "For nothing can be sole or
whole I That has not been rent" [375J.) Unlike Wordsworth who
is present at the Wye, Yeats is standing "on the roadway,"
directing his Being (thoughts, memories, desires, all at once)
to its moment of Irish perfection at Innisfree. While
Wordsworth's moment of perfection involves, even requires his
physical presence at the Wye, Yeats achieves his musical moment
of glory only at the more strenuous cost of his physical absence
from the lake isle in Lough Gill near his hometown of Sligo:
I will arise and go now, for always night and day
I hear lake water lapping with low sounds by the shore;
While I stand on the roadway or on the pavements grey,
I hear it in the deep heart's core. [74J
The Yeatsian clinamen or creative correction of Wordsworth's
vision is to claim that the music of the deep heart's core is a
deeper, a more sublime music, than the still, sad music of
humanity. Both poets hear the heart's music in the music of the
waters, whether it be in the lapping of the lake water or in the
rolling of the river waters. But being a belated Romantic, Yeats
must suffer a more severe dialectic than Wordsworth, for the
Irish bard must negate the white noise of his presence in London
in order to achieve the poetic sublimities of his vision at
Innisfree.
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As I noted above, Bloom contends that "poems become immortal
when their descendants in turn engender vital poems. ,,20 From
"Tintern Abbey" through "Innisfree" to Patrick Kavanagh's
modified Shakespearean sonnet "Canal Bank Walk," I read a line
of descent. The apostrophe that is also the final quatrain and
couplet of the sonnet bears witness to Kavanagh's Wordsworthian
passion, a passion that is mediated through the Yeatsian lyricism
of "Innisfree" as well as through the occult presences that
enrapture and transfigure the Yeats of The Wind among the Reeds,
despi te Kavanagh's famous (if self-deluded) derision of all
. 21
things Yeatslan:
o unworn world enrapture me, enrapture me in a web
Of fabulous grass and eternal voices by a beech,
Feed the gaping need of my senses, give me ad lib
To pray unselfconsciously with overflowing speech
For this soul needs to be honoured with a new dress woven
From green and blue things and arguments
22
that cannot be proven.
While Wordsworth's rolling river waters falloff into the
lapping lake waters of Innisfree (and these waters further
20 Misreading, p. 200.
21 In her essay on Kavanagh in Tradition and Influence in Anglo-Irish
Poetry (1989), Antoinette Quinn notes that "Kavanagh explicitly opposed his
'parish myth regarding literature' to the 'myth of Ireland as a spiritual
entity' which he attributed to Yeats in the first instance" [112] . And
considering Yeats's influence on Kavanagh, she goes on to say:
The most formidable of Kavanagh's Literary Revival antagonists
was, of course, Yeats, whose poetry he could neither comprehend
nor ignore. He was obsessed with the older poet and over and
over again attempted to assess and dismiss him but Yeats resisted
his parochial interrogation and remained impervious to his every
polemical ploy. Kavanagh's attitude to Yeats from first to last
was one of reluctant admiration. He had to content himself with
attempting to demolish the Yeatsian academy since for him Yeats
was the inventor of the Irish national literary myth and as the
instigator of the Literary Revival was responsible for all its
bogus works and pomps. [114]
If nothing else, Quinn's remarks show Bloom's subterranean influence on
critics, and this coming from a volume overtly antagonistic to Bloom. Again
I refer the reader to my published review of this volume.
22 collected Poems, p. 150. In his essay on Kavanagh in Tradition and
Influence in Anglo-Irish Poetry, Seamus Heaney quotes the first line here as:
"enrapture me, encapture me ... "; p. 184.
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contract to the waters of the canal that Kavanagh walks along),
the waters that threaten the voice of the ephebe will return with
greater force as Yeats begins to feel the influence of the sea
surrounding Hamlet's Elsinore, the sea that, despite Horatio's
warning, Hamlet dares in order that he may hear the voice of the
ghost of his father:
What if it tempt you toward the flood, my lord,
Or to the dreadful summit of the cliff
That beetles o'er his base into the sea,
And there assume some other, horrible form,
Which might deprive your sovereignty of reason
And draw you into madness? [I, iv, 69-74; p. 88]
But before going on to discuss Hamlet-in-Yeats, the story of
Yeatsian tessera needs more elaboration.
6.6 The Reversal of the Curse
What could have made her peaceful wi th a mind
That nobleness made simple as a fire,
With beauty like a tightened bow, a kind
That is not natural in an age like this,
Being high and solitary and most stern?
"No Second Troy"
As he leaves behind the occult beauties of The Rose and
especially of The Wind among the Reeds, as he remakes himself in
the poems of books called In the Seven Woods (1904) and The Green
Helmet and Other Poems (1910), Yeats begins again the project of
attempting to fulfill Shelley, a project begun at Innisfree and
now extended in poems like the stately and composed "Adam's
Curse" (1902) and the noble and taut "No Second Troy" (1908).23
23 I shall have space to discuss in detail here only "Adam's Curse."
However, by way of summary I can say that "No Second Troy" enacts a tessera
of Epipsychidion by reversing and completing Shelley's vision of womanly
beauty. Whereas Shelley's ep~psyche appears as a near-bodiless spirit--"An
image of some bright Eternity; / A shadow of some golden dream" [115-116)--the
soul out of Yeats's soul in "No Second Troy" is an image of beauty and
nobility fused ineluctably with tension, energy, and violence:
Why should I blame her that she filled my days
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"Adam's Curse" is Yeats's first truly strong love poem, the
precursor of one of his greatest poems, "Among School Children,"
and as a meditation on the theme of love, its Shelleyan precursor
is Epipsychidion. It may be no mere accident that like
Epipsychidion "Adam's Curse" is a poem of pentameter couplets--a
rare formal pattern in Yeats's work. The dialogue between the
two poems reveals their mutual importance. The Shelley poem
endows the Yeats poem with the very vision of Love that the Yeats
poem desires and mourns for, while the Yeats poem seems to be
consoling itself, saying to the Shelley poem--this is what a poem
on "the name of love" must now become, a poem that seeks to
transcend Original Sin by voicing labor's transfiguration into
beauty. It is as though "Adam's Curse" were saying to
Epipsychidion--you are beautiful because you have evaded Original
Sin, while I am beautiful because I have transformed Original
Sin, and I thereby fulfill your letter with my spirit.
The audacity here of the belated poem can be seen when we
realize the reversal that Yeats has attempted. Despite Shelley's
clear allusion to the "eternal Curse" as the condition or place
of his voicing, Epipsychidion presents to Yeats's memory a voice
and a vision of "the eternal Moon of Love," the fullness of love
before any catastrophe or fall into nature; furthermore, Yeats
manages to compose a poem on the very subj ect of the fall,
"Adam's Curse," which refuses to be simply a fall or clinamen
from the Shelley poem, and which instead makes the dialectical
crossing from limitation to restitution simply and effectively
With misery, or that she would of late
Have taught to ignorant men most violent ways .... [185)
See also the epigraph for this section.
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by transforming Adam's fall into a new Gnostic pleroma or
fullness of voice--even if this voice must end by being "As
weary-hearted as [a] hollow moon."
Whereas the nameless Poet-youth of Alastor dies in a vain
if noble quest after "the voice of his own soul" [line 153] which
appears to him in a dream, the voice that speaks in Epipsychidion
pursues not a dream, but a woman whose very presence is felt as
the fulfillment and source of his quest, each being the soul out
of the other's soul:
Sweet Benediction in the eternal Curse!
Veiled Glory of this lampless Universe!
Thou Moon beyond the clouds! Thou living Form
Among the Dead! Thou Star above the Storm!
Thou Wonder, and thou Beauty, and thou Terror!
Thou Harmony of Nature's art! Thou Mirror
In whom, as in the splendour of the Sun,
All Shapes look glorious which thou gazest on!
I never thought before my death to see
Youth's vision thus made perfect. Emily,
I love thee ...
How beyond refuge I am thine. Ah me!
I am not thine: I am part of thee.
See where she stands! ...
An image of some bright Eternity;
A shadow of some golden dream; a Splendour
Leaving the third sphere pilotless; a tender
Reflection of the eternal Moon of Love.
We shall become the same, we shall be one
Spirit within two frames, oh! wherefore two?
One passion in twin-hearts, which grows and grew,
Till like two meteors of expanding flame,
Those spheres instinct with it become the same,
Touch, mingle, are transfigured; ever still
Burning, yet ever inconsumable ....
[25-32,41-43, 51-52, 112, 115-118, 573-579]
Clearly, Plato's Symposium on Love (which Yeats will later allude
to in "Among School Children") and Neoplatonic visions of Love,
such as Dante's vision of Beatrice, influence Shelley's grand
trope of the soul out of one's soul, but I am here more concerned
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with how "Adam's Curse" receives Shelley's influence. In this
context, the trope of the moon in both poems is important, as we
shall see presently.
Even as "Adam's Curse" enacts a tessera in relation to
Epipsychidion, as a crisis lyric it also moves through the six
dialectical phases of revision. In order to begin, it takes the
ironic stance of clinamen towards its origins. Rather than
making love through a poem, as Shelley's theme seems in large
part to be, "Adam's Curse" takes for its theme the ironies of the
troubled relationship between labor and beauty as seen in the act
of love that is the writing of a poem:
We sat together at one summer's end,
That beautiful mild woman, your close friend,
And you and I, and talked of poetry.
I said, "A line will take us hours maybe;
Yet if it does not seem a moment's thought,
Our stitching and unstitching has been naught.
Better go down upon your marrow-bones
And scrub a kitchen pavement, or break stones
Like a pauper, in all kinds of weather;
For to articulate sweet sounds together
Is to work harder than all these, and yet
Be thought an idler by the noisy set
Of bankers, schoolmasters, and clergymen
The martyrs call the world." [132]
Clearly Yeats is frustrated by the white noise that is passively
accepted by martyrs as though it were the world. To articulate
sweet sounds together may be an active negation of the noisy
world, but it is also to be thought an idler--ironic since it is
experienced as the supreme labor. Unexpectedly, the speaker who
replies is not the poet's Muse, the figure of Maud Gonne
(Beatrice to Yeats's Dante), but her "close friend.,,24
24 Jeffares reports that she is Maud Gonne' s sis ter, Mrs. Kathleen
Pilcher; Yeats's Poems, p. 527.
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And thereupon
That beautiful mild woman for whose sake
There's many a one shall find out all heartache
On finding that her voice is sweet and low
Replied, "To be born woman is to know--
Although they do not talk of it at school--
That we must labour to be beautiful."
Here the poem moves dialectically from clinamen to tessera,
from its initial ironies to the difficul t antithetical completion
of labor in beauty and in love. It is not a pleasant lesson to
learn that, like poetic beauty, a woman's beauty is not simply
spontaneous (Wordsworth) or unselfconscious (Kavanagh), but is
the result of labor. Yeats realizes, however, that what links
poetic beauty to womanly beauty is not only labor but also love,
the love that may be the drive of labor itself. Yet the human
condition being fallen, even this love "seems an idle trade
enough." Now the poet enters the more severe contraction of
kenosis or self-isolation, for he wounds himself by wounding the
poetic tradition out of which he comes, appearing now to agree
with "the noisy set / Of bankers, schoolmasters, and clergymen"
whom he had earlier dismissed:
I said, "It's certain there is no fine thing
Since Adam's fall but needs much labouring.
There have been lovers who thought love should be
So much compounded of high courtesy
That they would sigh and quote with learned looks
Precedents out of beautiful old books;
Yet now it seems an idle trade enough. [132-133]
Adam's fall has already made labor inevitable, but in appearing
to accept that the practice of poetic love-making is itself an
idle trade, the poet inflicts a wound upon himself, silencing the
would-be lover in him.
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Yet here the poem suddenly crosses from a self-emptying
kenosis to a daemonic sublime, as it rises to its true theme, its
meditation on Love as a dying ember and as a hollow moon:
We sat grown quiet at the name of lovej
We saw the last embers of daylight die,
And in the trembling blue-green of the sky
A moon, worn as if it had been a shell
Washed by time's waters as they rose and fell
About the stars and broke in days and years.
Though the poem says that it is time's waters that rose and fell,
its antithetical meaning is that its own sublime voice rises and
falls despite time's waters. But nothing is got for nothing, and
here the Yeatsian Sublime, perhaps the first true instance of it
since "Innisfree," is purchased at the cost of troping itself as
a worn moon, hollowed out by time's waters. The poem moves into
the fifth phase, the limitation called askesis. Love, and
therefore woman's beauty, and also poetry are worn by time's
waters, compounding the defeat of Adam's fall into labor. The
Muse-beloved, who has remained silent throughout, and the poet-
lover approach spiritual union via the perspectivizing metaphor
of "the old high way of love":
I had a thought for no one's but your ears:
That you were beautiful and that I strove
To love you in the old high way of lovej
That it had all seemed happy, and yet we'd grown
As weary-hearted as that hollow moon. [133]
A metaphor in Bloom's terms is a limitation or contraction
because it tropes us into infinitely reversible perspectivi-
zations of inside and outside. It "condenses through
resemblance. ,,25 Here, "the old high way of love" is felt as an
externality, something outside, and thus as a limitation. But
25 A Map of Misreading, p. 101 .
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in relation to Love, Beauty, and Poetry, the hollow moon is not
a metaphor. Rather the hollow moon is a transumption in relation
to Love, Beauty, and Poetry, for it makes them seem late, worn,
and hollow, the victims of time's waters, while it makes itself
seem early, more primeval and more resilient than such labor-torn
and worn Shelleyan figures as Love, Beauty, and Poetry. The poem
therefore ends by crossing from the limitations of askesis to the
restitutions of the transumptive mode called apophrades. Even
though Yeats's moon is "worn as if it had been a shell," it is
an image that stands before and against time, an image that will
resist time's rage and ravage.
In relation to Epipsychidion, its "Moon beyond the clouds"
and its "Moon of Love," Yeats's hollow moon and his poem as a
whole, therefore, perform a reversal of the fall or curse
afflicting Shelley's poem. Seen from the perspective of "Adam's
Curse," Epipsychidion operates the illusion of creating a Divine
or Intellectual Moon prior to any fall or redemption, whereas to
itself "Adam'S Curse" antithetically completes the Shelley poem
by accepting the wounds of the fall and redeeming them in the
transfigurative power of his own poetic word. Yeats thus com-
pletes a Crossing of Election in which he assures the life of his
own poetic gift, but only at the cost of a new wound. The
movement of Shelley's soul out of the soul is upward and outward,
but the movement of Yeats's self-wounding voice is downward and
inward, like "A Dialogue of Self and Soul" as we saw in chapter
four. As a result, in this poem Yeats no longer simply swerves
or falls away from Shelley's Rose of Intellectual Beauty, for the
soul out of Yeats's soul brings him not a fallen vision of "the
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eternal Moon of Love," but rather a vision of a hollow moon that
appears to restore or complete Shelley's vision by redeeming it,
but only at the cost of a great weariness and hollowness.
However, as Yeats continues to pressurize his own past work
and the tradition itself, he begins to transform great weariness
into greater strength. Just as the trope of the Rose suggests
the Yeatsian clinamen from Shelley's Intellectual Beauty, and
just as the trope of the hollow moon in "Adam's Curse" suggests
Yeats's attempt to restore or fulfill a lack hidden within his
Rose and Shelley's Beauty, so we will find that the trope of the
Moon gains strength in Yeats's career-poem, especially when what
he calls "the phases of the moon" comes to dominate his
"daemonization" or Counter-Sublime to Shelley. But daemonization
is a second restitution of pathos, and its story will follow the
story of a second contraction into fate, the story of kenosis.
6.7 Kenosis, the Wound that Empties the Self
"I would but find what's there to find,
Love or deceit."
"It was the mask engaged your mind,
And after set your heart to beat,
Not what's behind."
"The Mask"
Having returned home after hearing that his father was
murdered, Laertes arrives at Elsinore only to find that his
",,4/
sister has gone mad, and he address" her as, "0 rose of May, /
Dear maid, kind sister, sweet Ophelia!" [IV, v, 159-160; p. 168]
As Yeats enters a new phase of his career-as-poem, the third
ratio that Bloom calls kenosis, Yeats begins to feel and give
voice to Shakespearean influences, notably influences from
Hamlet, and influences not always having their source only in
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Hamlet himself. Ophelia too, the rose of May, will play her role
in breathing a little life and madness into our poet; but firstly
to Bloom's theory of poetic misprision.
The Anxiety of Influence describes kenosis in terms of the
purposeful discontinuity of ephebe from precursor, resulting in
the appearance of a mutual emptying. Defensive "undoing" and
"self-isolation" are key terms here. As Bloom puts it,
kenosis is a revisionary act in which an "emptying" or
"ebbing" takes place in relation to the precursor.
This "emptying" is a liberating discontinuity, and
makes possible a kind of poem that a simple repetition
of the precursor's afflatus or godhood could not
allow. "Undoing" the precursor's strength in oneself
serves also to isolate the self from the precursor's
stance, and saves the latecomer-poet from becoming
taboo in and to himself. [87-88, italics removed]
In A Map of Misreading, as I have mentioned, kenosis is paired
in dialectical opposition to daemonization, the fourth ratio.
These two together therefore make up the second movement from
limitation to restitution. But this pair constitute a more
drastic revision of self and precursor than the simple swerve of
clinamen and its antithetical completion in tessera, for in this
pair we follow a movement from the emptying out of the self to
the heights and depths of what Bloom calls the ephebe's Counter-
Sublime. Looking ahead I note that, in the Yeatsian kenosis,
there is an undoing of the self that revises Hamlet in order to
isolate Shelley.
The Yeatsian kenosis begins with the collapse of his few
efforts at the fulfillment of Shelley. His tessera is a
relatively weak phase so that even a poem as strong as "Adam's
Curse" is in fact much weaker than the precursor poem, Epi-
psychidion, that it bravely seeks to complete antithetically--
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thus, the weariness and hollowness of the moon, the trope that
attempts the tessera. Beyond "Adam's Curse" and "No Second Troy"
there are very few canonical poems that contribute to In the
Seven Woods and The Green Helmet and other Poems. What strong
poems there are in these two books from the early middle period--
poems such as "The Folly of Being Comforted" (1902), "Never Give
All the Heart" (1905),26 "The Fascination of What's Difficult"
(1909-1910) which I quoted in chapter three (3.0), and "The Mask"
(1910)--all tend to be poems of the third phase, kenosis, rather
than of tessera. For example, in both "The Folly of Being
Comforted" and "Never Give All the Heart," Yeats isolates himself
not only from the precursor's visions of the epipsyche (both his
own and Shelley's), but he also alienates himself even from his
own "heart" which must learn the lesson that love is ambivalence,
i.e., that the Muse who is promiscuous will nevertheless still
be loved:
"Because of that great nobleness of hers
The fire that stirs about her, when she stirs,
Burns but more clearly." [130]
In the face of a kind of white noise felt as the beloved's
betrayal, the poet's only recourse is a self-isolation that both
absorbs and resists this worldly event by isolating even the
poet's own heart:
He that made this knows all the cost,
For he gave all his heart and lost. [131]
Similarly, "The Fascination of What's Difficult" admits that this
fascination and its white noise
26 1902 and 1905 are dates of first publication according to Jeffares,
Yeats's Poems, p. 526.
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Has dried the sap out of my veins, and rent
Spontaneous joy and natural content
Out of my heart. [188]
Here, the poet's sense of self has been so reduced to the dross
of existence that he feels "As though [he] dragged road metal."
"The Mask" so empties the self that only lying surfaces or traces
are to be seen, no guarantees beneath:
"Put off that mask of burning gold
With emerald eyes."
"0 no, my dear, you make so bold
To find if hearts be wild and wise,
And yet not cold." [189]
Despite these fine yet intermittent examples, the Yeatsian
collapse of the self into kenosis truly establishes itself as a
phase in some of the canonical poems of two books of the middle
period, Responsibilities (1914) and The Wild Swans at Coole
(1919) • In these two books the Yeatsian imagination walks a
barren and bitter landscape, like that of "Lines Written in
Dejection" (1915)--
When have I last looked on
The round green eyes and the long wavering bodies
Of the dark leopards of the moon?
The holy centaurs of the hills are vanished;
I have nothing but the embittered sun;
Banished heroic mother moon and vanished. . . .
[249]
Such remarkable self-emptyings only prepare the way for Yeats's
second poetic crossing, his shooting of the gap from kenosis to
the counter-Sublime of daemonization.
It is two of the poems in the cluster of elegiac poems on
Robert Gregory that most interestingly delineate the complex
revisionary matrix linking Yeats to his own prior poems, to
Shelley, and to Hamlet. There is a sense in which all strong
poems are strong because they quest after the divination of the
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poet, seeking intimations of immortali ty that will carry the poet
beyond word and world. But this is acutely true for elegies or
poems in the elegiac mode. Shelley's Adonais, his elegy for John
Keats, stands out, along with Milton's "Lycidas" and Whitman's
"When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom'd" for Abraham Lincoln,
as one of the most intensely self-divinating formal elegies in
the language. In mourning the loss of the ostensible hero, the
poem mourns by anticipation the loss-to-come of the true hero,
who is the poet, and in mourning this loss tries to turn this
loss into a gain, a poetic victory over death. Shelley begins
with, "I weep for Adonais--he is dead! / 0, weep for Adonais,"
but he then reverses the vision with, "He lives, he wakes--'tis
Death is dead, not he; / Mourn not for Adonais" [1-2, 361-362].
When Yeats comes to write his first formal elegy, "In Memory of
Major Robert Gregory" (1918), he too seeks a triumph over death,
but his strategy diverges markedly from his precursor's in
Adonais.
The divergence of strategies has nothing to do with the fact
that Keats was a far greater artistic genius than Gregory, for
unlike Yeats Shelley pays no attention at all to the life and
career of his ostensible hero. But the divergence has everything
to do with Yeats feeling hemmed in by the magnificence of
Adonais. If he diverges from Adonais in that he dwells on the
horsemanship and artistry of Gregory, then he duly repeats the
strategy of Adonais insofar as both elegies portray mock funeral
pageants in which spirits (the already-dead Lionel Johnson, John
Synge, and George Pollexfen in the Yeats poem) pay their respects
to the newly-dead. But the crucial divergence of the Yeats poem
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from Adonais comes in the fact that divination is sought in the
Yeats poem despite, not through, any divination of the ostensible
hero. Indeed, whereas the Keats elegy immediately announces that
it is an elegy for someone called Adonais, the Gregory elegy
wanders through nearly half its length, five stanzas, before it
finally mentions the occasion that prompts the poem. The inten-
sity of Shelley's passion for the figure of Adonais contrasts
sharply with the relative disinterest that Yeats shows in the
figure of Gregory. But why should the Yeats poem be seen as a
kenosis in relation to the Shelley poem? The answer is that
Yeats's stance towards Gregory amounts to an emptying out of his
own Shelleyan self.
Phlegmatic rather than sanguine about Gregory, unable to
throw himself with his usual Shelleyan zeal into passionate
identification with his poetic hero, Yeats seems instead to
recoil from his hero, seeming to force himself to praise him and
mourn his death--Gregory having been after all the only son of
his close friend, literary collaborator, benefactor, and
colleague in management of the Abbey Theatre in Dublin, Lady
Gregory. After subtly implying throughout stanzas VII, VIII, IX,
and X that Gregory was a man who failed to live up to his
potential--
And yet he had the intensity
To have published all to be a world's delight ...
[236 ]
--in stanza XI Yeats marks out clearly his own difference from
Gregory, for Yeats identifies with those who "burn damp faggots,"
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who burn a slow flame, whereas Gregory's fire had been reckless
and wasteful:
Some burn damp faggots, others may consume
The entire combustible world in one small room
As though dried straw, and if we turn about
The bare chimney is gone black out
Because the work had finished in that flare.
By turning against the figure of Gregory, Yeats turns against his
own passionate and profligate (Shelleyan) self. Had he not, in
so many early poems, troped his self into an occult flame that
would burn the world of white noise and itself in order to become
a transcendent spirit, a new Shelleyan visionary? He had sought
to identify with
the embattled flaming multitude
Who rise, wing above wing, flame above flame,
And, like a storm, cry the Ineffable Name,
And with the clashing of their sword-blades make
A rapturous music, till the morning break
And the white hush end all but the loud beat
Of their long wings, the flash of their white feet.27
Now impatient with visionary flames, Yeats isolates and wounds
his Shelleyan self. And yet if his elegy is to be strong, it
must be an act of divination. Yeats achieves a divination in the
phase of kenosis by wounding (which paradoxically is also
blessing) his Shelleyan self at the same time that he introjects
some of the divine afflatus of Hamlet.
In this respect only two points need to be mentioned.
Firstly, Ophelia's most sublime speech reappears in the Gregory
elegy. Her response to Hamlet's violence and madness in the
Nunnery Scene (which itself follows hard upon his most famous
soliloquy) is to observe:
27 These lines come from the poem, "To Some I Have Talked with by the
Fire," first published in 1895 (Yeats's Poems, p. 505).
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0, what a noble mind is here o'erthrown!
The courtier's, soldier's, scholar's,
eye, tongue, sword,
The expectancy and rose of the fair state,
The glass of fashion and the mould of form,
Th'observed of all observers, quite, quite down!
[III, i, 151-155; p. 127]
The thrice repeated line, "Soldier, scholar, horseman, he," not
only remembers Ophelia's speech, thus usurping some of the power
of Hamlet, but also alludes to Yeats's ambivalences in the poem.
Yeats is in love with the Hamlet within himself--had he not taken
Hamlet's retort to Gertrude, his mother, in the Portrait Scene
as the epigraph for his early three volume study of Blake?--
"Bring me to the test, / And I the matter will re-word, which
madness / Would gambol from." Yet here Ophelia's description of
the mad Hamlet is given to Robert Gregory, which shows that Yeats
in fact identifies with the profligacy in Gregory that he seemed
to reject. The wounds and wanderings of poetic misprision were
never more intricate.
The second point that needs mention is the sudden rising of
the spirit of Hamlet in the last line and a half of the elegy.
Hamlet's final word--"the rest is silence"--echoes eerily the
conclusion of the elegy, again bringing Yeats darkly closer to
Gregory than he would like to admit. When Yeats concludes his
poem with the words, "but a thought / Of that late death took all
my heart for speech," he merges his own voice with the silence
of Gregory via the divine silence of Hamlet. In so doing, Yeats
gains through kenosis a victory over himself and his precursor
Shelley. His lie against time here is to empty out the precursor
and former self by appearing to reject and dissociate his own
voice from the transcendent voice of that composite precursor,
313
yet at the same time to steal back that divine voice by invoking
the voice of Hamlet, thus permitting his ambivalent identifi-
cation with the profligate-in-life but now immortal Robert
Gregory.
"An Irish Airman Foresees his Death" (1918) is the second
poem in the Gregory cluster that enacts a kenosis of Shelley via
Hamlet. But here Yeats does not perform the evasion of
distancing himself from Gregory only then to identify with him.
Here the method is more direct, indeed more Shelleyan--simple and
complete identification with the airman. Yet the poem begins as
a kenosis of Shelley and of the Shelley in Yeats by virtue of its
stance towards Alastor.
I know that I shall meet my fate
Somewhere among the clouds above;
Those that I fight I do not hate,
Those that I guard I do not love;
Nor law, nor duty bade me fight,
Nor public men, nor cheering crowds,
A lonely impulse of delight
Drove to this tumult in the clouds;
I balanced all, brought all to mind,
The years to come seemed waste of breath,
A waste of breath the years behind
In balance with this life, this death. [237]
The poet-hero of Alastor follows a lonely impulse but achieves
no vision, only death. His quest remains as evanescent as the
moment it seized and obsessed him. But the Irish airman has it
both ways. Unlike Shelley's hero, his moment of deathly emptying
is also his moment of visionary fullness. Yeats hereby drains
the Shelleyan precursor of voice, while himself crossing over
into a new phase. Like Hamlet whose fate cries out among the
midnight mists of the platform above the sea at Elsinore, the
Irish airman also is to meet his fate somewhere among the clouds.
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Similarly, Hamlet discovers his deepest internal sublimities in
his victory over himself--"the readiness is all," says Hamlet,
finally at peace with himself even as he chooses to duel
28Laertes. Likewise, the Irish airman, with utter equanimity in
his lonely impulse of delight, balances all, death and breath.
The white noise of The Great War pressurizes Yeats who responds
dialectically by holding himself open to it yet also pushing
back, absorbing yet resisting. The poem which begins as a
kenosis of Shelley ends as a daemonization by Hamlet, with Yeats
making the crossing from self-isolation to the Counter-Sublime,
Bloom's Crossing of Solipsism, a crossing that many of his poems
will repeat, each uniquely.
Before turning to daemonization proper, I wish to re-
emphasize the uncanny importance of Ophelia for Yeats's work, and
here I must quote in full her soliloquy that follows the violent
Nunnery Scene.
0, what a noble mind is here o'erthrown!
The courtier's, soldier's, scholar's,
eye, tongue, sword,
The expectancy and rose of the fair state,
The glass of fashion and the mould of form,
Th'observed of all observers, quite, quite down!
And I, of ladies most deject and wretched,
That sucked the honey of his music vows,
Now see that noble and most sovereign reason
Like sweet bells jangled, out of bv)~ and harsh,
That unmatched form and feature of blown youth
Blasted with ecstasy. 0, woe is me
T'have seen what I have seen, see what I see!
[III, i, 151-162; p. 127]
Not at all do I wish to claim that "Another Song of a Fool"
(1919)29 matches Ophelia's soliloquy in passion, sublimity,
28 V, ii, 216; p , 195.
29 Date of first publication, Yeats's Poems, p. 567.
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theme, or stance. But far more than the allusion to the
soliloquy in the Gregory elegy--an allusion that borders on
conscious echoing rather than repressive remembering--the
allusion to it and more broadly to Ophelia in "Another Song of
a Fool" are startling and bottomless or imageless. As Shelley's
Demogorgon says, "the deep truth is imageless. ,,30
This great purple butterfly,
In the prison of my hands,
Has a learning in his eye
Not a poor fool understands.
Once he lived a schoolmaster
With a stark, denying look;
A string of scholars went in fear
Of his great birch and his great book.
Like the clangour of a bell,
Sweet and harsh, harsh and sweet,
That is how he learnt so well
To take the roses for his meat. [275-276]
In reading the third quatrain against Ophelia's speech, we
enter the dark beauties of poetic misprision. "Like sweet bells
jangled, out of tune and harsh," she says of Hamlet's sovereign
reason which has now become a shambles. Yeats has held on to the
line and the speech; smitten by its "imageless" beauty he has
made his poetic unconscious of it. The contents of such
repression cannot be known directly, but only through negation
which allows the distorted (troped) appearance of the image or
d 31word represse . Ophelia's word erupts, negatively, into the
third quatrain--"Like the clangour of a bell, / Sweet and harsh,
harsh and sweet." The "rose" which is also a name of Ophelia (at
30 Prometheus Unbound, II, iv, 116.
31 In The Breaking of th~ Vessels Bloom comments that "Negation is a way
of taking account of what i s repressed. .. The result is a kind of
intellectual acceptance of what is repressed, though in all essentials the
repression persists" [11].
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least according to Laertes), returns in her speech to suggest her
view of Hamlet--"Th'expectancy and rose of the fair state," but
it also returns, now deeply distorted, in the song of the fool
who sings of the butterfly that takes "the roses for his meat."
Even the scholar of Ophelia's speech returns in the "string of
scholars" in the song of the fool. Both the soliloquy and the
song condense a story of metamorphosis, Hamlet into a form become
"Blasted with ecstasy," and the schoolmaster into the form of a
"great purple butterfly." Finally, the ballad form of the Yeats
poem remembers the similar form of the songs sung by Ophelia
later in Act IV when she herself has gone mad, blasted with
ecstasy. Insofar as a fool is a kind of madman, Ophelia's
ballads are also songs of a fool.
He is dead and gone, lady.
He is dead and gone.
At his head a grass-green turf,
At his heels a stone. [IV, v, 29-32; p. 163]
This seemingly self-indulgent digression upon the Ophelia
within Yeats--I could easily adduce much more, for example the
distortions of Ophelia that return in the figure of Crazy Jane--
should serve pragmatically as an introduction to the fourth phase
of daemonization or the Counter-Sublime, for the repressive
movement into the Sublime, the Crossing of Solipsism, is, along
with the movement into the sixth phase of apophrades, a crossing
of profound importance in Bloom's work.
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6.8 Return of the Daemonic
All changed, changed utterly:
A terrible beauty is born.
"Easter, 1916"
It is quite possible that, even more so than "Innisfree,"
and despite a few famous lines from the first strophe of "The
Second Corning," Yeats's "Easter, 1916" (1916) is his poem of most
popular acquaintance. This has seemed to be due to its depiction
of the historically important Easter Rising in Dublin that for
many marks the beginning of de facto Irish independence. But as
this thesis has argued, such criticism entirely misconstrues,
weakly misreads, the relation between a strong poem and history.
The poetic strength of a poem has nothing to do with the
importance and positivity of any historical event, and the
persuasiveness of Yeats's poem has nothing to do either with the
Rising as an event, or with his representation of it as an event.
ItA-' positive or mimetic poli tical truth-value is irrelevant, but
its negative poetical lie-value is all-important. Its
persuasiveness derives entirely from the vigor with which
"Easter, 1916" holds itself open to and pushes against the white
noise of historical events, while also absorbing and resisting
its precursor poems, Prometheus Unbound, Hamlet, and Yeats's own
, 3 ,,32
'September 191 . Were it not for this negative vigor, the
poem would not be memorable i it would be just another forget table
description of the Rising, unable to have imposed itself upon our
imaginations and upon its tradition. As it is, however, the poem
32 I will not have space in this chapter to explore the revisionary
relationship between "September 1913" and "Easter, 1916," other than here to
suggest that the later p~em revises the earlier ~y quarrying more deeply the
rich vein of Yeats's amblvalence towards the Irlsh as an uncanny mixture of
small-minded Paudeens and tragic heroes.
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is so daemonized by its precursor poems that it rises to a
Counter-Sublime, creating the trope or lie that we have come to
know as Yeatsian voice.
Yeats's comments on Prometheus Unbound show that it had
imposed itself upon his imagination at a very young age. He is
known to have regarded it as one of "the sacred books of the
world."33 Its heroic and redemptive vision of a final defeat of
tyranny and pain due to the power of long-suffering Love and
forgiveness haunted Yeats throughout his career. How could it
be otherwise when the ephebe, who himself seeks poetic strength,
confronts a poem by discovering it within himself--a poem that
competes for poetic immortality with Paradise Lost and The Divine
Comedy? At the turn of the century Prometheus Unbound plays a
crucial role in Yeats's cri tical essay, liThe Philosophy of
Shelley's Poetry" (1900), and three decades later, still obsessed
with the problem of Demogorgon, Yeats publishes a short essay
called "Prometheus Unbound." But such works of cri tical thought,
although agonistic and highly original, are not my primary
concern. It is the daemonic presence of Prometheus Unbound in
"Easter, 1916" that concerns me.
In passing, however, I note that some of Yeats's early
poems, especially some collected in The Rose and The Wind among
the Reeds, are Yeats's versions of the many hymns and songs of
Prometheus Unbound. Early lyrics, such as liTheCountess Cathleen
in Paradise" (1891) ,34 re-enact the welcoming of the new
dispensation of Act IV of Shelley's lyrical drama:
33 Essays and Introductions, p. 65.
Date of first publication, Yeats's Poems, p. 502.34
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All the heavy days are over;
Leave the body's coloured pride
Underneath the grass and clover
With feet laid side by side.
'Mong the feet of angels seven
What a dancer, glimmering!
All the heavens bow down to Heaven,
Flame to flame and wing to wing. [77-78]
Other early poems, such as "The Everlasting Voices" (1895), "The
Unappeasable Host" (1896), and "The Valley of the Black Pig"
(1896) ,35 seek to usher in the new dispensation by performing an
occult prayer to the Powers of Eternity. They therefore seek a
Promethean voice, but a voice that twists Shelley's more orthodox
Neoplatonic metaphysics into Yeats's more characteristic
heretical vision:
Desolate winds that beat the doors of Heaven, and beat
The doors of Hell and blow there many a whimpering ghost;
o heart the winds have shaken, the unappeasable host
Is comelier than candles at Mother Mary's feet. [92]
But such lyrics are only a weak clinamen from Prometheus Unbound
which continues for years to dominate Yeats's imagination, while
"Easter, 1916" is a better match for the Shelley poem.
What is at stake in the match is each poem's vision of the
pragmatics and the meaning of its transformative powers. The
Shelley poem sees its powers in the sublime act which transforms
suffering into the final defeat of tyranny through an act of
Love. In retracting his curse upon the tyrant Jupiter by pitying
and forgiving his torturer, Prometheus initiates a chain of
events that includes the release of Asia, his epipsyche, from
isolation, his own release from eternal pain, and the defeat of
the tyrant by Demogorgon whose reign in Love will resist all
35 Dates for the second and third poems are of first publication,
Yeats's Poems, pp. 510, 516.
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further strife. At the conclusion to the drama Demogorgon
addresses Prometheus in the presence of all of the spirits of
Heaven and Earth, now liberated from tyranny through the
redemptive action of the hero:
This is the day . . .
Love, from its awful throne of patient power
In the wise heart . . .
springs
And folds over the world its healing wings.
And if, with infirm hand, Eternity,
IV
Mother of m~ acts and hours, should free
The serpent that would clasp her with his length;
These are the spells by which to resume
An empire o'er the disentangled doom.
To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;
To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;
To love and bear; to hope till Hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free;
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory.
[IV, 554-578]
The conclusion of the drama shows Shelley's ambivalence and
skepticism in that the seeming final victory of Prometheus may
turn out to be no final victory at all, "if, with infirm hand,
Eternity I ... should free I The serpent that would clasp her
with its length." In this case the battle to suffer, to forgive,
to love and bear, to hope and so on, would be rejoined. This
vision, though it sincerely desires a final redemption, admits
the possibility that Empedocles saw as an infinite contest
between Love and Strife. But when Yeats feels Prometheus Unbound
as an internalized poetic presence, he feels it as the voice of
the final victory of Love over Strife, a voice which irritates
or agitates him. For Yeats, the great message of the final
stanza is "to defy Power" which he translates as "to defy
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Shelley," not the ambivalent or skeptical Shelley but the Shelley
of the final victory of Love. It is in this sense that I
suggested in chapter four (4.5) that Yeats invokes Empedocles and
Heraclitus (just as he also invokes Hamlet) against his reading
of Shelley in order "to defy Power" in order to gain some
leverage against the Shelley within him. We can measure his
relative success in this effort by reading "Easter, 1916" against
Prometheus Unbound.
"Easter, 1916" is a deeply Promethean poem. The ordinari-
ness, which the first section illustrates with its twice-
mentioned "polite meaningless words," is only a polite veil that
was covering the truly enchained condition of the Irish
Prometheus, a condition that the first section announces to be
now "All changed, changed utterly: / A terrible beauty is born"
[287]. The second section likewise numbers the individuals who
were such unlikely Prometheans, in the speaker's eye at least.
Yet it is the burden of the poem to find an understanding of the
crossing from the ordinary to the heroic. Such a crossing
entails a strong negation of history as white noise. Somehow,
ordinary people had thrown off their chains, even one who was
A drunken, vainglorious lout.
He had done most bitter wrong
To some who are near my heart,
Yet I number him in the songi
He t~has resigned his part
In the casual comedYi
He, too, has been changed in his turn,
Transformed utterly:
A terrible beauty is born. [287-288]
But how could the casual comedy, where even a drunken lout plays
his part, be transformed into a terrible beauty?
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Breaking and re-making his precursor, Yeats's beauty must
be a terrible beauty. Shelley's Prometheus is a figure so
powerful and integral that he is able to suffer the torture of
Jupi ter' s furies yet remain master of his self and destiny,
thanks to his visionary retraction of the curse on the tyrant,
for when one of the furies says to Prometheus,
. we will be dread thought beneath thy brain,
And foul desire round thine astonished heart,
And blood within thy labyrinthine veins
Crawling with agony
--Prometheus is able to answer:
Why, ye are thus now;
Yet I am king over myself, and rule
The torturing and conflicting throngs within,
As Jove rules you when Hell grows mutinous.
[I, 488-494J
In the drama of Prometheus his moments of torture are moments of
terror. The movement of Prometheus Unbound is from terror to
beauty, as Jupiter I S power is defeated through the Love of
Prometheus. But in "Easter, 1916" terror is beauty. It is as
if the drama of Prometheus were so condensed that the transition
from slavery to freedom, from terror to beauty, has become one
moment of terrible beauty, with no suggestion of any beauty
beyond or without terror.
More than a mere fulfillment or tessera of Shelley, the poem
is Yeats's Counter-Sublime just as it is Shelley's daemonization
of Yeats. In The Anxiety of Influence Bloom says of this fourth
phase in the dialectic, this fourth wound among Cuchulain's six
mortal wounds, that solipsism invades the ephebe, a solipsism
that originates in the glance of the precursor:
To appropriate the precursor's landscape for himself,
the ephebe must estrange it further from himself. To
attain a self yet more inward than the precursor's,
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the ephebe becomes necessarily more solipsistic. To
evade the precursor's imagined glance, the ephebe
seeks to confine it in scope, which perversely
enlarges the glance, so that it rarely can be evaded.
[105]
Yeats's poem attempts to overturn the glance of Shelley's poem
by reducing its entire drama to a single moment in which terror
and beauty are one, or alternatively by enlarging the moment of
Prometheus's act of liberating forgiveness so that all else falls
away as insignificant. Yeats hereby seeks to replace Shelley's
+c
vision of the transformation of suffering in beauty with his own
/I.
vision of the union of suffering and beauty. But as Bloom's
description of daemonization suggests, such a stance towards the
precursor, a stance which breaks the glance of the precursor,
only succeeds in re-making the centrality of the precursor, as
Sublime counters Sublime in a daemonic dance of difference within
LderrtIty. Whereas Shelley's Prometheus transforms heroic
suffering into victory over the tyrant, Yeats's ordinary men and
women transform their "casual comedy" into a heroic drama, with
earthly victory remaining ambiguous. And while Prometheus
transforms the universal condition, Yeats's quotidian heroes
transform themselves whose only victory is won in their own
deaths. It is precisely here, at the point where lyricism meets
tragedy, that Yeats confronts Shelley with Hamlet and takes death
rather than love as the meaning of life and action.
To speak of the rising of Hamlet in "Easter, 1916" is to
speak of the mysterious sacrifice that can make "a stone of the
heart." For the meditation that obsesses this poem daemonically
remembers the meditation that obsessed Hamlet in his darkest
moment. Yeats verges on this moment in the third section of the
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poem with its contrast of the stone to the Heraclitean living
stream.
Hearts with one purpose alone
Through summer and winter seem
Enchanted to a stone
To trouble the living stream.
The horse that comes from the road,
The rider, the birds that range
From cloud to tumbling cloud,
Minute by minute they change;
A shadow of cloud on the stream
Changes minute by minute;
The stone's in the ~idst of all.36 [288 ]
Yeats here holds himself open to the deepest ambivalences about
history. Change, only change or the living stream is beautiful.
Yet the stone, emblematic of supreme resistance to change, is
also beautiful. More than this, it is the hearts which have
become enchanted to a stone that are the power of transformation
or the deepest change--at the cost of the highest personal sacri-
fice, for "Too long a.sacrifice / Can make a stone of the heart."
The poet's admiration for the beauty of the living stream is
schooled by his awareness that the living stream and its anti-
nomy, the stone which must be death, are linked, like Love and
Strife, in a terrible antithetical union. To love and admire the
beauty of the stream one must also love and admire the anti-
thetical beauty of death, the stone of the heart. Should there
remain any doubt that Yeats is here ambivalently at one with both
living stream and stubborn stone, we need only recall that in
"Men Improve with the Years" (1916), a poem written during the
same months as "Easter, 1916," Yeats writes:
36 In fragment L, Heraclitus says, "As they step into the same rivers,
other and still other waters flow upon them"; and in fragment LI, "One cannot
step twice into the same river" [Kahn 53).
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I am worn out with dreams;
A weather-worn marble triton
Among the streams. [238]
Though the figure of the stone in "Easter, 1916" may convention-
ally be taken as a denigration of political fanatics, Yeats here
clearly identifies with the stone, albeit an artistically carved
stone, among the streams.
The revisionary, self-canonizing force of Yeats's poem can
be measured when we read the daemonic voice of Hamlet rising
through Yeats's verse. For Hamlet too is burdened by a "sea of
troubles" occasioned by the pressure to know the meaning of his
own death within the processes of the living stream:
To die, to sleep--
No more--and by a sleep to say we end
The heartache and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to. 'Tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wished. To die, to sleep--
To sleep--perchance to dream. Ah, there's the rub.
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil
Must give us pause. [III, i, 60-68; p. 124]
Such questioning of the permutations of the meaning of death may
or may not have exercised the minds of those who turned their
hearts to stone in order to trouble the living stream, but such
questioning certainly exercises our poet who finds that in order
to speak he must re-absorb the voice of Hamlet within his own
voice:
Too long a sacrifice
Can make a stone of the heart.
o when may it suffice?
That is Heaven's part, our part
To murmur name upon name
As a mother names her child
When sleep at last has come
On limbs that had run wild.
What is it but nightfall?
No, no, not night but death;
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Was it needless death after all?
We know their dream; enough
To know they dreamed and are dead;
And what if excess of love
Bewildered them until they died?
The voice of Hamlet, who observes that in "that sleep of death
what dreams may come / / Must give us pause," erupts
ghostly into the voice of Yeats who is burdened by quite similar
questions as to the links between sleep and death and dreams.
In troping the martyrs of the Easter Rising as deathly
stones in the living stream, Yeats not only exhibits his great
ambivalence about the meaning of their self-sacrifice, his
admiration coupled with his skepticism, but he also provokes a
great questioning of the meaning of those deaths. But more than
this, his questioning returns him to a Scene of Instruction in
which Hamlet displaces Shelley as the daemonic precursor, for it
is the voice of Hamlet, not of Shelley, that wells up within the
voice of the final section of "Easter, 1916." Prometheus Unbound
daemonizes the Yeats poem insofar as the latter rises to a vision
in which terror becomes one with beauty, but Shelley's poem
cannot inspire a Yeatsian Counter-Sublime in which the question
of "terrible beauty" becomes the solipsistic question of death.
For this vision the Yeatsian voice turns to Hamlet's meditation
on sleep, death, and dreams in the third soliloquy. Yeats's
repression of Hamlet's speech yields a return to the names of
sleep, death, and dreams, in which, like a mother, "Yeats
"murmur[s] name upon name" in a vain yet Sublime quest after the
meaning of death. And like Demogorgon whose deep truth is
imageless, the only "answer" that the poem can make suggests the
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negative transcendence of an enigmatic oxymoron, "A terrible
beauty is born."
6.9 Askesis, and the Fire of the Gnostic
o sweet everlasting Voices, be still;
Go to the guards of the heavenly fold
And bid them wander obeying your will,
Flame under flame, till Time be no more.
"The Everlasting Voices"
In A Vision and in "The Phases of the Moon" (1918), which
he included as part of A Vision, Yeats creates his own occult
system in which each of us passes through the phases of a great
wheel that is the pattern of the soul's fate, each phase being
a different ratio of the influences pressed upon that soul and
the counter-influences emanating from that soul. It could be
argued that Bloom's theory of six poetic phases bears much more
than a chance relationship to Yeats's twenty-eight cradles of the
moon. I will have to leave for a future project the articulation
of the ratios that link these two systems, but the following
lines from "The Phases of the Moon" suggest a summary of what the
Yeatsian and Bloomian systems have in common:
The song will have it
That those that we have loved got their long fingers
From death, and wounds, or on Sinai's top,
Or from some bloody whip in their own hands.
They ran from cradle to cradle till at last
Their beauty dropped out of the loneliness
Of body and soul. [270]
As this chapter runs from cradle to cradle, there is much
that, regretfully, it must bypass in order to fulfill its
purpose, including several useful examples of daemonization or
the Crossing of Solipsism: Shelley's magnificent "Ode to the
West Wind" and its daemonization of "Nineteen Hundred and
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Nineteen"; "Ozyrnaridi.jrs" and its daemonization of "The Second
Coming"; 37 the Sublime revision of "Adam's Curse" by "Among
School Children"; the repressive remembering or patterns of
forgetting of Alastor and Epipsychidion in "A Dialogue of Self
and Soul"; the Sublime Crossing from the poems of the Rose of
Intellectual Beauty to "Sailing to Byzantium" and its vision of
Unity of Being. By listing these examples of Yeats's Counter-
Sublime, I hope to suggest the dimensions and the pragmatic value
of Bloom's revisionary project.
As opposed to the restituting phase of daemonization, the
cradle of askesis is a contraction, but it is such a severe
contraction that Bloom associates it with "purgation," and
inevitably therefore with Dante and with fire. Furthermore,
Bloom's reading of Yeats's Paterian work, "Per Arnica Silentia
Lunae" (1918) (which he calls a "marmoreal revery" and which he
greatly prefers to A Vision), causes him rightly to associate
askesis also with Heraclitus. Such a confusion of associations
requires some sorting and patterning, not least because Yeats
drew upon Heraclitus and Empedocles for his sense of poetic
purgation-as-endless-conflict, mainly, as I suggested in (4.5),
in order to defend against his own tendency toward Platonism.
Whereas daemonization is linked with the deep-rising of
repression or Sublime-remembering and with the trope of
hyperbole, askesis is linked with the defense of sublimation and
37 I have performed in detail a reading of the Sublime Crossings from
"Ode to the West Wind" to "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen," and from
"ozymandi1fs" to "The Second Coming" in two work-in-progress seminar papers,
called "Revisionism, Canonization, and the Play of History," and "Bloomian
Self-Transformations: Yeats's Stones and Roses."
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the perspectivizing trope of metaphor. In The Anxiety of
Influence Bloom's early musings on askesis are highly suggestive:
But what the poets call their Purgatory is largely
what Platonists, Christians, Nietzscheans, or
Freudians would agree to call a kind of sublimation,
or ego defenses that work .... [S]ublimation becomes
a form of askesis, a self-curtailment which seeks
transformation at the expense of narrowing the
creative circumference of precursor and ephebe alike.
[118-119]
Likewise, in Poetry and Repression Bloom's comments on the trope
of fire are insightful:
Shelley first tried to achieve a perspectivizing
stance in relation to precursors through the limiting
trope of metaphor. Fire is the prime perspectivizing
metaphor of Romanticism, and to burn through context,
the context of precursors and of nature, is the
revisionary aim of that metaphor. [105]
The perfect narrowing of a poet's creative circumference would
be to narrow it to a point, to the center of the circumference,
thus purifying the precursor and ephebe, who together are a
circle, of any dross. Fire would be the purest image of this act
of purification or sublimation, for as Heraclitus says, "All
things are requital for fire, and fire for all things, as goods
for gold and gold for goods. ,,38 In askesis, a poet reduces
precursor and self to a fiery center. Says Bloom,
purgatory for post-Enlightenment strong poets is
always oxymoronic, and never merely painful, because
every narrowing of circumference is compensated for by
the poetic illusion (a delusion, and yet a strong
poem) that the center therefore will hold better.
[1 21 ]
38 Kahn, fragment XL, p. 47.
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The center that cannot hold in "The Second Corning" (which is a
poem of daemonization, a successful repression of
l1..- 39
"Ozymandi)1s") becomes a center that appears to hold in
"Byzantium" because the poet has reduced the agonic circle of
self and precursor to a fiery center--"An agony of flame that
cannot singe a sleeve."
It is instructive that the movement both in the Inferno and
in the purgatorio is a narrowing movement from circumference to
center. Whether falsely or truly, the saying that God is a
circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is
nowhere has been attributed to 40Empedocles. Yeats himself
alludes to this gnomic proverb when he writes, "If it be true
that God is a circle whose centre is everywhere, the saint goes
to the centre, the poet and artist to the ring where everything
, ,,41
comes round agaln. On the face of it, the proverb looks to
be Neoplatonic or Hermetic, the kind of Shelleyan Intellectual
mystery that would interest Pico della Mirandola, the Italian
Renaissance enthusiast who influenced Yeats through Pater.42 In
stanza XLVII of his Adonais, Shelley brilliantly adopts the
center/circumference trope in his strategy to immortalize the
dead hero:
39 In Poetry and Repression, especially pp. 219-221, Bloom reads "The
Second Coming" not only against "Ozymandius" but also against passages in
Prometheus Unbound and The Triumph of Life.
40 The Cohens, in The Penguin Dictionary of Quotations, p. 155. But in
A Dictionary of Religious & Spiritual Quotations, p. 34, Parrinder says the
sentence is quoted in Roman de la Rose, without naming an origin. In The Home
Book of Quotations: Classical and Modern, p. 273, Stevenson attributes the
saying to Augustine (who was a Gnostic until he became a Christian) via
Emerson's essay, "Circles."
41 Essays and Introductions, p. 287. Yeats's comment comes originally
from "Discoveries," included in The Cutting of an Agate (1912).
42
Pater wrote a chapter on Pica in The Renaissance (1873).
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Who mourns for Adonais? Oh, come forth,
Fond wretch! and know thyself and him aright.
Clasp with thy panting soul the pendulous Earth;
As from a centre, dart thy spirit's light
Beyond all worlds, until its spacious might
Satiate the void circumference: then shrink
Even to a point within our day and night;
And keep thy heart light lest it make thee sink
When hope has kindled hope, and lured thee to the brink.
There is no evidence that Yeats was interested, during his early
Platonizing period, in Empedocles, but it seems to me that Yeats
was drawn to Empedocles and to Heraclitus as he began more and
more to subject his Platonism to gnostic revision. The circum-
ference that is also the center is an important trope in the
context of Platonism and Gnosticism, but the trope of the fire
as used by Yeats--a metaphor which allows him to be the consumer
and the consumed, the knower and the known--moves him away from
the Platonic One and into a gnostic stance that is so anti-
thetical to itself that it exceeds or evades the One, as in the
figure 1 = 1+/-.
In Poetry and Repression Bloom links the Yeatsian "Condition
of Fire" with Heraclitus, through Shelley and Pater [207J. The
Condition of Fire is the goal of Yeatsian gnosis and is
identified by Bloom with his own Scene of Instruction:
At the center of Per Arnica is Yeats's Gnostic version
of what I have called the Scene of Instruction, the
state of heightened demand that carries a new poet
from his origins into his first strong represen-
tations. [207]
Besides virtually here admitting that Yeats is his central
influence and crucial precursor (which was the theme of my fifth
chapter), Bloom follows Yeats in tracing the gnostic Condition
of Fire back to Heraclitus. "Per Arnica Silentia Lunae" ela-
borates an agon between poet and "Daimon" (or anti-self), and
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Yeats cites Heraclitus, saying that "The Daimon is our destiny."
The agonistic confrontation with the Daimon, like Jacob's
nightlong duel with a Dark Angel, leads the poet to the Condition
of Fire just as the Scene of Instruction leads eventually to the
ratio of askesis, that cradle of sacrifice in which the self
becomes a flame. In "Vacillation" (1931-1932), section VII,
which is a poem of six wounds, six brief lines of dialogue
between "Soul" and "Heart," the fourth line is the Heart's rising
to a daemonic exclamation--"Struck dumb in the simplicity of
fire! "--while the fifth line is the Soul's narrowing to an
askesis or purification--"Look on that fire, salvation walks
within" [367]. And the Daimon that Yeats invariably confronts
in the Scene of Instruction is the figure of Shelley, a voice
that, in Adonais, also saw a vision of the Heraclitean fire as
a burning fountain:
Dust to the dust! but the pure spirit shall flow
Back to the burning fountain whence it came,
A portion of the Eternal, which must glow
Through time and change, unquenchable the same,
Whilst thy cold embers choke the sordid hearth of shame.
[XXXVIII]
Just as Bloom has pointed out that "Per Arnica Silentia
Lunae" articulates a Heraclitean vision of the Daimon and the
Primal Fire, so A Vision extends Yeats's usurpation of tropes of
Heraclitus and Empedocles in his agon with Platonism.43 At the
beginning of Book I of A Vision, called "The Great Wheel," Yeats
cites Empedocles primarily, but also Heraclitus, as the sources
43 As I pointed out in chapter four, James Olney traces the pre-Socratic
philos~phers through Plato into Ye~t~. ,MYg,reat, quarrel with Olney is that
there as no sense of agon or r eva s i.onasm an hi s argument, while I argue
specifically that Yeats uses Heraclitus and Empedocles--but not Parmenides and
pythagoras who remain Platonic formalists in Yeats's view--against Plato in
his gnostic quarrel with his own internalized Platonism.
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of the great antithetical scheme he is about to put forward.
Empedocles' grand tropes of Love and Discord Yeats usurps as the
model for the interpenetrating gyres of his great wheel or
"vortex." Translating Love and Discord into his own terms as
"primary" and "antithetical," Yeats builds upon an Empedoclean
base his vision which unfolds his own argument between esoteric
Platonism and gnostic negative transcendence. But he claims that
Heraclitus is the founder of the vision: "Here the thought of
Heraclitus dominates all: 'Dying each other's life, living each
other's death'" [68].
The quotation of Heraclitus, meant to illustrate his gyres,
is found scattered throughout Yeats's late writings.44 But in
"Byzantium," quotation is transformed into poetry:
A mouth that has no moisture and no breath
Breathless mouths may summon;
I hail the superhuman;
I call it death-in-life and life-in-death. [363 ]
Like Hamlet, who is fascinated by the interpenetration of
opposite principles--
Your worm is your only emperor for diet. We fat all
creatures else to fat us, and we fat ourselves for
maggots. . A man may fish with the worm that hath
eat of a king, and eat of the fish that hath fed of
that worm. [IV, iii, 20-22, 26-27; pp. 158-159]
--Yeats too imagines a negative dialectic in which things are
their own negation, where
Everything that man esteems
Endures a moment or a day.
Love's pleasure drives his love away,
The painter's brush consumes his dreams;
44 For example, the final words spoken by a character in the play, The
Resurrection, except for the two songs of the chorus, are: "Your words are
clear at last, 0 Heraclitus, God and man die each other's life, live each
other's death" [Collected Plays 594]. The reference is to part of fragment
XCII, which Kahn gives in full and translates as "Immortals are mortal,
mortals immortal, living the others' death, dead in the others' life" [71).
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The herald's cry, the soldier's tread
Exhaust his glory and his might:
Whatever flames upon the night
Man's own resinous heart has fed. [321]45
But the Heraclitean trope of "death-in-life and life-in-death"
transcends the fragment from Heraclitus that Yeats is fond of
quoting. Mortal immortals and immortal mortals are equally
caught on the round of a great wheel of life and death. But the
purgative eloquence of Yeats's gnostic stance in "Byzantium"
transfigures the Heraclitean fragment as a;:-image of a great
wheel. In the fire of "Byzantium" Yeats achieves a negative
transcendence of both life and death. By negating each, he
transcends both. As Bloom says about Shelley, he "burnCs]
through ... the context of precursors and of nature." To hail
the superhuman is to hail neither the human nor the anti-human,
but both at once. Neither natural "bird" nor anti-natural
"golden handiwork," the Yeatsian askesis is a supernatural
"miracle"--"More miracle than bird or handiwork" [363J. Like
Bloom's "supermimesis" that is a negative transcendence, Yeats's
hailing of the superhuman bows down neither to life as an idol
nor to death as an (anti-) idol, nor even to the interpenetration
of each; rather it engages in a troping that is like a fire from
beyond the wheel, a circle divine whose circumference is its
center.
Shelley, too, in The Triumph of Life, had seen a self-
purifying vision of the precursor and surely The Triumph of Life
is a crucial precursor-poem for "Byzantium." But from the
perspective of "Byzantium," Shelley's poem gestures too ob-
45 This is a stanza from "Two Songs from a Play" (1926, 1931?), which
yeats also published as the final song of the chorus in The Resurrection.
335
sessively towards the spirit world, the world of the precursor,
the shape that calls itself "Rousseau. ,,46 From the perspective
of "Byzantium," The Triumph of Life is obsessed with death.
"Byzantium" creatively corrects its Shelleyan precursor-poem by
enacting a fiery negative transcendence. It curtails or narrows
itself and the precursor by mounting flame upon flame, "flames
begotten of flame." Shelley speaks of being in a "trance," a
"waking dream": "a vision on my brain was rolled" [40-42]; Yeats
speaks of "an agony of trance," and Shelley's figures in the
triumph are "tortured by their agonizing pleasure" [143]; but the
shape that Yeats confronts is "Shade more than man, more image
than a shade." "Byzantium" evades repeating what it sees as an
obsession with death in The Triumph of Life by troping beyond the
deathly precursor to death-in-life and life-in-death. Of course,
it is a delusion--the poem lying to itself and to us--that
"Byzantium" actually corrects its precursor poem by purging both
of them in a revisionary fire, but without such lying there would
not be any new poems worth reading, remembering, repressing, or
revising.
46 In his essay called "Shelley and His Precursors" in Poetry and
Repression, Bloom brilliantly reads the "~ousseau" of the poem as Shelley's
composite precursor, Wordsworth and ColerLdge, who by 1821 were "living on
with an extinguished poetic hearth and writing sparkless verses. .
Rousseau might just as well be named Wordsworth or Coleridge in the poem,
except that Shelley was too tactful and urbane to utilize those who were
still, technically speaking, alive" [103-104).
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6.10 Apophrades, the Final Wound
Now that my ladder's gone
I must lie down where all the ladders start,
In the toul rag and bone shop of the heart.
"The Circus Animals' Desertion"
As with the other five wounds that Yeats has inflicted upon
himself in order to achieve the blessing of divination, the sixth
wound will be inflicted several times over. Apophrades being the
cradle of transumption, many of Yeats's late poems will belong
to this phase. I speak here not of those late ranting poems that
indulge violence as a perverse pleasure, for such poems retreat
from the austere demands of a strong revisionary poetry by
falling into worship of the idols of mimeticism or naturalism--
Remember all those renowned generations,
Remember all that have sunk in their blood,
Remember all that have died on the scaffold,
Remember all that have fled, that have stood
stood, took death like a tune
On an old tambourine. [457]47
Such lines read more like a position paper than a poem,
attempting to hoodwink the reader into a certain poli tico-
journalistic march. Furthermore, such poems fail to rise to the
challenge of holding themselves open to white noise and
transforming it. Instead they merely imitate, arguing that we
should submit to the authority of blood and nature. But Yeats's
poetry at its best never merely imitates. Rather it absorbs and
resists both nature and the precursor, in order to achieve
revisionary, canonical strength.
In his final phase, Yeats's best poems take his own earlier
fine poetry as the main precursor. Transumption, meaning the
47 This is the second stanza in the first poem of "Three Marching
Songs."
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troping upon a prior trope in a way that makes the earlier trope
seem late and the later trope seem early, is the rhetorical
stance of the phase of apophrades. Thus, poems like "The Circus
Animals' Desertion" (1937-1938)48 and "Man and the Echo" (1938)
allude to Yeats's earlier work with such fresh strength that the
earlier work is made to seem as though it weakly imitated the
later work. Similarly, in poems like "Lapis Lazuli" (1936)49
and "Cuchulain Comforted" (1939) Yeats makes the Crossing of
Identification. 50 From the volatility of the metaphor of fire
he crosses to a new restitution of voice which aggressively
introjects earliness despite the lateness or belatedness of the
poet's hour. It is as if this new voice were actualizing the
Nietzschean maxim--Try to live as though it were morning. 51
In his discussion of apophrades from the perspective of the
ephebe in The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom returns to the trope
of "drowning" which was such a severe anxiety for Yeats in his
Rose poems: "The precursors flood us, and our imaginations can
die by drowning in them, but no imaginative life is possible if
such inundation is wholly evaded" [154, my emphasis]. Bloom
describes apophrades as "The Return of the Dead" because a
bizarre reversal has taken place. Whereas in the phase of
clinamen the ephebe strove to avoid drowning in the voice of the
precursor, strove to gain a little rose-breath all his own, in
the phase of apophrades the ephebe is now so strong that it is
48 Yeats's Poems, p. 641.
49 Yeats's Poems, p. 621.
50 Begun in December 1938, "Cuchulain Comforted" was completed on 13
January 1939, a few days before Yeats died.
51 Quoted occasionally by Bloom, e.g., Vessels, p. 89 and Ruin, p. 82.
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the precursor who appears to speak in and through the breath of
the ephebe. Says Bloom, after quoting passages from Shelley,
We feel, in reading The Witch of Atlas, that Shelley
has read too deeply in Yeats, and is doomed never to
get the tonal complexities of the Byzantium poems out
of his mind. [153]
While early poems such as "The Song of the Happy Shepherd" enact
a clinamen in relation to The Witch of Atlas, the Byzantium
poems, in Bloom's view, exemplify the ratio of apophrades in
relation to it. "The mightY dead return," says Bloom, "but they1\
return in our colors, and speaking in our voices, at least in
part, at least in moments, moments that testify to our
persistence, and not to their own" [141]. Despite the ephebe's
dominance, the fear of death, which is fear in its purest form,
remains. In making the Crossing of Identification, a poet re-
enters the Scene of Instruction in order to confront the fear of
death. As Bloom says in Wallace stevens, the poet has a sense
that the final internalization is the internalization
of death. A Crossing of Identification defensively
tropes against death, and also tropes toward it,
confirming the ambivalence of Freud's hypothetical yet
Romantically based "death instinct." [405]
With these descriptions to aid us, we can now read the final
wound in Yeats's poetic career-as-crisis-poem, as seen in "Lapis
Lazuli."
The startling magnificence of this poem is achieved through
the transuming of Yeats's own prior voices, and through the
return of Hamlet. As a whole, the poem takes a transumptive
stance towards Yeats's work. Yet, like "Adam's Curse" which is
one of its precursor-poems, "Lapis Lazuli" itself moves through
the six-phased map of misprision. It begins in a bitter irony.
It swerves away from the views of the "hysterical women" who want
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to scapegoat poets and artists for the impending disaster of
World War II, just as it also transumptively ironizes Yeats's
many earlier poems which sought to save or redeem the world
through visionary art.
I have heard that hysterical women say
They are sick of the palette and fiddle-bow,
Of poets that are always gay,
For everybody knows or else should know
That if nothing drastic is done
Aeroplane and Zeppelin will come out,
Pitch like King Billy bomb-balls in
Until the town lie beaten flat. [412]
It would be a tendentious error of weak misreading, though no
doubt in fashion, to charge Yeats here with some kind of sexism,
for the "hysterical women" are no more ironized than is Yeats
himself. As we saw in (6.6) for example, the Yeats of "Adam's
Curse" attempts to trope Love as a redemptive force in a fallen
world. In fact, throughout much of Yeats's work there is a
strong desire to turn poetic art into a messianic force. His
swerve from the hysterical women is as much a swerve from the
messianic voices of his own past poems which continue to impinge
upon or influence him. In order to begin, in order to re-make
himself, something drastic must be done. Here it is the drastic
step of ironizing his own redemptive voices, voices which sang,
in two of his greatest poems for example, that
Labour is blossoming or dancing where
The body is not bruised to pleasure soul . [325]
--or that
We are blest by everything,
Everything we look upon is blest. [351]
stepping away from such transumptive irony, "Lapis Lazuli"
enters the ratio of tessera in its second verse paragraph,
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crossing from the ethos of irony to a pathos that attempts to
fulfill the glory of Hamlet.
All perform their tragic play,
There struts Hamlet, there is Lear,
That's Ophelia, that Cordelia;
Yet they, should the last scene be there,
The great stage curtain about to drop,
If worthy their prominent part in the play,
Do not break up their lines to weep.
They know that Hamlet and Lear are gay;
Gaiety transfiguring all that dread.
All men have aimed at, found and lost;
Black out; Heaven blazing into the head:
Tragedy wrought to its uttermost.
Though Hamlet rambles and Lear rages,
And all the drop-scenes drop at once
Upon a hundred thousand stages,
It cannot grow by an inch or an ounce.
Fulfilling Shakespeare here, Yeats also transumes his own
visionary voice. According to Bloom's map of misprision, in the
phase of tessera we will find that the poem represents by
substituting part for whole or whole for part. In this section
of "Lapis Lazuli II the poet collapses any distinction between
character and player. Part and whole become one thing. A play
is not only something that happens on a stage, it is also our
lives as we imagine and live them. We are Hamlet and Ophelia,
drawn to the precipice of madness--"the dreadful summit of the
cliff / That beetles o'er his base into the sea." Whether or not
we are drawn into madness, losing our sovereignty of reason, all
of us are put to the test--not just the Hamlet and the Ophelia
who seem to ramble on the theater stage. For we all must face
death in its awful individuality. Hamlet and Ophelia thus
instruct us on the depth of our own souls.
At the center of this passage, Yeats's completion of Hamlet
merges with a transumption of his own poetry:
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Gaiety transfiguring all that dread.
All men have aimed at, found and lost;
Black out; Heaven blazing into the head:
Tragedy wrought to its uttermost.
In "The Cold Heaven" Yeats spoke of being "Riddled with light"
[227], but "Lapis Lazuli" and its lightning expose just how short
of negative transcendence the earlier poem falls. Instead of
being "riddled" or ignorant, the later poem achieves a gnosis of
transfigurati ve gaiety, a negation of ignorance. Dread and loss,
which are figures for death, are transformed in this new
lightning, and a Heaven--no longer simply cold--blazes into the
head. The question common to all of us, yet felt by each of us
alone as uniquely our own, is the question that is asked when
tragedy is wrought to its uttermost. And how each one answers
the question makes all the difference between mere repetition of
ethos (which would be the breaking up of our lines to weep) and
self-transfiguration. Whatever figurative choice we make, as
"all the drop scenes drop at once / Upon a hundred thousand
stages," we all bear the same burden of utter defeat, for "It
cannot grow by an inch or an ounce."
The third verse paragraph combines a crossing from the self-
emptying voice of kenosis to the sublime voice of daemonization
wi th a renewed attempt by Yeats to transume his precursor Hamlet.
On their own feet they came, or on shipboard,
Camel-back, horse-back, ass-back, mule-back,
Old civilisations put to the sword.
Then they and their wisdom went to rack:
These four lines empty the poet of his love for all things
beautiful and fine, wise and true--all those things about human
civilization that Yeats wishes to see as somehow immortal and
even of his own making. Now all has gone to rack and ruin, for
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like individuals, a civilization is powerless in the end against
its own great defeat. Yet here the passage crosses over and
rises to its daemonization by Hamlet:
No handiwork of Callimachus,
Who handled marble as if it were bronze,
Made draperies that seemed to rise
When sea-wind swept the corner, stands;
His long lamp-chimney shaped like the stem
Of a slender palm, stood but a day;
All things fall and are built again,
And those that build them again are gay. [412-413]
While Claudius, who is a regicide, is cynical and arrogant enough
to comment that
There's such divinity doth hedge a king
That treason can but peep to what it would,
Acts little of his will ... [IV, v, 125-127; p. 166]
--Hamlet sees divinity in a humane if austere light:
There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will. [V, ii, 10-11; p. 189]
But for Yeats it is the very voice of Hamlet itself that is
divinity, and it is Hamlet's discussion of providence and the
fall of a sparrow that daemonizes the Yeats passage in "Lapis
Lazuli." When Horatio pleads that Hamlet should cancel the
contest, should act on his intuition that the imminent duel with
Laertes will be for more than mere sport, Hamlet answers:
Not a whit. We defy augury. There is a special
providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now,
'tis not to come. If it be not to come, it will be
now. If it be not now, yet it will come. The
readiness is all. Since no man knows of aught he
leaves, what is't to leave betimes? Let be.
[V, ii, 213-218; p. 195]
Yeats's lines concerning the artistic heroism of Callimachus are
daemonized by the utter equanimity of Hamlet's tragic heroism,
for the fall of a sparrow or of a man is like the fall of a long
lamp chimney shaped like the stem of a slender palm. Each is an
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achieved beauty, beauty that must die, as Keats says in the "Ode
on Melancholy." Similarly, the two lines that comment on the
tragic case of Callimachus transume "The Second Coming." Instead
of the terrible beauty of "Things fall apart; the centre cannot
hold" [294], we have the transumptive lines troping upon this
earlier trope, and telling us that there must be more than the
center not holding--
All things fall and are built again
And those that build them again are gay.
To fall again and again is inevitable, but to build anew despite
the inevitable is heroic vitalism.
For Yeats to see this and to write it, is for him to enlarge
the earlier trope by transuming it, but with the fourth section,
"Lapis Lazuli" returns to a new contraction, this time the phase
of askesis with its perspectivizing reliance on the metaphor of
the stone carved by an artist.
Two Chinamen, behind them a third,
Are carved in lapis lazuli,
Over them flies a long-legged bird,
A symbol of longevity:
The third, doubtless a serving-man,
Carries a musical instrument. [413]
In this brief askesis, the poet concentrates or narrows all his
meaning to a single metaphor: the spatial image of a carved
It is as if the circumference of all of the poet' sstone.
meanings were now reduced--like the God of Empedocles, Augustine,
and Emerson--to the center of a circle, the circle of a precious
and fragile lapis lazuli. According to this perspective, all
that is inside the circle of the metaphor, the images on the
stone, is meaningful, while all that is outside it is not. But
as Bloom's map of misreading shows, such perspectivizing
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metaphors soon undergo a new breaking of the vessels, as a poem
moves dialectically from its fifth to its sixth phase.
Crossing from askesis to apophrades, the poem moves out of
contraction and into a new restitution of voice, as the circle
of meaning contained wi thin the carved stone is cracked or
shattered, offering new meaning beyond the narrowing limits of
a metaphor.
Every discoloration of the stone,
Every accidental crack or dent,
Seems a water-course or an avalanche,
Or lofty slope where it still snows
Though doubtless plum or cherry-branch
Sweetens the little half-way house
Those Chinamen climb towards, and I
Delight to imagine them seated there;
There, on the mountain and the sky,
On all the tragic scene they stare.
One asks for mournful melodies;
Accomplished fingers begin to play.
Their eyes mid many wrinkles, their eyes,
Their ancient, glittering eyes are gay. [413]
The poem here turns from metaphor to transumption first by
troping on its own trope of the carved stone, and then by troping
on the penultimate line of "Among School Children." As
"discolouration" and "crack or den" become "a water-course or an
avalanche, / Or lofty slope where it still snows," the transump-
tive imagination of the poet expands in pathos. Soon the carved
stone itself has disappeared as the sweet enticements of "plum
or cherry-branch" further our movement away from the stone and
into the visionary world invoked by the poet's negative
transcendence of the stone. The passage continues to expand its
transumptive power as imagination and image appear to coalesce.
The Chinamen climb the mountain, "and I / Delight to imagine them
seated there." Mountain, sky, and tragic scene exclude nothing
that is and nothing that is not. The poet's vision seems so
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comprehensive here that it achieves the earliness of a first
vision, the vision of the first morning after the fall.
Mountain, sky, and tragic scene, three Chinamen and their music--
it is the first creation out of or after catastrophe. In what
Bloom would call a "metaleptic reversal" of Yeats's old age as
well as his poetic belatedness, the poet here writes the vision
of a new primal scene that presents itself with such freshness
that it is as if this were the first or only vision of a fall
that always is, and is exactly as it is here seen.
The final four lines of the poem return us transumptively
to "Among School Children," where Pythagorean music was so
crucial:
World-famous golden-thighed Pythagoras
Fingered upon a fiddle stick or strings
What a star sang and careless Muses heard. [325]
Such divine music is only a source of poetic frustration and
longing to overcome the dualism of worldly body and heavenly
soul, but when metaleptically reversed by "Lapis Lazuli," the
music of Pythagoras becomes a music that is fallen and mournful
but that also invokes the poem's final transumption. "Among
School Children" had asked of the "body swayed to music" and of
the "brightening glance" the ambiguous unanswerable question,
"How can we know the dancer from the dance?"--the question upon
which Paul de Man based his theory of aporia or linguistic
bewilderment, discussed in (1.3) and (2.5). But "Lapis Lazuli"
shows Yeats's visionary impatience with "Among School Children"
by transuming its "brightening glance," troping on this trope
anew, to make it feel late and weak in relation to the earliness
and strength of his new trope:
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Their eyes mid many wrinkles, their eyes,
Their ancient, glittering eyes are gay.
With the help of his three Chinamen, the aging poet is yet able
to lie against time once more, to invoke the glory and the
freshness of an imaginative dream by returning to an earlier
trope--one that felt strong and fresh in its own day. "Lapis
Lazuli," like other canonical poems written in the twilight of
Yeats's career, restitutes that career by taking it into the
sixth and final cradle of the dialectic of revisionism.
o rocky voice
Shall we in that great night rejoice?
What do we know but that we face
One another in this place?
"Man and the Echo"
Conclusion
Yeats's life-long contest with the internalized voices of
Hamlet and Shelley created poems that, along with the poems of
Wallace Stevens, must surely be the best of this century in this
language. Such a conjecture can only be made by trying to
measure or assess the relative strength with which poets enter
the agon of poets, the Scene of Instruction which for each is a
battle with the internalized dead, and by trying to read the
influence of their work on those who come after. In this
dissertation I have not focused on Yeats's poetic progeny--an
investigation that would have to deal with the revision of Yeats
by many great imaginations, including James Joyce, Samuel
Beckett, Dylan Thomas, Seamus Heaney, and a sizeable group of
American poets. But I have highlighted his influence upon some
great critics and theorists, including Edward Said, George
Steiner, J. Hillis Miller, Paul de Man, and especially Harold
Bloom whose theory of poetry could be said to be the dark double
of Yeats's own poetry, its antithetical soul. By performing my
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own practical misreading of Bloom's theory of misreading, I have
argued how Yeats's canonical place in the tradition that gave him
breath is a result of his having built into his poems his agon
with that tradition. I have also argued the importance of gnosis
and negative transcendence to any critical approach to Yeats that
must be dissatisfied with prevalent historicizing, Platonizing,
or even anti-Platonizing approaches to Yeats. Finally, I have
argued that Bloom's theory itself can be creatively corrected,
using tropes from Yeats and my own trope of white noise to read
more strongly the negative dialectics that transfigures history
into the making of a soul:
Now shall I make my soul,
Compelling it to study
In a learned school
Till the wreck of body,
Slow decay of blood,
Testy delirium
Or dull decrepitude,
Or what worse evil come--
The death of friends, or death
Of every brilliant eye
That made a catch in the breath--
Seem but the clouds of the sky
When the horizon fades,
Or a bird's sleepy cry
Among the deepening shades.
[from liThe Tower"]
July 29, 1992
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